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CASE NO.: Appeal (crl.)  1180 of 2003

PETITIONER: State of Andhra Pradesh

RESPONDENT: Golconda Linga Swamy and Anr.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 27/07/2004

BENCH: S.N. VARIAVA & ARIJIT PASAYAT.

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T

WITH

(Criminal Appeal Nos. 1181/2003, 1183-1189/2003, 1191-1196/2003,  Criminal Appeal No.732/2004 @ SLP(Crl.)No.4702/2003, Crl.A.No.                   736/2004@SLP(Crl.)no. 4703/2003, Crl.A. No.735/2004 @ SLP(Crl.)No.  4704/2003, Crl. A.No.730/2004 @SLP(Crl.)No. 513/2003, Crl. A. No.              739/2004 @SLP (Crl.)no. 2190/2003, Crl.A. No.733/2004 @SLP(Crl.) No.  2191/2003, Crl.A. No. 737/2004 @SLP (Crl.)No. 2632/2003, Crl. A. No.                 738/2004 @SLP (Crl.)No. 2633/2003, Crl.A. No.731/2004 @  SLP(Crl.)No. 2636/2004 and Crl.A. No.734/2004 @SLP(Crl.)No.  3463/2003)

ARIJIT PASAYAT, J

       Leave granted in SLP (Crl.) Nos. 4702-4704/2003, 513/2003, 2190/2003,  2191/2003, 2632/2003, 2633/2003, 2636/2003 and 3463/2003.  

       By the impugned judgments the High Court of Andhra Pradesh has  quashed the FIR filed by Prohibition and Excise officers alleging  commission of   offences under Andhra Pradesh Excise Act, 1968 (in short the ’Act’) and the  Andhra Pradesh Prohibition Act, 1995  (in short the ’Prohibition Act’). In all the  cases the allegation was that the concerned accused was either transporting or  storing black jaggery/molasses  for the purpose of manufacturing illicit distilled  liquor or was an abettor so far as the offence of manufacturing illicit liquor is  concerned.  On being moved by application under Section 482 of the Code of  Criminal Procedure, 1973 ( in short the "Code") by the concerned accused for  quashing the FIR, the High Court accepted the plea holding that there was no  material to show that the seized articles were intended to be used for  manufacturing of illicit distilled liquor. Accordingly the FIR in each case was  quashed.

       In support of the appeals, learned counsel appearing for the State of  Andhra Pradesh submitted that the High Court’s approach is clearly erroneous.  These are not  cases where there was no material to show the commission of a  crime. Whether there was adequate material already in existence or which could  have been collected during investigation and their relevance is essentially a  matter of trial. The High Court was not therefore justified in quashing the FIR.   The exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code is clearly indefensible.

       Per contra, learned counsel for the concerned accused-respondents  submitted that on mere surmises and conjectures that the black jaggery/molasses  being transported or stored were intended to be used for the purpose of  manufacturing illicit distilled liquor, the FIR was lodged.   Suspicion however  strong cannot be a ground to initiate criminal proceedings thereby unnecessarily

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harassing the innocent traders/transporters. In some cases, it was pointed out that  there was absolutely no material to even show that the seized articles were  intended for manufacturing illicit distilled liquor.

Exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code in a case of this nature is  the exception and not the rule.  The Section does not confer any new powers on  the High Court.  It only saves the inherent power which the Court possessed  before the enactment of the Code.  It envisages three circumstances under which  the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order  under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise  secure the ends of justice.  It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any  inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction.  No  legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that may  possibly arise.  Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from express  provisions of law which are necessary for proper discharge of functions and  duties imposed upon them by law.  That is the doctrine which finds expression in  the Section which merely recognizes and preserves inherent powers of the High  Courts.  All courts, whether civil or criminal possess, in the absence of any  express provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are  necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in course of administration of  justice on the principle quando lex aliquid alique concedit, conceditur et id sine  quo res ipsa esse non potest (when the law gives a person anything it gives him  that without which it cannot exist).  While exercising powers under the Section,  the Court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction  under the Section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with  caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid  down in the Section itself.  It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and  substantial justice for the administration of which alone courts exist.  Authority  of the court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse  that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent such  abuse.  It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any action which  would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice.  In exercises of the  powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation  or continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these  proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice.  When no offence is  disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact.  When a  complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to  assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out  even if the allegations are accepted in toto.

