15 July 1999
Supreme Court
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SRI BHAGWAN SAMARDHA S.V.V.V.MAHARAJ Vs STATE BY DSP OF POLICE,CID,VISKHAPAT&ORS

Bench: M.B.Shah,K.T.Thomas
Case number: Crl.A. No.-000638-000638 / 1999
Diary number: 3062 / 1999
Advocates: Vs GUNTUR PRABHAKAR


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PETITIONER: SRI BHAGWAN SAMARDHA SREEPADA V.VENKATA VISHWANDADHA MAHARAJ

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       15/07/1999

BENCH: M.B.Shah, K.T.Thomas

JUDGMENT:

THOMAS,J.

Leave granted.

     A godman is now in the dock.  One who was initiated by him as his devotee has later turned to be his betenoire, and the  godman  is  facing  a prosecution for  the  offence  of cheating  under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.   When he  moved  the High Court to quash the criminal  proceedings pending  against  him, the motion was dismissed as  per  the impugned  order  against which the present appeal  has  been filed  by  special  leave.  Facts, thus far  developed,  are stated  below:   An  FIR  happned to be  registered  on  the complaint  lodged by one Venkatakrishna Reddy with the  Town Police   Station,   Nellore,    containing   the   following allegations.   Appellant  (Sri   Bhagwan  Samardha  Sreepada Vallabha Venkata Vishanandha Maharaj) who is a youngman, son of  a teacher of Gummaluru Village (A.P.) claimed to possess occult  faculties  and attracted a number of  devotees.   He represented  to  have  divine  healing  powers  through  his touches,  particularly  of  chronic  diseases.   Complainant approached  him for healing his 15 year old daughter who  is congenitally   a   dumb  child.    Appellant   assured   the complainant  that  the  little girl would be  cured  of  her impairment  through his divine powers.  He demanded a sum of Rs.1  lac  as consideration to be paid in instalments.   The first  instalment demanded was Rs.10,000/- which, after some bargaining,  was fixed at Rs.5,000/-.  Complainant paid that amount  and  later  he paid a further amount  of  Rs.1,000/- towards   incidental  expenses.   He   waited  eagerly   for improvement  of his dump child till 1994 which was the  time limit  indicated  by  the appellant for the  girl  to  start speaking.  As the child remained the same, complainant began to  entertain  doubts.  Appellant postponed the  time  limit till August 1994 for the girl to develop speech capacity.  A little more amount of Rs.516/- was collected for performance of  a  yagyan.   But  unfortunately nothing  of  such  thing brought  about  any change in the girl.  In  the  meanwhile, news  of  some  other  persons defrauded  by  the  appellant reached  the  ears of the complainant as newspapers  started publishing   such  other  activities   indulged  in  by  the appellant.   In  one such publication it was mentioned  that the appellant had mobilised more than a crore of rupees from different  devotees.   It  was  then  that  the  complainant realised  the fraud committed by the appellant, according to

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the  complainant.   Hence  a complaint was lodged  with  the police for cheating.

     The  police conducted investigation and on  15-12-1994 laid  final  report  before   the  Magistrate  concerned  by referring the case as mistake of fact mainly on the ground that  this is a kind of religious belief prevalent in India among devotees of God. According to the appellant, this was not  a  case  of  cheating  or breach  of  trust.   But  the Magistrate  was  not  prepared to give accord  to  the  said report.   On 2-8-1995 he ordered for reinvestigation of the case.    Pursuant   to   the   said   order,   the   police reinvestigated  and filed a report on 15-9-1997 holding that appellant has committed the offence under Section 420 of the IPC.   The  Magistrate  took cognizance of  the  offence  on receipt  of  the  said report and issued warrant  of  arrest against  the appellant.  Appellant moved the High Court  for quashing  the proceedings on two grounds.  First is that the Magistrate  has  no  jurisdiction to  order  reinvestigation after  receipt  of the first report of the  police,  without affording  an opportunity to the appellant.  Second is  that allegations  of  the  complainant would  not  constitute  an offence  of  cheating.   But the High  Court  dismissed  the petition  for which the impugned order was passed.   Learned counsel  contended  that  no  offence  of  cheating  can  be discerned  from the allegations, particularly in view of the admitted fact that the complainant reposed faith only in the divine  powers  which appellant would only have  offered  to invoke  through rituals and prayers.  If somebody offers his prayers  to God for healing the sick, there cannot  normally be  any  element of fraud.  But if he represents to  another that  he has divine powers and either directly or indirectly makes  that  another person believe that he has such  divine powers, it is inducement referred to Section 415 of the IPC. Anybody  who responds to such inducement pursuant to it  and gives  the  inducer money or any other article and does  not get  the  desired  result  is a  victim  of  the  fraudulent representation.   Court can in such a situation presume that the  offence of cheating falling within the ambit of Section 420  of the IPC has been committed.  It is for the  accused, in  such  a  situation, to rebut the  presumption.   So  the contention  that the allegations do not disclose an  offence under  Section 420 of the IPC has to be repelled and we  are of  the  opinion  that  the  Magistrate  has  rightly  taken cognizance  of  the  said offence.  Power of the  police  to conduct further investigation, after laying final report, is recognised  under  Section  173(8) of the Code  of  Criminal Procedure.   Even  after  the court took cognizance  of  any offence  on  the  strength  of   the  police  report   first submitted,  it  is  open to the police  to  conduct  further investigation.  This has been so stated by this Court in Ram Lal  Narang v.  State (Delhi Admn.) (AIR 1979 SC 1791).  The only  rider  provided by the aforesaid decision is  that  it would  be desirable that the police should inform the  court and  seek  formal permission to make further  investigation. In  such  a situation the power of the court to  direct  the police  to  conduct  further investigation cannot  have  any inhibition.   There is nothing in Section 173(8) to  suggest that  the  court is obliged to hear the accused  before  any such  direction is made.  Casting of any such obligation  on the  court  would only result in encumbering the court  with the  burden of searching for all the potential accused to be afforded  with the opportunity of being heard.  As law  does not require it, we would not burden the magistrate with such an obligation.

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     For  the aforesaid reasons, we are unable to interfere with  the  order  passed  by   the  magistrate.   Appeal  is accordingly dismissed.