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PETITIONER: SITA DEVI AND OTHERS,ETC. ETC.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF HARYANA & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       23/08/1996

BENCH: JEEVAN REDDY, B.P. (J) BENCH: JEEVAN REDDY, B.P. (J) MANOHAR SUJATA V. (J)

CITATION:  JT 1996 (7)   438        1996 SCALE  (6)151

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                       J U D G M E N T B.P. JEEVAN REDDY, J. WRIT PETITION (C) NO.584 OF 1989      In this  writ petition  filed under  Article 32  of the Constitution of  India, three  reliefs are  asked for  by as many as 748 petitioners. The reliefs sought for are:      "(a) Issue  writ in  the nature  of      mandamus or  any appropriate  writ,      order   or   direction   that   the      petitioners be treated to be in the      service of the respondents from the      date of  their initial  appointment      irrespective   be    there    being      artificial break  in their services      during the period.      (b)  Issue   an  appropriate  writ,      order   or    direction   to    the      respondents to  put the petitioners      on regular  pay scales  to that  of      primary  school   teachers  in  the      Education  Department   of  Haryana      plus other  consequential  benefits      from  the  date  of  their  initial      appointment and  further direct the      respondents to  pay the petitioners      the difference in arrears of salary      accrued to  them from  the date  of      their initial appointment.      (c)  Issue   by  appropriate  writ,      order   or   direction   that   the      department of  Audit Education  and      Non-formal Education is a permanent      department of  the  State  and  the      petitioners are regular teachers in      the  department  appointed  against      sanctioned posts of Instructors."

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    On the  date of  the filing of the writ petition (March 1989) the  petitioners were  working as  "under  matriculate instructors in  the Adult Literacy Programme" devised by the Government of  Haryana. They  were being  paid  a  lump  sum amount of Rs.200/- per month as salary. They had put in 5 to 6 years service and have been performing their duties to the satisfaction of all concerned. Their submission is that when matriculate instructors  approached this  Court for  similar reliefs, they  were granted  certain reliefs  though not all the reliefs  asked for  by them.  The reference  is  to  the judgment of  this Court  in Jaipal  and others  v. State  of Haryana and  other [A.I.R.  1988 S.C. 1504 = 1968 (3) S.C.C. 354] wherein  this  Court  directed  that  the  "matriculate instructors are  entitled to  the same  pay scale as that of the squad  teachers, having  regard to  the length  of their service with  effect from  their date of initial appointment by ignoring  the break  in service  on account of six months fresh appointments.  It was  further directed  by this Court that the  said petitioners  will be entitled to the said pay scales in  accordance with  law notwithstanding the break in service that  might have  taken place.  The said  directions were made  effective with  effect from  September  1,  1985. However, the  claim for regularization of their services put forward by the said petitioners was rejected, since the very project was  likely to  last only  till  1990.  The  present petitioners’ case  is that though they are non- matriculates they too  have been  performing the very same duties as were being performed  by  matriculate  teachers  (petitioners  in Jaipal). The  petitioners invoke the principle of ’equal pay for equal work’. According to them, except the difference in the matter  of educational  qualifications there is no other distinction  between  the  post  held  and  the  duties  and functions performed  by the  petitioners in  Jaipal and  the petitioners herein.  They have  set out in the writ petition the several  duties performed  by  them.  Reliance  is  also placed upon  certain other  decisions of  this  Court  viz., Randhir Singh  v. Union  of  India  [1982  (3)  S.C.R.  298; Dhirendra Chamoli v. State of U.P. [1986 (1) S.C.C. 637] and Surinder Singh  v. Engineer-in-Chief,  CPWD [1986 (1) S.C.C. 639].      The  doctrine   of  ’equal   work  for  equal  pay’  is recognised by  this Court  as a facet of the equality clause contained in  Article 14  of the  Constitution. The first of the several  decisions on  the subject  is Randhir  Singh v. Union of  India [1982 (1) S.C.C. 618]. The said doctrine has been dealt  with by  this Court  in several  later decisions including State  of Madhya  Pradesh and  Another  v.  Pramod Bhartiya and Others [1993 (1) S.C.C. 539] decided by a three -member Bench  of which one of us (B.P.Jeevan Reddy, J.) was a member.  This decision  dealt mainly  with the  manner  in which the claim of equal work has to be judged. It was held, after referring to the definition of "same work or work of a similar nature"  in Section  2(h) of  Equal Remuneration Act 1976, that:      "the stress  is upon the similarity      of skill, effort and responsibility      when   performed    under   similar      conditions. Further, as pointed but      by Mukharji, J. (as he then was) in      Federation of All India Customs and      Excise  Stenographers   [1988   (3)      S.C.C.  91   :   1988   SCC   (L&S)      673:(1988) 7  ATC 591]  the quality      of work may vary from post to post.      It may  vary  from  institution  to

