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PETITIONER: SRIMATI ORAMBA SUNDARI DASI

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SRI SRI ISWAR GOPAL JIEU.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 12/03/1954

BENCH: HASAN, GHULAM BENCH: HASAN, GHULAM MAHAJAN, MEHAR CHAND (CJ) MUKHERJEA, B.K. DAS, SUDHI RANJAN BOSE, VIVIAN

CITATION:  1954 AIR  307            1954 SCR  982  CITATOR INFO :  E&D        1960 SC 475  (9,12)  R          1967 SC 829  (6)  R          1974 SC 366  (58)  RF         1981 SC 873  (18,27)  R          1987 SC1802  (9)

ACT:  Bengal Money-Lenders Act, 1940 (Bengal Act X of 1940), s. 36  Scope  of-Court  whether competent to make an  enquiry  that  decree-holder on record is benamidar for another person.

HEADNOTE: Held, that in a proceeding under s. 36 of the Bengal  Money- Lenders  Act, 1940, it is not competent to the court  to  go behind the decree and embark on an enquiry as to whether the decree-holders on record were in fact benamidars for another person. Scope of s. 36 of the Act discussed. Renula  v. Manmatha (72 I.A. 156) and Bank of Commerce  Ltd. v.  Amulya  Krishna Basu Boy Chowdhury ([1944]  F.C.R.  126) referred to.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION:  Civil Appeals Nos.  130  and 131 of 1951. Appeals  from.  the  Judgment and Decrees,  dated  the  12th August, 1948, of the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta in Appeals from Original Decrees Nos. 214 of 1942 and 231 of 1943 arising from the Decrees, dated the 16th June, 1942, of the  Court of the Subordinate Judge, Burdwan, in Money  Suit No.  261  of 1932/ Miscellaneous Case No. 132  of  1941  and Money  Suit  No. 262 of 1932/Miscellaneous Case No.  131  of 1941. N.   C. Chatterjee (A.  K. Dutt and Sukumar Ghose, with him) for the appellant. Manmohan.Mukherjee  and P. K. Chatterjee for respondent  No. 1.

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989  1954.  March 12.  The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     MUKHERJEA  J.-These  two  analogous  appeals,  which  are  between  the  same parties and involve the  same  points  in  dispute,  are  directed  against  a  common  judgment  of  a  Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court dated the 12th  of  August,  1948,  by  which the learned  Judges  affirmed,  in  appeal,  the  decision of the Subordinate Judge  of  Burdwan  passed in two analogous proceedings under section 36 of  the  Bengal MoneyLenders Act.  The facts material for our present  purpose  lie  within a narrow compass and may be  stated  as  follows:  The  principal  respondents  are  certain   idols,  represented by their managing Shebait Ram Govinda Roy.   The  idols  are the family deities of the Roys of Bonpash in  the  district  of Burdwan, and the number of Shebaits being  very  large,  there is a recognised usage in this family that  the  seniormost  member  amongst the descendants of  the  founder  acts  as the managing Shebait and it is he who  manages  the  endowed  properties and looks after the due  performance  of  the worship of the idols.  It is not disputed by the parties  that it is within the competence of the managing Shebait  to  borrow  money  to meet the necessities of the idols  and  to  execute such documents as may be necessary for that purpose.  Admittedly  Adwaita Charan Roy was the managing  Shebait  of  the deities from 1926 to 1930 and as Shebait, he executed  a  Hatchita in favour of one Nanitosh Chakraborty some time  in  April,  1928, on the basis of which he received advances  of  money from time to time from the latter.  The last entry  in  the  Hatchita was made in March, 1929, and the total  amount  borrowed up to that date came up to Rs. 3,801.  Adwaita died  in  March,  1930, and after his death,  Satish  Chandra  Roy  became  the  managing Shebait and continued to act  as  such  till his death in 1940.  There was an adjustment of accounts  between Nanitosh, the creditor,in whose favour the  Hatchita  was executed, and Satish Chandra, the managing Shebait  some  time  in October, 1931, and a sum of Rs. 5,068, having  been  found due to the  128  990  creditor,  Satish  Chandra gave him a renewed  Hatchita  for  that  amount.  It appears that while Adwaita was  still  the  managing  Shebait, a suit was instituted by some of his  co-  Shebaits  to  remove  him from his office  and  pending  the  hearing of the suit, Ramjanaki Roy, another co-Shebait,  was  appointed a Receiver of the debutter property by the  court.  With  the permission of the court, Ramjanaki  borrowed  from  the same Nanitosh Chakraborty -three sums of money on  three  different promissory notes executed respectively on the 27th  September, 1929, 1st October, 1929, and 14th January,  1930.  The suit was eventually dismissed for non-prosecution  after  Adwaita’s  death.  Nanitosh died in 193 1, and in 1932)  his  two sons Aditya and Dhirendra, who figure as respondents  14  and 15 in these appeals, instituted two money suits  against  Satish  Chnandra, the managing Shebait, in the Court of  the  Subordinate  Judge, Burdwan, being Money Suits Nos. 261  and  262  of 1932, for recovery of the moneys due in  respect  of  the  Hatchita and the promissory notes mentioned  aforesaid.  Both  the  suits were decreed on the basis of  a  compromise  dated  the  23rd July, 1933, and two  consent  decrees  were  passed,  one for a sum of Rs. 5,800, and the other  for  Rs.  2,200,  both  payable in sixteen yearly instalments  with  a  further stipulation that in default of payment of any one of  the instalments, the whole or balance of the decretal amount  would  become due and payable in each.  The instalments  not  having  been  paid in either of the cases both  the  decrees

