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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  5104 of 2006

PETITIONER: Som Lal

RESPONDENT: Vijay Laxmi & Ors

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 14/03/2008

BENCH: A.K.MATHUR & ALTAMAS KABIR

JUDGMENT: JUDGMENT

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5104 of 2006

A.K.MATHUR,J.

1.      This appeal is directed against the order dated 26.10.2006  passed by learned Single Judge of the Punjab & Haryana  High Court  whereby the learned Single Judge held that the appellant- Som Lal was  holding the whole-time salaried office of a statutory body as he was  on the rolls of the Market Committee, Sirsa as Fireman on 29.6.2003  and he was disqualified  from contesting the election as Sarpanch,  Gram Panchayat, Village Dhobra  on 29.6.2003. Therefore, he has been  rightly held to be disqualified  by the Election Tribunal.  Accordingly, the learned Single Judge upheld the order of the  Election Tribunal whereby the election of the appellant was set  aside. Aggrieved against this order dated 26.10.2006 passed by the  learned Single Judge of the High Court of Punjab & Haryana  the  present appeal was filed.

2.    Brief facts which are necessary for disposal of this appeal are  that the appellant contested the election of Sarpanch on 29.6.2003 of  Village Dhobara, Tehsil Pathankot,  and the appellant was elected and  the opponent- Vijay Laxmi lost. Total votes polled -800; 411 votes  were polled in favour of the appellant- Som Lal; 376 votes were  polled in favour of Vijay Laxmi and 13 votes were cancelled. Hence,  the appellant was declared elected.  The election of the appellant  was challenged by the respondent- Vijay Laxmi by filing an election  petition.  The main ground taken by the respondent was that the  appellant was working as a Fireman in the Haryana State Agricultural  Marketing Board  and he was posted at Sirsa. Therefore, he was  disqualified  from contesting the election as he was holding the  office of profit. The plea of the appellant was that he was an  employee of the Haryana State Agricultural Marketing Board but he had  left the job about 7-8 years prior to the conduct  of the election.  Therefore, he did not suffer from any disqualification.  The  respondent contended before the Election Tribunal that as per Section  208 (1)(g) of the Punjab Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 (Punjab Act 9 of  1994) [hereinafter to be referred to as "the Punjab Act 9 of 1994"],a  person who is a whole-time salaried employee of any local authority,  Statutory Corporation or Board or a Co-operative Society registered  under the Punjab Co-operative Societies Act, 1961 or of the State  Government or the Central Government, is disqualified for being  chosen as and for being a member of a Panchayat and since the  appellant was an employee of the Market Committee, therefore, he was  disqualified. As against this, it was contended by the appellant   that Section 11 of the Punjab State Election Commission Act,1994(  Punjab Act 19 of 1994)[hereinafter to be referred to as "the Punjab

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Act No.19 of 1994] which came into force with effect from 19th  September, 1994 after the Punjab Act 9 of 1994 which came into force  with effect from 21.4.1994, which deals with disqualification,  says  that a person shall be disqualified for being chosen as and for being  a member of a Panchayat or a Municipality if he holds an office of  profit under a Panchayat or a Municipality; or he holds an office of  profit under the Government of India or any State Government and not  for holding office of profit under local authority and being a member  of the Marketing Board. Therefore, as per Section 11 of the Act of 19  of 1994 an incumbent is not disqualified to contest the election. The  Election Tribunal after recording necessary evidence found that the  appellant was an employee of the Haryana State Agricultural Marketing  Board, Sirsa and therefore, he was disqualified from contesting the  election for Sarpanch, Gram Panchayat of village Dhobra. Hence, the  Election Tribunal by order dated 13.12.2004 set aside the election of  the appellant before us and allowed the election petition of the  respondent- Vijay Laxmi and declared her as elected to the Office of  Sarpanch. Aggrieved against this order the appellant filed an appeal  before the High Court of Punjab & Haryana. Since there was a conflict  between the two provisions, learned Single Judge referred the matter  to the Division Bench for adjudicating the following question of law:

       "  Whether election of Sarpanch/ Member of a Gram  Panchayat can be set aside on the basis of  disqualifications contemplated under section 208 of  the Punjab Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 or it can be set  aside only on the basis of disqualifications  enumerated in Section 11 of the Punjab State Election  Commission Act, 1994?"

