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PETITIONER: SMT. ANGOORI DEVI

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF U.P. & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       22/01/1997

BENCH: FAIZAN UDDIN, SUHAS C. SEN

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                       J U D G M E N T SEN, J.      This  is   a  case   under  Urban   Land  (Ceiling  and Regulation) Act,  1976 (hereinafter  described as  ‘the Act) which involves  interpretation of  the provisions of the Act on which there are two conflicting judgments of this Court.      One Gopichand  filed a statement under Section 6 (1) of the Act in the office of the Competent Authority, Meerut, on 24.10.76 in respect of two properties:-      1.   Khasra  No.  1685  measuring  1545  square  metres           situated at Beri Pura Road, Meerut City.      2.   Khasra Nos.  1969 and  1970 measuring  1630 square           metres situated  on Delhi  Road, Meerut  City.  In           this plot stood a factory having 493 square metres           of covered  area and  1156 square  metres of  open           land.      The  Competent  Authority,  after  examination  of  the facts, held  that an area measuring 910.50 square metres was vacant land of Gopi Chand.      An objection  under Section  8 (3)  of the said Act was field on  26.9.77 by  the legal  heirs of Gopi Chand who had died in the meantime. Their contention was that there was no vacant surplus land and the order of the Competent Authority was not in accordance with the provisions of the said Act.      The District  Judge, Meerut, who heard the appeal, held that the  Competent Authority  had wrongly construed Section 4(9) of  the Act.  That provision, according to the District Judge, came  into play  only when  there was vacant land and other land  having a  building with a dwelling unit thereon. In the  instant case,  there was  no  dwelling  unit  but  a factory. Therefore,  the covered area on which factory stood could not  be taken  into account  in computation  of vacant land.  The   District  Judge   also  pointed   out  that  no constructions were  permissible on  an area  measuring  1358 square  metres   of  land   held  by  Gopi  Chand.  However, construction was  permissible  on  an  area  measuring  1384 square metres  permissible on  an area measuring 1384 square metres which was well within the ceiling limit prescribed by the Act.      The decision  of  the  District  Judge  was  challenged

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before the  High Court  at Allahabad by the State of U.P. It held by  the  High  Court  that  interpretation  of  Section 2(g)(i) made  by the  District Judge  was not  correct.  The controversy was concluded by a judgment of that Court in the case of  Prem Nath  Duggal v.  State of U.P., which had been decided on 16.8.1984.      In the  appeal before  us, a  point was  sought  to  be raised about  the ownership  of  the  factory.  That  point, however, was  not gone  into and  decided by the High Court. Therefore, this question cannot be raised at this stage. The only question that falls for determination in this appeal is whether Gopi  Chand at the material time held vacant land in excess of ceiling limit fixed by the Act?      ‘Dwelling unit’,  ‘land appurtenant’  and ‘vacant land’ have been defined by Section 2:-      "2. Definitions.  -  In  this  Act,      unless   the    context   otherwise      requires,      ...  ...  ...      (e) ‘dwelling unit’, in relation to      a  building   or  a  portion  of  a      building,   means    a   unit    of      accommodation, in  such building or      portion,  used   solely   for   the      purpose of residence;      ...  ...  ...      (g) ‘land appurtenant’, in relation      to any building, means-      (i) in  an  area  where  there  are      building regulations,  the  minimum      extent of  land required under such      regulations  to  be  kept  as  open      space for  the  enjoyment  of  such      building, which  in no  case  shall      exceed five  hundred square metres;      or      (ii) in  an area where there are no      building regulations,  an extent of      five  hundred  square  metres  five      hundred square metres contiguous to      the land occupied by such building,      and includes,  in the  case of  any      building  constructed   before  the      appointed  day   with   constructed      before the  appointed  day  with  a      dwelling    unit     therein,    an      additional  extent   not  exceeding      five hundred square metres of land,      if any,  contiguous to  the minimum      extent referred  to  in  sub-clause      (i) or  the extent  referred to  in      sub-clause (ii),  as the  case  may      be;      ...  ...  ...      (q) ‘vacant  land’ means  land, not      being  land  mainly  used  for  the      purpose of agriculture, in an urban      agglomeration,   but    does    not      include-      (i) land on which construction of a      building is  not permissible  under      the building  regulations in  force      in the  area in  which such land is      situated.      (ii) in  an area  where  there  are

