IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL No.5489 OF 2007

Sindhi Education Society & Anr.          …Appellants

Versus

The Chief Secretary, Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Ors.                   …Respondents   

JUDGMENT

Swatanter Kumar, J.

1. The Bench hearing the letters patent appeal in the High Court of  

Delhi at New Delhi, while setting aside the judgment/order passed  

by the learned Single Judge dated 14th September, 2005 in Writ  

Petition  (C)  No.2426  of  1992,  issued  a  certificate  of  leave  to  

appeal  under  Article  133  read  with  Article  134-A  of  the  

Constitution  of  India,  1950  (for  short  ‘the  Constitution’)  in  its  

judgment  dated  30th November,  2006  and  considered  it

appropriate to frame the following questions to be decided by this  

Court :-

(a) Whether  Rule  64(1)(b)  of  the  Delhi  School  

Education  Rules  1973  and  the  

orders/instructions issued thereunder would, if  

made  applicable  to  an  aided  minority  

educational  institution,  violate  the  

fundamental  right  guaranteed  under  Article  

30(1)  of  the  Constitution  and  are  the  

respondents  herein  entitled  to  a  declaration  

and consequential directions to that effect ?

(b) Have  the  judgments  of  the  learned  Single  

Judge of the High Court in Sumanjit  Kaur v.  

NCT of  Delhi  [2005  III  AD  (Delhi)  560],  as  

affirmed by the decision dated 1.2.2006 of the  

Division  Bench  of  the  High  Court  in  (LPA  

Nos.445-446/2005)  Govt.  of  National  Capital  

of  Territory  of  Delhi  v.  Sumanjit  Kaur  been  

correctly decided ?

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1. It is useful to notice at this juncture itself that the Division Bench  

doubted the correctness of judgment of another Division Bench of  

that Court in the case of Govt. of NCT of Delhi v. Sumanjit Kaur in  

LPA Nos. 445-446 of 2006 dated 1.2.2006.  The  Division  

Bench  had  affirmed  the  view  taken  by  the  Single  Judge  in  

Sumanjit Kaur (supra).   The learned Single Judge had expressed  

the  view  that  such  circulars  and  regulations  issued  by  the  

Directorate of Education, would be unconstitutional since they are  

likely to interfere with the choice of the medium of instruction as  

well  as  minority  character  of  the  institution  by  compelling  the  

appointment  to  the  teaching  faculty  of  persons,  who  may  be  

inimical towards that minority community.   The Court further held  

that since the approval in the facts of the case would be deemed  

to have been granted, the Court was not expected to discuss or  

pass further orders in the writ petition.  The Division Bench, which  

passed the impugned judgment expressed the view contra to the  

view taken by the learned Single Judge in the Case of Sumanjit  

Kaur (supra), as affirmed by the Division Bench.  While noticing  

that the Government of NCT of Delhi had filed the Special Leave  

Petition  (C)  No.  16374  of  2006  in  this  Court  in  that  case,  the  

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Division  Bench  in  the  present  case  thought  it  fit  to  grant  the  

certificate for leave to appeal to this Court.

1. This  is  how  we  have  been  called  upon  to  examine  the  

constitutionality and legality or otherwise of the above questions  

framed by the High Court of Delhi.   We are also of the considered  

view that besides the above question, it will have to be examined  

that even if the relevant provisions of the Delhi School Education  

Act, 1973 (for short the ‘DSE Act’) are not unconstitutional, would  

they still  apply with their rigors to the linguistic minority schools  

receiving grant-in-aid from the Government.  Before we enter upon  

the aspects relating to law on the above issues, reference to the  

basic facts would be necessary.

Facts :-

1. The appellant – Sindhi Education Society (hereinafter referred to  

as ‘the Society’) is a Society established and duly registered under  

the  provisions  of  the  Societies  Registration  Act,  1860.   The  

Society  is  running,  inter  alia,  a  school  known  as  S.E.S.  Baba  

Nebhraj Senior Secondary School at Lajpat Nagar, New Delhi.     

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1. According to the Society, Sindhi language is one of the languages  

included  in  VIII  Schedule  of  the  Constitution  and  the  people  

speaking  Sindhi  language are  scattered  in  various parts  of  the  

country.   As Sindhi  language is not  spoken by the majority of  

people in Delhi, therefore,  the Sindhi community in Delhi is and  

has been held to be a linguistic minority by virtue of Article 30(1)  

of the Constitution.   The Society, therefore, has a constitutional  

right  to  establish  and  administer  educational  institutions  of  its  

choice.   In  furtherance  of  such  an  object,  the  school  was  

established for preservation of Sindhi language and managing the  

affairs  of  the  school  as  per  its  constitution  and  under  the  

provisions of the relevant laws.    

1. In  the  year 1973,  the DSE Act  came into  force  with a view to  

provide  better  organization  and  development  of  the  school  

education in Union Territory of Delhi  and for matters connected  

therewith and incidental thereto.  Soon after coming into force of  

the provisions of the DSE Act, 1973, the Society felt that certain  

provisions of the DSE Act infringed the minority character of the  

Society,  particularly,  in  matters  related  to  administration  and  

management of the school.   