Learned Division Bench answered the question by order dated 22.1.2006  in this very case which reads as follows:

               " In view of what has been discussed above,  we hold that a person shall be disqualified for  being chosen and for being a member of a Panchayat  if, he incurs any of the disqualifications enlisted  in Section 208 of the Punjab Panchayati Raj Act,  1994 and/or section 11 of the Punjab State Election  Commission Act, 1994."

3.              Now, the question before us is whether  the  disqualifications enumerated in Section 208 of the Act 9 of 1994  shall prevail or the disqualifications mentioned in Section 11 of the  Act 19 of 1994. Both the provisions are quoted below for the sake of  convenience.                 " 208. Disqualification for Membership. (1) A  person shall be disqualified for being chosen as  and for being a member of a Panchayat if,- (a)     he is so disqualified by or under any law for the  time being in force for the purposes of elections   to the Legislature of the State : Provided that no person shall be disqualified on  the ground that he is less than twenty-five years  of age, if he has attained the age of twenty-one  years; (b)     has been found guilty of any corrupt practice in any  election of a Gram Panchayat, Panchayat Samiti or  Zilla Parishad; (c)     has been convicted of any offence involving moral  turpitude or an offence implying of any defect of a  Sarpanch or Panch or Gram Panchayat  or member of a  Panchayat Samiti or Zila Parishad, unless a period  of five years has elapsed since his conviction; or

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(d)     has been convicted of an election offence; or (e)     has been ordered to give security for good behaviour  under section 110 of the Code of Criminal  Procedure, 1973; or (f)     has been notified as disqualified for appointment as  public servant except on medical grounds; or (g)     is a whole-time salaried employee of any local  authority, Statutory Corporation or Board or a Co- operative Society registered under the Punjab Co- operative Societies Act,1961, or of the State  Government or the Central Government; or (h)     is registered as a habitual offender xx              xx              xx 11. Disqualifications for membership of a Panchayat  or a Municipality.- A person shall be disqualified  for being chosen as, and for being a member of a  Panchayat or a Municipality,- (a)     if he is not a citizen of India, or has  voluntarily acquired the citizenship  of a foreign  State, or is under any acknowledgement of  allegiance or adherence to a foreign State; or (b)     if he is of unsound mind and stands so  declared by a competent court; or )       if he is an undischarged insolvent; or (d)     if he has, in proceedings for questioning the  validity or regularity of an election, been found  guilty of any corrupt practice; or (e)     if he has been found guilty of any offence  punishable under Section 153A or Section 171E or  section 171F or section 376 of section 376A of  section 376B or section 376C or section 376D or  section 498A or section 505 of the Indian Penal  Code, 1960 or any offence punishable under Chapter  XIII of this Act unless a period of six years has  elapsed since the date of such conviction; or (f)     if he holds an office of profit under a Panchayat  or a Municipality; or (g)     if he holds an office of profit under the  Government of India or any State Government; or (h)     xx              xx              xx"

Both the provisions bearing on the subject have been quoted  and the  disqualifications given in both the provisions make it clear that  so  far as Act 9 of 1994 is concerned,  there any person holding office  of profit under the local authority, statutory corporation or Board  or a Co-operative society or under  the State Government or the  Central Government has been disqualified whereas under Section 11 (f)  & (g) of Act 19 of 1994, a person shall be disqualified for being  chosen as and for being a member of a Panchayat or a Municipality if  he holds an office of profit under a Panchayat or a Municipality; or   under the Government of India or any State Government.  Therefore, it  is to be seen whether this disqualification which has come into force  under the Act 19 of 1994  i.e. on 19.9.1994 will prevail or the  earlier disqualifications as prescribed in Section 208 of Act 9 of  1994 will prevail.  In this connection,  the important provisions  which have substantial bearing on the subject are Sections 142 and  143 of the Act 19 of 1994 are relevant which read as under :

