25 February 1992
Supreme Court
Download

SMT. NIRMALA R. BAFNA/KERSHI SHIVAX CAMBATTA ANDORS. Vs KHANDESH SPINNING AND WEAVING MILLS CO. LTD. ANDANR./OFFICI

Bench: JEEVAN REDDY,B.P. (J)
Case number: Appeal Civil 886 of 1992


1

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 9  

PETITIONER: SMT. NIRMALA R. BAFNA/KERSHI SHIVAX CAMBATTA ANDORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: KHANDESH SPINNING AND WEAVING MILLS CO. LTD. ANDANR./OFFICIA

DATE OF JUDGMENT25/02/1992

BENCH: JEEVAN REDDY, B.P. (J) BENCH: JEEVAN REDDY, B.P. (J) VENKATACHALLIAH, M.N. (J) AHMADI, A.M. (J)

CITATION:  1993 AIR 1380            1992 SCR  (1) 985  1992 SCC  (2) 322        JT 1992 (4)   245  1992 SCALE  (1)485

ACT:      Landlord and Tenant :      Tenant-Company  under  liquidation-Official  Liquidator took possession of premises-Suit by appellant claiming  sub- tenancy  pending-In  appeal arising out  of  an  application under  s. 446 of Companies Act, appellant allowed to  be  in occupation  as  agent of official  liquidator-Directions  of High  Court-Whether  amounted to dispossession  and  altered status  of  appellant; Whether  warranted  at  interlocutory stage.

HEADNOTE:      The  respondent company was the tenant of the  flat  in dispute.   Consequent upon a winding up order in respect  of the Company in Company Petition No. 59 of 1984 the  official liquidator  took possession of the flat and sealed it.   The appellant  in C.A.No. 886/92 before this Court, who  is  the sister of one of the Directors of the Company claimed on the basis  of  an  agreement dated 15.7.79  said  to  have  been entered  into  between her and the Company, to be  the  sub- tenant of the flat except a small portion thereof and  that with  the consent of the landlord she was in possession   of the premises since the date of the agreement.  The  official liquidator delivered the possession of the premises to  her, but  later  he threatened to dispossess her,  whereupon  the appellant  filed a suit against the company in the court  of Small  Causes for injunction and for a declaration that  she was  the lawful tenant and/or a protected sub-tenant of  the flat  in  dispute (excluding the portion  reserved  for  the Company).      On  an objection raised by the Official liquidator  the appellant  applied under s. 446 of the Companies Act to  the High Court for grant of leave to proceed with the suit.  The Company  Judge rejected the application holding the  suit  a collusive.                                                   986      On  appeal, the Division Bench transferred the suit  to the  High Court granting leave with the conditions that  the official  liquidator  would take possession  of  the  entire premises  and would allow the appellant to  occupy the  area

2

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 9  

in  the  premises,  which at the relevant time  was  in  her possession,  as an agent of the official liquidator  pending the   disposal  of  the  suit,  on  payment  of  a   monthly compensation  of Rs. 7,500 besides depositing  Rs.   15,000. Aggrieved  the  appellant preferred the  appeal  by  special leave to this Court.      The  landlord-Trust  filed  a  company  application  in Company  Petition No. 59 of 1984 for possession of the  flat including symbolic possession of the premises in  occupation of  the  appellant on the ground that the  Company  no  more required the portion in their possession.  The Single  Judge dismissed  the  application  holding  that  the   liquidator required the said portion for storing the company records at Bombay.  Dismissing the consequent appeal the Division Bench of the High Court held that a proposal from Rashtriya  Girni Kamgar   Sangh   for   revival   the   Company   was   under consideration.   The  said order is the  subject  matter  of C.A.No. 887 of 1992.      It  was contended on behalf of the appellant  that  the tenancy interest of the company in the flat was not an asset of  the Company in liquidation and th liquidator could  not trade  in the said right; that the appellant had a right  to be in possession of the premises in her own right as a  sub- tenant;  and in view of the Bombay Rent Act, the High  Court erred  in  converting  the appellant into an  agent  of  the official  liquidator  and  in imposing  the  conditions  and enhancing the rent.      The  official  liquidator contended that  the  landlord Trust acted beyond th authority in consenting, if at all, to the said sub-tenancy.      Counsel  for  the landlord-trust accepted the  fact  of oral consent to the sub-tenancy.      Against  an order dated 9.8.1989 passed by the  Company Judge,  the landlord Trust -filed S.L.P. No. 16368  of  1990 before  this  Court as also an appeal  before  the  Division Bench  of  the  High  Court.   Since  the  appeal  had  been dismissed  by  the  High Court,  this  court  dismissed  the special leave petition as infructuous.      Disposing  of the appellant’s appeal  (C.A.No.  886/92) and dismissing                                                   987 the  appeal of the landlord - Trust (C.A.No.  887/92),  this Court,      HELD : 1. Merely because a company goes in  liquidation and  a  liquidator/official  liquidator  is  appointed,  the rights  of  the company viz a-viz its  landlord  and/or  its tenant do not undergo any change. [p. 994C-D]      2.   The tenancy rights the company had in the flat  in dispute  may not be an asset for the purpose of  liquidation proceedings. [p. 994B-C]      3.   Having  regard  to the facts -  the  admission  of official  liquidator of a special resolution passed  by  the Board of Directors of the Company affirming the sub-tenancy, and the consent of the landlord-Trust to the said sub-tenancy (a  fact  not present before the High Court) and appellant’s possession  over  a major portion of the said flat   on  the date of appointment of the official liquidator on a  monthly rent  of Rs. 600 payable by the appellant to the Company  as against the monthly  rent of Rs. 900 payable by the  Company -  the  appellant’s plea of sub-tenancy  is,  preima  facie, established; and in the circumstances, prima facie speaking, her  claim of protection of Bombay  Rent Control Act  cannot be rejected.                                     [pp.993 C-D; GH; 994A-B]      4.   The  rights  of the appellant  and  the  questions