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1. It appears that the society filed a writ petition in the High Court of  

Delhi  being  Writ  Petition  (C)  No.  940  of  1975,  titled  Sindhi  

Education Society (Regd.) v.  Director  of Education and others,  

which came to be disposed of by a detailed judgment of the Delhi  

High Court  dated 14th July, 1982.    In that  judgment,  the Court  

specifically held that the Society was a linguistic minority and the  

provisions of the DSE Act as specified in the judgment would not  

be applicable  to  the  Society.   In  order  to  put  the  matters  with  

clarity,  it  will  be useful  to  refer  to  the findings  recorded  by the  

Court which read as under :-

“In  the  present  case  the  Delhi  School  Education Act is applicable only to the Union  territory of Delhi.   It is with reference to this  Territory  that  one  has  to  consider  as  to  whether Sindhi is a language spoken by the  majority or minority of the people.    On this  there can be no doubt.   Sindhi is not spoken  by  majority  of  the  people  in  Delhi  and,  therefore,  the Sindhi community in Delhi can  legitimately  be  regarded  as  a  linguistic  minority.   Just as a religious minority may be  composed  of  persons  whose mother-tongue  may  not  be  the  same,  similarly  a  linguistic  minority may not necessarily be composed of  people who belong to a religious minority of  the State.   As such, every person, who is a  Sindhi, would be regarded as belonging to a  linguistic minority irrespective of the fact as to  

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whether  he  is  a  Hindu,  or  a  Muslim  or  a  Christian  to  the  effect  that  some  of  the  provisions of the Act and the Rules would not  apply to minority institutions, while some other  provisions could be made applicable only with  certain  modifications  or  in  accordance  with  the  observations  made  by the  Court.    We  may now summarise the decision of this Court  with regard to those provisions of the Act and  the  Rules  which  it  held  as  not  being  applicable,  or  being  applicable  as  per  the  directions  contained  therein,  because  the  learned counsel for the petitioner states that a  similar direction should be issued in this case  also.

xxx   xxx    xxx xxx    xxx

The aforesaid provisions are not  to apply to  the school but the Director of Education, Delhi  should  be  kept  informed  of  any  order  of  dismissal,  removal,  reduction  in  rank  or  termination of service of an employee by the  management.   If  the Administration  receives  information  that  the  disciplinary  powers  are  being  abused  by  the  school  then  the  Administration  will  have  a  right  to  suspend,  reduce or stop the grant-in-aid to the School  after giving a hearing to the school.

Section 27A and B :- The said provisions are  not to apply to the minority school.

The writ petition is accordingly allowed in the  aforesaid terms and, like in Jain Sabha’s case  (supra),  it  is  directed  that  the  aforesaid  provisions of the Delhi School Education Act,  1973  and  the  Rules  framed  thereunder  will  

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not apply to the petitioner or would apply only  in  the  manner  in  which  they  have  been  interpreted by this Court.   The petitioner will  be entitled to costs.   Counsel’s fee Rs.550/-.”

1. The aforesaid judgment appears to have attained finality and, in  

fact, was not impugned before this Court.   The Division Bench,  

while  deciding  the  above  case,  clearly  held  that  certain  Rules  

would not be applicable and it specifically noticed the provisions  

relating to the constitution of the Managing Committee under Rule  

59,  Rule 64,  different  Clauses under Rule 96(3),  Rule 98,  Rule  

105  and  Rule  120  of  Delhi  School  Education  Rules,  1973  (for  

short ‘DSE Rules’) in that behalf.   The Court held that Rule 64 of  

the DSE Rules is to be construed in respect of minority schools to  

require  compliance  only  if  those  provisions  of  the  Act  and  the  

Rules  and  instructions  thereunder  are  in  consonance  with  the  

provisions of the Constitution, particularly, with Article 30(1) of the  

Constitution.

1. Rule 64, primarily, deals with the conditions of providing grant-in-

aid and further states that no aid is to be granted unless suitable  

undertaking is given by the Managing Committee.   Rule 64 came  

to  be  amended  by  Notification  Nos.  1340-2340  dated  23rd  

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February, 1990.  This Rule prescribe certain limitation which the  

Competent Authority can impose in exercise of its powers.   Even  

before amendment of this Rule, on 12th March, 1985, instructions  

were issued by the Deputy Director of Education, addressed to the  

appellant  stating,  inter alia,  that  in accordance with provision of  

Rule  64  of  the  DSE  Rules,  the  Managing  Committee  of  the  

Society was required  to  furnish  an undertaking that  they would  

make  reservation  in  the  appointments  of  teachers  for  the  

Scheduled  Castes and Scheduled  Tribes.    The reference  was  

also  made  to  the  instructions  issued  by  the  Department  of  

Personnel,  Government  of  India,  wherein  reservation  for  

Scheduled  Castes  and  Scheduled  Tribes  in  the  

Institutions/Organisations was ordered.   The relevant part of the  

said letter reads as under :-

“4. Since the schools are required to apply for  grants-in-aid  every  years  on  the  prescribed  proforma as provided under the Act, they are  also  required  to  given  undertaking  to  make  reservation  in  the  services  and  posts  for  scheduled  castes  and  scheduled  tribes  accordingly.    A specimen of the declaration  is sent herewith the request that the same be  sent to this office duly filled in and signed with  stamp of the Authority signing.

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5. It may be noted that the future grants-in-aid  shall  be  released  on  giving  the  aforesaid  undertaking on the enclosed proforma.”