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were put into execution.  In Execution Cases Nos. 76 and  77  of  1936,  arising out of Money Suits Nos. 261  and  262  of  1932,  the properties mentioned in Schedule Ka in each  case  were  put up to sale and they were purchased  ostensibly  by  the two decreeholders Aditya and Dhiren.  Three years later,  Execution Cases Nos. 17 and 18 of 1939 were started again in  connection   with  the  said  decrees  and  this  time   the  properties  specified in Schedule Kha were attached and  put  up  to sale and they were also purchased by the  Chakraborty  decreeholders.  Finally, in Execution Cases Nos. 163 of 1939  and 5 of 1940, the properties described in Schedule GA  were  sold and  991  they were, knocked down to Srimati Oramba Sundari Dasi,  who  figures  as the appellant in the appeals before us and  who,  it  may be noted, is the wife of Aghore Nath Roy, a  son  of  Adwaita, the former managing Shebait of the debutter estate.  Subsequently,  the decreeholders, who purchased Ka  and  Kha  Schedule properties sold them by a registered Kobala to  the  said  Oramba  Sundari Dasi on the 26th of July,  1940.   The  result, therefore, was that the properties described in  the  three Schedules came to vest in Oramba Sundari, the wife  of  Aghore  Nath  Roy.  On the 28th August,  1941,  the  deities  represented  by some of the Shebaits filed two  applications  under  section 36 (6) (a) (ii) of the  Bengal  Money-Lenders  Act praying for the reopening of the two compromise  decrees  mentioned  aforesaid  and the passing  of.  new  installment  decrees in accordance with the provisions of the Act.  There  were prayers also for restoration. to the deities of all the  properties mentioned in Schedules, Ka, Kha and Ga which were  purchased  in  execution  of  the  decrees.   The  principal  opposite  parties to these proceedings were the  Chakraborty  decreeholders, Oramba Sundari, the ostensible purchaser, and  Aghore Nath Roy, her husband.     The  allegations in the applications, in substance,  were  that  the Chakrabortys were mere benamidars for Aghore  Nath  Roy,  who was the real lender and the real  decreeholder  in  both  these  suits.   It was alleged that  Aghore  Nath  Roy  purchased   these   properties   in  the   benami   of   the  decreeholders in two out of the three execution  proceedings  and  in the benami of his wife Oramba Sundari in the  third.  The subsequent Kobala executed by the Chakrabortys in favour  of  Oramba  . Sundari was also asserted to be  a  fictitious  conveyance made in favour of Aghore Nath Roy in the name  of  his  wife.   In these  circumstances,  the  judgment-debtors  prayed  that they were entitled to have the  two  compromise  decrees  reopened  and  on the  passing  of  new  instalment  decrees to have the properties, which were in possession  of  the  real decreeholder, restored to the deities in terms  of  section 36(2)(c) of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act.  The trial  judge decided  992  in favour of the judgment-debtors and granted their  prayers  in both the applications.  Orders were made for reopening of  the  decrees and making of fresh decrees in their places  in  accordance  with the provisions of the Bengal  Money-Lenders  Act.   Direction  was  also given  for  restoration  of  the  properties  mentioned  in Schedules Ka, Kha and  Ga  to  the  deities  under the provision of section  36(2)(c).   Against  this  decision, Oramba Sundari took two appeals to the  High  Court  of  Calcutta and the learned Judges,  who  heard  the  appeals,  affirmed  the  decision of  the  court  below  and  dismissed both the appeals.  Oramba Sundari has now come  up  in  appeal  to this court on the strength of  a  certificate  given  by the High Court under sections 109 (a) and  110  of