               " 142. Over-riding effect.- The provisions of  this Act shall have over-riding effect  notwithstanding  anything inconsistent therewith  contained in any other law for the time being in  force relating to the conduct of elections to the  Panchayats or Municipalities or any incidental  matter thereto.

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               143.Repeal and savings.- The provisions of  any State Law corresponding to the provisions of  this Act are hereby repealed:                 Provided that such repeal shall not attect- (a)     the previous operation of the corresponding  provisions of any State Law so repealed or anything  duly done or suffered thereunder; or (b)     any right, privilege, obligation or liability  occurred, accrued or incurred under the  corresponding provisions of any State Law so  repealed; or (c)     any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in  respect  of any offence committed against the  corresponding provisions of any State Law so  repealed; or (d)     any legal proceedings, investigation or remedy in  respect of any such right, privilege, obligation,  liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as  aforesaid, and any such legal proceedings,  investigation or remedy may be instituted  or  continued or enforced and any such penalty,  forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if this  Act had not been passed. (2)     Notwithstanding such repeal, anything done or  any action taken under the corresponding provisions  of any State Law so repealed (including any  notification, order, notice issued, application  made or permission granted, if any) which is not  inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, shall  be deemed to have been done or taken under the  corresponding provisions of this Act, as if this  Act was in force at the time, such thing was so  done or action so taken and shall continue to be in  force unless and until superseded by anything done  or any action taken under this Act."                  4.              Learned counsel for the appellant submitted before us that  when disqualifications have been prescribed in both the Acts i.e. Act  9 of 1994 and Act 19 of 1994 and the Act 19 of 1994  being subsequent  in point of time would prevail specially when there is section 142  which has laid down the over-riding effect notwithstanding  anything  contained in any other law which is inconsistent with this Act shall  prevail and similarly,  in Section 143 it clearly contemplates that   all other provisions of State law corresponding to the provisions of  this Act  shall stand repealed,  save to the extent that the  provisions which are not inconsistent with this Act.  Therefore, in  view of Sections 142 and 143 of the Act 19 of 1994, the over-riding  effect of the subsequent legislation is that  the legislature in its  wisdom  while enacted the Act 19 of 1994 which has come into force  with effect from 19.9.1994 much after the Act 9 of 1994, intended  that this provision shall prevail especially when it has the over- riding effect and the repeal is specific. Therefore, the clear  intention of the legislature should be given effect to.  In support  of his contention, learned counsel for the appellant invited our  attention to the decision of this Court in Hyderabad Chemical and  Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. etc. v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors.  ([1964] 7 S.C.R. 376) and in Ratan Lal Adukia v. Union of India  [(1989) 3 SCC 537].  

5.              As against this, Mr.P.S.Patwalia, learned senior counsel  for the respondents  submitted that there is no express repeal but it  is only by implication and submitted that both the Acts can be read  harmoniously and in support of his contention, invited our attention   to the following decisions of this Court.

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i.      (2003) 12 SCC 274      Kishorebhai Khamanchand Goyal v      State of Gujarat & Anr.

ii.      1989 Supp.(1) SCC 589      Jugal Kishore v.       State of Maharashtra & Ors.

iii.     (1986) 2 SCC 209      Mary Roy & Ors. V.       State of Kerala & Ors.

iv.     (1980) 4 SCC 435 M/s. Jain Ink Manufacturing Company        v. Life  Insurance Corporation of India & Anr.

v.       (1969) 3 SCC 801

vi.     Principles of Statutory   Interpretation [11th Edn.  2008] By Justice G.P.Singh (Chapter 7, Synopsis 4 at page  637-639)