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    institution. We  cannot  ignore  or      overlook this  reality. It is not a      matter of  assumption  but  one  of      proof. It  must be  remembered that      since the  plea of  equal  pay  for      equal work  has to be examined with      reference to Article 14, the burden      is   upon    the   petitioners   to      establish their right to equal pay,      or the  plea of  discrimination, as      the case may be."      It was  observed in  the said decision, on the basis of the  earlier   decisions  of  this  Court,  that  where  the petitioners complain  of unlawful  discrimination  offending Article 14,  it is  for them  to satisfy  the Court that the distinction made  is irrational  and baseless  and  that  it really amounts  to  unlawful  discrimination  prohibited  by Article 14.  Applying the  principle of the said decision to this case, can it be said that the petitioner herein who are non-matriculate instructors  are similarly placed to that of the matriculate  instructors or  that the  distinction  made between both  the categories  is irrational  or baseless. In other words,  the question  is  whether  the  Government  of Haryana is  guilty of unlawful discrimination in refusing to extend to  non-matriculate instructors  the pay-scale  which has been extended to matriculate instructors pursuant to the judgment of  this Court  in Jaipal.  We  do  not  think  on. Classification on  the basis  of educational  qualifications has always  been upheld  by this  Court  as  reasonable  and permissible under  Article 14.  In The  State of  Mysore and another v.  P. Narasinga  Rao [A.I.R.  1968 S.C.  349],  the Government of  Karnataka had prescribed two different scales for tracers  - one for matriculate tracers with higher scale and another  for  non-matriculate  tracers  with  lower  pay scale.   The    non-matriculate   tracers    complained   of discrimination. The  said plea  was negatived  holding  that prescribing two  different scales  for matriculates and non- matriculates is  not violative  of Article 14 and 16. It was held  that  distinction  made  on  the  basis  of  technical qualifications or  for that  matter even  on  the  basis  of general   educational   qualifications   relevant   to   the suitability  of   the  candidate   for  public   service  is permissible under  the said  articles. Indeed,  in that case both the  matriculate and non-matriculate tracers formed one single category  with one  single pay  scale earlier. It was only at  a later  stage that  a distinction was made between matriculates and  non-matriculates, which  led to  the  said proceedings. This  Court proceeded  on the  assumption  that both matriculates  and non-matriculate  tracers "were  doing the same  kind of  work"; yet  the classification  made  was upheld as  permissible under  Articles  14  and  16  of  the Constitution.  Distinction   on  the  basis  of  educational qualifications has  been upheld  as valid by this Court in a large number  of cases  since. By  way of  illustration,  in State of  Jammu and  Kashmir v.  Triloki Nath  Khosa [A.I.R. 1974 S.C.  1] the  classification of  Assistant Engineers as diploma  holders  and  degree  holders  and  providing  more promotional  avenues   to  degree   holders  was  upheld  as reasonable. The  later decision  in P. Murugesan & Others v. State of  Tamil Nadu  [1993 (2)  S.C.C. 340)  is also to the same effect.  In this  decision, all  the decisions  on  the subject  of  classification  on  the  basis  of  educational qualifications have been fully discussed.      We are,  therefore, of  the opinion  that the grievance made by the petitioners is unacceptable. We may also mention

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that apart  from relying  upon the decision of this Court in Jaipal and  claiming that  the benefit  given to matriculate teachers should  also be  given to them, no attempt has been made in the writ petition to allege and establish that their qualifications; duties and functions are similar to those of squad teachers.      For the  above reasons,  the writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. No costs. W.P. (C) NOS.1008/88, 815/88 545/92      No separate  arguments  are  addressed  in  these  writ petitions. They  too are  accordingly dismissed for the very same reasons. No costs.