04 May 1971
Supreme Court
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SRIRAM NARAYAN MEDHI Vs STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

Bench: SIKRI, S.M. (CJ),MITTER, G.K.,VAIDYIALINGAM, C.A.,RAY, A.N.,REDDY, P. JAGANMOHAN
Case number: Writ Petition (Civil) 254 of 1968


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PETITIONER: SRIRAM  NARAYAN MEDHI

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

DATE OF JUDGMENT04/05/1971

BENCH: REDDY, P. JAGANMOHAN BENCH: REDDY, P. JAGANMOHAN SIKRI, S.M. (CJ) MITTER, G.K. VAIDYIALINGAM, C.A. RAY, A.N.

CITATION:  1971 AIR 1992            1971 SCR  661

ACT: Bombay  Tenancy & Agricultural Lands (Amendment)  Act,  1964 (Maharashtra   Act  31  of  1965)-Validity   of   amendments challenged  under  Arts. 19 and 31 of  the  Constitution-Act whether protected from such challenge by Art. 31A.

HEADNOTE: The Bombay Tenancy & Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 was passed in  furtherance of the State’s policy of social welfare  and to  give  effect to agrarian reform.   By  the  Constitution First  Amendment Act 1951 the said Act was included  in  the Ninth  Schedule and came within the purview of Art.  31B  of the Constitution.  In 1956 the State Legislature in order to implement  the Directive Principles of State  Policy  passed the  Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands  (Amendment)  Act which  came into force on 1st August 1956.  The main  effect of the amendments made by the 1956 Act was that on 1st April 1957 every tenant was subject to other provisions deemed  to have  purchased from his landlord free of all  encumbrances, the  land held by him as a tenant.  The  erstwhile  landlord remained entitled only to recover the price fixed under  the provisions  of  the  Amendment Act in  the  manner  provided therein   i.e.  by  a  tribunal.   The  Amendment  Act   was challenged  by a petition under Art. 32 but this Court  held that  it was protected by Art. 31A.  Further changes in  the Act  were  made  by the impugned  Act,  namely,  the  Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Amendment) Act, 1964.  In  a petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution it was  contended that  these changes had affected the petitioner’s  right  to property  in  that he had neither the right to  recover  the price  of the land deemed to be purchased by the tenant  nor any  hope of recovering it through the procedure  prescribed by the impugned Act within a reasonable time.  It was  urged that  there was no time fixed for the tribunal to  determine that  it  had failed in the efforts to  recover  the  amount under the Revenue Recovery Act so that the tenant  purchaser could  be  evicted.   The provisions of the  Act  were  also attacked  as  unreasonable.   The  question  that  fell  for consideration was whether the impugned Act was protected  by Art. 31A.

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HELD:     Once  it has been held that Art 31A applies to  an Act  the  petitioner cannot complain that his  rights  under Arts. 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution have been infringed. The  protection  is available not only to  Acts  which  come within  its  terms but also to Acts amending  such  Acts  to include new items of property or which change some detail of the  scheme of the Act provided firstly that the  change  is not  such as would take it out of Art. 31A or by  itself  is not  such as would not be protected by it and secondly  that the  assent of the President has been given to the  amending statute.  So long as the amendment also relates to a  scheme of  agrarian  reform providing for the  acquisition  of  any estate  or of any right thereunder or for extinguishment  or modification  of such right the mere transfer of the  tenure from  one person to another or the payment of the  price  in instalment or even the postponement of payment by a  further period  cannot  be  challenged under Arts. 14,  19  and  31. [666H] 662 In  the  present case the impugned  legislation  had  merely amended  the Provision which related to the recovery of  the amounts  from  the tenant who had become purchaser  and  the postponement of the time of ineffectiveness of sale till the tribunal has tried and failed to recover the amount from the tenant purchaser., This had not in any way affected the main purpose  of the Act or the object which it seeks to  achieve nor  did the amendments effected thereby take the  provision out  of  the protection given to it under Art.  31A  of  the Constitution. [667B-C] The petition must accordingly be dismissed.. Sri Ram Ram Narain Medhi v. State of Bombay, 119591 1  Supp. S.C.R. 489, referred to and held inapplicable.