The appellant Society responded to that letter vide reply dated  

15th April, 1985, inviting attention of the authorities  to the judgment of  

the High Court  dated 14.7.1982,  in Writ  Petition No. 940 of  1975,  

deciding, inter alia, that the school in question, has been held to be a  

minority  institution  and  that  Rule  64  of  the  DSE  Rules  is  to  be  

accordingly  construed  in  respect  of  minority  school(s)  that  they  

require  compliance,  only,  if  the  same  is  in  consonance  with  the  

provisions of Article 30(1) of   the Constitution.

   1. The Secretary (Education),  Govt.  of  NCT of  Delhi,  Respondent  

No.3, thereafter vide his communication dated 21st March, 1986,  

informed the appellant that the undertaking, which was required to  

be given by all  the Government  aided schools  in  the matter  of  

compliance  with  the  provisions  relating  to  reservation  for  

Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the institutions, is not  

applicable  to  the  minority  institutions.    Thus,  they  were  not  

required to adhere to the same.   It will be useful to refer to the  

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communication of the Government at this stage itself, which reads  

as follow :-

“In connection with circular letter issued vide  even  number  dated  12.3.85,  this  is  hereby  clarified that  an undertaking in writing which  was  required  to  be  given  by  all  the  Govt.  Aided  Schools  in  the  matter  of  compliance  with the provisions relating to reservation for  SC/ST in the institutions is not applicable to  the  minority  institutions.   As  such  the  managements  of  the  institutions  are  at  the  discretion to adhere or not  to  adhere to the  instructions  issued  by  the  Govt.  of  India  regarding reservation of SC/ST.”

1. The aforesaid letter  was issued after  the judgment of the Court  

had  been  pronounced,  however,  according  to  the  appellant,  in  

violation of all the principles and the law laid down by that Court,  

they still  received another communication from the authorities in  

September, 1989, addressed to all the schools that appointment  

of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes candidates is a  

precondition  for  all  the  agencies  receiving grant-in-aid  from the  

Government and while referring to Rule 64 of the DSE Rules and  

its amendment,  they were required by the authorities  to comply  

with  this  condition.   The  correctness  of  this  action  of  the  

respondent was questioned by appellants by filing a writ petition in  

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the High Court, which came to be registered as Writ Petition (C)  

No.2426 of  1992 titled as Sindhi  Education Society v.  Union of  

India and Others.   This writ petition was allowed by the learned  

Single Judge vide his Order dated 14.9.2005.  The learned Single  

Judge felt that the case was entirely covered by the judgment of  

that  Court  in the case of  Sumanjit  Kaur (supra).   That was the  

primary and only reason, stated by the learned Single Judge, for  

allowing the writ petition.

2. Aggrieved from the  judgment  of  the  learned  Single  Judge,  the  

NCT of Delhi filed a letter patent appeal being L.P.A. Nos. 33 to  

36  of  2006  and  40-43  of  2006,  and  the  same  was  not  only  

accepted  but  the  Division  Bench  had  felt  it  proper  to  grant  

certificate of leave to appeal to this Court,  vide judgment dated  

30.11.2006.   While  setting  aside  the  judgment  of  the  learned  

Single Judge and also expressing a dissent to the Division Bench  

Judgment  in  the  case  of  Sumanjit  Kaur  (supra),  the  Division  

Bench, primarily, recorded the reasons as [a] that Rule 64(1)(b)  

does not infringe any right of the minority institution, [b] Clause 11  

of the Kerala Education Bill, 1957, which was the subject matter of  

consideration  before  the  Supreme Court  in  the  case  of  In  Re.  

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Kerala Education Bill, 1957, [(1959) SCR 995], was pari materia to  

Rule 64(1)(b) of DSE Rules, and as such was in conformity with  

law  and  lastly,  implementation  of  roster  of  reservation  was  in  

consonance with the stated principle and the fundamental rights  

are not infringed.  For these reasons, the High Court passed the  

order afore-noticed, resulting in filing of the present appeal.

1. We have already noticed the questions of law of general public  

importance, which had been framed by the High Court at the time  

of  issuance  of  certificate.    The  appellants  herein  succeeded  

before  the  learned  Single  Judge,  which  order  in  turn,  was  set  

aside by the Division Bench of the High Court.   The appellants in  

writ petition had raised a specific  challenge to the provisions of  

Rule 64(1)(b) of the DSE Rules which had been accepted by the  

learned Single Judge as the matter was stated to be covered by  

the judgment of that Court in Sumanjit Kaur’s case (supra).   The  

respondents  vide  their  letter  dated  12th March,  1985,  and,  

thereafter,  while  referring  to  the  Department  of  Personnel  and  

Administration, letter  dated 7th October,  1974, pressed upon the  

Managing Committee of the institutions, which were Government  

aided including minority institutions, to furnish an undertaking that  

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they would abide by the rule promoting reservation while making  

appointment  of teachers in the school.   Thus, the question that  

clearly  arise  for  consideration  before  this  Court  is  whether  the  

provisions  of  Rule  64(1)(b)  of  the  DSE  Rules  is  ultra-vires  or  

violative of Article 30(1) of the Constitution.    In the alternative,  

whether the said Rule,  as framed,  can be enforced against  the  

Government aided institutions belonging to linguistic minorities.    

