Reportable  IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 852 OF 2010 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.22962 of 2008)

Sri Jeyaram Educational Trust & Ors. … Appellants

Vs.

A.G.Syed Mohideen & Ors.     … Respondents

J U D G M E N T

R.V.RAVEENDRAN, J.

Leave  granted.   Heard  learned  counsel  for  the  appellants  and  

respondents.  We have  also  heard  the  learned  counsel  for  the  State  of  

Tamil Nadu and Registrar General of the Madras High Court to whom  

notices had been issued in regard to the interpretation of section 92 of the  

Code of Civil Procedure (‘Code’ for short), with reference to the State  

Government Notification No. GOM No.727 dated 8.3.1960.

2. The respondents instituted a suit (OS No. 13 of  2006) on the file of  

the  Principal  District  Judge,  Cuddalore  against  the  appellants  under  

Section 92 of  Code, seeking a direction to the second appellant to repay

all the amounts spent by him after 20.6.2005 contrary to the terms of the  

supplementary deed of Trust, and also to convene the Trust meeting for  

approval of the income and expenditure and other consequential reliefs.  

3. Appellants 2 to 4 herein filed a memo before the District  Court  

stating that having regard to the decision of the Madras High Court in P.  

S. Subramanian v. K. L. Lakshmanan – 2007 (5) Mad. L.J. 921, the court  

did  not  have jurisdiction  to  entertain  any suit  under  section 92 of  the  

Code and therefore the suit may be transferred to the file of the Principal  

Subordinate  Judge,  Cuddalore.  The learned District  Judge rejected  the  

said memo by order dated 1.8.2007 holding that he had jurisdiction to  

entertain the suit, as the value of the suit was Rs.10 lakhs. The revision  

filed by the appellants, challenging the said order of the District Court,  

was dismissed by the Madras High Court by the impugned order dated  

25.4.2008.  The  said  judgment  is  challenged  in  this  appeal  by  special  

leave.  The only question that arises for consideration in this  appeal  is  

whether  a  District  Court  in  the  State  of  Tamil  Nadu,  does  not  have  

jurisdiction to try a suit under section 92 of the Code.  

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4. Section 92 relates to public charities. It enables a suit being filed in  

the  case  of  any  alleged  breach  of  any  express  or  constructive  Trust  

created for  public  purposes of  a charitable  or  religious  nature,  ‘in the  

Principal  Civil  Court  of  original  jurisdiction  or  in  any  other  Court   

empowered in that behalf by the State Government within the local limits   

of whose jurisdiction the whole or any part of the subject-matter of the   

Trust is situate’.  

4.1) Section 2(4) of the Code extracted below, while defining the term  

‘district’, in effect defines the terms ‘district court’ :  

"2(4). ‘district’  means  the  local  limits  of  the  jurisdiction  of  a  principal  Civil  Court  of  original  jurisdiction  (hereinafter called a "District Court"), and includes the local limits of  the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of a High Court.”

4.2) Section 9 of the Code provides that the courts shall (subject to the  

provisions of the Code) have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature  

excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly  

barred.  Sections  15  to  19  of  the  Code  deal  with  place  of  suing.  

Section 15 requires every suit to be instituted in the court of the lowest  

grade competent to try it.  

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4.3) Section  6  of  the  Code  deals  with  pecuniary  jurisdiction  and  

provides as follows :  

“6. Pecuniary jurisdiction :  Save in so far as is otherwise expressly  provided, nothing herein contained shall operate to give any Court  jurisdiction over suits the amount or value of the subject-matter of  which  exceeds  the  pecuniary  limits  (if  any)  of  its  ordinary  jurisdiction.”

