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PETITIONER: STATE BANK OF INDIA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SHRI N. SUNDARA MONEY

DATE OF JUDGMENT16/01/1976

BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. GUPTA, A.C.

CITATION:  1976 AIR 1111            1976 SCR  (3) 160  1976 SCC  (1) 822  CITATOR INFO :  F          1977 SC  31  (2,4)  R          1979 SC 170  (17)  F          1980 SC1219  (11,12,13)  RF         1981 SC 422  (5)  RF         1981 SC1253  (7,8)  R          1982 SC 854  (5,6)  D          1983 SC 865  (6)  E          1983 SC1320  (7,8,9,11,12)  R          1984 SC 500  (2)  R          1984 SC 684  (50)  RF         1986 SC 132  (7)  RF         1986 SC1680  (4)  E&D        1990 SC1808  (5)

ACT:      Constitution of India-Art. 133(1)-Scheme of -Conditions precedent for  the issue  of a certificate under in exercise of power  under Art.  136 of  the  Constitution  on  such  a certificate.      Industrial Disputes  Act. 1947 (Act 14 of 1947)-Section 25F read  with ss.  2(oo) and 25(B) (2)-Scope of the concept of retrenchment under s.2(oo).      Statutory construction  of social  welfare legislation- Guidelines.      Words    and     phrases-Meaning    of     the    words "termination.....for   any   reason   whatsoever"   includes automatic  extinguishment   of  service   by  virtue   of  a preemptive provision  to terminate  in the appointment order itself.

HEADNOTE:      Section 25(F)(b)  of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, provides that  no workman  employed in  any industry who has been in  continuous service for not less than one year under an employer  shall be  retrenched by  that employer until he has been  paid at the time of the retrenchment, compensation which shall  be equivalent to 15 days’ average pay for every completed year  of service or any  part thereof in excess of six months  Section 2(oo)  of the Act defines ’retrenchment’ as meaning the termination by the employer of the service of a workman  for any  reasons whatsoever,  otherwise than as a

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punishment inflicted  by way  of disciplinary action. In the "Hospital Mazdoor  Sabha’s" the  Supreme Court held that the statutory requirement  of the  payment of compensation under s. 25(F)(b)  of the  Industrial  Disputes  Act,  1947  is  a condition precedent  for the  retrenchment of  a workman and any  retrenchment   without  payment  at  the  time  of  the retrenchment  makes   the  retrenchment  order  invalid  and inoperative      As  the   automatic  extinguishment   of  his   service consequent to  the preemptive  provision in  his appointment order  as  to  the  temporariness  and  the  period  of  his employment was  covered by  the words "termination . for any reasons whatsoever"  occurring in s. 2(oo) of the Act, in an application under  Art.  226  of  the  Constitution  by  the respondent claiming  that by virtue of his deemed continuous service of  one year  within the meaning of s. 25B(2) of the Industrial Disputes  Act, he  was entitled  to be reinstated for non-compliance  of s.  25F of the Act. The High Court of Madras allowing the writ made the rule nisi  absolute. The writ appeal filed by the appellant respondent also failed.  However, the  High Court granted a certificate under Art. 133(1)(c) of the Constitution.      Dismissing the  appeals and  negativing the contentions of the appellant, the Court. ^      HELD: (1) The grant of a Constitutional passport to the Supreme Court   by  the High  Court is  not a matter of easy insouciance  but   anxious  advertence  to  the  dual  vital requirements built into Art. 133(1) by specific amendment. A substantial question  of law of general importance is a sine quo non  to certify  fitness for  hearing by the apex court. Nay, more; the question, however, important and substantial, must be  of such pervasive import and deep significance that in the  High Court’s  judgment it  imperatively needs  to be settled at  the national level by the highest bench. Failure here stultifies  the scheme  of the  Article and floods this court with  cases  of  lesser  magnitude  with  illegitimate entry.                                                    [162 C-E]      Union of  India v.  Hafiz Mohmd.  Said, ILR  [1973]  II Delhi 673, 676, approved.      (2) While  exercising the  vital powers  under Art. 136 the Supreme Court must have due regard to the constitutional limitations of  Art. 133(1)  and  owe  allegiance  to  those restraints save in exceptional cases. [163 A] 161      (3) If  the workman swims into the harbour of s. 25F of the Industrial  Disputes Act,  1947, he cannot be retrenched without payment,  at the  lime of retrenchment, compensation computed as prescribed therein read with s. 25B(2)                                                      [164 D]      State of  Bombay and others v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha & others [1960] (2) S.C.R. &66. applied.      (4)  Statutory   construction,  when   courts  consider welfare legislation  with an  economic justice  bias, cannot turn on  cold print,  glorified as grammatical construction, but  on  teleological  purpose  and  protective  intendment. Sections 25F,  25B    and  2(oo), of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947  have a workers’ mission and  the input of Part IV of  the   Constitution  also   underscores  this   benignant approach. while canons of traditional sanctity cannot wholly govern,  courts   cannot  go   hay  wire   in   interpreting provisions, ignoring the text and context. Words of multiple import have  to be  winnowed judicially  to suit  the social philosophy of the statute. Dictionaries are not dictators of