In order to examine this aspect in some elaboration, we would  

have  to  dissect  it  into  two  different  sections.   Firstly,  the  law  in  

relation  to  such  minorities,  as  has  been  settled  by  catena  of  

judgments of this Court, and their correct application to the present  

case, secondly, analysis of the scheme of the DSE Act and the Rules  

framed there under, in relation to minority institutions.   Depending  

upon the answer to these two aspects,  lastly, whether the Rule is  

enforceable  against  the  minority  institutions  to  the  extent  that  the  

authorities can deny grant-in-aid for non-compliance.

Scheme under  the  Delhi  School  Education  Act,  1973  and the  Rules framed thereunder in relation to the Minority Institutions :-

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1. As already noticed, there is no dispute to the fact that appellant is  

a  minority  institution  and  the  Society  is  one  which  enjoys  the  

status  of  a  linguistic  minority  and  thus  is  entitled  to  all  the  

constitutional benefit  and protection under Articles 29 and 30 of  

the Constitution.  Firstly, one has to examine what is a minority.  

‘Minority’, would include both religious and linguistic minorities.    

Section  2(o)  of  the  DSE  Act  defines  ‘minority  school’  as  

follows:-

“minority school” means a school established  and  administered  by  a  minority  having  the  right to do so under clause (1) of Article 30 of   the Constitution

Once an institution satisfies the above ingredients, it has to be  

given  the  status  of  a  minority  institution.    The High  Court  in  its  

judgment in Sindhi Education Society (Writ Petition No.940 of 1975)  

(supra) had clearly declared that the appellant is a linguistic minority  

and that judgment has attained finality.    

1. There is  hardly any dispute  in  regard  to  status  of  this  Society.  

Prior to coming into force of DSE Rules, the Society was obviously  

free to carry on its activity of running the educational institution,  

free from any restriction and in accordance with law.  DSE Act  

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was enacted to provide better  organization and development  of  

school  education  in  Union  Territory  of  Delhi  and  for  matters  

connected therewith or incidental thereto.  The very object of this  

Act  was,  therefore,  to  improve  the  organization  and  school  

education  in  Delhi.    The primary object,  thus,  was to  aid  and  

develop the  education  system at  the  school  level.   In  order  to  

achieve  this  purpose,  power  is  vested  in  the  Administrator  to  

regulate education in all schools in Delhi in accordance with the  

provisions of the DSE Act and Rules made there under.  Section  

3(3) of the DSE Act makes it abundantly clear that on and from  

the commencement of DSE Act, and subject to the provisions of  

Clause 1 of Article 30 of the Constitution, the establishment of a  

new school or opening of a higher class or even closing of existing  

classes shall have to be in accordance with the provisions of the  

DSE Act, but for such compliance, the recognition shall be denied  

to  such  institution  by  the  appropriate  authority.   The  school  is  

required to have a scheme of management in terms of Section 5  

of  the  DSE  Act,  but  such  scheme  insofar  as  it  relates  to  the  

previous  approval  of  the  appropriate  authority,  will  not  be  

applicable to the scheme for an unaided school.

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1. Powers  of  wide  dimensions  and  authority  are  vested  in  the  

Administrator under Section 20 of the DSE Act, which forms part  

of Chapter VII relating to taking over of the management of the  

schools  under  the  provisions  of  the  Act.   Whenever  the  

Administrator  is  satisfied  that  the  managing  committee  or  the  

manager  of  the school  has failed or  neglected  to  perform their  

duties and carry on the management of the school in accordance  

with the provisions of the Act, the Administrator can take over the  

management  of the school whether such school is recognized or  

not.  But, such action can be taken only in accordance with the  

prescribed  procedure.   However,  where  the  Administrator  feels  

that it is expedient to take over the management of the school, it  

could  pass  orders  from time  to  time,  outer  limit  being  3  years  

which  again  could  be  extended  for  further  period,  if  the  

Administrator is of that opinion for valid reasons but, in any case, it  

cannot exceed the period of 5 years in its entirety.  These powers  

of the Administrator  indicate the legislative intent to ensure that  

the object of the DSE Act is not defeated and every recognized or  

unrecognized  institution,  without  classification  on  the  basis  of  

receiving  Government  aid,  should  function  and  be  managed  in  

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accordance  with  the  provisions  of  the  DSE Act  and  the  Rules  

framed thereunder.   It is of great significance to notice here that  

the legislature in its wisdom by a specific provision under Section  

21 of the DSE Act has kept minority schools outside the ambit and  

scope of Section 20.   In other words, the power of control and  

management vested in the authority even on the basis of alleged  

breach of conditions would not enable the authorities to take over  

the management of any minority school.   Section 21, thus, is an  

absolute exception to the applicability of Section 20 of the DSE  

Act.   Section 28 of the DSE Act empowers the Administrator to  

frame  Rules  with  the  previous  approval  of  the  Central  

Government.    The  Administrator  has  been  empowered  under  

Section 28(2), in particular and without prejudice to the generality  

of  the stated  powers,  to  frame Rules  in  relation  to  the matters  

specified in that   sub-section.    

