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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  3951 of 2006

PETITIONER: SOM DEV & ORS.

RESPONDENT: RATI RAM & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 06/09/2006

BENCH: H.K. SEMA & P.K. BALASUBRAMANYAN

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T  (ARISING OUT OF S.L.P. (C) NO.3353 OF 2006)

P.K. BALASUBRAMANYAN, J.

               Heard learned counsel for the parties.

Leave granted.   

1.              This Appeal is by the contesting defendants in a suit  filed by Respondent No.1 herein for recovery of possession of  the suit property in enforcement of a right of pre-emption  claimed by him.   The plaintiff claimed that a half share in the  suit property had been relinquished in favour of himself and  his brother by Sheoram a co-owner with the assignor of the  contesting defendants and the said relinquishment had been  recognised by the court by decreeing the claim made by the  present plaintiff and his brother in Civil Suit No.398 of 1980.     Thus, having become a co-owner with the assignor of the  contesting defendants, the plaintiff was entitled to enforce a  right of pre-emption and recover possession of the property  from the assignee of the other co-owner.   The contesting  defendants resisted the suit.   The contention germane to this  appeal that was raised by the contesting defendants was that  a right was created in the present plaintiff by the decree in  Civil Suit No.398 of 1980 which was one based on a  compromise and since the decree purported to create a right in  the plaintiff in a property in which he had no pre-existing  right, the compromise decree required registration in terms of  Section 17(1) of the Registration Act and the decree not having  been registered, the plaintiff was not entitled to enforce the  alleged right of pre-emption as against the contesting  defendants or their assignor, the other co-owner.

2.              The trial court held that the decree in Civil Suit  No.398 of 1980 was enforceable even without registration as it  was not hit by Section 17(1) of the Registration Act; that the  said decree had recognised the right claimed by the plaintiff  and in the circumstances the plaintiff was entitled to a decree  for possession from the assignee of the other co-owner in  enforcement of his right of pre-emption.   On appeal, the lower  appellate court affirmed this view of the trial court.   The lower  appellate court also held that what was involved in Civil Suit  No.398 of 1980 was a family arrangement and since a bona  fide family arrangement among the members of a family in the  larger sense of the term, did not require registration, no

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objection could be raised by the contesting defendants to the  enforceability of the title claimed by the plaintiff.   Thus, the  decree of the trial court was affirmed.   The contesting  defendants filed a second appeal.   They raised the substantial  question of law that the decree in Civil Suit No.398 of 1980  created rights in favour of the plaintiff in a property in which  he had no pre-existing right and such a decree, to become  enforceable, required registration.   Reliance was placed on the  decision of this Court in Bhoop Singh vs. Ram Singh Major  and others  [(1995) Supp. 3 S.C.R. 466) in support.   The High  Court held that the decree in Civil Suit No.398 of 1980 was  based on a family settlement which did not require registration  and that the decree itself did not require registration in view of  Section 17(2)(vi) of the Registration Act.   Thus, the substantial  question of law formulated was answered in favour of the  plaintiff, the judgments and decrees of the courts below were  confirmed and the second appeal filed by the contesting  defendants was dismissed.  It is challenging this decision of  the High Court that this appeal by special leave is filed by the  contesting defendants.

3.              Before proceeding to consider the question argued  before us, we think that it is proper to notice that the case  arises from the State of Haryana which was originally a part of  the State of Punjab and that the Transfer of Property Act as  such did not apply to the State.   But, Sections 54, 107 and  123 of the Transfer of Property Act were made applicable to  the State of Punjab with effect from 01.04.1955 vide  notification dated 23.03.1955.    As is clear, Section 54 of the  Transfer of Property Act relates to a sale of immovable  property of the value of Rs.100/- and upwards, Section 107  deals with leases of immovable property and Section 123  indicates how the transfer of immovable property by way of gift  is to be effected.  It insists that for making a gift of immovable  property, the transfer must be effected by a registered  instrument singed by or on behalf of the donor and attested by  at least two witnesses.   One other aspect to be noted is the  introduction of sub-section (1A) of Section 17 of the  Registration Act made prospective from the date of coming into  force of the Registration and Other Related Laws (Amendment)  Act, 2001 insisting that documents containing contracts to  transfer for consideration any immovable property for the  purpose of Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, shall be  registered if they have been created after the commencement  of sub-section (1A) of Section 17 of the Transfer of Property  Act.