3

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 9  

whether the sub-tenancy is true, whether it is valid in  law and  whether the consent of the landlord is true  and  valid would be decided in the suit. [9. 993E-F]      5.1   The directions made by the Division Bench of  the High  Court have the effect of dispossessing  the  appellant from  the premises in dispute and were not warranted at  the interlocutory stage when the rights of the appellant are yet to be adjudicated upon.  The character of her possession has also  wrongly  been  altered as she is permitted  to  be  in occupation  of  a  portion of the flat as an  agent  of  the liquidator.  [p. 994D-F]      5.2    Having  regard  to  the  particular  facts   and circumstances  of the case and with a view to safeguard  the rights of the company in the event of dismissal of the suit, the  appellant  should furnish security in a sum  of  rupees five  lakh by way of bank guarantee to the  satisfaction  of the  Company  Judge.   The amount  already  deposited  shall continue  to  lie in Court.  The instant arrangement  is  an interim one pending the suit and shall not reflect upon  the merits of the the suit. [pp. 994 G-H; 995A-B]      6.   The  official  liquidator’s  requirement  of   the portion of the flat (which is in his actual possession)  for storing the company books, and                                                   988 the  proposal  of the Rashtriya Girni Kamgar Sangh  who  are said to have formed an action committee of the Khandesh Mill Employees  Industrial  Production Co-operative  Society  for revival  of the said company are relevant factors;  and  the High Court rightly dismissed the application and the  appeal filed by the landlord Trust.  [p. 996B-E]           Ravindra  Ishwardas  Sethna  &  Anr.  v.  Official           Liquidator,  High Court, Bombay & Anr.,  [1983]  4           SCC 269, cited.

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos.  886- 887 of 1992.      From  the  Judgements  and  Orders  dated  2.9.1986   & 12.11.1990  of the Bombay High Court in Appeal  Nos.  777/86 and 1038 of 1990.                     With      Special Leave Petition (C) No. 16368 of 1990.      B.   A.  Masodkar,  B.K.  Mehta,  G.L.   Sanghi,   A.M. Khanwilkar,  Vimal  Dave, V.D. Khanna,  R.F.  Nariman,  R.N. Karanjawala, Ms. Manik Karanjawala and Sanjay Singh for  the appearing parties.      Nitin Thakkar for the intervenor.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      B.P. JEEVAN REDDY, J. In S.L.P. No.  12199 of 1986 1. Leave granted.      2.  The appeal is directed against the Judgement  of  a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Appeal No. 777 of 1986 disposing of the appeal preferred by the appellant with certain directions.      3.  Khandesh Spinning and Weaving Mills Pvt. Ltd.  Went into  liquidation at the instance of a creditor.  The  order of  winding up was passed on September 19, 1984  in  company petition  No.  59  of 1984.   The  official  liquidator  was appointed as the liquidator for the company.      4.   The company was the tenant of a flat  situated  at Church-gate,  Bombay.  It is fairly big flat having an  area of  3500 sq. ft.  The company had its registered  office  in the   said   flat   until  it   was   shifted   to   Jalgoan