4.4) Section 10 of the Tamil Nadu Civil  Courts Act,  1873 (for short  

‘Civil Courts Act’) empowers the state government to fix, and from time  

to time vary, the local limits of the jurisdiction  of any District Court or  

Sub-ordinate Judge’s court under that Act. Section 12 of the Civil Courts  

Act  (as  amended  by  Amendment  Act  No.1  of  2004),  deals  with  the  

jurisdiction of the District Judge and the Subordinate Judge is extracted  

below:  

“12. The  jurisdiction  of  a  District  Judge  extends,  subject to the rules contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, to all  original suits and proceedings of a civil nature, of which the amount  or  value  of  the  subject  matter  exceeds  five  lakh  rupees.  The  jurisdiction  of  a  Sub-ordinate  Judge  extends,  subject  to  the  rules  contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, to all like original suits  and proceedings, of which the amount or value of the subject matter  exceeds one lakh rupees but does not exceed five lakh rupees.”   

4.5) By a notification dated 8.3.1960 issued in exercise of power under  

section  92(1)  of  the  Code,  in  supersession of  the  Judicial  Department  

Notification No.719 dated 17.10.1910, the Governor of Madras invested  

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all courts of Subordinate Judges in the State of Madras with jurisdiction  

under the Code in respect of suits relating to Trusts created for public  

purposes of a charitable and religious nature.  

5. The appellants submit that on a true interpretation of section 92 of  

the  Code,  the  District  Court  as  the  Principal  Civil  Court  of  original  

jurisdiction  in  a  district  had  jurisdiction  to  try  suits  relating  to  public  

Trusts till 8.3.1960, having regard to the provisions of section 92 of the  

Code;  and  that  once  the  State  Government  issues  a  notification  in  

exercise  of  power  under  section  92  empowering  courts  of  the  Sub-

ordinate  Judges  to  entertain  suits  under  section  92,  the  District  Court  

ceased to have jurisdiction to try suits under the said section. In support  

of their contention, they strongly relied upon the decision of a learned  

Single Judge in the case of P.S. Subramanian (supra) wherein it was held  

that the word “or” occurring between the words “may institute a suit in  

the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction” and “in any other court  

empowered in that behalf by the State Government” in section 92 of the  

Code, should have to be read as substitutive and not as disjunctive or  

alternative.  

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6. It is now well settled that a provision of a statute should have to be  

read  as  it  is,  in  a  natural  manner,  plain  and straight,  without  adding,  

substituting or omitting any words. While doing so, the words used in the  

provision  should  be  assigned  and  ascribed  their  natural,  ordinary  or  

popular meaning. Only when such plain and straight reading, or ascribing  

the natural and normal meaning to the words on such reading, leads to  

ambiguity, vagueness, uncertainty, or absurdity which were not obviously  

intended by the  Legislature  or  the  Lawmaker,  a  court  should open its  

interpretation  tool  kit  containing  the  settled  rules  of  construction  and  

interpretation, to arrive at the true meaning of the provision. While using  

the tools of interpretation, the court should remember that it  is not the  

author of the Statute who is empowered to amend, substitute or delete, so  

as to change the structure and contents. A court as an interpreter cannot  

alter  or amend the law. It  can only interpret  the provision, to make it  

meaningful and workable so as to achieve the legislative object,  when  

there is vagueness, ambiguity or absurdity. The purpose of interpretation  

is not to make a provision what the Judge thinks it should be, but to make  

it what the legislature intended it to be.   

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7. Section 92 provides that a suit under that section can be instituted  

“in the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction or in any other court  

empowered in that behalf by the State Government”. When it is read in a  

normal manner, it means that the suits under section 92 should be filed in  

the district court or in the sub-ordinate court. When the language is clear  

and  unambiguous  and  when  there  is  no  need  to  apply  the  tools  of  

interpretation, there is no need to interpret the word ‘or’, nor any need to  

read it as a substitutive word, instead of its plain and simple meaning  

denoting an ‘alternative’.  

