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PETITIONER: SMT.  SITABATI DEBI &.ANR.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 01/12/1961

BENCH:

ACT: Constitution  of India, 1950.  Arts. 19 and 3,1(1) and  (2)- Law under Art. 31(2)-If subject to Art. 19(1)(f).

HEADNOTE: Before the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955, it had been  held  by this Court in Bhanit Munji’s  case  [1955]  1 S.C.R.  777 and other earlier cases, that both  clauses  (1) and (2) of the, Art. 31 of the Constitution dealt with a law giving  power  to  the  State  ’to  acquire  or  requisition property  I , and that, Art. 19 ( 1) (f ) was not  attracted to  such  a  law.  After the Amendment,  in  Kochuni’s  case [1960]  3 S.C.R. 887, this Court held that of the  Art.-  31 alone dealt with acquisition and requisition of property  by the,  State.,  that  cl.  (1)  dealt  with,  deprivation  of property in other ways, and that, a law under cl. (1) had to satisfy  the  test of reasonablenss under Art.  19(1).   The court  also  observed that Bhanji Munii’s  case  "no  longer holds the field".  This Court, in Babu Barkva Thakur’s case, [1961] 1 S.C.R. 128, decided after Kochuni’s case held  that an Act providing for acquisition or requisition of  property by the State could not be attacked for the, reason that  it, offended Art. 1.9 (I.) (f).  The  appellant’s  land  was requisitioned  under  the  West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948 and  she questioned the validity of the Act by a writ petition in the High  Court  on the ground that it offended  Art.19(1)  (f). The  High  court followed the decision in  Barkvao  Thakur’s case and dismissed the petition. In  appeal  to  this Court it  was  contended,  that  Barkva Thakur’s  case  Was based  on Bhanj Munji’s case  which  had lost  its  authority in view of  Kochuni’s  case  and   that therefore, should not have  been followed. HELD:Kochuni’s.  case  was  not  concerned  with  a  law  of requisition  or acquisition- Therefore, the  observation  in that  case has to be understood as only meaning that  Bhanii Munji’s  case  no  longer,govems.a case  of  deprivation  of property by means other than requisition and acquisation  by the State.  There is thus no conflict between Birkva Thaur’s case  and  kochuni’s case with respect  to  acquisition  and requisition of property by the State under Art.-, 31(2) and; therefore the validity of an Act relating to acquisitioa  or requisition  cannot  be  questioned on the  ground  that  it offends  Art.   19(1)  (f) and need not  be  tested  by  the criterion in Art. 19(5).[951 F-H; 952 B-C]

JUDGMENT:

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CIVIL  APPELLATE  JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal   No.  322  of 1961. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  Order  dated January.31,  1961 of the Calcutta High Court, in Civil  Rule No. 2112 of 1957. Arun Kumar Dutta and D. N. Mukherjee, for the ’appellants. 950 S. M. Bose,Advocate-General   for  the  State  of   West Bengal, S. C. Bose andP. K. Bose, for the respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Sarkar,  J.  In this case the validity of  the  West  Bengal Land .(Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948 was questioned by the ,appellants by a petition moved under Art. 226 of the Constitution in the High Court at Calcutta.  The High  Court having  dismissed  the petition, the appellants  have  filed this appeal with special leave granted by this Court. The Act provided for requisition and also for acquisition of ,land  by the . State Government "for  maintaining  supplies and  services essential to the life of the,community or  for providing  ,proper facilities for transport,  communication, irrigation  or  drain.age,, or-for the  creation  of  better living  conditions in rural or ,urban areas........  by  the construction  or  reconstruction of.  dwelling  places  for, people  residing  in  such areas."  The  Act  ;provided  for payment  of  ’compensation  in respect  of  requisition  and acquisition made under it. An,  order was made under, the Act on July 22,  1957  requi- tioning  certain lands belonging to one of  the  appellants, the  other  ,appellant being, a lessee thereof, and  it  was stated in the order that possession would be taken on August 2, 1957.  Thereupon the apperants filed the petition. The  appellants challenged the validity of Act in  the  High -Court on various grounds.  In this Court however only , one ground was advanced in support of the appeal and that alone, therefore, we are called upon to discuss in this judgment. It was said that the Act offended Art. 1 9 ( I ) (f ) of the ConsTitution  as  it put unreasonable  restrictions  on  the right to hold property.  I The High Court had rejected  this contention on the round- that this Court had decided in Babu Barkya  Thakur  v.  The  State  of  Bombav(1)  that  an  Act providing for acquisition of property by the State could not be attacked for the reason that it offended Art. 19(1)  (f). It also held that the decision in Kavalappara Kochuni v. The State  of  Madras(2)  did not bold that Art.  31(2)  of  the Constitution  does  not exclude the applicability  of  Art.: 19(1)(f).   We think that the High Court was right  on  both these  points.   Obviously,  what was said  in  Babu  Barkya Thakur’s  case(1)  about a law relating  to  acquisition  of property  by  the State would apply t lo a law  relating  to requisition.   It would follow that the validity of the  Act cannot  be  questioned ,on the ground that it  offends  Art. 19(1) (f). (1)[1961] 1 S.C.R.128. (2) [1961]3 S.C.R. 887. 951 The  learned advocate for the appellants contended that  the decisions  of this Court earlier mentioned were in  conflict with each other and that the later decision, namely, that in Babu Barkya Thakur’s case(1) concerning the applicability of Art.  19 (I) (f) to a law of requisition or  acquisition  by the  State  covered  by Art. 31(2) had  been  based  on  two earlier decisions of this Court, namely, The State of Bombay v.  Bhanii  Munji(1)  and  Lila-vati Bai  v.  The  Siate  of Bombay(’,),  both of which must, in view of the decision  in Kavalappara Kochuni’s(4) case, be deemed to have lost  their