4

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 9  

                                                   989 sometime prior to July, 1979.      5.  The appellant is the sister of one of the directors of the company.  Her Husband was the Manager of the company. According  to  her, she entered into an agreement  with  the company  on  July  15, 1979  whereunder  a  sub-tenancy  was created in her favour in respect of he said flat except  for a  small  are  of 150 sq. ft.  which  was  retained  by  the company.    According  to  her,  the  landlord  had   orally consented to the creation of sub-tenancy in her favour.  The rent  of the flat payable to the landlord was Rs.  900   per month.   Under the said agreement, the appellant was to  pay Rs.  600 every month to the company.  She says further  that she was put in possession of the said portion on the date of agreement and has continued in possession ever since.      6.   The liquidator appointed by court for the  company took  possession  of the entire flat in  October,  1984.  He sealed it.  Against the order of winding up dated  September 19,  1984, an appeal was preferred and the operation of  the order including the appointment of the liquidator stayed  on October  29, 1984.  Soon thereupon, the appellant  wrote  to the  official liquidator (on October 30, 1984)  calling-upon him  to  allow  her to use the premises  in  her  occupation without  any  hindrance or disturbance from  him.   In  this letter, she referred to the agreement of sub-tenancy arrived at with the company in or about March, 1979 and stated  that the  agreement  is  lying in the  said  premises  sealed  by official liquidator and that the exact portion given to  her is  delineated  in the plan annexed to the  agreement.   She asserted  that since the date of agreement, she has been  in possession  of the premises, paying the agreed rent  to  the company without any default.  The premises were sealed,  she said,  during her absence and that she discovered  the  same only on her return from Indore on October 29, 1984.      7.  The official liquidator delivered possession of the premises to the appellant.      8.   In  the  appeal preferred  against  the  order  of winding  up, a Division Bench of the Bombay High  Court,  by its  order dated  January 31, 1985, appointed a  provisional liquidator.  The appeal was dismissed later on September  9, 1985.      9.  In November, 1984 the appellant filed a suit, being suit  No. 4873 of 1984, in the court of Small Causes  for  a declaration that she is the lawful                                                   990 tenant   and/or  protected  sub-tenant  of  the  said   flat (excluding the portion reserved for the company) and for  an injunction  restraining the defendant from interfering  with her  possession  and enjoyment.  The sole defendant  to  the suit  was  "Khandesh Spinning and Weaving  Mills  Pvt.  Ltd. having  its  registered  office  at  Station  Road,  Jalgaon (Maharashtra  State)".  The appellant also applied  for  and obtained  a  temporary  injunction  against  the  defendant- company.  Sometime in October, 1985, the official liquidator appeared  in the suit on behalf of the defendant and  raised an  objection that without the leave of  the  company-court, the  suit cannot proceed.  Evidently to meet this  objection the  appellant applied to the company Judge (High  Court  of Bombay) on March 12, 1986 for grant of leave to proceed with the  suit  under  section 446 of  the  Companies  Act.   The application was registered as Company Application No. 38  of 1986.   The official liquidator filed an  application  under Sub-section  (3) of Section 446 for transfer of  the    said suit  to  the High Court to be tried by  the  Company-Judge, which application was registered as Company Application  No.

