REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.   732          OF 2009 (Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No. 677 of 2004)

The State of Andhra Pradesh  ....Appellant

Versus

Aravapally Venkanna & Anr. ....Respondents

J U D G M E N T

Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.  

1. Leave granted.

2. Challenge  in  this  appeal  is  to  the  order  passed  by  learned  Single

Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court allowing the prayer made by the

appellant to quash the FIR in Crime No. 433/2002-2003 of Prohibition and

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Excise Station, Mahabubabad, Warangal District registered under Section 7

(A) read with Section 8(e) of A.P. Prohibition Act, 1995 read with Section

109 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the ‘IPC’).  The Petition was

filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short

the ‘Code’).

3.  In support of the appeals, learned counsel appearing for the State of

Andhra  Pradesh  submitted  that  the  High  Court's  approach  is  clearly

erroneous.  These are  not  cases where there was no material  to show the

commission  of  a  crime.  Whether  there  was  adequate  material  already in

existence or which could have been collected during investigation and their

relevance is essentially a matter of trial The High Court was not therefore

justified in quashing the FIR. The exercise of power under Section 482 of

the Code is clearly indefensible.

4.  There is no appearance on behalf of the respondent-accused.

5.   Exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code in a case of this

nature is the exception and not the rule. The Section does not confer any

new powers on the High Court. It only saves the inherent power which the

Court  possessed  before  the  enactment  of  the  Code.  It  envisages  three

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circumstances  under  which  the  inherent  jurisdiction  may  be  exercised,

namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of

the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is

neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would

govern  the  exercise  of  inherent  jurisdiction.  No  legislative  enactment

dealing with  procedure can provide for all  cases that  may possibly arise.

Courts,  therefore,  have inherent  powers  apart  from express  provisions  of

law  which  are  necessary  for  proper  discharge  of  functions  and  duties

imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds expression in

the Section which merely recognizes and preserves inherent powers of the

High Courts. All courts, whether civil or criminal possess, in the absence of

any express provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as

are  necessary  to  do  the  right  and  to  undo  a  wrong  in  the  course  of

administration  of  justice  on  the  principle  quando  lex  a  liquid  aliquot

concedit, conceditur et id sine quo res ipsa esse non potest (when the law

gives  a person anything it  gives him that  without which it  cannot exist).

While exercising powers under the Section, the Court does not function as a

court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the Section though

wide  has  to  be  exercised  sparingly,  carefully  and with  caution  and  only

when such exercise  is  justified by the tests  specifically laid  down in the

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Section  itself.  It  is  to  be  exercised  ex  debito  justitiae  to  do  real  and

substantial  justice  for  the  administration  of  which  alone  courts  exist.

Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is

made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power

to prevent such abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow

any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice.

In  exercise  of  these  powers  court  would  be  justified  to  quash  any

proceeding if it finds that initiation or continuance of it amounts to abuse of

the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve

the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court

may  examine  the  question  of  fact.  When  a  complaint  is  sought  to  be

quashed,  it  is  permissible  to  look  into  the  materials  to  assess  what  the

complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the

allegations are accepted in toto.

6.  In  R.P. Kapur v.  State of Punjab   (AIR  1960 SC 866) this Court

summarized some categories of cases where inherent power can and should

be exercised to quash the proceedings.

(i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against

the institution or continuance e.g. want of sanction;

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(ii)  where  the  allegations  in  the  first  information  report  or

complaint taken at its face value and accepted in their entirety

do not constitute the offence alleged;

(iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no

legal  evidence  adduced  or  the  evidence  adduced  clearly  or

manifestly fails to prove the charge.

7.  In  dealing  with  the  last  category,  it  is  important  to  bear  in  mind  the

distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is

evidence which is clearly inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case

where  there  is  legal  evidence  which,  on  appreciation,  may  or  may  not

support the accusations. When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of

the Code,  the  High Court  would  not  ordinarily  embark upon an enquiry

whether  the  evidence  in  question  is  reliable  or  not  or  whether  on  a

reasonable appreciation of it accusation would not be sustained. That is the

function  of  the  trial  Judge.  Judicial  process  no  doubt  should  not  be  an

instrument  of  oppression,  or,  needless  harassment.  Court  should  be

circumspect  and  judicious  in  exercising  discretion  and  should  take  all

relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing process,

lest  it  would  be  an  instrument  in  the  hands  of  a  private  complainant  to

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unleash  vendetta  to  harass  any person  needlessly.  At  the  same time  the

Section is not an instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit  a

prosecution  and  bring  about  its  sudden  death.  The  scope  of  exercise  of

power under Section 482 of the Code and the categories of cases where the

High Court may exercise its power under it relating to cognizable offences

to prevent abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of

justice  were  set  out  in  some detail  by this  Court  in  State  of  Haryana v.