4.              The decree in Civil Suit No.398 of 1980 was really a  decree on admission.  It was not a compromise decree.   In the  plaint in that suit the present plaintiff and his brother had  asserted that Sheo Ram the son of the sister of the assignor of  the contesting defendants had relinquished his half share in  the properties in their favour and on the death of Phusa Ram  the grandfather of Sheo Ram, the plaintiffs therein had  become the absolute owners of that half share and the  defendant Sheo Ram did not have any right in the property.    This case set up by the plaintiffs in that suit was admitted in  his written statement by Sheo Ram as also in his evidence.   Based on these admissions, the court decreed the suit as  prayed for by the plaintiffs therein.   The decree thus upheld  the right of the present plaintiff and his brother to one half of  the present suit property on the basis of the arrangement  between themselves and Sheo Ram.   This decree is relied on  by the present plaintiff as affirming his right that entitles him  to exercise a right of pre-emption in respect of the other half

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that belonged to the assignor of the contesting defendants.   It  is in that context that the contesting defendants have raised  the contention that the decree created fresh rights in the  property in favour of the plaintiff wherein he had no pre- existing right and hence that decree required registration.   It  is also attempted to be argued that the decree is one on  compromise and going by the ratio of Bhoop Singh (supra), it  required registration.

5.              On an advertence to the circumstances leading to  that decree, in the context of the pleadings in that suit, we are  not in a position to agree with counsel for the contesting  defendants that the decree was a compromise decree.   It was  really a decree on admission and the admission was of the  pre-existing right set up by the plaintiffs as created by Sheo  Ram.  The decree by itself did not create any right in  immovable property.  It only recognised the right set up by the  plaintiffs in that suit in respect of the property involved in that  suit.   It is one thing to say that that decree is vitiated by  collusion or by fraud or some such vitiating element.  But it is  quite another thing to say that such a decree could be  excluded from consideration on the ground of want of  registration.

6.              We shall now advert to Section 17 of the  Registration Act, 1908.   Sub-section (1) specifies what are the  documents that are to be registered.    An instrument of gift of  immovable property, an instrument which purports to create,  declare, assign, limit or extinguish, whether in present or in  future any right, title or interest in immovable property, the  value of which exceeds Rs.100/-,  any instrument which  acknowledges the receipt or  payment of consideration on  account of the creation, declaration, assignment, limitation or  extinction of any right title or interest, leases of immovable  property from year to year or for a term exceeding one year  and instruments transferring or assigning any decree or order  of court or any award where such decree or order or award  operates to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish any  right, title or interest in immovable property, the value of  which exceeds Rs.100/-.   Sub-section (1A) provides that  agreements for sale to be used to claim protection of Section  53A of the Transfer of Property Act entered into after  24.09.2001 require registration.   Sub-section (2) excludes  from the operation of clauses (b) and (c) of sub-section (1) of  Section 17, the various transactions described therein under  various clauses.   We are concerned with clause (vi) therein.    We shall set down that provision for convenience:  "Any decree or order of a Court except a  decree or order expressed to be made on a  compromise and comprising immovable  property other than which is subject matter of  the suit or proceeding". (emphasis supplied)

It may be noted that going by clause (vi), a decree or order of  court need not be registered on the basis that it comes within  the purview of Section 17(1)(b) or 17(1)(c) of the Act as an  instrument purporting to or operating to create, declare,  assign, limit or extinguish any right, title or interest in  immovable property.   It may further be seen that a  compromise decree also does not require registration in terms  of clauses (b) and (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 17 of the  Registration Act unless that decree takes in immovable  property valued above Rs.100/-, that is not a subject matter of  the suit or the proceeding giving rise to the compromise  decree.   In other words,  only if the compromise also takes in

