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PETITIONER: SMT. SATYA GUPTA ALIAS MADHU GUPTA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: BRIJESH KUMAR

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       04/08/1998

BENCH: K. VENKATASWAMI

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                       J U D G M E N T K. Venkataswami, J.      This appeal  is  preferred  against  the  judgment  and decree dated  14.2.83 of  the Allahabad High Court in Second Appeal No.  1845 of  1974. Brief  facts giving  rise to this appeal by special leave are the following :-      The respondent  herein filed an Original Suit No. 43 of 1962 in  the Court  of the  Second Civil  Judge. Meerut, for partitioning his half share in the Property described in the plaint and  for rendition of account in respect of the same. The appellant  was the  defendant  in  the  said  suit,  now representated by  legal representatives  as she died pending this appeal.  For easy appreciation, we refer the parties as plaintiff  (respondent   herein)  and   defendant  (deceased appellant) in this judgment. On Battu Mal was the husband of the  defendant.  The  said  Battu  Mal  purchased  the  suit property under  a Sale  Deed dated  9.5.53 for  a sum of Rs. 17,000/- in  the joint  names of  himself and the plaintiff, who was  then a  minor aged 16 years. The said Battu Mal was murdered in June, 1956. The plaintiff was prosecuted for the murder of  said Battu Mal and was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment and factually when the suit was filed he was in prison. The  plaintiff was  the son  of a cousin of the said Battu Mal. Battu Mal had no issue.      In the  plaint,  though  a  claim  was  made  that  the plaintiff was  the adopted  son of  Battu Mal,  the suit was based not  on that  ground but  expressly on  the basis that Battu Mal  purchased half  of  the  property  for  him  (the plaintiff).      The suit  was resisted by filing the Written Statement. It was,  inter alia,  stated in  the Written  Statement that there was no disclosure in the plaint as to how the property in dispute  belonged to the plaintiff and Battu Mal equally. It was  also stated  that the  said Battu  Mal purchased the suit property  exclusively for him by paying the entire sale consideration. There  was no  intention on the part of Battu Mal to  share  the  property  or  gift  half  share  to  the plaintiff  when  the  name  of  the  plaintiff  was  jointly included in the sale deed.      The  Trial   Court   found   that   the   entire   sale

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consideration came  from the  deceased  Battu  Mal  and  the plaintiff did  not contribute any money towards the purchase of the  suit property.  The Trial  Court also found that the defendant has discharged the initial burden to show that the sale deed  in the  joint name  of the  plaintiff was  only a Benami transaction.  After  finding  that  the  entire  sale consideration was  advanced by the said Battu Mal, the Trial Court observed  that the  burden was  on the  e plaintiff to establish that  the deceased Battu Mal intended to gift away half of  the property purchased by him to the plaintiff. The Trial Court  has noticed the fact that the plaintiff, except alleging that half of the suit property belonged to him, had not disclosed  how and  on what basis such claim was made in the plaint.  After discussing  the evidence  of P.Ws. 1 to 3 and after noticing that the defendant had not entered in the witness box  but tendered  evidence through her brothers son as D.W.  1, came  to the  conclusion that the deceased Battu Mal, in  fact, intended  to pay half of the consideration of the  sale   deed  for   the  benefit   of   the   plaintiff. Consequently, the  Trial  Court  decreed  the  suit  of  the plaintiff for  half share  in  the  suit  property  and  for rendition of  accounts  for  past  three  years  before  the institution of the suit.      The defendants,  aggrieved by the judgment of the Trial Court, preferred an appeal to the Additional District Judge, Meerut. The  learned District  Judge, while  confirming  the finding  of   the  Trial   Court  that   the   entire   sale consideration was given by the deceased Battu Mal, expressed his inability  to endorse the Trial Court’s finding that the deceased Battu  Mal intended that the property should b e of the plaintiff  as well. The learned District Judge took note of the  fact that  in the Plaint it was nowhere averred that Battu Mal  intended the purchase of the suit house to be for the benefit  of the  plaintiff as  well. The Lower Appellate Court agreed  with the  contention advanced on behalf of the defendant that  if there  was any truth in the  claim of the plaintiff that  Battu Mal  really intended  to  s  hare  the property with  the plaintiff,  that should have been pleaded expressly in  the plaint  itself.  After  referring  to  the pleadings, the  Lower Appellate Court examined in detail the oral evidence  given on  behalf of  the plaintiff. The Lower Appellate Court  found that  ‘the plaintiff’s  evidence  is, thus, extremely  meagre  and  unsatisfactory  to  rebut  the presumption that  the sale  deed was obtained benami by Shri Battu Mal’. The Lower Appellate Court has also given reasons in the judgment why it differed with the conclusions reached by the  Trial Court on this point. The Lower Appellate Court observed             as              follows              :-      "In the present case, the plaintiff      was  not   the  son   (natural   or      adopted)  of  Sri  Battu  Mal.  The      plaintiff was  the son of Sri Battu      Mal’s cousin and from the mere fact      that the  plaintiff lived  with and      was loved  by  Sri  Battu  Mal,  we      cannot   conclude   that   it   was      intended to  purchase the house for      the plaintiff’s benefit."      After referring  to a judgment of the Nagpur High Court in Gopal  Trimbak Bhate Vs. Keshoosa Vishnoosa Lad [AIR 1936 Nagpur 185], the Lower Appellate Court held as follows :-      "Relying on  the case of 6 M I A 53      (P.C.) it  was held  that  where  a      Hindu father purchases property out      of his own money in the name of his