6.              Both the Acts i.e. Act 9 of 1994 and Act 19 of 1994 came  into being in view of seventy-third amendment and seventy-fourth  amendment of the Constitution of India to provide more teeth to local  self government. By this amendment under Part IX  of the  Constitution, Article 243 was amended. Likewise by inserting Part  IXA, Municipalities were also strengthened.  Self-governance were  given to the local bodies. As a result of these seventy-third and  seventy-fourth amendments, The Punjab Panchayati Raj Act, 1994(Punjab  Act 9 of 1994) and the Punjab State Election Commission Act, 1994  (Punjab Act No. 19 of 1994) were enacted. The preamble of The Punjab  Panchayati Raj Act,1994 ( Punjab Act 9 of 1994) reads as under :

               " Whereas it is expedient to replace the  present enactments by a comprehensive new enactment  to establish a three-tier Panchayati Raj system in  the State of Punjab with elected bodies at the  village, Block and District levels, in keeping with  the provisions of the Constitution (Seventy-third  Amendment) Act, 1992 for greater participation of  the people and more effective implementation of  rural development and Panchayati Raj system;

Likewise the Punjab State Election Commission Act, 1994 was enacted   and the preamble reads as under:

               " An Act to provide for the constitution of  the State Election Commission and for vesting the  superintendence, direction and control of the  preparation of election rolls for, and the conduct of  all elections to the Panchayats and Municipalities in  the State of Punjab, in the State Election Commission,  and to provide for all matters relating to, or  ancillary or in connection with the elections to the  Panchayats and Municipalities, in terms of the  provisions of Parts IX and IX-A of the Constitution of  India."

This is also a fact that the Act 9 of 1994 came into effect on

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21.4.1994 and the Act 19 of 1994 came into effect on 19.9.1994. Act  19 of 1994 is definitely later in point of time and here under  Section 11 (f) & (g) the disqualifications have been prescribed.  Though similar disqualifications  existed under Section 208 of the  Act of 9 of 1994 but subsequently the legislature in its wisdom has  reduced the disqualifications and confined only to the area that one  should not hold office of profit under a Panchayat or a Municipality  or under the Government of India or any State Government. Thus, the  legislature in its wisdom has not considered it proper to continue  with the disqualification of being an employee of any local  authority, Statutory Corporation or Board or a Co-operative Society.   Had that been the intention of the legislature then perhaps they  would have specifically provided the disqualifications under Section  11 of the Act 19 of 1994. Section 11 clearly says that a person shall  be disqualified for being chosen as, and for being a member of a  Panchayat or a Municipality if he holds an office of profit under a  Panchayat or a Municipality; or if he holds an office of profit under  the Government of India or any State Government; whereas Section 208  (g) says a person shall be disqualified for being chosen as, and for  being a member of a Panchayat or a Municipality if he is a whole-time  salaried employee of any local authority, Statutory Corporation or  Board  or a Co-operative Society registered under the Punjab Co- operative Societies Act, 1961, or of the State Government or the  Central Government. But in the subsequent Act 19 of 1994 the area of  disqualification has been narrowed down.  Since the Act 19 of 1994 is  subsequent in point of time and it also has the provisions of  Sections 142 and 143 which clearly contemplate that it shall have the  complete over-riding effect, reading of Section 142 makes it clear  that the legislature were aware of the earlier disqualification and  subsequently they have inserted the disqualifications under sub- sections (f) & (g) of Section 11 so far as the office of profit is  concerned and provided over-riding effect and have clearly laid  down  that notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any  other law for the time being in force relating to the conduct of  elections to the Panchayats or Municipalities or any incidental  matter thereto shall stand repealed. Therefore, the mandate of the  legislature appears on the face of it very clear and they have saved  the actions under Section 143 to the extent that any other law which  is  inconsistent with this law shall stand repealed and only that  action taken under the corresponding provisions of any State law  which were in force at that time, those actions shall only be saved  and not otherwise.  Therefore, the saving clause is very limited if  any action has been taken under the earlier legislation before coming  into force  of Act 19 of 1994, those actions would  be saved after  the coming into force of Act 19 of 1994. The mandate of legislature  is categorically clear in view of Sections 142 and 143 and it admits  of no two opinion in the matter. The courts should be  very slow to  interfere with the mandates of the legislature unless there are  compelling reasons for doing so. In the present case, the clear  mandate of the legislature was that anything which is inconsistent  with the Act 19 of 1994 shall be deemed to have been repealed leaves  no room for us to take a contrary view of the matter. With respect we  cannot agree with the view taken by the Division Bench of the High  Court that both the provisions can be read harmoniously i.e. Section  11 of Act 19 of 1994  read with Section 208 of Act 9 of 1994 but we  regret it cannot be. Harmonious reading of both the provisions will  be limited to the extent of Section 11 of the Act 19 of 1994. When  Section 11 of Act 19 of 1994 clearly contemplates that these are the  only disqualifications mentioned in sub-sections (f) & (g), which are  already present in Section 208 of Act 9 of 1994, beyond that it  cannot be read. If Section 208 of Act 9 of 1994 lays down further  disqualifications then those disqualifications will  run counter to  the disqualifications as mentioned in Section 11 of Act 19 of 1994.  If Section 208 of Act 9 of 1994 is inconsistent to the extent of  Section 11 of Act 19 of 1994, then to this extent the provisions of