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any property that is not the subject matter of the suit, it would  require registration.   If the compromise is confined to the  subject matter of the suit, it would not.  It may be noted that  Section 43 of the Registration Act of 1864 and Section 41 of  the Registration Act of 1866 provided that when any civil court  should by a decree or order, declare any document relating to  immovable property, which should have been registered, to be  invalid or when any civil court should pass a decree or order  affecting any such document and the decree or order should  create, declare, transfer, limit or extinguish any right, title or  interest under such document to or in the immovable property  to which it relates, the court should cause a memorandum of  the decree or order to be sent to the Registrar within whose  district the document was originally registered.   But these  sections were omitted while enacting the Registration Act of  1871.  But in the Specific Relief Act, 1877, Section 39 was  introduced providing that where an instrument is adjudged  void or viodable under that section and ordered to be delivered  up and cancelled, the court should send a copy of its decree, if  the instrument has been registered under the Registration Act,  to the officer in whose office the instrument had been so  registered and such officer should note on the copy of the  instrument contained in his books the effect of its  cancellation.   But under the 1887 Act, decrees and orders of  courts and awards were exempted from registration.   They  were also not mentioned in Section 18 which related to  documents of which registration was optional.   Sargent, CJ in  Purmananddas vs. Vallabdas ( ILR 11 Bombay 506) explained  the position as follows: "The application (for execution) was refused on  the ground that the decree was an instrument,  which created an interest in immovable  property, and could not be given in evidence  for want of registration.   Provision was made  for the registration of such a decree by Section  42 of Act XX of 1886, but that section was not  re-enacted in Act VIII of 1871.  If, therefore, it  required registration under the Act, it could  only be as an ’executed instrument’ under  Section 17, a description which is scarcely  applicable to a decree.  Moreover, it is to be  remarked that Section 32 deals only with the  presentation  of a ’copy’ of a decree, the  optional registration of which is expressly  provided for by section 18 of the Act.   Upon a  true construction of the Act of 1871, read with  reference to Act XX of 1866, such a decree, we  are strongly inclined to think, did not fall  within Section 17.   However, Act III of 1877,  which is now in force, expressly excludes such  decrees, whether passed before or after the  Act, from the operation of compulsory  registration, and the decree is, therefore, now  admissible in evidence."

In Pranal Anni Vs. Lakshmi Anni & Ors. [I.L.R. 22 MADRAS  508], the Privy Council held: "The razinamah was not registered in  accordance with the Act of 1877; but the  objection founded upon its non-registration  does not, in their Lordships’ opinion, apply to  its stipulations and provisions in so far as  these were incorporated with, and given effect  to by, the order made upon it by the

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Subordinate Judge in the suit of 1885.  The  razinamah, in so far as it was submitted to  and was acted upon judicially by the learned  Judge, was in itself a step of judicial procedure  not requiring registration; and any order  pronounced in terms of it constituted res  judicata, binding upon both the parties to this  appeal who gave their consent to it."

In Rani Hemanta Kumari Debi vs. Midnapur Zamindari  Company Limited (46 Indian Appeals 240) the Privy Council  again held that a consent decree did not require registration  even if it compromised immovable property other than that  which was the subject matter of the suit and that the  consequences provided for by Section 49 of the Act would not  follow.   It was in the light of this decision of the Privy Council,  that by virtue of Section 10 of the Transfer of Property  (Amendment) Supplementary Act, 1929, which came into force  on 01.04.1930,   clause (vi) of Section 17(2) of the Registration  Act was amended and re-enacted in the present form, thus,  excluding decrees and orders of courts including compromise  decrees from registration because of Section 17(1)(b) and (c), if  they related only to the subject matter of the suit or if the  compromise did not take in any property outside the subject  matter of the suit.  (See Mulla on Registration Act, Tenth  Edition)