1. It will not be necessary for us to notice in detail the purposes for  

which Rules can be framed but reference to few of them would be  

useful.   Under Section 28(2)(b), Rules can be framed in regard to  

the  condition  which  every  existing  school  shall  be  required  to  

comply.   While, Section 28(2)(g) contemplate framing of minimum  

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qualifications for,  and method of recruitment, and the terms and  

conditions  of  service  of  employees,  Section  28(2)(k)  empowers  

the Administrator to frame Rules in regard to the conditions under  

which aid may be granted to recognized schools and on violation  

of which, aid may be stopped, reduced or suspended and Section  

28(2)(q) relates to faming of Rules for admission to a recognized  

school and lastly under Section 28(2)(u), Rules can be framed in  

regard to financial and other returns to be filed by the managing  

committee of recognized private school.  It has to be noticed that  

all these Rules can be framed and have only one purpose ‘make  

rules to carry out the provisions of the Act’’.  In other words, the  

framing  of  Rules  does  not  empower  the  Administrator  to  go  

beyond the purpose of object of the Act and all these Rules so  

framed should be intended only to further the cause of the Act and  

bring nothing into existence, which is specifically or by necessary  

implication impermissible under the provisions of the DSE Act.

1. At this point reference to some of the DSE Rules can be of some  

assistance.   Under  Chapter-II  -  Regulation  of  Education  -  The  

freedom of minority institutions to establish educational institutions  

for advancement of their own language and culture is a protected  

19

freedom.  Rule 10 of the DSE Rules recognizes such mandate.  It  

is provided there that any linguistic minority which intends to set  

up school  with the object  of  imparting education in the mother-

tongue of such linguistic minority, shall  be entitled to do so and  

shall be entitled to receive grant-in-aid, if other conditions for that  

purpose are satisfied.  However, second proviso to this rule states  

that linguistic minority can decide to impart education at the school  

in a language other than the language of such linguistic minority.  

In that event, it shall not be obligatory upon the Administrator to  

give  grant-in-aid  to  such  schools.   In  other  words,  this  rule  

recognizes two aspects – firstly, the extent of freedom available to  

the linguistic minority for educational purposes and secondly, an  

obligation  on  the  part  of  the  Administrator  to  give  grant-in-aid  

unless the linguistic minority was covered by the second proviso.  

The indication that such institution would normally be entitled to  

receive grant-in-aid, if they satisfy the conditions, is clear in terms  

of Rule 10.   

1. Chapter-III  deals  with  Opening  of  New Schools  or  Classes  or  

Closure of Existing Schools or Classes.   Rule 44 provides that  

every individual, association of individuals, society or trust which  

20

desires to establish a new school, not being a minority school, is  

required to give intimation in writing to the Administrator of their  

intention  to  establish  such  school.   The  details  of  the  

intention/intimation  required  have  been  stated  in  Rule  44(2).  

Amongst others, it requires details to be submitted in respect of  

managing  committee  of  the  proposed  new  school  and  the  

proposed procedure  until  its  recognition  under the DSE Act  for  

selection of the Head of the School and the teachers as well as  

the  non-teaching  staff  etc.   It  is  noteworthy  that  this  rule  is  

applicable  to  the  institutions  not  being  a  minority  school.   The  

minority institution, therefore, has specifically been kept out of the  

application of this rule, the purpose being that the administration  

and  management  of  a  minority  school  will  remain  outside  the  

rigors of compliance of Rule 44.   

1. Chapter–IV of the DSE Rules deals with Recognition of Schools.  

Rule  50 states  the  condition  which  an institution  is  required  to  

satisfy before it can be granted recognition.   Rule 56 empowers  

the competent  authority to suspend or  withdraw the recognition  

granted.  

21

1. Chapter-V  deals  with  the  Scheme  of  Management  of  the  

recognized  schools.  Rule  59  is  one  other  provision  which,  

primarily,  indicates  the  limitations  of  the  schools  in  regard  to  

furnishing  of  scheme  of  the  management  of  the  recognized  

schools.  All the recognized schools are expected to submit to the  

authority  the  scheme  of  management  and  comply  with  the  

requirements of formation of managing committee of the school  

and total  number of  the members in terms of  that  rule.     The  

managing committee would include two members to be nominated  

by the Director, and other members to be nominated or elected,  

as the case may be, in accordance with the rules and regulations  

of  the  society  in  terms  of  Section  590(1)(iv),  (v)  and  (vi)  

respectively.  The members, who are nominated by the Director  

and the persons nominated by the Advisory Board, in the case of  

schools other than the minority schools, have an effective role to  

play in  decisions  of  management  as well  as they have right  of  

voting.  However, in regard to minority school the framers of the  

rule  have added five  provisos  to  Rule  59(1).   They specifically  

provided that in a minority school, the members, instead of being  

elected, would be the one nominated by the society or the trust by  

22

which such unaided minority school is run.  The educationist, to be  

nominated by the Director, shall be a non-official belonging to the  

minority  by  which  the  school  is  established  and  run,  and  the  

managing committee shall co-opt two senior-most teachers out of  

a panel of ten senior-most teachers of the school by rotation and  

in  case  the  school  works  in  two  shifts,  then  one  senior-most  

teacher  shall  be  co-opted  from  a  panel  of  five  senior  most  

teachers in each shift by rotation.  Sub-rule (iv) of Rule 59 which  

gives powers to the Advisory Board to nominate two persons will  

not  apply in the case of  the minority school.   Furthermore,  the  

members nominated by the Director, Education in exercise of its  

powers under Sub-rule (v) of Rule 59 shall not be entitled to take  

part in the management of the minority school and shall function  

as  advisers  and  observers  to  put  forward  the  views  of  the  

Government in the meeting.  This reflects the kind of control, the  

framers of  the rule desired,  that  the authorities should exercise  

over the aided minority schools in comparison to the Government  

aided non-minority schools. There is clear line of distinction which  

gets  more  and  more  prominent  with  further  reference  to  the  

23

various  provisions  of  the  DSE  Act  and  the  Rules  framed  

thereunder.  