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statutory construction  where the  benignant mood  of a  law and, more  emphatically, the  definition  clause  furnish  a different denotation.  Section 2(00)  is the  master of  the situation and  the Court  cannot truncate its amplitude. The words "for  any  reason  whatsoever"  in  s.  2(00)  of  the Industrial Disputes Act are very wide and almost admit of no exception.                                 [163 G, 164 H, 165 B, 166 B]      (5) A  breakdown of  s. 2(00)  unmistakably expands the semantics of  retrenchment. "Termination  .. for  any reason whatsoever" are  the key  words.  Every  termination  spells retrenchment. A termination takes place where a term expires either by  the active  step of the master or the running out of the  stipulated term.  To protect  the weak  against  the strong this  policy of  comprehensive  definition  has  been effectuated. Termination  embraces not  merely  the  act  of termination by the employer, but the fact of termination how soever produced.  Retrenchment is  no longer terra incognita but area  covered by  an expansive  definition. It means ’to end’ conclude,  cease’. That  to write  into  the  order  of appointment the  date of  termination confers no moksha from s. 25F(b)  is inferable  from the  proviso to  s. 25F(1).  A separate subsequent  termination of  the service  is not the sole magnetic  pull of the provision. A preemptive provision to terminate  is  struck  by  the  same  vice  as  a    post appointment termination.  Dexterity of diction cannot defeat the articulated conscience of the provision. [165 B-C, D, E, 166 C]      Observation:-Social   justice   has   two   sides   and occasionally one  party or  he other  makes myopic  mistakes resulting in further litigation. [166 G]      [The Court reiterated its views held out in Trustees of Port, Bombay’s  case, namely, where the law is not free from obscurity and  needs this  Court’s pronouncement  and one of the affected parties is weak, being a worker, the costs must come out  of public  funds and suggested the constitution by the State  of a   "Suitors  Fund" which  will take  care  of hardships and  public interest  in  the  area  of  necessary litigation.]

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION :  Civil Appeals Nos. 933 and 934 of 1975.      From the  judgment and  orders dated  the 24th and 25th March, 1975  of the  Madras High  Court at  Madras  in  writ appeal No. 231  of 1973 and writ petition No. 5062 of 1973.      F. S. Nariman, M/s. 1. N. Shroff and H. S. Parihar, for the appellant.      M. K. Ramamurthi and J. Ramamurthi, for the respondent.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      KRISHNA 1 YEAR, J.-The appellant employer, undaunted by a double  defeat at  both  tiers  in  the  High  Court,  has appealed against  the ad verse judgments, by certificate, on the only  ground that  there  was  no  retrenchment  of  the respondent-employee (within the meaning of 162 Of s. 2(00) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Act XIV of 1947) hereinafter  called the  Act)  and,  consequently  the latter was ineligible to-the statutory compensation the non- payment of  which, along  with the  termination of  service, nullified the  termination itself.  The end  result was that the Division  Bench of  the Court  ruled that the respondent ’was  entitled  to  retrenchment  compensation’  which,  not