7.              On a plain reading of Section 17 of the Registration  Act, with particular reference to clause (vi) of sub-section (2) it  is clear that a decree or order of a court and a compromise  decree that relates only to the subject matter of the suit need  not be registered on the ground that it is a non-testamentary  instrument which purports to or operates to create, declare,  assign, limit or extinguish any right to or in immovable  property or which acknowledges receipt or payment of any  consideration on account of a transaction which brings about  the above results.   But if a suit is decreed on the basis of a  compromise and that compromise takes in property that is not  the subject matter of the suit, such a compromise decree  would require registration.   Of course, we are not unmindful  of the line of authorities that say that even if there is inclusion  of property that is not the subject matter of the suit, if it  constitutes the consideration for the compromise, such a  compromise decree would be considered to be a compromise  relating to the subject matter of the suit and such a decree  would also not require registration in view of clause (vi) of  Section 17(2) of the Registration Act.  Since we are not  concerned with that aspect here, it is not necessary to further  deal with that question.   Suffice it to say that on a plain  reading of clause (vi) of Section 17(2) all decrees and orders of  Court including a compromise decree subject to the exception  as regards properties that are outside the subject matter of the  suit, do not require registration on the ground that they are  hit by Section 17(1)(b) and (c) of the Act.   But at the same  time, there is no exemption or exclusion, in respect of the  clauses (a), (d) and (e) of Section 17(1) so that if a decree  brings about a gift of immovable property, or lease of  immovable property from year to year or for a term exceeding  one year or reserving an early rent or a transfer of a decree or  order of a Court or any award creating, declaring, assigning,  limiting or extinguishing rights to and in immovable property,  that requires to be registered.

8.              After the amendment of the Code of Civil Procedure

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by Act 104 of 1976, a compromise of a suit can be effected and  the imprimatur of the Court obtained thereon leading to a  decree, only if the agreement or compromise presented in  court is in writing and signed by the parties and also by their  counsel as per practice.   In a case where one party sets up a  compromise and the other denies it, the Court can decide the  question whether, as a matter of fact, there has been a  compromise.  But, when a compromise is to be recorded and a  decree is to be passed, Rule 3 of Order XXIII of the Code  insists that the terms to the compromise should be reduced to  writing and signed by the parties.  Therefore, after 1.2.1977, a  compromise decree can be passed only on compliance with the  requirements of Rule 3 of Order XXIII of the Code and unless a  decree is passed in terms thereof, it may not be possible to  recognise the same as a compromise decree.  In the case on  hand, a decree was passed on 10.10.1980 after the  amendment of the Code and it was not in terms of Order XXIII  Rule 3 of the Code.  On the other hand, as the decree itself  indicates, it was one on admission of a pre-existing  arrangement.   