JUDGMENT: ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: WRIT PETITION No. 254 of 1968. Petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for  the enforcement of fundamental rights. V.   M.  Tarkunde,  V. M. Limaye and S. S.  Shukla  for  the petitioners. V.   S. Desai, M. C. Bhandare and S. P. Nayar, for the  res- pondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by P.   Jagamohan Reddy, J.-The petitioner challenges the vires of  the  Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural  Lands  (Amendment) Act,  1964  (Maharashtra  Act  XXXI  of  1965)  (hereinafter referred  to as the ’impugned Act’).  The parent Act is  the Bombay  Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act 1948 (Bombay  Act XLVII  of  1948)  (hereinafter referred to  as  ’the  parent Act’).  In 1956 the State Legislature amended the parent Act by  Bombay  Tenancy and Agricultural Lands  (Amendment)  Act 1956  (Bombay Act XIII of 1956) (hereinafter referred to  as ’the  Amendment  Act’) which came into force on  1st  August 1956. The State of Bombay undertook legislation in furtherance  of its policy of social welfare and to give effect to  agrarian reform.   The  parent  Act was passed by  the  Bombay  State Legislature  in  order to amend the law which  governed  the relationship   between   the   landlord   and   tenants   of agricultural  lands, the object sought to be achieved  being as indicated in its preamble that "on account of the neglect of  a  landholder or disputes between the landlord  and  his tenants,  the  cultivation  of his estate has  as  a  result suffered  or for the purposes of improving the economic  and

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social  conditions  of  peasant or  ensuring  the  full  and efficient  use of land for agriculture, it is  expedient  to assume management of estates held by the landholders and  to regulate and impose restrictions on transfer of agricultural lands, dwelling houses, sites and lands                             663 appurtenant   thereto   belonging   to   or   occupied    by agriculturists,  agricultural labourers and artisans in  the province of Bombay and to make provisions for certain  other purposes". By the Constitution first Amendment Act 1951 the parent  Act was included in the Ninth Schedule and came within the  pur- view  of  Art. 31B of the Constitution.  In 1956  the  State Legislature  in order to implement the directive  principles of  the  State  Policy  set out in Aft. 38  and  39  of  the Constitution  of India by seeking to promote the welfare  of the  tenants,  the landless peasants and  labourers  and  to enable  them to acquire land and with a view to bring  about equitable  distribution  of ownership of  land,  passed  the amendment Act which received the assent of the- President on March  16,  1956.   This Act made  further  changes  in  the relationship  of  landlord  and  tenants  which  were   more drastic.  The main effect of the amendments of Section 32 to 32-B  was that on the 1st April 57 (hereinafter referred  to as the tiller’s day) every tenant was, subject to the  other provisions  deemed to have purchased from his landlord  free of all encumbrances subsisting thereon, on the said day, the land  held by him as a tenant subject to certain  conditions (vide Section 32).  The tenant under Section 32-A was deemed to  have purchased the land up to the ceiling area.  It  was further provided by Section 32-B that if a tenant held  the land  partly as owner and partly as tenant, but the area  of the  land  held by him as owner is equal to or  exceeds  the ceiling  area he shall not be deemed to have  purchased  the land held by him as a tenant under Section 32. Section 32-E provided that the balance of any land after the purchase by the tenant under Section 32 shall be disposed of in  the  manner laid down in Section 15 as if it  were  land surrendered  by the tenant.  Section 32-F  further  provided that  in  the case of disabled  landholders  namely  minors, widows  or  persons  subject  to  any  mental  or   physical disability  or  where the tenants are  equally  disabled  as aforesaid or where they are members of the Armed Forces, the tiller’s  day was postponed by one year after the  cessation of disability. As a result of the Amendment Act, on the 1st of April,  1957 the relationship of landlord and tenant came to an end,  the landholder  ceased  to  be a  tenure-holder  and  the  title thereto was vested in the tenants defeasible only on certain specified contingencies.  The relationship of landholder and tenant  was  thus  transformed  into  a  relationship  of  a creditor  and debtor, the erstwhile landlord being  entitled only to recover the price fixed under the provisions of  the Amendment  Act in the manner provided therein under  Section 32G  read with 32H, the price which. was to be paid  by  the tenant Was to be determined by the tribunal as soon 664 as may be after the tiller’s day and in the manner  provided thereunder  subject however to the amount so determined  not being less than 20 times and not more than 200 times of  the assessment.  An appeal against the decision of the  Tribunal was provided to the State Govt. under Section 32-J. The mode of payment by the tenant of the price fixed by  the Tribunal  is  prescribed under Section 32-K which  shall  be payable in annual instalments not exceeding 12, with  simple