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Section 208 of Act 9 of 1994 cannot be read. Since there are only   four disqualifications mentioned in Section 11 of Act 19 of 1994, the  rest of the disqualifications cannot be imported  by implication of  the Act 9 of 1994. Mr. Patwalia, learned senior counsel for the  respondents  tried to persuade us that the theory of not expressly  repealed by implication should be read into but we regret, it cannot  be. The intention of the legislature is clear  and there is no reason  why  the intention of the legislature be not  given effect to. In  fact the Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that  Section 11 should be  read with Section 208; that means Section 208  can survive  to the extent that it is consistent with Section 11 of  Act 19 of 1994. Rest part of section 208 i.e. a person who is holding  office of profit under local authority, Statutory Corporation, Board  or Co-operative Society will not be disqualified. Therefore, if a  person holds an office of profit under the local authority, Statutory  Corporation or Board or a Co-operative Society cannot by implication  be said to be a person disqualified under the Act.  These provisions  can be read harmoniously to the extent  that if a person is holding  office under the Panchayat or a Municipality, or under the Government  of India or any State Government, to that extent it will be deemed to  be office of profit. If he holds an office of profit under any other  organization, like local authority, Statutory Corporation or Board or  a Co-operative Society, that will not be office of profit so as to  disqualify him to be chosen as and for being a member of a Panchayat.

7.              Mr.Patwalia, learned senior counsel for the respondents   invited our attention to Chapter VII at pg.637  of the Principles of  Statutory Interpretation (11th Edn.2008) by Justice G.P.Singh, which  reads as under :

               "   The use of any particular form of words is  not necessary to bring about  an express repeal. All  that is necessary is that  the words used show an  intention to abrogate  the Act or provision in  question. The usual form is to use the words’ is or  are hereby repealed’ and to mention the Acts sought  to be repealed in the repealing section or to  catalogue them in a Schedule. The use of words ’  shall cease to have effect’, is also not uncommon.  When  the object is to repeal only a portion of an  Act words ’shall be omitted’ are normally used. The  legislative practice in India shows that ’omission’  of a provision is treated as amendment which  signifies deletion of that provision and is not  different from repeal. It has been held that "there  is no real distinction between repeal and an  amendment." It has also been held that" where a  provision of an Act is omitted by an Act and the said  Act simultaneously re-enacts a new provision which  substantially covers the field occupied by the repealed  provision with certain modification, in that event such  re-enactment is regarded having force continuously  and the modification  or changes are treated as  amendment coming into force with effect from the date  of enforcement of re-enacted provision."  