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    building  regulations,   the   land      occupied by  any building which has      been constructed before or is being      constructed on,  the appointed  day      with   the    approval    of    the      appropriate authority  and the land      appurtenant to such building; and      (iii) in an area where there are no      building  regulations,   the   land      occupied by  any building which has      been  constructed   before,  or  is      being constructed on, the appointed      day and  the  land  appurtenant  to      such building:      Provided  that   where  any  person      ordinarily keeps  his cattle, other      than  for   the  purpose  of  dairy      farming  or   for  the  purpose  of      breeding of live-stock, on any land      situated in  a  village  within  an      urban agglomeration (described as a      village in  there  venue  records),      then, so much extent of the land as      has been  orinarily  used  for  the      keeping of  such cattle immediately      before the  appointed day shall not      be deemed to be vacant land for the      purposes of this clause."      Section 3 of the Act lays down that except as otherwise provided in  this Act,  on and from the commencement of this Act, no  person shall be entitled to hold any vacant land in excess of  the ceiling limit. Ceiling limit has been defined in Section 4 to mean:      "4. Ceiling limit. - (1) Subject to      the  other   provisions   of   this      section,  in   the  case  of  every      person,  the  ceiling  limit  shall      be,-      (a)  where   the  vacant   land  is      situated in  an urban agglomeration      falling within category A specified      in Schedule  I, five hundred square      metres;      (b) where  such land is situated in      an  urban   agglomeration   falling      within  category   B  specified  in      Schedule  I,  one  thousand  square      metres;      (c) where  such land is situated in      an  urban   agglomeration   falling      within  category   C  specified  in      Schedule  I,   one  thousand   five      hundred square metres;      (d) where  such land is situated in      an  urban   agglomeration   falling      within  category   D  specified  in      Schedule  I,  two  thousand  square      metres.      x    x    x    x    x    x    x      x      (9) Where  a  person  holds  vacant      land and  also holds any other land      on which there is a building with a      dwelling unit  therein, the  extent      of such  other land occupied by the

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    extent of  such other land occupied      by the  building unit  therein, the      extent of  such other land occupied      by  the   building  and   the  land      appurtenant thereto  shall also  be      taken into  account in  calculating      the extent  of vacant  land held by      such person."      The dispute in this case turns round the interpretation of sub-section (9) of Section 4 read with sub-section (q) of Section 2 which defines "Vacant land".      The controversy in this case is as to the object of the Act and  how  that  object  has  been  achieved  by  various provisions and,  in particular, sub-section (9) of Section 4 of the Act. If has been contended on behalf of the appellant that the  question of  law raised  in this  case is  not res integra any  more. Section 4(9) has been examined in several decisions of  this Court  and there  is  no  scope  for  any further debate on this issue.      On behalf  of the  respondents, it has been pointed out that the  object of  the Act is to prevent the concentration of urban  land in  the hands  of a  few persons. If a person owns several  houses in  an urban  area and a plot of vacant land of less than 2000 square metres falling within category ‘D’, to allow such a person to continue to use and enjoy the vacant plot  of land  regardless of the other lands occupied by buildings  owned by  him, will not subserve the object of the Act  and the  Act should  not e construed in a manner to defeat the  object. Any land occupied by buildings cannot be treated as  vacant land  as defined  in Section 2 (q). There cannot be  any dispute  about  that  proposition.  But  what Section 4(9)  has done is to introduce a rule of computation of vacant  land by which is if a person who owns vacant land also holds  another  plot  of  land  on  which  there  is  a building, then  the vacant land held by such a person has to be computed  after taking  into account the land occupied by building and  also the  land appurtenant  thereto. In  other words, although  any land  occupied by building and the land appurtenant thereto  will  not  otherwise  come  within  the mischief of  the definition  of  vacant  land  as  given  in Section 2(q), by virtue of the provisions of sub-section (9) of Section  4 of  the Act,  such land will have to bed taken into reckoning for the purpose of computation of vacant land under sub-section (9) of Section 4.      There is  considerable force  in this  argument and the case of State of U.P. and Others v. L.J. Johnson and others, (1983) 4 SCC 110, lends support to this contention.,      On behalf  of  the  appellant,  however,  it  has  been contended that the points decided by this Court in Johnson’s Case were  examined further  by a larger Bench of this Court in the  case of  Meera Gupta  (Smt.) v. State of West Bengal and Others,  (1992) SCC  494, where  the scope and effect of various provision  of Section  4 including  sub-section  (9) were  closely   examined  with   reference  to  the  meaning attributed to  vacant land by Section 2(q)(ii) and (iii). It has been emphasised in that judgment that-      "The interpretation  we have put to      the provisions  pertinently  relate      to sub-clauses  (ii) and  (iii)  of      clause (q)  of Section 2. Johnson’s      Case as  said  before,  is  a  case      under sub-clause  (i) of clause (q)      of Section 2."      On behalf  of the  respondents, it has been pointed out that it  will not  be right to regard Johnson’s Case (supra)