5

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 9  

141  of  1986.  Both these applications came up  before  the Company  Judge  on August 20,  1986.  In a short  order  the learned  Judge dismissed the Company Application No.  38  of 1986 observing that :          "the  suit instituted by  the applicant  after  the          winding   up  order  is  collusive  and  claim   is          dishonest.  The appellant is a sister of one of the          directors  and  claims  to have  tenancy  right  in          respect  of a portion of a company’s office.  I  am          not  satisfied  that  a  claim  even  required   an          investigation.  P.C. Judges summons dismissed."      10.   No orders were passed on Company Application  No. 141  of 1986, presumably because Company Application No.  38 of 1986 was dismissed.      11.  On August 22, 1986, the official liquidator called upon the appellant to deliver possession of the premises  in her possession.  Upon the appellant’s failure to comply with the  said demand, the official liquidator obtained an  order from the Company-Court, on August 27, 1986,  empowering  him to take possession of the said premises.  The appellant says that in pursuance of the said order the official  liquidator again put a seal on the said premises.      12.   On August 28, 1986 the appellant filed an  appeal against the                                                   991 order  of the Company Judge dated 20th August,  1986,  which was  disposed  of on September 1, 1986.  At this  stage,  it would  be  appropriate to notice the reasoning of,  and  the directions  given  in the said Judgment  (impugned  herein). After  referring to the appellant’s plea of Sub-tenancy  and oral  consent of the landlord thereto, the  Bench  observed, "It  is  extremely difficult to believe  that  such  consent would  be given by the landlord looking into the  conditions relating to availability of premises prevailing in  Bombay." The  Bench  observed that for a similar premises,  the  rent would  not  be less than Rs. 20,000 per month and  that  the alleged agreement of sub-tenancy "appears to be bogus and/or at  any  rate of extremely doubtful  legal  validity."   The Bench  then  opined:  "however,  bogus  or  fraudulent   the agreement  between the company and the appellant may  appear to  be, the claim of the appellant will have to be  adjusted (adjudicated?)   upon "and that, therefore, leave is  to  be granted.  Accordingly, it granted leave and transferred  it, with  the consent of both the parties, to High  Court.   The Bench  took  notice  of  the fact  that  there  are  several liabilities  outstanding against the company  including  the claim  of workers for salary and provident fund amounts  and further  that the official liquidator requires a portion  of the said flat for storing the books of the company.   Having regard  to  all the said circumstances, grant of  leave  was made subjected to certain conditions which conditions  alone constitute  the subject matter of this appeal.  They run  as follows:          "Further  the  official liquidator is  directed  to          take  possession  of the said  entire  premises  in          which the company’s office was originally situated,          including  the  portion  of  the  premises  in  the          occupation   of   the  appellant.    The   official          liquidator,  however, will allow the  appellant  to          occupy  the area in the said premises which  is  at          present in her possession, save and except for room          No.  2  as marked in Exhibit ‘A’, as shown  in  the          plan  which is put on record by consent of  parties          ....  She  will however, remain  in  occupation  as          agent   of  the official  liquidator  pending   the

6

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 9  

        disposal  of the suit which is transferred to  this          court, on payment of a monthly  compensation of Rs.          7500  per month.  She will also deposit a  sum  Rs.          15,000  with  the official liquidator  as  security          deposit.   She will pay the monthly amounts  on  or          before  date 10th day of each month, starting  from          10th September, 1986.  She will deposit the sum  of          Rs. 15,000 on or before 10th October 1986.  In  the          event of her committing any                                                      992          default  in the payment of the security  amount  or          any two monthly amounts, the official liquidator to          take  possession of the premises in her  occupation          forthwith".      13.   It  was made clear that "this  order  is  without prejudice  to the rights and  contentions of the parties  in the said suit and is subject to the result of the said suit. It  will also be open to the learned Judge hearing the  said suit  to  vary  this order in the event  of  any  change  of circumstances  or  to  pass any  other  appropriate  interim orders, as may be required."      14.   Sri Masodkar, learned counsel for  the  appellant submitted that the Division Bench was in error in rejecting, on  a  mere  presumption,  the  appellant’s  case  that  the landlord   had consented to the sub-tenancy in  her  favour. The   landlord  himself  has  come  forward   with   certain applications  of  his own wherein he has affirmed  his  oral consent  to the   sub-tenancy in favour  of  the  appellant. Counsel  submitted  that  the  conditions  imposed  by   the Division   Bench  are  contrary  to  law  inasmuch  as   the protection of Bombay Rent Control Act.  Act available to the appellant  cannot  be ignored or undone merely  because  the company  has gone into liquidation.  He submitted  that  the appellant can be evicted only by an authority under the Rent Control  Act  on  the grounds specified  in  the  Act.   The enhancement  of  rent from Rs. 600 to Rs. 7,500  is  equally incompetent for the same reason.  He submitted further  that the tenancy interest the company had in the said flat is not an  asset  of the company in liquidation and that,   at  any rate,  the liquidator cannot trade in the said  right.    He complained  that  the  appellant  had  a  right  to  be   in possession  of the said premises in her own right as a  sub- tenant,  and  that  the Division Bench  acted  illegally  in converting  the  appellant  into an agent  of  the  official liquidator.   The    company court had  no  jurisdiction  to direct  the  official liquidator to take possession  of  the entire  flat  including  the portion in  possession  of  the appellant, he submitted.      15.   Sir  Mehta,  learned  counsel  for  the  official liquidator  supported the reasoning and directions given  by the  Division  Bench.  He submitted that the story  of  sub- tenancy  is  untrue  besides being  invalid.  The  story  of consent of landlord to the alleged sub-tenancy agreement  is equally  untrue.   The trustee (representing  the  landlord- trust) acted beyond the authority in consenting to the  said sub-tenancy, assuming that there was such a consent.  Having regard  to the close relationship of the appellant with  one of the                                                   993 directors of the company (and the Manager of  the  company), and  in  all the facts and circumstances of  the  case,  the directions made by the Division Bench are perfectly just and that  this court ought not to interfere with the  same.   He submitted that the directions made by the Division Bench are discretionary in nature and have been made without prejudice