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having been  paid, ’the  termination would  be invalid’. The subtle r  legal issue,  substantial in its financial impact, is whether  s. 25F  read with  s. 2(00),  vis a  vis a short employment, casts a lethal spell on the cessation of service for non-compliance  with the  condition precedent set out in the provision. The Certificate      The  certificate   issued  by   the  High  Court  under Art.133(1) is  bad on its face, according to counsel for the respondent and  the appeal  consequently incompetent. We are inclined  to  agree  that  the  grant  of  a  constitutional passport to  the Supreme  Court by  the High  Court is not a matter of  easy insouciance  but anxious  advertence to  the dual vital  requirements built  into Art. 133(1) by specific amendment. Failure here stultifies the scheme of the Article and floods  this Court  with cases  of lesser magnitude with illegitimate entry. A substantial question of law of general importance is  a sine qua non to certify fitness for hearing by the  apex court.  Nay,  .  more;  the  question,  however important and  substantial, must be of such pervasive import and deep  significance that  in the High Court’s judgment it imperatively needs  to be  settled at  the national level by the highest bench. The crux of the matter has been correctly set out  in a  decision(l) of  the Delhi High Court in words which find our approval:      "A certificate can be granted only if the case involves      a question of law:- .           (i)  which is  not only substantial but is also of                general importance; and           (ii) the said  question, in  our opinion, needs to                be decided by the Supreme Court. r _      It has  to be  noted that  all the  above  requirements      should  be   satisfied  before  a  certificate  can  be      granted. It means that it is not sufficient if the case      involves a  substantial  question  of  law  of  general      importance but  in addition to it the High Court should      be of  the opinion  that  such  question  needs  to  be      decided by the Supreme Court. Further, the word ’needs’      suggests that  there has  to be  a necessity  for  a  "      decision by the Supreme Court on the question, and such      a necessity  can be  said to  exist when, for instance,      two views  are possible  regarding the question and the      High  Court  takes  one  of  the  said  views.  Such  a      necessity can  also said to exist when a different view      has been expressed by another High Court.      (1) Union  of India  v. Hafiz Mohd. Said: ILR [1973] II Delhi 673, 676. 163      It is  but fair  to add  an implied  but important foot note that   while  exercising the wider power under Art. 136 this Court  must  have  due  regard  to  the  constitutional limitations on  Art. 133(1)  and  owe  allegiance  to  those restraints save in exceptional cases.      This view o f the certificate would have put the lid on this appeal but on hearing counsel we feel that the omission of the  High Court  to assess  the case explicitly from this angle does not disable us from B. granting special leave, if applied for.  So much  so counsel have proceeded to argue on the merits,  the penumbral area of industrial law covered by the subject  matter being  one which cannot be left in legal twilight. The facts      One of  the two employees involved in these appeals has been re-absorbed  in service  and his  case is  therefore of lesser import,  but the  other is  still out in the cold and

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his legal  fate falls for examination in the matrix of facts which we  proceed to state. This respondent was appointed as cashier, off and on, by the state Bank of India between July 31, 1973  and  August  29,  1973.  The  intermittent  breaks notwithstanding, his  total number  of  days  of  employment answered the  test of  ’deemed’ continuous service within s. 258(2) and  both sides  accept that  fact situation. But the order of  appointment, which  bears in  its bosom  the ’good bye’  to   the  employee   after  a   few  days,  calls  for construction in  the light  of s.2(oo) and s. 25F and we may as well read it here:           "(1) The appointment is purely a temporary one for                a period  of 9  days but  may  be  terminated                earlier,   without   assigning   any   reason                therefor at the bank’s discretion;           (2)  The employment,  unless  terminated  earlier,                will automatically cease at the expiry of the                period i.e., 1972." This nine  days’ employment,  tacked on  to  what  has  gone before, Fr has ripened to a continuous service for a year on the antecedent  arithmetic of  240 days  of broken  bits  of service. The legal issue      The skiagram  of the  employment  order  must  now  be. studied to   ascertain  which of  the rival meanings counsel have pressed  deserves preference.  Statutory  construction, when courts  consider welfare  legislation with  an economic justice  bias,  cannot  turn  on  cold  print  glorified  as grammatical construction  but on  teleological  purpose  and protective intendment.  Here s.  25F, 25B  and 2(oo)  have a workers’  mission   and  the   input  of   Part  IV  of  the Constitution also underscores this benignant approach. While canons of traditional sanctity can not wholly govern, courts cannot go  haywire in  interpreting provisions, ignoring the text and  context. With  these guidelines before us, we seek to decode  the implications of the order of appointment. But before doing  so, an  analysis of the legal components of s. 25F will facilitate the diagnostic task. 164      The leading  case on  this facet of law is The Hospital Mazdoor  Sabha(1).  Gajendragadkar,  J.  (as  he  then  was) observed:           "Section 25F(b)  provides that no workman employed      in any  industry who has been in continuous service for      not less  than one  year under  an  employer  shall  be      retrenched by  that employer  until he has been paid at      the time  of retrenchment  compensation which  shall be      equivalent to  fifteen  days’  average  pay  for  every      completed year of service or any part thereof in excess      of six  months. Clauses  (a) c  and  (e)  of  the  said      section prescribe  similar conditions  but " we are not      concerned with them. On a plain reading of s. 25F(b) it      is clear  that the  requirement prescribed  by it  is a      condition precedent  for the  retrenchment of  the work      man. The  section provides that no workman shall be .1,      retrenched until  the condition  in question  has  been      satisfied. It  is difficult  to accede  to the argument      that when  the P  section imposes  in mandatory terms a      condition  precedent,   non-compliance  with  the  said      condition would  not render  the impugned  retrenchment      invalid ....  failure to comply with the said provision      renders the impugned orders invalid and inoperative."      Without further  ado, we  reach the  conclusion that if the workman  swims into  the harbour of s. 25F, he cannot be retrenched without  payment, at  the time  of  retrenchment,