Bhajan Lal [ 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335]. A note of caution was, however,

added that the power should be exercised sparingly and that too in rarest of

rare cases. The illustrative categories indicated by this Court are as follows:

"(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report

or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and

accepted  in  their  entirety  do  not  prima  facie  constitute  any

offence or make out a case against the accused.

(2)  Where  the  allegations  in  the first  information  report  and

other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a

cognizable  offence,  justifying  an  investigation  by  police

officers  under  Section  156(1)  of  the  Code  except  under  an

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order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of

the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the F.I.R. or

complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do

not  disclose  the  commission  of  any offence  and make out  a

case against the accused.

(4)  Where  the  allegations  in  the  F.I.R.  do  not  constitute  a

cognizable  offence  but  constitute  only  a  non-cognizable

offence,  no  investigation  is  permitted  by  a  Police  Officer

without ah order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section

155(2) of the Code.  

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so

absurd  and  inherently  improbable  on  the  basis  of  which  no

prudent  person can ever reach a just  conclusion that  there is

sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the

provisions  of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a

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criminal  proceeding  is  instituted)  to  the  institution  and

continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific

provision  in  the  Code  or  the  concerned  Act,  providing

efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

(7)  Where a criminal  proceeding  is  manifestly  attended with

mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted

with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused

and  with  a  view  to  spite  him  due  to  private  and  personal

grudge.

8. As noted above, the powers possessed by the High Court under Section

482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires

great caution in its exercise. Court must be careful to see that its decision in

exercise of this  power is  based  on  sound principles.  The inherent  power

should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. High Court being

the highest Court  of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima

facie decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more

so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court

and  the  issues  involved,  whether  factual  or  legal,  are  of  magnitude  and

cannot  be  seen  in  their  true  perspective  without  sufficient  material.  Of

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course, no hard and fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which

the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the

proceeding  at  any  stage.  It  would  not  be  proper  for  the  High  Court  to

analyse the case of the complainant in the light of all probabilities in order

to  determine  whether  a  conviction  would  be  sustainable  and  on  such

premises, arrive at a conclusion that the proceedings are to be quashed. It

would be erroneous to assess the material before it  and conclude that the

complaint cannot be proceeded with. In proceeding instituted on complaint,

exercise of the inherent powers to quash the proceedings is called for only

in a case where the complaint does not disclose any offence or is frivolous,

vexatious or oppressive. If the allegations set out in the complaint do not

constitute  the  offence  of  which  cognizance  has  been  taken  by  the

Magistrate, it is open to the High Court to quash the same in exercise of the

inherent  powers  under  Section  482 of  the  Code.  It  is  not,  however,

necessary that  there should be meticulous analysis of the case before the

trial to find out whether the case would end in conviction or acquittal. The

complaint/F.I.R.  has  to  be  read  as  a  whole.  If  it  appears  that  on

consideration of the allegations in the light of the statement made on oath of

the complainant or disclosed in the F.I.R. that the ingredients of the offence

or  offences  are  disclosed  and  there  is  no  material  to  show  that  the

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complaint/F.I.R.  is  mala  fide,  frivolous  or  vexatious,  in  that  event  there

would  be  no  justification  for  interference  by  the  High  Court.  When  an

information is lodged at the police station and an offence is registered, then

the mala fides of the informant would be of secondary importance. It is the

material collected during the investigation and evidence led in Court which

decides the fate of the accused person. The allegations of mala fides against

the informant are of no consequence and cannot by itself be the basis for

quashing the proceeding.  

8. Keeping in view the principles of law as enunciated above, the action of

the High Court in quashing the FIR cannot be maintained so far as Criminal

Appeal arising out of SLP(Crl.) NO. 677 OF 2004 is concerned.

9.  Whether  the  material  already  in  existence  or  to  be  collected  during

investigation would be sufficient for holding the concerned accused persons

guilty has to be considered at the time of trial. At the time of framing the

charge  it  can  be  decided  whether  prima  facie  case  has  been  made  out

showing commission of an offence and involvement of the charged persons.

At  that  stage  also  evidence  cannot  be  gone  into  meticulously.  It  is

immaterial whether the case is based on direct or circumstantial evidence.

Charge can be framed, if there are materials showing possibility about the

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commission of the crime as against certainty. That being so, the interference

at the threshold with the F.I.R. is to be in very exceptional circumstances as

held in R.P. Kapoor’s case supra.

10. Ultimately, the acceptability of the materials to fasten culpability on the

accused persons is a matter of trial. These are not the cases where it can be

said that the FIR did not disclose commission of an offence. Therefore, the

High Court was not justified in quashing the FIR in the concerned cases.

11. The appeal is allowed.

.....................................................J. (Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT)

…….............................................J. (LOKESHWAR SINGH PANTA)

…….............................................J. (P. SATHASIVAM)

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New Delhi; April 15, 2009

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