7

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 9  

to  the  rights and contentions of the parties in  the  said suit.  The Bench has further empowered the company Judge  to vary  the  said  directions at any time  he  thinks  proper. Having  regard  to  the  prevailing  rents  in  Bombay,  the location of the flat and all the circumstances of the  case, the  monthly compensation fixed by the Division Bench is  in fact on the lower side, submitted the  counsel.      16.  At this stage, we must refer to the stand taken by the  counsel for the landlord-trust.  The two SLPs filed  by the landlord trust were posted and heard alongwith this SLP. Sri  G.L.  Sanghi, learned counsel for  the  landlord  trust stated  before  us that the trustees have  indeed  consented orally to the sub-tenancy agreement between the company  and the appellants.  We must say that this circumstance was  not present  before  the Division Bench and evidently  for  this reason that the Bench appears to have rejected the theory of consent  of the landlord.  We cannot however refuse to  take notice  of the said statement of the counsel.  We do so  for the limited purpose of this appeal.      17.  From the facts narrated above, it would be evident that  the rights of the appellant have to be adjudicated  in the suit filed by her which is now transferred to  the  High Court   with the consent of both the parties.   Whether  the sub-tenancy is true, whether it is valid in law and  whether the  consent  of  the landlord is true and  valid,  are  all questions  which arise for decision in the suit.  We  cannot pronounce  upon them at this stage.  The only  question  for our  consideration  is whether the directions given  by  the Division Bench, extracted hereinabove, are justified in  the circumstances of the case and in law?      18.  It is admitted by the Official liquidator that the Board  of  directors  of the company  had  indeed  passed  a special  resolution affirming the agreement  of  sub-tenancy in  favour  of the appellant.  (In her plaint in   Suit  No. 4873 of 1984 the appellant has referred to the said  special resolution  of the Board of directors.)  This  fact  coupled with the statement of the learned counsel for the  landlord- trust establishes, prima facie, the                                                   994 appellant’s plea of sub-tenancy.  That she was in possession of  a  major  portion  of  the said  flat  on  the  date  of appointment of liquidator is also not in dispute.  According to  the  sub-tenancy  agreement, the  rent  payable  by  the appellant is Rs. 600 per month as against Rs. 900 per  month payable by the company to the landlord for the entire  flat. In  the above circumstances, we cannot reject,  prima  facie speaking, the appellant’s claim of protection of Bombay Rent Control  Act.  In addition to this factual situation,  there are  two  other  circumstances  which  must  be  taken  into consideration, viz.,               a.  The tenancy rights the company had in  the                   said  flat  may not be an  asset  for  the                   purpose of liquidation proceedings and               b.   merely   because  a   company   goes   in               liquidation    and    a    liquidator/official               liquidator  is  appointed, the rights  of  the               company  viz-a-viz  its  landlord  and/or  its               tenants do not undergo any change.      19.   In view of the above facts and  circumstance,  we are of the opinion that the directions made by the  Division Bench  were  not really warranted at this stage.   The  said directions  have the effect of dispossessing  the  appellant from  the  said  premises at an  interlocutory  stage.   The character of her possession has also been altered-she is now permitted  to be in occupation of a portion of the  flat  as