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    son, the  presumption  is  that  he      intended to  make the  purchase for      his own  benefit and  not  for  the      benefit           of            his      son................................      ...I need hardly emphasize that the      plaintiff being  not the son of Sri      Battu Mal  could  not  be  held  in      greater love  than a  son. His case      is, therefore, on no higher footing      and in view of law laid down in the      above mentioned  cases, I must hold      that the  sale was  obtained benami      by Sri Battu Mal. There should have      been something  more than the- mere      existence of  love  too  rebut  the      presumption  of   the   transaction      being benami."      In  the  light  of  the  above  conclusion,  the  Lower Appellate  Court   allowed  the   appeal  and   consequently dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff.      The plaintiff,  aggrieved by the reversing judgement of the Lower  Appellate Court, preferred a Second Appeal to the High Court.  The High  Court, after  going into the evidence and reappreciating  the same,  differed from the conclusions reached on  facts by  the Lower  Appellate Court.  The  High Court observed as follows :-      "I am  of opinion  that the  proper      inference to  be drawn in this case      on   the    aforesaid   facts   and      circumstances was  that Lala  Battu      Mal intended  to make the plaintiff      a joint  owner of the property with      him and  that it  was not a case of      Benami transaction."      The High Court initially delivered the judgment without hearing the  counsel for  the defendant.  Later  on,  on  an application to  recall the  judgment passed  without hearing the defendant’s  counsel, the  learned Judge,  after hearing learned counsel  for the  defendant, confirmed  the  earlier judgment by referring to passages from it.      When the  learned counsel,  appearing for the defendant before the  High Court,  invited its  attention to the cases decided by  the Privy  Council and  of this  Court, the High Court, distinguishing those cases, held as follows :-      "I then  took note of the fact that      the theory  of advancement said not      to apply in India because the habit      of  making   Benami  purchase   was      rempant among  ‘the natives’  which      was the  name given  to us  by  the      British. It is said that the theory      applied only  in England.  In  then      noticed the  change that  has  over      taken our  country since  the first      pronouncement of  the Privy Council      on which  the pronouncements of the      Privy Council  in Guran  Ditta  and      Anr. Vs.  T. Ram  Ditta  [IAR  1928      P.C.   172]   and   Lakshmiah   Vs.      Kothandarama [AIR  1925 P.C.  1981]      were based.  I  observed  that  the      presumptions, which could be raised      more  than   a  century   ago,  can      longer be raised in the present day