1. Chapter-VI is the basic chapter, with which, we may be concerned  

in the present case, as it deals with grant-in-aid.   Under Rule 60,  

every  aided  school,  which  was  receiving  aid,  will  continue  to  

receive such aid, so long as it  fulfills the conditions of receiving  

the aid, in terms of Rule 64.   Rule 64 deals with the condition that  

an  undertaking  in  writing  has  to  be  filed  by  the  institution  to  

receive the grant-in-aid allowed by the competent authority under  

the provisions of the DSE Act.   The Rule reads as under :

“(1)  No  school  shall  be  granted  aid  unless  its  managing  committee  gives  an  undertaking  in  writing that:  

(a) it  shall comply with the provisions of the Act  and these rules;

(a) it shall fill  in the posts in the school with the  Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes  candidates in accordance with the instructions  issued by the Central Government from time  to time and also maintain the roster and other  connected returns in this behalf;"

Rule  65  details  the  conditions  which  a  school,  applying  for  

grant-in-aid, should satisfy.  The grant-in-aid is required to be given  

24

only for the qualified staff as Rule 66 imposes no obligation upon the  

State  to  release  grant-in-aid  in  relation  to  unqualified  staff.   The  

management  of  the  school  must  employ  adequate  number  of  

qualified teachers and other staff which is approved by the Director  

under  the  norms  prescribed  for  such  post  or  which  may  be  

prescribed from time to time.

1. Rule 96 under Chapter VIII relates to the Recruitment and Terms  

and Conditions of Service of the Employees of the Private Schools  

other than the Unaided Minority Schools.  This chapter itself will  

not  apply to  unaided minority schools  but  would apply to  other  

schools.  The chapter deals with how a selection committee will be  

constituted and how the employees including the teachers would  

be appointed to the schools.  DSE Rules 96(1) to 96(3) deals in  

some  detail  with  reference  to  appointment,  constitution  of  the  

selection committee, methodology of selection and appointment to  

the post of teacher as well as Group-D employees.  Significantly,  

DSE Rules 96(3A) and 96(3B) are exceptions to the earlier part of  

the  DSE  Rules.  The  said  DSE  Rule  96(3A)  refers  to  various  

nominations which makes it clear that in the case of aided minority  

schools, such nominated persons, under different clauses stated  

25

therein, shall act only as advisers and will not have the power to  

vote or actually control the selection of an employee.  Rule 96(3B)  

states that notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rule (3), the  

Selection Committee of a minority school shall not be limited by  

the  number  specified  in  the  said  sub-rule  and  its  managing  

committee may fix such number.  Obviously, all these provisions  

have been framed with the emphasis on the fact that authorities  

like the Administrator,  Director and other officers do not have a  

direct,  and  in  some  cases,  even  indirect  participation  in  the  

management  and  administration  of  the  minority  school  which  

includes the selection and appointment of teachers.  It attains a  

greater significance, once these provisions along with restrictions  

stated in the DSE Act are read in conjunction with Articles 29 and  

30 of the Constitution.  

1. Chapter-XI of the DSE Rules deal with Unaided Minority School.  

It  requires  that  recruitment  of  employees  of  each  recognized  

unaided minority school shall be made on the recommendation of  

a  Selection  Committee  to  be  constituted  by  the  managing  

committee  of  that  school.   Rule  128(1)  requires  the  minimum  

qualifications for appointment as a teacher of an unaided minority  

26

school  shall  not  be  less  than  those  as  are  prescribed  by  the  

Affiliating  Board.   In  the  event,  no minimum qualifications  have  

been specified by the Affiliating Board, in respect of the post of  

any  teacher,  the  minimum  qualifications  for  recruitment  to  the  

such post  be made by the Administrator  after  considering such  

recommendations  or  suggestions  as  may  be   made  by  the  

unaided  school  in  this  behalf.      In  terms  of  Rule  129,  the  

appropriate Authority has been empowered to relax the minimum  

qualification  for  such  period  as  it  may  deem  fit  and  proper.  

Chapter XII  deals with ‘Admissions to               Recognized  

Schools’.

1. Thus, the scheme of the DSE Act, in particular, is to give greater  

freedom to the aided minority institutions and not to impinge upon  

their  minority  status  as  granted  under  Article  30(1)  of  the  

Constitution.  We shall shortly discuss the constitutional mandate  

and effect thereof with reference to the facts of the present case.  

On the analysis of the above, it is clear that Section 21 of the DSE  

Act has to be given its true meaning and permitted to operate in  

the larger field.    The stringent power vested in the appropriate  

Authority in terms of the Section 20 cannot be enforced against a  

27

minority  institution.  It  is  the  consequence  flowing  from  the  

violations committed by management of a school that empowers  

the authorities to take over the management of the school within  

the  scope  of  Section  21  of  the  DSE Act.   Minority  Institutions  

being an exception to these rules have been given a distinct and  

definite status under the Act and the Rules framed thereunder.