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interest at 4-1/2% per annum, on or before the said dates as may  be prescribed by the Tribunal and ’the  tribunal  shall direct that the amount deposited in lumpsum or the amount of instalments deposited shall be paid to the former  landlord. The  landlord however did not have the right to recover  the amount by recourse to a Court of law.  The only way in which he could recover it if the instalments were not duly paid by the  tenant  voluntarily  was  by  an  application  to   the concerned  authorities  under the Revenue  recovery  Act  to recover  it as arrears of land revenue (Section 32-L)  which provision  it may be stated was subsequently deleted by  the impugned  Act  under Section 32-M.  On the  payment  of  the price  either in lumpsum or of the last instalment  of  such price  the tribunal was required to issue a  certificate  in the  prescribed form to the tenant purchaser in  respect  of the land, which certificate shall be the conclusive evidence of purchase.  If the tenant fails to pay the lumpsum  within the  period prescribed for, or is at any time in arrears  of four instalments the purchase was to be ineffective and  the land was to be put at the disposal of the Collector and  any amount  deposited  by such tenant towards the price  of  the land  was to be refunded to him.  It ’is important  to  note that  Section  32-P  provides that if the  tenant  fails  to exercise   his  right  to  purchase  or  the  sale   becomes ineffective  on  account of default of payment  of  purchase price  the  tenant shall be evicted and the  land  shall  be surrendered to the former landlord.  Sections 32-Q and  32-R provide that the amount of purchase price was to be  applied towards  the satisfaction of debts and the purchaser was  to be evicted from the land purchased by him as aforesaid if he fails to cultivate the land personally. The Amendment Act was challenged by a petition under Art. 32 but this Court held that it is protected by Art. 31A of  the Constitution  and  is therefore valid.  We  shall  presently refer  to  that decision but the petitioner’s  grievance  is against the changes that have been affected by the  impugned Act  in the law as it stood after Amendment Act.  It is  the contention  of the learned Advocate for the Petitioner  that he  changes  that transgress the fundamental rights  of  the petitioner  are  (1)  that if the tenant does  not  pay  the instalments by the end of twelve years but before the end of the  period he makes an application that he is at  the  time incapable of paying the arrears within the time and                             665 pays one instalment together with the interest on the  total amount  of one year’s instalment, the period of  payment  is extended by another 12 years. (2) where he fails to pay  the price in lumpsum or is in arrears of four instalments  where the  number  of instalments fixed is four or  more  and  the purchase has thereby become ineffective even then if he  was in possession of the land on the 1st of May ’65 and files an application within six months therefrom or from the date  of default  of the payment of price in lumpsum or of  the  last instalment whichever is later and applies to the tribunal to condone   the  default  on  the  ground  that  there   being sufficient reason as he was incapable of paying the price in lumpsum or the instalment within the time, the tribunal  can if  it  is satisfied condone the default and  allow  further time,  in  the case of payment of lumpsum one year  and  for payment  of  arrears  in  the  case  where  payment  is   by instalments by increasing the total number of instalments to sixteen. (3) Even when the arrears are not paid as  required under  the law during the extended period and  sale  becomes ineffective  and  the  tenant  purchaser  has   nevertheless continued  in possession, the landlord has no right to  have