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    social  conditions   and  the  said      decisions of the Privy Council must      accordingly be  applied  with  some      caution. I  then took  note of  the      law declared by the Supreme Curt in      Bhim Singh  Vs. Kan SIngh [AIR 1980      S.C. 727], wherein the true test fr      determining whether  a  transaction      was Benami  or not was laid down to      be that of intention and instead of      presuming that the purchase made by      Lala Battu Mal was Benami in so far      as the plaintiff was concerned, and      that the  theory of advancement not      being  applicable   in  India,  the      plaintiff could not be said to have      had an  equal share in the property      on account  of his name having been      joined as  a co-purchaser  by  Lala      Battu Mal  unless  it  were  proved      that Lala  Battu Mal  had, in fact,      made a  gift of  an equal  share in      the property  when he  purchased it      in the  plaintiff’s name,  I looked      at  the   surrounding   facts   and      circumstances in an attempt to find      out the  intention, with which Lala      Battu Mal  joined  the  plaintiff’s      name as  a co-purchaser with him in      the sale  deed of  the property  in      question and on that test according      to  the   view  taken  by  me,  the      surrounding facts and circumstances      all lead  t the inference that when      Lala Battu Mal joined the plaintiff      as  a  co-purchaser  with  him  and      described him  as his  adopted  son      living under  his guardianship,  he      intended to  make   the plaintiff a      joint equal  owner in  the property      with him."      Ultimately, the  High Court held as      follows :-      "It  rested   n   the   facts   and      circumstances brought  out  by  the      evidence  on   the  facts   on  the      record. One  fact  which  weigh  ed      with me  considerably was  the fact      that the  purchase was made by Lala      Battu Mal  in  the  joint  names  f      himself and  the plaintiff and that      there was  nothing secretive  about      the transaction."      On the  basis of  the said  conclusions, the High Court allowed the  Second Appeal,  set aside  the judgment  of the Lower  Appellate   Court  and  decreed  the  suit  of  t  he plaintiff.      The defendant  aggrieved by  the judgment  of the  High Court has filed this appeal.      Mr. Salve,  learned senior  counsel appearing  for  the appellant, submitted  that the  High  Court  went  wrong  in reappreciating the oral evidence and also distinguishing the case which  are directly  on point  and allowing  the Second Appeal. He  placed reliance  on Guran  Ditta’s case (supra), which has  been referred  to with  approval in  Bhim Singh’s

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case  (supra)  by  this  Court.  According  to  the  learned counsel, in  the light  of law  settled in  these cases, the Judgment of  the High  Court is  liable to  be set aside and that of the Lower Appellate Court has to be restored.      Mr. Rakesh K. Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff,  supporting  the  judgment  of  the  High  Court, submitted that  on the  facts of this case the High Curt was right in  distinguishing the  cases relied on by the learned counsel for the defendant.      We have considered the rival submissions.      At the  outset, we  would like  to point  out that  the findings on  facts by  the Lower  Appellate Court as a final Court   on facts,  are based on appreciation of evidence and the same  cannot be  treated as  perverse  or  based  on  no evidence. That  being the  position, were]  are of  the view that the  High Court,  after reappreciating the evidence and without finding  that the  conclusions reached  by the Lower Appellate Court were not based on the evidence, reversed the conclusions on facts on the ground that the view taken by it was also  a possible view n the facts. The High Court, it is well settled,  while exercising  jurisdiction under  Section 100, C.P.C.,  cannot  reverse  the  findings  of  the  Lower Appellate Court  on facts  merely on  the ground that on the facts found  by the  Lower Appellate  Court another view was possible.      In  Bhim   Singh’s  case   (supra),  this  Curt,  after considering the  number of cases on an identical issue, held as follows ;-      "The   principle    governing   the      determination   of   the   question      whether  a  transfer  is  a  benami      transaction or not may be summed up      thus :  (1) The  burden of  showing      that  a   transfer  is   a   benami      transaction lies on t he person who      asserts   that   it   is   such   a      transaction; (2)  if it  is  proved      that the purchase money came from a      person other  than  the  person  in      whose  favour   the   property   is      transferred, the  purchase is prima      facie assumed to be for the benefit      of  the  person  who  supplied  the      purchase  money,  unless  there  is      evidence to  the contrary;  (3) the      true character  of the  transaction      is governed by the intention of the      person  who   has  contributed  the      purchase money and (4) the question      as to what his intention was has to      be decided  on  the  basis  of  the      surrounding   circumstances,    the      relationship of  the  parties,  the      motives governing  their action  in      bringing about  the transaction and      their subsequent conduct, etc."      Again, in  The Controller  of Estate  Duty, Lucknow Vs. Aloke Mitra  [1981 (1)  SCR 943],  this Court considered the similar issue and held as follows :-      "The law  in this  matter is not in      doubt and is authoritatively stated      by a  long line of decisions of the      Privy  Council  starting  from  the      well  known   case  of   Gopeekrist      Gosain V.  Gungapersaud  Gosain  to