Discussion on law particularly with reference to the judgments  relied upon by the respective parties.

1. Mr.  P.P.  Malhotra,  the  learned  Additional  Solicitor  General  of  

India, with great emphasis, argued that by providing and enforcing  

the intent of Rule 64(1)(b) of the DSE Rules, the Government is  

not  causing  any discrimination.  The  said  DSE Rule  relating  to  

reservation is uniformly applied to all schools.   It was fairly stated  

that there is no dispute to the fact that the appellant institution is a  

linguistic  minority  institution.    It  is  also  contended  that  the  

controversy in the present case is covered by Kerala Education  

Bill, 1957, case (supra) and the appeal deserves to be dismissed.

1. The direction issued by the Directorate of Education for furnishing  

of such an undertaking is contemplated under Rule 64(1)(b) and  

28

its implementation is in consonance with the principle of equality  

before  law  and  also  within  the  ambit  of  Article  15  of  the  

Constitution.   The  right  is  vested  in  the  Government  to  make  

reservation,  as such the  grant-in-aid  is  to  be used for  a social  

object, namely, upliftment of reserved category, even by providing  

employment in minority institutions, like the appellant.   This shall  

be  the  true  spirit  of  the  preamble  of  the  Constitution,  which  

requires attainment of the goal, to secure to all citizens, justice,  

social,  economic and political.    These expressions are of wide  

magnitude and the authorities are well within their competence to  

require  minority  institutions  as  well  to  comply  with  the  rule  of  

reservation  and  file  undertakings  as  contemplated  under  Rule  

64(1)(b)  of  the  DSE  Rules.   The  reliance  has  primarily  been  

placed  upon  the  judgment  of  this  Court  in  the  case  of  Kerala  

Education  Bill,  1957 (supra);  T.M.A.  Pai  Foundation  v.  State  of  

Karnataka [(2002)  8 SCC 481];  Kanya Junior  High School,  Bal  

Vidya Mandir v. U.P. Basic Shiksha Parishad [(2006) 11 SCC 92],  

Secy. Malankara Syrian Catholic College v. T. Jose [(2007) 1 SCC  

386]  and  Brahmo  Samaj  Education  Society  v.  State  of  W.B.  

[(2004) 6 SCC 224].  

29

1. On  the  contra,  the  submission  made  by  Mr.  K.L.  Janjani,  the  

learned  counsel  appearing  on  behalf  of  the  appellant  is  that  

merely because the State is  providing grant-in-aid  to a minority  

institution, it will not clothe the authority with the power to interfere  

in  the  administration  and  management  of  a  minority  institution.  

Right to appoint a teacher is a part of the management and, thus,  

is  free  from  any  restriction.    In  terms  of  Article  30  of  the  

Constitution,  the  right  of  minority  to  establish  and  administer  

educational institutions of their own choice, is incapable of being  

interfered  with  by  the  authorities  and  the  language  of  Rule  

64(1)(b),  as  well  as  the  directives  issued  by  the  respondents  

violates the constitutional protection available to the appellants in  

accordance with law.  It is the contention of the appellant that the  

law enunciated in Kerala Education Bill  case,1957  (supra)  has  

been watered down suitably by this  Court  in  T.M.A.  Pai’s  case  

(supra)  and  also  that  the  provisions  of  DSE  Act  are  not  pari   

materia,  much less, identical to that of Kerala Education Bill, 1957  

case (supra).  There are specific provisions in the DSE Act and  

the Rules exempting linguistic minority institutions and, as such,  

the State cannot derive any benefit from the said judgment.  The  

30

purpose  of  allowing grant-in-aid  is  to  create  equality and parity  

with other institutions.  But this does not mean that the authorities  

under the pretext of granting to the minority institutions additional  

protections  impose  conditions  which  would  frustrate  the  very  

purpose and object of minority institution and for non-compliance  

thereof,  deny the  grant-in-aid.   On  the  simple  interpretation  of  

Articles 15, 29 and 30 of the Constitution, it is crystal clear that the  

linguistic minority institution has the right to make appointments,  

free  of  restriction  or  reservation,  as  that  alone  will  be  in  the  

interest  of  the linguistic  minority.    The learned counsel  for  the  

appellants relied upon the dictum of  order in T.M.A. Pai’s  case  

(supra), in addition to the Ahmedabad St. Xaviers College Society  

v. State of Gujarat [AIR 1974 SC 1389]; Father Thomas Shingare  

v.  State  of  Maharashtra  [(2002)  1  SCC 758];  T.  Devadasan v.  

Union  of  India  [AIR  1964  SC  179],  Brahmo  Samaj  Education  

Society (supra)  and Lt.  Governor of  Delhi  v. V.K. Sodhi & Ors.  

[AIR 2007 SC 2885] in support of his contentions.