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the tenant purchaser evicted, till the tribunal admits  that it has failed to recover the amount of the purchase price. Shri Tarkunde contends that these changes have effected  the petitioner’s  right to property in that he has  neither  the right  to recover the amount through a Court of law nor  has he   any  hope  of  recovering  it  through  the   procedure prescribed  by the impugned Act within any reasonable  time; that  in spite of the fact that under the previous  law  the sale  had  become  ineffective under 32-H  or  32-G  by  the default  of  the  tenant  purchaser to  pay  the  price  the Collector under 32-P was required to give possession to  the landlord  but under the impugned Act that right  has  become illusory  because  the landholder has  no  effective  remedy either to recover the amount or to recover the land and that all  that the tenant has to do is to sit tight, he need  not apply  for extension nor need he pay the instalment  nor  is there  any time fixed for the tribunal to determine that  it has  failed in the efforts to recover the amount  under  the revenue  recovery Act.  No distinction in fact, it is  said, has been made between a person who is unable to pay and  one who will not pay. In  view of these contentions ’it is necessary to point  out that    this    very   petitioner   had    challenged    the constitutionality of the Amendment Act in Sri Ram Ram Narain Medhi  v.  State  of Bombay (1) on the ground  that  it  was beyond  the competence of the legislature; that  legislation not being protected by Art. 31(A) had infringed Arts. 14, 19 and  31  of  the Constitution; and that it was  a  piece  of colourable legislation vitiated in part by excessive (1)  [1959] 1 Suppl.  S. C. R. 489. 666 delegation  of legislative power to the State. On behalf  of the  Respondent, it was urged that the impugned legislationfall within  entry 18 in List II of the Seventh Schedule  to  the Constitution,  that  it provided for the  extinguishment  or modification of rights to estates and was as such  protected by  Art.  31-A  of the Constitution and that  there  was  no excessive delegation of legislative power. This  Court held (1) that the legislation fell within  entry 18 of List II and therefore the legislature was competent to enact the Amendment Act; (2) that the word estate applied to landholders  as defined by Section 2(5) of the  Bombay  Land Revenue  Code which is equally applicable to tenure  holders and  occupants  of  unalienated lands;  (3)  that  the  word ’landholder’  as defined in Section 2(9) of the  parent  Act made no distinction between alienated and unalienated  lands and  showed that the interest of the landholder fell  within the definition of ’estate’ contained in Section 2(5) of  the Bombay Land Revenue Code ; (4) that there was no warrant for the  proposition that extinguishment or modification of  any rights  in estates as contemplated by Art. 3 1 A(.1) (a)  of the Constitution must mean only what happened in the process of acquisition of any estate or of any rights therein by the State.    The  language  of  the  Article  was   clear   and unambiguous  and showed that it treated the two concepts  as distinct  and  different  from  each  other,  and  (5)  that Sections  32 to 32-R of the Amendment Act  contemplated  the vesting  of  title  in  the  tenure  on  the  tiller’s   day defeasible  only  on  certain  specified  contingencies  and intended to bring about an extinguishment or modification of rights in the estate within the meaning of Art. 31A(1)(a) of the  Constitution.   For the aforesaid reasons it  was  held that the Amendment Act was not vulnerable as being violative of Arts. 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution. This decision concludes the most important question  whether