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compensation computed  as prescribed  therein read  with  s. 25B(2). But, argues the appellant all these obligations flow only out  of  retrenchment,  not  termination  outside  that species of  snapping employment. What, then, is retrenchment ? The  key to this vexed question is to be found in s. 2(oo) which reads thus:      "2(oo)    "retrenchment" means  the termination  by the                employer of  the service of a workman for any                reason  whatsoever,   otherwise  than   as  a                punishment inflicted  by way  of disciplinary                action, but does not include- -               (a)   voluntary retirement of the workman; or               (b)   retirement of  the workman  on  reaching                     the  age   of  supera-annuation  if  the                     contract  of   employment  between   the                     employer  and   the  workman   concerned                     contains a  stipulation in  that behalf;                     or               (c)   termination of  the service of a workman                     on the ground of continued ill-health; for any  reason whatsoever-very wide and almost admitting of no exception.  Still, the employer urges that when the order of appointment  carries an  automatic cessation  of service, tho period  of employment  works itself  out  by  efflux  of times, not by act of employer. (1) [1960] 2 S.C.R. 866, 871-872. 165 Such cases  are outside  the concept  of ’retrenchment’  and cannot entail  the  burdensome  conditions  of  s.  25F.  Of course, that  a nine-days’  employment, hedged  in  with  an express condition  of temporariness and automatic cessation, may look  like being  in a different street (if we may use a colloquialism) from telling a man off by retrenching him. To retrench  is  to  cut  down.  You  cannot  retrench  without trenching or  cutting. But dictionaries are not dictators of statutory construction  where the  benignant mood  of a  law and, more  emphatically, the  definition  clause  furnish  a different denotation.  Section 2(oo)  is the  master of  the situation and the Court cannot truncate its amplitude.      A break-down  of  s.  2(oo)  unmistakably  expands  the semantics of  retrenchment. ’Termination...  for any  reason whatsoever’ are  the key  words. Whatever  the reason, every termination spells retrenchment. So the sole question is-has the employee’s  service been  terminated  ?  Verbal  apparel apart, the  substance is decisive. A termination takes place where a term expires either by the active step of the master of the  running out  of the  stipulated term. To protect the weak  against   the  strong  this  policy  of  comprehensive definition has  been effectuated.  Termination embraces  not merely the  act of termination by the employer, but the fact of termination  howsoever produced.  May be, the present may be a hard case, but we can visualise abuses by employers, by suitable verbal  devices, circumventing  the armour of s.25F and s.2(oo).  Without speculating  on possibilities,  we may agree that  ’retrenchment’ is  no longer terra incognita but area covered  by an  expansive definition. It means ’to end, conclude, cease’. In the present case the employment ceased, concluded,  ended   on   the   expiration   of   nine   days automatically may  be, but  cessation all  the same. That to write into  the order of appointment the date of termination confers no  moksha  from  s.25F(b)  is  inferable  from  the proviso  to   s.  25F(1).   True,  the   section  speaks  of retrenchment by  the employer  and it is urged that some act of volition  by the  employer to bring about the termination is essential  to attract s. 25F and automatic extinguishment