8

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 9  

the  agent  of  the liquidator.  These  directions,  in  our opinion,  were  not really warranted, at any rate,  at  this stage  of the proceedings. When the rights of the  appellant are yet to be adjudicated upon.  One important circumstance, which  was not present before the Division Bench  and  which has  been  brought  to  our notice is  the  consent  of  the landlord to the sub-tenancy in her favour.  In the light  of all  the  circumstances, we  are of  the  opinion  that  the directions  extracted hereinbefore in para were  really  not called  for,  at the interlocutory stage.   However,  having regard  to  the particular facts and circumstances  of  this case, and with a view to safeguard the rights of the Company in  the event of dismissal of the aforesaid suit, we  direct the appellant to furnish security in a sum of Rupees 5 lakhs by  way  of  a Bank guarantee to  the  satisfaction  of  the learned  company Judge of the Bombay High Court, within  two months  from  today.  The amount already  deposited  by  the appellant  in  pursuance  of the order  under  appeal  shall continue to lie in court.  The                                                      995 said  amount and the security furnished by her in  pursuance of  this  order  shall be subject to  the  decision  in  the appellant’s suit, now transferred to the Bombay High Court.      20.   We  make it clear that this is  only  an  interim arrangement  pending the suit and shall not reflect upon  or affect  the  merits  of the suit or any of  the  rights  and contentions of the parties.  In case the appellant fails  to furnish  the  security as directed herein, within  the  time prescribed, the directions of the Division Bench will revive and come into operation forthwith.      21.  The Appeal is disposed of accordingly.      S.L.P.(C) NOS. 15678 of 1990 and 16368 of 1990      S.L.P.  No 16368 of 1990 is directed against the  order dated  9.8.1990  passed  by a learned Single  Judge  of  the Bombay  High Court in Company Application No. 43 of 1989  in Company  Petition No. 59 of 1984.  Pending the said  S.L.P., the appeal preferred by the petitioner-appellant against the aforsaid order of the learned Single Judge was dismissed  by a  Division Bench on 12.11.1990 (Appeal No. 1028  of  1990). S.L.P.  No. 15678 of 1990 is preferred against the order  of the  Division Bench.  For this reason, S.L.P. No.  16368  of 1990 has become infructuous and is, accordingly, dismissed.      Leave  granted in the S.L.P. No. 15678 of 1990.      The  appellant-  petitioner is a Trust which  owns  the flat  in  question.  On 22.12.1988, the appellant  filed  an application (Company Application No. 48 of 1989) in  Company Petition  No.  59 of 1984 for a direction  to  the  official liquidator  to surrender possession of the said flat to  the appellant  including symbolic possession of the  portion  in possession  of  Smt.  Nirmala R. Bafna.   According  to  the appellant,  the  sub-tenancy in favour of  Smt.  Nirmala  R. Bafna  was created with their consent.  The ground on  which vacant possession of the remaining portion was asked for was that  the official liquidator, or the Company, does no  more require  the said portion for their purpose.   Reliance  was placed upon the decision of this Court in Ravindra Ishwardas Sethna & Anr. v. Official Liquidator, High Court, Bombay and Anr., [1983] 4 S.C.C. 269.  The official liquidator  opposed the  application.   The learned Single Judge  dismissed  the application by his                                                   996 order dated 9.8.1989.  The learned Judge was of the  opinion that the decision in Sethna has no application to the  facts herein  and that more-over the liquidator requires the  said portion  (of  the flat in his possession)  for  storing  the

9

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 9 of 9  

company   records  at  Bombay.   The  Appeal  Court,   while affirming  the relevance of the reason given by the  learned Single Judge, gave an additional reason in support of  their order  viz.,  that a proposal received  from  the  Rashtriya Girni Kamgar Sangh for revival of the said Company is  under consideration.    The  order  of  the  Division   Bench   is challenged herein.      That  the official liquidator requires the  portion  of the  flat  (now in his actual possession)  for  storing  the company  books, is certainly a relevant consideration.   Mr. Sanghi,  learned counsel for the appellant, argued that  the official  liquidator does not require the said premises  for storing  the  books and that he can store the books  in  his office or anywhere else.  May be, the liquidator can do  so, but  we  cannot force him to do so, so long  as  the  reason given by him for continuing in possession is a relevant one. Secondly,  the fact that the proposal of th Rashtriya  Girni Kamgar  Sangh  who  are  said   to  have  formed  an  action Committee   of  the  Khandesh  Mill   Employees   Industrial Production  Co-operative  Society, for revival of  the  said Company was an equally relevant factor.  Mr.  Sanghi  states that the said proposal has come to nought.  We do not  know. suffice it to say that the reasons for which the application filed  by th appellant-landlord (and his appeal)  have  been dismissed   cannot  said  to  be  irrelevant.   We   cannot, therefore, interfere with the said orders.  The appeal is  , accordingly dismissed.  No costs.      It is, however, made clear that if there is any  change in  the  circumstances, it is always open to  the  landlord- appellant to approach the Company Court for such  directions as they think appropriate in the circumstances of the case. R.P.                          CA No. 886/92 disposed of and                                    CA No. 887/92 dismissed.                                                   997