Similarly, our attention was invited to a paragraph at page 639.  There it has been observed as follows:

" The Legislature sometimes does not enumerate the  Acts sought to be repealed, and only says that " all  provisions inconsistent with this Act" are hereby  repealed. With respect to such a repealing provision,  it has been said that it merely substitutes for the

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uncertainty of the general law an express provision  of equal uncertainty; and in determining whether a  particular earlier provision is repealed  by such a  repealing provision on the ground of inconsistency  with it, the same provisions which are application in  determining a question of implied repeal have to be  applied."

At page 640, under the heading  Implied repeal it has been observed  as follows:

" There is a presumption against a repeal by  implication; and the reason of this rule is based on  the theory that the Legislature while enacting  a law  has a complete knowledge of the existing laws on the  same subject-matter, and therefore, when it does not  provide a repealing provision, it gives out an  intention not to repeal the existing legislation.  When the new Act contains a repealing section  mentioning the Acts which it expressly repeals, the  presumption against implied repeal of other laws is  further strengthened on the principle expressio unius est  exclusion alterius. Further, the presumption will be  comparatively strong in case of virtually  contemporaneous Acts. The continuance of existing  legislation, in the absence of an express provision  of repeal, being presumed, the burden to show that  there has been a repeal by implication lies on the  party asserting  the same. The presumption is,  however, rebutted and a repeal is inferred by  necessary implication when the provisions of the  later Act are so inconsistent with or repugnant to  the provisions of the earlier Act " that the two  cannot stand together"."

As already mentioned above it is very clear that Section 142  clearly  contemplates that the earlier laws which are inconsistent with the  Act shall stand repealed and it is saved to the limited extent as  provided under Section 143. Therefore, if both the provisions i.e.  Section 208 of Act 9 of 1994 and Section 11 of Act 19 of 1994 can be  read harmoniously to show that the disqualifications which are  mentioned for holding office of profit are that an incumbent should  not be an employee or a salaried person under the Panchayat, or under    Municipality, or under the State Government; or the Central  Government. To this extent there is identity between the two  provisions  and no other disqualifications have been saved and it has  been subsequently repealed and it is more than apparent from Sections  142 and 143 of the Act 19 of 1994.

8.              In Ratan Lal Adukia v. Union of India [(1989) 3 SCC 537] it  has been held as follows:

               " The doctrine of implied repeal is based on  the postulate that the legislature which is  presumed to know the existing state of the law did  not intend to create any confusion by retaining  conflicting provisions. Courts in applying this  doctrine are supposed merely to give effect to the  legislative intent by examining the object and  scope of the two enactments. But in a conceivable  case, the very existence  of two provisions may by  itself, and without more, lead to an inference of  mutual irreconcilability if the later set of  provisions is by itself a complete code with

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respect to the same matter. In such a case the  actual detailed comparison of the two sets of  provisions may not be necessary. It is a matter of  legislative intent that the two sets of provisions  were not expected to be applied simultaneously."

9.              In Hyderabad Chemical and Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. etc. v.  State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. ([1964] 7 S.C.R. 376), it was held as  follows:

" By virtue of Entry 84 List I of the VII Schedule  to the Constitution no charge could be levied on  the manufacture of medicinal preparations except by  the Union of India and since the 1955 Act is a law  made otherwise by Parliament within the meaning of  Art. 277 the duties and other charges which used to  be levied by the State  in connection with  medicinal preparations could no longer be levied by  it. Further the effect of s.21 of the Act is that  so far as the Hyderabad Act applied to the use of  alcohol in the manufacture of medicinal and toilet  preparations, the Hyderabad Act must be deemed to  have been repealed."