In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab (AIR 1960 SC 866), this Court  summarized some categories of cases where inherent power can and should be  exercised to quash the proceedings.

(i)     where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar  against the institution or continuance e.g. want of  sanction;

(ii)    where the allegations in the first information report  or complaint taken at its face value and accepted in  their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged;

(iii)    where the allegations constitute an offence, but there  is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence  adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the  charge.

In dealing with the last category, it is important to bear in mind the  distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is  evidence which is clearly inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case  where there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or may not support the  accusations.  When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, the  High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in

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question is reliable or not or whether on a reasonable appreciation of it accusation  would not be sustained.  That is the function of the trial Judge.  Judicial process  no doubt should not be an instrument of oppression, or, needless harassment.   Court should be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should  take all relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing  process, lest it would be an instrument in the hands of a private complainant to  unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly.  At the same time the Section is  not an instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and  bring about its sudden death.  The scope of exercise of power under Section 482  of the Code and the categories of cases where the High Court may exercise its  power under it relating to cognizable offences to prevent abuse of process of any  court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice were set out in some detail by this  Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992 Supp (1) SCC 335) A note of  caution was, however, added that the power should be exercised sparingly and  that too in rarest of rare cases.  The illustrative categories indicated by this Court  are as follows:  

"(1)    Where the allegations made in the first information  report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their  face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima  facie constitute any offence or make out a case against  the accused.

(2)     Where the allegations in the first information report and  other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not  disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation  by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code  except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview  of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3)     Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the F.I.R.  or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the  same do not disclose the commission of any offence and  make out a case against the accused.  (4)  Where the allegations in the F.I.R. do not constitute a  cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable  offence, no investigation is permitted by a Police Officer  without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under S.  155(2) of the Code.  (5)     Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so  absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which  no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that  there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the  accused.  (6)     Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the  provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which  a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and  continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a  specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act,  providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the  aggrieved party.  (7)    Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with  mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously  instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance  on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private  and personal grudge.  

As noted above, the powers possessed by the High Court under Section  482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great  caution in its exercise. Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of  this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be  exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. High Court being the highest Court of  a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case  where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has  not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved,  whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true

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perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard and fast rule can be  laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its  extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any stage. (See : The  Janata Dal etc. v. H.S. Chowdhary and others, etc. (AIR 1993 SC 892), Dr.  Raghubir Saran v. State of Bihar and another (AIR 1964 SC 1)). It would not be  proper for the High Court to analyse the case of the complainant in the light of all  probabilities in order to determine whether a conviction would be sustainable and  on such premises, arrive at a conclusion that the proceedings are to be quashed. It  would be erroneous to assess the material before it and conclude that the  complaint cannot be proceeded with. In proceeding instituted on complaint,  exercise of the inherent powers to quash the proceedings is called for only in a  case where the complaint does not disclose any offence or is frivolous, vexatious  or oppressive. If the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the  offence of which cognizance has been taken by the Magistrate, it is open to the  High Court to quash the same in exercise of the inherent powers under Section  482 of the Code. It is not, however, necessary that there should be meticulous  analysis of the case before the trial to find out whether the case would end in  conviction or acquittal. The complaint/F.I.R. has to be read as a whole. If it  appears that on consideration of the allegations in the light of the statement made  on oath of the complainant or disclosed in the F.I.R. that the ingredients of the  offence or offences are disclosed and there is no material to show that the  complaint/F.I.R. is mala fide, frivolous or vexatious, in that event there would be  no justification for interference by the High Court. When an information is  lodged at the police station and an offence is registered, then the mala fides of the  informant would be of secondary importance. It is the material collected during  the investigation and evidence led in Court which decides the fate of the accused  person. The allegations of mala fides against the informant are of no consequence  and cannot by itself be the basis for quashing the proceeding. (See : Mrs.  Dhanalakshmi v. R. Prasanna Kumar and others (AIR 1990 SC 494), State of  Bihar and another v. P. P. Sharma, I.A.S. and another (1992 Suppl (1) SCC 222),  Rupan Deol Bajaj (Mrs.) and another v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill and another (1995  (6) SCC 194), State of Kerala and others v. O.C. Kuttan and others (1999 (2)  SCC 651), State of U.P. v. O. P. Sharma (1996 (7) SCC 705),  Rashmi Kumar  (Smt.) v. Mahesh Kumar Bhada (1997 (2) SCC 397), Satvinder Kaur v. State  (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) and another (1999 (8) SCC 728), Rajesh Bajaj v. State  NCT of Delhi and others AIR 1999 SC 1216), State of Karnataka v. M.  Devendrappa and another (2002 (3) SCC 89).