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the Civil Procedure Code.  Mr.  Chatterjee who appeared in support of the appeals,  has  not   challenged   before   us   the   findings   of    fact  concurrently  arrived at by the courts below, viz.,that  the  appellant  Oramba  Sundari  was a  mere  benamidar  for  her  husband  Aghore  in respect of the purchase of  Ga  Schedule  properties in court sale, and also that the Kobala  executed  by  the Chakrabortys in her favour on July 26, 1940,  was  a  fictitious transaction.  The point, which he has pressed for  our consideration, is that in a proceeding under section  36  of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act, it is not open to the court  to go behind the decree and launch an enquiry as to  whether  the  decreeholders  on record were in  fact  benamidars  for  another  person.   In other words, the contention  is  that,  even  if Aghore was proved to have advanced the  money  upon  which  the Chakrabortys obtained the decrees,  in  reopening  the decrees and in working out the rights of the parties  in  accordance  with the provisions of the Bengal  Money-Lenders  Act  the  court could treat the Chakrabortys  alone  as  the  decreeholders.  For a proper determination of this point, it  is  necessary  to  examine the scope of section  36  of  the  Bengal Money-Lenders Act and the reliefs which the Court  is  competent to grant in terms of that section.    Section,  36 of the Bengal Money-Lenders Act sets out  the  various powers which the court can exercise,  993  if it has reason to believe that the exercise of one or more  of   the  powers  will  give  relief  to  the  borrower   as  contemplated  by  the Act; and one of the powers,  which  is  mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section (1) of the section is  to  reopen any transaction and take an account  between  the  parties.   The drafting of section 36 is indeed obscure  and  somewhat  clumsy, but it is clear, as the Privy Council  (1)  has pointed out, that the power of reopening a  transaction,  as  contemplated  by the section, extends  to  reopening  of  decrees  as  well.  Sub-section (2) of section  36  contains  detailed  provisions as to what the court may or may not  do  when  a decree is reopened.  It cannot be disputed that  the  court  reopens  a decree under section 36(2)  only  for  the  purpose and so far as it is necessary to give relief to  the  borrower  in the manner provided for in the Act, namely,  to  release  him from all liability for interest -in  excess  of  the  limits  prescribed  by section 30 of the  Act.   A  new  decree  is passed only for the purpose of  substituting  the  method   of  accounting  sanctioned  by  the  Act  for   the  calculations  upon which the original decree was passed  and  to  give  an opportunity to the judgment-debtor to  pay  the  decretal dues thus ascertained by instalments.  But save and  except   for   these,  the  old  decree  as  well   as   the  adjudications  made  thereunder are not wiped  out  and  the  parties  are not relegated to their rights  and  liabilities  under  the original cause of action (2).  How the rights  of  the parties are to be adjusted and worked out when a  decree  hat;  been reopened has been dealt with exhaustively in  the  several  clauses  of  section 36 (2) of  the  Bengal  Money-  Lenders  Act, and an examination of these clauses  makes  it  clear to our minds that an enquiry as to whether the decree-  holder was in fact a benamidar for another person in respect  of  the  decree, does not come within the purview  of  these  provisions.  Clause (a) of section 36(2) empowers the  court  to  pass a new decree in accordance with the  provisions  of  the  Act.   Obviously, this new decree is to  be  passed  in  favour   of   the  original  decreeholder   and   only   the  calculations upon which the old  (1)  Vide Renula v. Manmatha, 72 I.A. 156.