9.              We shall now advert to the position in the present  case.  The plaintiffs in Civil Suit No.398 of 1980 were the  descendants of Jeeta @ Chet Ram.   Sheo Ram, the defendant  in that suit, was the descendant of Deepa.   Deepa and Jeeta  were children of Mauji.   The property descended from Mauji  and one half of the entire property came to the present  plaintiff and his brother, the descendants of Jeeta and the  other half descended to Phusa and through him to the  assignor of the contesting defendants and to Sheo Ram the  defendant  in the earlier suit, through his mother.   It was in  this property that a half share was surrendered or  relinquished by Sheo Ram in favour of the present plaintiff  and his brother.   The present plaintiff and his brother could  not take possession of the property since Phusa Ram was alive  at the relevant time.   After the death of Phusa Ram the  present plaintiff and his brother filed the earlier suit for  establishment of their right on the basis of the arrangement  came to with Sheo Ram even during the life time of Phusa  Ram.   It was that arrangement or relinquishment of right by  Sheo Ram that was admitted by him in his written statement  in the earlier suit and it was based on that admission that a  decree was given to plaintiff and his brother.   It was pleaded  that the relinquishment or surrender by Sheo Ram was by way  of a family arrangement in view of the close relationship  enjoyed by the present plaintiff and his brother, the uncles  (not direct) on the one hand and Sheo Ram on the other, who  was actually their nephew one step removed, but who was  treated by them as their own real nephew.   There was no case  that his share was gifted by Sheo Ram in favour of the present  plaintiff and his brother so as to attract clause (a) of Section  17(1) of the Registration Act.   It was really a case of clause (b)  of Section 17(1) being attracted, if at all.   All the courts have  found that the relinquishment was part of a family settlement  and hence its validity cannot be questioned on the ground of  want of registration in the light of the decisions of this Court.    Apart from that strand of reasoning, it appears to us that the  decree in Civil Suit No.398 of 1980 did not create, declare,  assign, limit or extinguish any right in the suit property.   It  merely recognised the right put forward by the plaintiffs in  that suit based on an earlier family arrangement or  relinquishment by the defendant in that suit and on the basis  that the defendant in that suit had admitted such an  arrangement or relinquishment.   Therefore, on principle, it  appears to us that the decree in Civil Suit No.398 of 1980

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cannot be held to be not admissible or cannot be treated as  evidencing the recognition of the rights of the present plaintiff  and his brother as co-owners, for want of registration.  Nor  can we ignore the relief obtained therein by the plaintiff and  his brother.   10.             Almost the whole of the argument on behalf of the  appellants here, is based on the ratio of the decision of this  Court in Bhoop Singh (supra).   It was held in that case that  exception under clause (vi) of Section 17(2) of the Act is meant  to cover that decree or order of a Court including the decree or  order expressed to be made on a compromise which declares  the pre-existing right and does not by itself create new right,  title or interest in praesenti in immovable property of the value  of Rs.100/- or upwards.   Any other view would find the  mischief of avoidance of registration which requires payment  of stamp duty embedded in the decree or order.    It would,  therefore, be the duty of the Court to examine in each case  whether the parties had pre-existing right to the immovable  property or whether under the order or decree of the Court one  party having right, title or interest therein agreed or suffered to  extinguish the same and created a right in praesenti in  immovable property of the value of Rs.100/- or upwards in  favour of the other party for the first time either by  compromise or pretended consent.    If latter be the position,  the document is compulsorily registrable.   Their Lordships  referred to the decisions of this Court in regard to the family  arrangements and whether such family arrangements require  to be compulsorily registered and also the decision relating to  an award.   With respect, we may point out that an award does  not come within the exception contained in clause (vi) of  Section 17(2) of the Registration act and the exception therein  is confined to decrees or orders of a Court.   Understood in the  context of the decision in Hemanta Kumari Debi (supra) and  the subsequent amendment brought about in the provision,  the position that emerges is that a decree or order of a court is  exempted from registration even if clauses (b)and (c) of Section  17(1) of the Registration Act are attracted, and even a  compromise decree comes under the exception, unless, of  course, it takes in any immovable property that is not the  subject matter of the suit.

11.             In Mangan Lal Deoshi Vs. Mohammad Moinul  Haque & Others [(1950) SCR 833], this Court considered a  case where the effect of a decree was to create a perpetual  under-lease and considered the case whether under such  circumstances that decree required registration in the context  of Section 17(1)(b) of the Act.  This Court stated: "What the compromise really did was, as  stated already, to bring the Singhs and the  Deoshis into a new legal relationship as under- lessor and under-lessee in respect of 500  bighas which were the subject matter of the  title suit; in other words, its legal effect was to  create a perpetual under-lease between the  Singhs and the Deoshis which would clearly  fall under clause (d) but for the circumstance  that it was to take effect only on condition that  the Singhs paid Rs. 8,000 to Kumar within 2  months thereafter.  As pointed out by the  Judicial Committee in Hemanta Kumari’s case  [47 Calcutta 485] "An agreement for a lease,  which a lease is by the statute declared to  include, must, in their Lordships’ opinion, be a  document which effects an actual demise and  operates as a lease\005\005.  The phrase which in