8. Assuming that there was any need for applying the principles of  

interpretation,  let  us next  consider whether  the word ‘or’  was used in  

section 92 of the Code in a substitutive sense. It is clear from section 92  

of the Code that the legislature did not want to go by the general rule  

contained in section 15 of the Code that every suit shall be instituted in  

the court of the lowest grade competent to try it, in regard to suits relating  

to  public  Trusts.  The intention  of  the  law makers  was  that  such suits  

should be tried by the District Court. At the same time, the law makers  

contemplated that if there was heavy work load on the District Court, the  

State Government should be enabled to empower any other court (within  

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the local limits of whose jurisdiction, the whole or any part of the subject  

matter is situate), also to entertain such suits. Therefore, the word “or” is  

used in the ordinary and normal sense, that is to denote an alternative,  

giving  a  choice.  The  provisions  of  section  92  do  not  give  room for  

interpreting  the  word  “or”  as  a  substitutive,  so  as  to  lead  to  an  

interpretation that when the Government notified any other court, such  

notified court alone will have jurisdiction and not the District Court. If  

the  intention  was  to  substitute  the  Court  empowered  by  the  State  

Government in place of the Principal Civil Court of Original jurisdiction,  

instead of the words ‘may institute a suit in the Principal Civil Court of  

original jurisdiction or in any other court empowered in that behalf by the  

State  Government’,  the following words would have been used in the  

section :  

‘may  institute  a  suit  in  the  principal  Civil  Court  of  original   jurisdiction, or when any other court is empowered in that behalf   by the  State Government, then in such court empowered by the   state government,’  

OR

‘may institute a suit in the court notified by the state government.’

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9. The provisions of section 12 of the Civil Courts Act specifying the  

pecuniary limits of District Courts and Sub-ordinate Courts, is subject to  

the provisions of the Code of Civil  Procedure.  In view of the express  

provisions of section 92 specifying the courts which will have jurisdiction  

to entertain suits under that section, neither the provisions of sections 15  

to 20 of the Code nor the provisions of section 12 of the Civil Courts Act  

will  apply to such suits.  Section 92 is  a self  contained provision,  and  

conferment of jurisdiction in regard to suits under that section does not  

depend upon the value of the subject matter of the suit. Therefore, insofar  

as the suits under section 92 are concerned, the District Courts and Sub-

ordinate Courts will have concurrent jurisdiction without reference to any  

pecuniary limits. We find that the learned District Judge had held that he  

had jurisdiction because the value of the subject matter was Rs.10 lakhs,  

apparently keeping in view, section 12 of the Civil Courts Act. We make  

it  clear  that  the  pecuniary  limits  mentioned  in  section 12 of  the Civil  

Courts Act, do not apply to suits under section 92 of the Code. In fact, if  

section 12 of the Civil Courts Act is applied to decide the jurisdiction of  

courts with reference to suits under section 92 of the Code, it will then  

lead to the following anomalous position: The District Court will  have  

jurisdiction if  the value of the subject  matter  exceeds Rs.5 lakhs.  The  

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Sub-ordinate Court will have jurisdiction where the value of the subject  

matter exceeds Rs.1 lakh but does not exceed to Rs.5 lakhs. That would  

mean that a suit under section 92 of the Code, where the subject matter  

does not exceeds Rs.1 lakh, cannot be filed in any court as section 92  

confers jurisdiction only on District Court and Sub-ordinate Courts. This  

obviously was not intended. Be that as it may.  

10. We do not  therefore  approve the  decision of  the  learned Single  

Judge of the Madras High Court in  PS Subramanian which ignores the  

earlier decisions of that court and decisions of other High Courts which  

have consistently taken the view that where jurisdiction is also conferred  

on  any  other  court  by  the  state  government  by  a  notification  (under  

section 92 of the Code or under any similar provision), then that court  

and the District Court will have concurrent jurisdiction. We may in this  

behalf refer to the decisions in Annamalai vs. Slaiyappa - AIR 1935 Mad.  

983, Dakor Temple Committee vs. Shankerlal - AIR 1944 Bom. 300, R.  

Rama Subbarayalu Reddiar vs. Rengammal – AIR 1962 Madras 450, and  

Pazhukkamattom  Devaswom  vs.  Lakshmi  Kutty  Amma  –  1980  Kerala  

LT 645.  

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11. In view of the above, the appeal is dismissed. The learned District  

Judge will proceed to decide the suit expeditiously.  

____________________J. (R V Raveendran)

New Delhi; ____________________J. January 22, 2010. (K S Radhakrishnan)  

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