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(2)  Vide  Bank of Commerce Ltd. v. Amulya Krishna Babu  Roy  Chowdhury [1944] F.C.R. 126.  994  decree  was  based  would be  changed  by  substituting  the  statutory method of accounting in place of what rested  upon  the  contract  between  the parties.  Clauses  (b)  and  (C)  contemplate  cases  where  properties  have  been  sold   in  execution  of the original decree.  If the purchaser is  the  decreeholder,  himself  and  he  is  in  possession  of  the  property  when the decree is reopened, it is incumbent  upon  the  court to order restoration of these properties  to  the  judgment-debtor  under clause (c).  If, on the  other  hand,  the  properties  had been acquired by  strangers  either  by  purchase  at  the execution sale or  from  the  decreeholder  purchaser,  their interests would be protected if they  have  acquired  these rights bona fide as contemplated  by  clause  (b).   Under clause (d), the court has to order the  payment  of  the  decretal amount in such instalments  as  it  thinks  proper,  and clause (e) further imposes a duty on the  court  to  give a direction in such cases that if there is  default  in the payment of any one of the instalments, the properties  restored  to the judgment-debtor under clause (e)  would  be  put  back  into the possession of the decreeholder.   It  is  quite  true that the object of restoring possession  of  the  properties sold in execution of the decree to the  judgment-  debtor is to enable the latter to pay off the decretal dues,  but  it  is  to be remembered that the sale  itself  is  not  annulled,  and in case of default in payment of any  of  the  instalments, the properties are returned to the decreeholder  purchaser.   We  agree  that  if the  purchaser  is  a  mere  benamidar  for the decreeholder, clause (b), subsection  (2)  of  the  section would not afford protection to him  in  any  way.   He could not be regarded as a person other  than  the  decreeholder  acquiring rights bona fide as contemplated  by  that  clause.  For-the purpose of giving effect  to  clauses  (b) and (c), therefore, the court has not only the right but  is  under  a  duty  to make an enquiry  as  to  whether  the  ostensible  purchaser at the execution sale, or  the  person  who  purports to have acquired an interest therein  under  a  subsequent  transfer  from the decreeholder  purchaser,  has  bonafide  acquired such rights within the meaning of  clause  (b).  But we do not agree with the learned  995  Judges  of the High Court that in making a new decree  under  clause  (a) of section 36(2) and giving the  judgment-debtor  consequential  relief under clause (c) of  the  sub-section,  the  court can at all enter into the question as to  whether  the  decreeholder  on  record is  himself  a  benamidar  for  another  person in respect of the decree.  Such enquiry,  it  seems  to  us,  is altogether outside  the  purview  of  the  different  clauses  of section 36(2) of  the  Bengal  Money-  Lenders  Act.  These provisions do not recognise  any  other  decreeholder  than  the  one in whose  favour  the  original  decree  was  passed.  It is between him  and  the  judgment-  debtor that the rights are to be adjusted in accordance with  the provisions of the Act; to him would the instalments have  to  be  paid  under the new decree, and he  alone  would  be  compelled  to restore the properties which he had  purchased  in  execution  proceedings.  None but  the  decreeholder  on  record can give a valid discharge or record satisfaction  of  the  decree.   This  being the position,  it  is  altogether  immaterial, in our opinion, that it was Aghore, the  husband  of the appellant, who, really advanced the money upon  which  the  decrees were obtained.  We must treat the  Chakrabortys  and  the Chakrabortys alone as the decreeholders and see  to

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what  extent  the  provisions of the Act  could  be  applied  against  them in the circumstances of the present case.   So  far as the properties described in Schedules Ka and Kha  are  concerned,  it is not disputed that they were  purchased  by  the decreeholders themselves.  No price was actually paid by  the  decreeholders,  but  the sale  proceeds  were  set  off  against  the decretal dues.  The  decreeholders,  therefore,  must  be  deemed to be the purchasers  of  these  properties  within  the meaning of clause (c) of section 36(2);  and  as  the  subsequent conveyance of these properties in favour  of  Oramba  Sundari,  the appellant, has been held by  both  the  courts  below to be a fictitious transaction, we  must  hold  that  Oramba  Sundari did not bona fide  acquire  any  right  which could be protected under clause (b) of section  36(2).  With  regard to these properties, therefore, the  order  for  restoration  of  possession made by both  the  courts  below  should stand.  As regards Ga  996  Schedule   properties,  however,  Oramba  Sundari  was   the  purchaser at the execution sale and whether or not the money  for   such  purchase  was  paid  by  her   husband   becomes  immaterial.   This  was not the property  purchased  by  the  decreeholders  and  there is no proof of  the  decreeholders  being  in  possession of the same either  by  themselves  or  through Oramba Sundari.  In these circumstances, clause  (e)  of section 36(2) cannot be attracted in favour of  judgment-  debtors  so  far  as  this property  is  concerned  and  the  possession  of  it  must remain  with  the  appellant.   We,  therefore, allow the appeal in part and set aside the  order  for  restoration of possession made by the courts  below  in  respect  to  the  Ga Schedule property.   The  rest  of  the  decision of the High Court will stand.  We make no order  as  to costs of these appeals.  Appeal partly allowed.