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the context where it occurs and in the statute  in which it is found, must in their opinion  relate to some document which creates a  present and immediate interest in the land."  The compromise decree expressly provides that   unless the sum of Rs.8,000 was paid within  the stipulated time the Singhs were not to  execute the decree or to take possession of the  disputed property.  Until the payment was  made it was impossible to determine whether  there would be any under-lease or not.  Such a  contingent agreement is not within clause (d)  and although it is covered by clause (b), is  excepted by clause (vi) of sub-section (2)." (Emphasis supplied)

12.              We shall now examine the decision in Bhoop Singh  (supra).  What was involved therein was a decree based on  admission.  It is to be noted that in that case it was a decree  that created the right.  The decree that is quoted in paragraph  2 of that judgment was to the effect: "It is ordered that a declaratory decree in  respect of the property in suit fully detailed in  the heading of the plaint to the effect that the  plaintiff will be the owner in possession from  today in lieu of the defendant after his death  and the plaintiff deserves his name to be  incorporated as such in the revenue papers, is  granted in favour of the plaintiff against the  defendant,\005\005\005\005\005\005\005\005."  

Therefore, it was a case of the right being created by the  decree for the first time unlike in the present case.  In  paragraph 13 of that Judgment it is stated that the Court  must enquire whether a document has recorded unqualified  and unconditional words of present demise of right, title and  interest in the property and if the document extinguishes that  right of one and seeks to confer it on the other, it requires  registration.  But with respect, it must be pointed out that a  decree or order of a Court does not require registration if it is  not based on a compromise on the ground that clauses (b) and  (c) of Section 17 of the Registration Act are attracted.   Even a  decree on a compromise does not require registration if it does  not take in property that is not the subject matter of the suit.   A decree or order of a Court is normally binding on those who  are parties to it unless it is shown by resort to Section 44 of  the Evidence Act that the same is one without jurisdiction or  is vitiated by fraud or collusion or that it is avoidable on any  ground known to law.   But otherwise that decree is operative  and going by the plain language of Section 17 of the  Registration Act, particularly, in the context of sub-clause (vi)  of sub-section (2) in the background of the legislative history,  it cannot be said that a decree based on admission requires  registration.   On the facts of that case, it is seen that their  Lordships proceeded on the basis that it was the decree on  admission that created the title for the first time.  It is obvious  that it was treated as a case coming under Section 17(1)(a) of  the Act, though the scope of Section 17(2)(vi) of the Act was  discussed in detail.  But on the facts of this case, as we have  indicated and as found by the courts, it is not a case of a  decree creating for the first time a right, title or interest in the  present plaintiff and his brother.   The present is a case where  they were putting forward in the suit a right based on an  earlier transaction of relinquishment or family arrangement by  which they had acquired interest in the property scheduled to

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that plaint.  Clearly, Section 17(1)(a) is not attracted.  It is  interesting to note that their Lordships who rendered the  judgment in Bhoop Singh themselves distinguished the  decision therein in S. Noordeen Vs. V.S. Thiru Venkita  Reddiar and Ors. [(1996) 2 S.C.R. 261] on the basis that in  the case of Bhoop Singh there was no pre-existing right to the  properties between the parties, but a right was sought to be  created for the first time under the compromise.  Their  Lordships proceeded to hold that in a case where the plaintiff  had obtained an attachment before judgment on certain  properties, the said properties would become subject matter of  the suit and a compromise decree relating to those properties  came within the exception in Section 17(2)(vi) of the Act and  such a compromise decree did not require registration.    Merely because the defendant in that suit in the written  statement admitted the arrangement pleaded by the plaintiff it  could not be held that by that pleading a right was being  created in the plaintiffs and a decree based on such an  admission in pleading would require registration.   We are  satisfied that the decision in Bhoop Singh (supra) is clearly  distinguishable on facts.   We may notice once again that all  the courts have found that it was as a part of a family  arrangement that the defendant in the earlier suit  relinquished his interest in favour of the present plaintiff and  his brother and such a family arrangement has been held even  in Bhoop Singh (supra) not to require registration.