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as a  case dealing with Section 2(q) (i) of the Act only. As many as 200 and odd appeals were disposed of by the judgment in Johnson’s  Case. The  Court interpreted Section 4(9) with reference to  Section 2(q)  generally. There is no reason to presume that the case was confined only to sub-clause (i) of Section 2(q).  Specific reference  has been  made to Section 2(q) (ii)  and (iii)  of the  Act in  paragraph  24  in  the following words:      "In  the   ultimate  analysis   the      position  is   quite   clear   that      Section 4(9) contemplates that if a      person holds  vacant land  as  also      other  portion  of  land  on  which      there is a building with a dwelling      unit, the  extent of  land occupied      by  the   building  and   the  land      appurtenant thereto  shall be taken      into  account  in  calculating  the      extent of  the  vacant  land.  This      sub-section  has   to  be  read  in      conjunction with  Section  2(q)(ii)      and (iii).  A combined  reading  of      these  two   statutory   provisions      would  lead   to  the  irresistible      inference that  in cases which fall      within the third category mentioned      above, the-      (1) total  area of  the land  of  a      landholder   is    first   to    be      determined and  if the  total area,      built or  unbuilt, falls below 2000      sq.  metres  in  category  D  area,      there would  be no  question of any      excess land,      (2)  Where,  however,  there  is  a      building and  a dwelling  unit then      the area  beneath the  building and      the dwelling  unit would have to be      excluded   while    computing   the      ceiling. Further,  if there are any      bylaws requiring  a portion  of the      land  to   be  kept   vacant,   the      landholder would  be allowed to set      apart the  said land to the maximum      extent of  500 sq. metres. He would      also  be   allowed  to   retain  an      additional area  of 500  sq. metres      for  the   beneficial  use  of  the      building so  that he  may enjoy the      use of  a little  compound also for      various purposes."      After discussing  the matter further in para 25, it was concluded in para 26:-      "The  argument  that  once  a  plot      contains a  building, the  whole of      the plot  would be  exempt from the      ceiling area cannot be countenanced      on    a     plain    and     simple      interpretation of  Section 2(q)(ii)      read with  Section  4(9).  In  fact      Section 4(9) itself puts the matter      beyond  controversy  by  qualifying      the words  ‘other land  occupied by      the   building    and   the    land      appurtenant      thereto’.      The

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    expression  ‘  thereto’  manifestly      shows that  the  intention  of  the      legislature was  to  refer  to  the      land on  which the  building or the      dwelling  unit   stands.  In  other      words,  the   vacant   land   which      contains a  building would  include      appurtenant land  or any other land      situated in that particular plot."      In Meera Gupta’s case (supra) a larger Bench considered Johnson’s case.  Presumably this  Court’s attention  was not drawn to  the aforesaid  analysis of  Section 4(9) read with Section  2(q)(ii)  and  (iii)  made  by  Fazal  Ali,  J.  in Johnson’s case.  Johnson’s case was distinguished in para 11 of the case in the following words:-      "In these  appeals, we  are  mainly      concerned with  the  interpretation      of  Section  4(9)  and  the  allied      construction of  Sections 2(g)  and      2(q)(ii) and  (iii) of  the Act and      their impact  on Section  4(9).  It      follows, therefore,  that once  the      view taken  in  Johnson’s  case  in      regard to this question is reversed      all the  matters will  have  to  go      back to the competent authority for      a decision in the light of the view      taken by  this Court.  This will be      the ultimate outcome because in all      the allied  matters there is only a      cryptic  order   disposing  of  the      concerned matter in accordance with      the view taken by the High Court in      Johnson’s case  in  regard  to  the      interpretation of Section 4(9). The      remaining questions  raised by  the      landholders   will   have   to   be      resolved and the actual computation      of excess  land, if any, would have      to be  undertaken by  the competent      authority on remand."      It  has   been  contended   that  Johnson’s   Case  had specifically dealt  with the  definition of  vacant land  as given in  Section 2(q)  (ii) and (iii). It will not be right to say  that the Johnson’s Case was confined to Section 2(q) (i) of the Act.      There is  some force  in this contention. The principle laid down in Meera Gupta’s case has been applied in the case of Atma Ram Aggarwal v. State of U.P., (1993) Supp. 1 SCC 1. Since Meera  Gupta’s case  was decided  by a  Bench of three Judges, the  contention raised  by the respondents should be considered by a larger Bench. This case may be placed before the Hon’ble  the Chief  Justice  of  India  for  appropriate direction.