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    Sura    Lakshmiah     Chetty     V.      Kothandarama  Pillai  and  of  this      Court in Shree Meenakshi Mills Ltd.      V. CIT. As observed by Knight Bruce      L.J. in  Gopeekrist Gosain’s  case,      the doctrine  of advancement is not      applicable in India, so as to raise      the question  of a resulting trust.      When a  property is  purchased by a      husband in the name of his wife, or      by a father in the name of his son,      it must  be presumed  that they are      benamidars, and if they claim it as      their  own  by  alleging  that  the      husband or  the father  intended to      make a gift f the property to them,      the  onus   rests  upon   them   to      establish  such  a  gift.  In  Sura      Lakshmiah Chetty’s  case,  the  law      was stated with clarity by Sir John      Edge in these words ;      "There can  be no  doubt now that a      purchase in  India by  a native  of      India of  property in  India in the      name of  his  wife  unexplained  by      other proved  or admitted  facts is      to  be   regarded   as   a   benami      transaction,    by     which    the      beneficial interest in the property      is in  the  husband,  although  the      ostensible title is in the wife."      It is  but axiomatic  that a benami      transaction does not vest any title      in the  banamidar but  vests it  in      the real  owner. When the benamidar      is in  possession of  the  property      standing in  h is  name, he is in a      sense  the  trustee  for  the  real      owner, he  is only a name-lender or      an alias  for the  real  owner.  In      Petheperumal  Chetty   v.  Muniandy      Servai,  the   Judicial   Committee      quoted with  approval the following      passage from  Mayne’s Hindu Law 7th      ed., para 446 :           "Where a  transaction is  once           made out  to be a mere benami,           it   is   evident   that   the           benamidar           absolutely           disappears from the title. His           name is  simply an  alias  for           that     of     the     person           beneficially interested."      The cardinal  distinction between a      trustee known  to English law and a      benamidar lies  in the  fact that a      trustee is  the legal  owner of the      property standing  in his  name and      cestui  que   trust   is   only   a      beneficial owner,  whereas  in  the      case of  a benami  transaction  the      real owner  has got the legal title      through the property is i the  name      of  the   benamidar.  It   is  well      settled that  the  real  owner  can

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    deal  with   the  property  without      reference to  the  latter.  In  Gur      Narayan  V.  Shoo  Lal  Singh,  the      Judicial Committee  referred to the      judgment of  Sir George  Farwell in      Mst. Bilas  Kunwar v. Dasraj Ranjit      Singh, where it was observed that a      benami transaction   had  a curious      resemblance  to   the  doctrine  of      English law  that the  trust of the      legal estate results to the man who      pays the  purchase-money, and  went      on to say :           ".....the  benamidar  has  not           beneficial  interest   in  the           property  or   business   that           stands   in   his   name;   he           represents, in  fact, the real           owner,  and  s  far  as  their           relative  legal   position  is           concerned he is a mere trustee           for him."      In Guran  Ditta V.  Ram, Ditta, the      judicial Committee  reiterated  the      principle laid  down in  Gopeekrist      Gosain’s case  and observed that in      case of a benami transaction, there      is a resulting trust in favour of t      he person  providing  the  purchase      money."      In the  light of  the above  exposition of  law by this Court and  in  the  light  of  the  findings  of  the  Lower Appellate  Court,   the  judgment  of  the  High  Court,  on reappreciation  of  evidence,  cannot  be  upheld.  We  have noticed earlier  the vagueness  in  the  plaint  about  non- disclosure of  how and  on what  basis the plaintiff claimed partition in  the suit  property. We  have also noticed that the Trial  Court and  the Lower Appellate Court noticed this aspect. The  Lower  Appellate  Court  also  found  that  the plaintiff’s    evidence    was    extremely    meagre    and unsatisfactory. Taking  all factors  into consideration, the Lower Appellate Court found that Battu Mal did not intend to purchase the house for the Plaintiff’s benefit. This finding has  been   upset  by   the  High  Court  illegally  by  re- appreciating the evidence. This is not permissible.      The    High     Court    was     not    justified    in ignoring/distinguishing the  law laid  down by this Court in Bhim Singh’s case without properly appreciating the ratio of that decision.      In the  circumstances, we set aside the judgment of the High Court  under appeal  and  restore  that  of  the  Lower Appellate Court in First Appeal No. 130 of  1963.      In the  result, the  appeal  succeeds  and  is  allowed accordingly with no order as to costs.