13.             When a cause of action is put in suit and it  fructifies into a decree, the cause of action gets merged in the  decree.  Thereafter, the cause of action cannot be resurrected  to examine whether that cause of action was enforceable or  the right claimed therein could be enforced.  To borrow the  words of Spencer-Bower and Turner on ’Res judicata’, every  judicial decision: "is of such exalted nature that it extinguishes  the original cause of action, and consequently  bars the successful party from afterwards  attempting to resuscitate what has been so  extinguished and stir the dust which has  received such honourable sepulture;"

(See Introduction to the Second Edition)  In the face of the decree in Civil Suit No. 398 of 1980, it is not  permissible to search in the cause of action put in suit therein  for any infirmity based on want of registration.  The title  acquired earlier had been pleaded by the plaintiff and his  brother and upheld by the decree.  It is only permissible to  look at the evidentiary value of that decree at least as a case of  assertion and recognition of the right by the court.  In the case  on hand, the family arrangement set up, which suffered no  defect on the ground of want of registration, had been  accepted by the Court in Civil Suit No. 398 of 1980 and relief  granted.  That grant of relief cannot be ignored as not  admissible.   14.             Learned counsel for the plaintiff-contesting  respondent raised a contention that the ratio of the decision in  Bhoop Singh (supra) requires reconsideration since the said  decision has not properly understood the scope of clause (vi) of  Section 17(2) of the Registration Act.   For the purposes of this  case we do not think that it is necessary to examine this  argument.   We are satisfied that the said decision is  distinguishable.

15.             We also feel that the tendency, if any, to defeat the  law of registration has to be curtailed by the legislature by

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appropriate legislation.  In this instance, we wonder why the  Transfer of Property Act is not being extended to the  concerned states even now.  Its extension would ensure that  no transfer is effected without satisfying the requirements of  that Act and of the Stamp and Registration Acts.

16.             Going by the history of the legislation, the decisions  of the Privy Council and of the High Courts earlier rendered we  are satisfied that the decree in Civil Suit No.398 of 1980 is  admissible in evidence to establish that there had been a  relinquishment of his interest by Sheo Ram in favour of the  present plaintiff and his brother and that they were entitled to  possession of half share in the property.   Firstly, the decree  did not create any title for the first time in the present plaintiff  and his brother.  Secondly, as a decree it did not require  registration in view of clause (vi) of Section 17(2) of the  Registration Act,   though it was a decree based on admission.   We have noticed that there is no challenge to that decree  either on the ground that it was fraudulent or vitiated by  collusion or that it was passed by a court which had no  jurisdiction to pass it.   It is not as if a litigant cannot admit a  true claim and he has necessarily to controvert  whatever has  been stated in a plaint or deny a transaction set up in the  plaint even if, as a matter of fact, such a transaction had gone  through.   Therefore, merely because a decree is based on  admission, it would not mean that the decree is vitiated by  collusion.   Though, generally there is reluctance on the part of  the litigants to come forward with the truth in a Court of law,  we cannot accede to the argument that they are not entitled to  admit something that is true while they enter their plea.   We  are, therefore, satisfied that there is no merit in the challenge  of counsel for the contesting defendants to the decree in Civil  Suit No.398 of 1980.

17.             The courts below have held that as a family  arrangement the relinquishment had followed and on that  basis the decree in the earlier suit recognising that  arrangement did not require registration.   In the face of that,  the High Court was justified in answering the substantial  question of law formulated by it in favour of the plaintiff and  against the contesting defendants.

18.             We, thus find no merit in this appeal.   We confirm  the judgments and decrees under appeal and dismiss this  appeal.   In the circumstances, we make no order as to costs.