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of service  by effluxion  of time  cannot be  sufficient. An English case R. v. Secretary of State(l) was relied on where Lord Denning MR observed:           "I   think    that   the   word   ’terminate’   or      ’termination’ is  by itself  ambiguous. It can refer to      either of two things either to termination by notice or      to termination  by effluxion  of time. It is often used      in that dual sense in landlord and tenant and in master      and servant cases. But there are several indications in      this paragraph  to show  that it  refers here  only  to      termination by notice. Buckley L.C., concurred and said:           "In my  judgment the  words  are  not  capable  of      bearing that  meaning. As  counsel for the Secretary of      State has  point- ed  out, the  verb ’terminate’ can be      used either transitively or      1973] 2 All E.R. 103. 166      intransitively. A  contract may  be said  to  terminate      when it  s comes  to an end by effluxion of time, or it      may be  said to  be terminated when it is determined at      notice or  otherwise by some act of one of the parties.      Here in  my judgment the 7 word ’terminated’ is used in      this passage  in para  190 in the transitive sense, and      it postulates  some act  by somebody  which is to bring      the appointment  to an  end, and is not applicable to a      case in  which the  appointment comes  to end merely by      effluxion of time." Words of  multiple import  have to be winnowed judicially to suit the  c social philosophy of the statute. So screened we hold that the transitive and intransitive senses are covered in the  current context.  Moreover, an  employer  terminates employment not  merely by  passing an  order as  the service runs. He  can do so by writing a composite order, one giving employment and  the other ending or limiting it. A separate, subsequent determination  is not  the sole  magnetic pull of the provision.  A  pre-emptive  provision  to  terminate  is struck by the same vice as the post-appointment termination. Dexterity  of   diction  cannot   defeat   the   articulated conscience of the provision.      What follows  ? Had  the State  Bank known  the law and acted on  it, half-a-month’s  pay would  have concluded  the story. But  that did  not happen.  And now,  some years have passed and  the Bank  has to  pay, for  no service rendered. Even so,  hard cases  cannot make bad law. Re-instatement is the necessary  relief that  follows. At  what point ? In the particular  facts   and  circumstances  of  this  case,  the respondent shall  be put back where he left off, but his new salary will  be what  he would draw where he to be appointed in the  same post  today de  novo. As  for benefits, if any, flowing from  service he  will be  rank below  all permanent employees in that cadre and will be deemed to be a temporary hand  upto  now.  He  will  not  be  allowed  to  claim  any advantages in  the matter  of seniority  or  other  priority inter se  among temporary  employees on  the ground that his retrenchment is  being declared  invalid by  this Court. Not that we  are laying down any general proposition of law, but make this  direction in  the special  circumstances  of  the case. As  for the  respondent’s emoluments, he will  have to pursue other remedies, if any.      We substantially  dismiss the appeal (C.A. 934 of 1975) subject to  the slight  modification made  above. There  was some intervening  suggestion for  settlement of  the dispute but  it   fell  through.   We  are  persuaded  to  make  the observation based  on that  circumstance that social justice

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has two  sides and,  occasionally, one  party or  the  other makes r myopic mistakes resulting in further litigation.      Subject  to  the  above  observations,  the  appeal  is dismissed. The  parties will  bear their  costs  throughout, although, in cases like this, where the law is not free from obscurity and  needs this  Court’s pronouncement  and one of the affected parties is weak, being a worker, the costs must come out  of public  funds as suggested in Trustees of Port, Bombay(1). The  State, we  hope, will  constitute a suitors’ fund (1) [1974] 4 S.C.C. 710. 167 which will take care of hardships and public interest in the area of necessary litigation.      In C.A. 933 of 1975 the respondent has been re-employed by the  appellant although  in his case also we declare, for reasons already  given and subject to the same term till his absorption that  the retrenchment  is invalid. The costs, in this appeal, will be borne by each of the parties. S.R.                                      Appeal dismissed . 12-L390SCI/76 168