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the  petitioner’s  fundamental rights  are  infringed  under Arts.  14,  19  and  31 as the parent Act  as  well  as  the amending   Act  is  now  protected  by  Art.  31A   of   the Constitution.  Neither the question of discrimination nor of compensation  or its adequacy can be gone into nor  can  the unreasonableness of the provisions under which the landlords title  has  been extinguished nor the manner  in  which  the price  is  to be paid can be challenged.  Once it  has  been held  that Art. 31A applies the petitioner  cannot  complain that   his  rights  under  Arts.  14,  19  and  31  of   the Constitution  have  been  infringed.   This  protection   is available  not only to Acts which come within its terms  but also  to  Acts amending such Acts to include  new  items  of property  or which change some detail of the scheme  of  the Act provided firstly that the change 667 is  not such as would take it put of Art. 31A or  by  itself is, not such as would not be protected by it and  secondly that  the  assent  of the President has been  given  to  the amending  statute.   To put it differently as  long  as  the amendment  also  relates  to a scheme  of  agrarian  reforms providing for the acquisition of any estate or of any  right thereunder  or  for extinguishment or modification  of  such right  the  mere transfer of the tenure from one  person  to another  or the payment of the price in instalment  or  even the  postponement of payment by a further period  cannot  be challenged  under Arts. 14, 19 and 31. In this case we  have noticed  that  the impugned legislation has  merely  amended that provision which related to the recovery of the  amounts from   the   tenant  who  has  become  purchaser   and   the postponement  of the time, of ineffectiveness of  sale  till the tribunal has tried and failed to recover the amount from the  tenant  purchaser.   The  only  way  under  which   the petitioner  could  have  recovered  the  amounts  under  the Amendment  Act was by an application to the Collector  under the  Revenue  Recovery Act for collecting it as  arrears  of land  revenue but that provision under Section 32-L has  now been deleted.  While the vesting of the title of the  tenure in the erstwhile tenant is still defeasible only on  certain specified  contingencies as was before the impugned  Act  it only modified the previous provisions to the extent that the erstwhile  tenant has been given the benefit of  having  the payment postponed or instalments increased by requiring  the tribunal  to  make  an  enquiry as  to  whether  there  were sufficient reasons for the tenant purchaser making a default and  if it is satisfied to condone the delay and extend  the period  of payment.  It also vested in the tribunal  instead of the Collector the power to make the recovery on behalf of the  landholder.   It  may also be noticed  that  under  the impugned Act the sale still becomes ineffective as was under the amendment Act when the amount is not recovered with this difference that under the former it has to be shown that the tenant  purchaser  was not in a position to pay.   No  doubt before  the  impugned Act, if the tenant-purchaser  did  not pay,  the  Collector  could take action  under  the  revenue recovery Act to recover the amount and if he did not recover it the sale became ineffective and the landlord could be put in  possession by evicting the tenant purchaser provided  he was entitled to get possession of it under the Act, as  when his  holdings  do not come within the  ceiling.   The  basic position  still remains the same after the impugned Act  and there  is nothing in the Amendment Act which is  destructive of the scheme of agrarian reform which the legislation seeks to  implement and which is protected under Art. 31A  of  the Constitution.

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This  view of ours is amply borne out also by the  statement of  objects  and reasons which impelled the  legislature  to state   the   difficulty  that  was  being   felt   in   the implementation of the agrarian                             668 land reforms and indicate how it sought to find a remedy and got over it.  This is what was stated "According  to provisions of Section 32-K, 32-L and 32-M  of the Bombay Tenancy Agricultural Land Act 1942; it is left to the tenant to deposit with the tribunal the purchase of  the land  which  is deemed to have been purchased by  him  under Section 32 of that Act.  If he fails to deposit the price in lumpsum or instalments the purchase becomes ineffective  and under Section 32-P the tenant can be summarily evicted  from the  land.   It  has  been brought  to  the  notice  of  the Government  that  in the case of an Act a  large  number  of tenants  specially  belonging  to the  Scheduled  Caste  and Scheduled  Tribe,  the  purchase  is  in  danger  of   being ineffective  for  failure to deposit the sale price  on  due dates.   It is noticed that these tenants  being  illiterate and socially backward have failed to deposit the amount more out  of  ignorance than willful default.   Unless  therefore immediate  steps  are  taken  to  provide  for  recovery  of purchase  price through Government agency a large number  of tenants  are  likely to be evicted from their lands  due  to purchase   becoming  ineffective.   This  will   result   in defeating  the object of the tenancy legislation.  To  avoid this   result,   it  is  therefore   considered   that   the agricultural  lands tribunal showed be empowered to  recover the, purchase price from tenants as arrears of land  revenue and  until the tribunal has failed to recover  the  purchase price,  the purchase should not become ineffective.   It  is also considered that the benefit of these provisions  should be  given  to  tenants whose  purchase  has  already  become ineffective  but  who have not yet been evicted  from  their lands under Section 32-P.  This bill is intended to  achieve these objects". We  do not therefore think that the impugned Act has in  any way affected the main purpose of the Act or the object which it  seeks to achieve nor do the amendments effected  thereby take the provisions out of the protection given to it  under Art. 31A of the Constitution. Shri  Tarkunde has referred us to the case of Maharana  Shri Jayvantsinghji  Ranmalsinghji etc. v. The State  of  Gujarat (1)  in  support  of his contention that  the  impugned  Act infringes Art. 19(1)(f) of the Constitution and is not saved by  clause 5 thereof as the provisions of the said  Act  are unreasonable  in  that the indefinite  postponement  of  the recovery  of the price makes the payment  thereof  illusory, and   even  after  the  sale  has  become  ineffective   the landholder is not entitled to recover the land. What fell for determination in the case referred to was whe- ther as a result of the provisions of the Bombay Land Tenure (1)  [1966] Supp.  S.C.R. 411. 669 Abolition Laws (Amendment) Act 1958, particularly under Sec- tions  3  and  4 read with Section 6  thereof  certain  non- permanent  tenants  were  deemed to  have  become  permanent tenants  as  from the commencement of the  Bombay  Taluqdari Tenure  Abolition  Act 1949 and thereby became  entitled  to acquire the tenure on payment of 6 times the assessment or 6 times the rent instead of atleast the minimum of 20 times to 200   times  the  assessment  which  right   infringed   the fundamental  right  of  the landlord  to  acquire  hold  and dispose  of  property.   This result it  was  contended  had