Therefore, it clearly transpires that  by virtue of subsequent  amendment of the law made by the Parliament, the Hyderabad Act  automatically stood repealed. Similar is the position here also that  the subsequent Act 19 of 1994  which has come at later point of time,  repeals the provisions of the Act 9 of 1994 so far as it is  inconsistent with the Act 19 of 1994.

10.             As against this, learned senior counsel for the  respondents, invited our attention to a decision of this Court in  Municipal Corporation  of Delhi v. Shiv Shankar [ 1971 (1) SCC 442]  wherein it has been held as follows:

               " As the Legislature must be presumed in  deference of the rule of law to intend to enact  consistent and harmonious body of laws, a  subsequent legislation may not be too readily  presumed to effectuate a repeal of existing  statutory laws in the absence of express or at  least clear and unambiguous indication to that  effect."

But in the present case,  the intention of the Legislature is more  than apparent that the existing legislation as subsequently held  under Section 142 of the Act 19 of 1994 that this Act will have over- riding effect on all other laws in the State and likewise,  under  Section 143 there is repeal. Therefore, there is no question of  ambiguity in the matter of intention of the legislature as it is very  clear.  

11.             In Kishorebhai Khamanchand Goyal v. State of Gujarat &  Anr.[ (2003) 12 SCC 274] their Lordships held as follows:

               " There is a presumption against repeal by  implication. The reason is that the legislature while  enacting a law is presumed to have complete knowledge  of the existing laws on the same subject-matter, and  therefore, when  it does not provide a repealing  provision the intention is clear not to repeal the  existing legislation. Besides when the new Act  contains a repealing section mentioning the Acts  which it expressly repeals, the presumption against

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implied repeal of other laws is further strengthened  on the principle of expressio unius (personae vel rei) est exclusion alterius.(  The express intention of one person or thing is the  exclusion of another.) The continuance of existing  legislation, in the absence of an express provision  of repeal being presumed, the burden to show that  there has been repeal by implication lies on the  party asserting the same. The presumption is,  however, rebutted and a repeal is inferred by  necessary implication when the provisions of the  later Act are so inconsistent with or repugnant to  the provisions of the earlier Act that the two cannot  stand together. But, if the two can be read together  and some application can be made of the words in the  earlier Act, a repeal will not be inferred. The  necessary questions to be asked are: (1)     Whether there is direct conflict   between the  two provisions. (2)     Whether the legislature intended to lay down an  exhaustive Code in respect of the subject-matter  replacing the earlier law. (3)     Whether the two laws occupy the same field."

As already mentioned  there is no necessary implication. In this  case, the intention of the legislature is more than apparent.  

12.             Learned counsel for the appellant has tried to submit that   in fact the incumbent was virtually not holding  the office of profit  as he  ceased to be an employee for the last 8-9 years. We do not  want to go into this controversy as we have already decided the  question of law involved in the present case that a salaried employee  of any local authority, statutory corporation or Board or a Co- operative Society can not be held to have held the office of profit  under Section 11 of the Act 19 of 1994. Therefore, we need not to go  into the factual controversy. Mr. P.S.Patwalia, learned senior  counsel for the respondents tried to persuade us that we  should look  to the scope of both the Acts. The disqualifications are only  mentioned in Section 208 of the Act 9 of 1994  and  the intention of  the legislature is very clear and Section 11 of the Act of 1994 being  in  later point of time stating therein what are the  disqualifications, therefore, the disqualifications mentioned in  Section 11 of the Act 19 of 1994 will prevail and not the  disqualifications mentioned in Section 208 of Act 9 of 1994. The  disqualifications mentioned in Section 208 which are consistent with  Section 11 of Act 19 of 1994 can only survive and not other  disqualifications.  

13. As a result of our above discussions, we are opinion that the  view taken by the learned Single Judge on the basis of the judgment  of the Division Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana cannot  be sustained. Consequently, we allow this appeal, set aside the  judgment and order of the learned Single Judge and hold that the  appellant while serving in the Marketing Committee cannot be held to  be holding the office of profit. There would be no order as to costs.