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authority after the Constitution (Fourth Ai-nendmerit)  Act, 1955.  It was pointed out that in Kavalappara Kochuni’s case (4  )  it was said that Bhanji Alunji’s(2) case  "no  longer holds  the field after the Constitution, (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955 The same observation, it was contended, would also apply  to the case of Lilavati Bai v. The State of  Bombay(- ’). It  is true that Bdbu Barkya Thakur’s, case(1) in so far  as it dealt with Arts. 19(1) (f) and 31(2), was based on Bhanji Munji’s case(2) and Lilavati Bai’s case(3) both of which had been  decided on Art. 31 as it stood prior to the  aforesaid amendment  of the, Constitution.. It is also true that  both these cases dealt with a statute giving power to the,  State to requisition land and held that such a law if valid  under Art. 31 as it stood before the amendment, would not be  void on the ground, that it infringed Art. 19(1)(f). Now, before the amendment it had been held by this Court  by a majority-Das J., as he then was, alone taking a  different view-that both cls. (1) and (2) of Art. 31 dealt with a  law giving  power  to  the  State  to  acquire  or   requisition property. Kavalappara Kochuni’s case(4) held that after  the amendment,  cl. (2) of Art. 31 alone dealt with  acquisition and  requisition of property by the State and cl. (1)  dealt with  deprivation of property in other ways.  This case  did not  deal  with  a  law of  acquisition  or  requisition  of property by the State but was concerned with a law by  which deprivation  of  property was brought about in  other  ways, which law, it held, had to satisfy Art. 19 and the principle in  Bhanji Munji’s(2) case which could have saved  that  law before the amendment could not save it after the  amendment. The observation in Kavalappara Kochuni’s(4) case that Bhanji Miinji’s  (2 ) case "no longer holds the field"’has,  there- fore, to be understood as meaning that it no longer  governs a  case  of  deprivation of property  by  means  other  than requisition  and  acquisition  by  the  State.   Kavalappara Kochuni’s  case(4  )  was  not  concerned  with  a  law   of requisition  or acquisition.  It was not directly  concerned with the question whether Bhanji Munji’s (1) [1961] 1 S.C.R. 128.    (2) [1955] 1 S. C.R. 777. (3) [1957] S.C.R. 721.       (4) [196 ]1 3 S. C.R .  887. 952 case(1)  would not after the amendment, apply even to a  law requisition  or  acquisition of Property  governed  by  Art. 31(2) as it now stands, and did not decide that question. Indeed  it  might be said- that the reasoning ’in  so  I  me passages  of  the judgment in  the  Kavalappara(2)  decision would   appear   to  suggest  that  a  law   providing   for "acquisition"  and "requisition" by the State as  understood in  the  sense indicated by Art. 31(2) (a),  does  not  fall within Art. 19(1) (f) and that the validity of such a law is not to be tested by the criterion in Art. 19(5).   Otherwise the  point  made in it regarding the  disseverance  effected between the content ’of Art. 31(1) and of Art. 31(2) by  the Fourth  Amendment  would lose all  significance.   It  would therefore  appear that there is nothing in that  case  which would  bring into any conflict with Babu Barkya  Thakur’s(3) case.   As the only ground on which the correctness- of  the decision in Babu Barkya Thakur’s, case(3) was challenged was that it was inconsistent with Kavalappara Kochuni’s case(2), that argument must fail. The appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed with costs. V.P.S.                 Appeal dismissed. (1) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 777.      (2) [1961]1 S.C.R. 128., (3)[1960] 3 S.C.R. 887. L3 Sup.  C. I.67.-2,50C-20-12-67  GIPI-.

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