       Keeping in view the principles of law as enunciated above, the action of  the High Court in quashing the FIR cannot be maintained so far as Criminal  Appeal Nos. 1180-1181/2003, 1184-1189/2003, 1191-1192/2003 and                           Criminal Appeals arising out of  SLP(Crl.) Nos. 4702-4704/2003, 513/2003,   2636/2003  are concerned.  

       In all these cases there was either statements of  witnesses or seizure of  illicit distilled liquor  which factors cannot be said to be without relevance.   Whether the material already in existence or to be collected during investigation  would be sufficient for holding the concerned accused persons guilty  has to be  considered at the time of trial.  At the time of  framing the charge it can be  decided  whether  prima facie case has been made out showing commission of an  offence and involvement of  the charged persons.  At that stage also evidence  cannot be gone into meticulously.  It is immaterial whether the case is based on  direct or circumstantial evidence.  Charge can be framed, if there are materials  showing possibility about the commission of the crime as against certainty.  That  being so, the interference at the threshold with the F.I.R. is to be in very  exceptional circumstances as held in R.P. Kapoor and Bhajan Lal cases (supra).

Ultimately, the acceptability of the materials to fasten culpability on the  accused persons is a matter of trial. These are not the cases where it can be said  that the FIR did not disclose commission of an offence.  Therefore, the High  Court was not justified in quashing the FIR in the concerned cases.  

       So far as Criminal Appeal Nos. 1183/2003, 1193-1196/2003   and Criminal  Appeals arising out of  SLP(Crl.) Nos. 2191/2003, 2632/2003, 2633/2003,  and  3463/2003 are concerned,  we find that the FIR did not disclose commission of

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an offence without anything being added or subtracted from the recitals therein.  Though the FIR is not intended to be an encyclopedia of the background  scenario, yet even skeletal features must disclose the commission of an offence.  The position is not so in these cases. Therefore, the High Court’s interference  does not suffer from any legal infirmity, though the reasonings indicated by the  High Court do not have our approval.  In the ultimate analysis, Criminal Appeal Nos. 1180/2003, 1181/2003,  1184-1189/2003, 1191-1192/03 and Criminal Appeals arising out of SLP (Crl.)  nos.4702-4704/2003, 513/2003, 2636/2003 are allowed and Crl. A. Nos.  1183/2003, 1193-96/2003,  and Criminal appeals arising out of SLP (Crl.) Nos.  2191/2003, 2632/2003, 2633/2003 and 3463/2003 are dismissed so far as  Criminal Appeal arising out of SLP (Crl.)No. 2190 is concerned, it is allowed in  respect of A-1, but dismissed so far as it relates to A-2 in the absence of any  allegation against him.   

        Learned counsel for the concerned accused persons submitted that early   investigation in the matter and in submission of the report under Section 173 of  the Code would be in the interest of all concerned accused. Learned counsel for  the State of Andhra Pradesh submitted that all possible efforts will be  made to  complete  the investigation in each case latest by the end of November, 2004. We  make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case.             The appeals are disposed of as set out above.