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substantially  deprived the petitioners of the  right  which they  acquired  on  the  tiller’s  day  by  reason  of   the provisions  contained in Section 32 and other provisions  in the  parent Act as amended from time to time.  The  majority held  that  the  provisions of Sections 3, 4 and  6  of  the Bombay  Land  Tenure Abolition Laws  (Amendment)  Act,  1958 insofar as they deemed some tenants as permanent tenants  in possession of Taluqdari land were unconstitutional and  void in  that  under the guise of changing the  definition  of  a permanent tenant and changing a rule of evidence, it  really reduced  the  purchase  price  that  the  petitioners   were entitled  to  receive  from some of  their  tenants  on  the ’tiller’s day’ under Section 32-H of the parent Act. It would appear from the Judgment of S. K. Das, J.  speaking for himself and Sinha C.J., that the constitutional validity of  the relevant provisions of the Taluqdari  Abolition  Act 1949 and the parent Act read with the Amendment Act had  not been  challenged  before  them.  The  decision  of  Dhirubha Devisingh Gohil v. The State of Bombay (1) and Shri Ram  Ram Narain  Medhi  v.  The State of Bombay  (1)  were  cited  as upholding  the constitutionality of the relevant  provisions of  those  2 Acts.  After pointing out that  what  has  been challenged  before them was the constitutional  validity  of the Bombay Act LVII of 1958 particularly the provisions 3, 4 and  6  of that Act, and referring to the  earlier  decision that this Court had held that Sections 32 to 32-R of  parent Act read with the Amendment Act were designed to bring about an  extinguishment  or in any event a  modification  of  the landlords  rights in the estate within the meaning  of  Art. 31A(1)(a)  of  the Constitution, it was  observed  that  the right  which the petitioners got of receiving  the  purchase price  was undoubtedly a right to property guaranteed  under Art.  19(1)(f)  of  the Constitution and was  not  saved  by clause 5 thereof nor are the cases before them protected  by Art.  31A.  S. K. Das, J. gave the following  reasoning  for the aforesaid conclusion at page 438-439 :               "The   petitioners   have   three   kinds   of               tenants--permanent  tenant protected  tenants,               and ordinary tenants.  On (1) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 691.     (2) [1959] Suppl. 1 S.C.R. 489.                             670               April  1, 1957, the petitioners ceased  to  be               tenure holders in respect of all tenants other               than  permanent  tenants and  became  entitled               only to the purchase price under’ s. 32H.   If               any tenant claimed on that date that he was  a               permanent  tenant,  he had  to  establish  his               claim in accordance with s. 83 of the  Revenue               Code.  Such a claim could be contested by  the               tenure-holder  whenever  made by  the  tenant.               But  by  the impugned Act 1958, all  this  was               changed, and unless the tenure holder made  an               application   within   six   months   of   the               commencement of the impugned Act, 1958, he               was not in a position to say that a particular               tenant  who was in possession of  tenure  land               for continuous period aggregating twelve years               on  and  before  August 15, 1950,  was  not  a               permanent tenant.  We are unable to hold  that               the  six months’ limit imposed by s. 5 of  the               impugned Act, 1958, is in the circumstances, a               reasonable  restriction within the meaning  of               Art. 19(5) of the Constitution." The  decision in the above case is clearly inapplicable to the  facts  and  circumstances of the  case  before  us  and

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consequently  in  the view we have taken  this  petition  is dismissed with costs. G.C.                                    Petition dismissed. 671