1. In the light of the submissions made before us, it will be pertinent  

for us to examine how the law has travelled for all these years in  

relation  to  the  right  of  minority  to  run  their  institutions  and the  

31

extent to which they can be subjected to control by the appropriate  

authorities, in accordance with law.  The seven-Judge Bench of  

this Court in the case of Kerala Education Bill, 1957 (supra) was  

concerned with constitutionality or otherwise of certain clauses of  

the Kerala Education Bill, 1957.  While, discussing the scope of  

rights available to the minority institutions in relation to running of  

educational courses, the Court dealt with different aspects of the  

matter  and discussed  the  constitutional  provisions  construed  in  

light of the Kerala Education Bill.  The Bill had provided different  

clauses which the institution was required to satisfy to receive the  

grant-in-aid.    In  para  29  of  the  judgment,  the  Court  noticed  

various clauses of the Kerala Education Bill, the validity of which  

was  challenged  before  this  Court.    The  argument  advanced  

before the Court,  inter alia, was also with reference to the Anglo  

Indian Education Institutions, that they were entitled to receive the  

grant under Article 337 of the Constitution and the provisions of  

the said Bill, which legitimately come within the provisions which  

infringe their right not only under Article 337 of the Constitution,  

but also violate Article 30(1) of the Constitution.  In that case they  

are  prevented  from  effectively  exercising  its  rights.   A  Bench  

32

noticed the grievances of the minorities in para 29 of the judgment  

and discussed the same in para 31 before  arriving at  the final  

conclusion.

 1. The  Court  in  that  case  was  dealing  with  the  Presidential  

Reference,  in  terms  of  Article  143  of  the  Constitution.   While  

referring to the questions framed for the opinion of the Court, the  

Court noticed that the width of power of control thus sought to be  

assumed by the State evidently appeared to the President to be  

calculated to raise doubts as to the constitutional validity of some  

of  the  clauses  of  the  said  Bill  on  the  ground  of  prohibited  

infringement  of  some  of  the  fundamental  rights  granted  to  the  

minority communities by the Constitution.  The Bench in Para 10  

noticed the questions which are as under :-

(1) “Does  sub-clause  5  of  clause  3  of  the  Kerala Education Bill  read with clause 36  thereof or any of the provisions of the said   sub-clause  36  thereof   or  any  of  the  provisions  of  the  said  sub-clause,  offend  article  14  of  the  Constitution  in  any  particulars or to any extent?

(1) Do sub-clause (5) of clause (3), sub-clause  (3) of clause 8 and clause 9 to 13 of the   Kerala  Education  Bill  or  any  provisions  

33

thereof,  offend clause 91) of article 30 of  the Constitution in any particulars or to any  extent?

(1) Does  clause  15  of  the  Kerala  Education   Bill or any provisions thereof, offend article   14  of the Constitution in any particulars or  to any extent?

(1) Does  clause  33  of  the  Kerala  Education   Bill,  or  any  provisions  thereof,  offend   article  226  of  the  Constitution  in  any  particulars or to any extent?”

The answers to question Nos. 1 and 3 :

“That  result,  therefore,  is  that  the charge of  invalidity  of  the  several  clauses  of  the  Bill   which fall within the ambit of questions  1 and  3 on the ground of the infraction of Article 14  must stand repelled and our answers to both   the questions 1 and 3 must, therefore, be in   the negative”.

Answer to question No. 2 :-

“Yes,  so  far  as  Anglo  Indian  education   institutions entitled to grant under Article 337  are concerned. (ii) As regards other minorities  not  entitled  to  grant  as  of  right  under  any  express provision of he constitution but are in  receipt of aid or desire such aid and also as  regards Anglo Indian educational  institutions  in so far as they are receiving aid in excess of   what  are  due  to  them  under  Article  337  clauses 8(3) and 9 to 13 do not offend Article   30(1)  but  clause 3(5)  in  so far  as  it  makes  such  educational  institutions  subject  to   clauses 14 and 15 do not offend Article 30(1).   

34

(iii) Clause 7 (except sub clauses (1) and (3)   which  applies  only  to  aided  schools),   clause10 in so far as they apply to recognized  schools  to  be established after  the said  Bill   comes into force do not offend Article 30(1)   but clause 3(5) in so far as it makes the new  schools established after the commencement  of  the Bill  subject  to  clause 20 does offend   Article 30(1).”

In the said case, the Court held that right of the minorities to  

some  extent  was  restricted  in  the  sense  that  general  control  still  

could be exercised by the authorities concerned, but in accordance  

with law.  That is how Clause 11 of the Bill,  which has been very  

heavily relied upon by the respondents before us, completely put an  

embargo  on  the  appointment  of  teachers  of  their  choice  and  the  

teachers could only be appointed  out of the panel selected by the  

Public  Service  Commission.    This  clause  was  held  not  to  be  in  

violation of the Constitution, but clauses 14 and 15, which related to  

taking over of the management of an aided school for the conditions  

stipulated therein, were held to be unconstitutional and bad.    This  

was in  view of  the  law stated  under  the  Bill  and its  scheme that  

weighed with the Court to record findings afore-noticed.

35

1. Still another Seven Judge Bench of this Court, in the case of the  

Ahmedabad St.  Xavier’s  College Society (supra)  was,  primarily,  

concerned with the scope of Articles 29 and 30 of the Constitution,  

relating to the rights of minorities to impart general education and  

applicability of  the concept  of  affiliation to such institutions.   Of  

course, the Court held that there was no fundamental right of a  

minority  institution  to  get  affiliation  from a  University.   When  a  

minority  institution  applies  to  a  University  to  be  affiliated,  it  

expresses  its  choice  to  participate  in  the  system  of  general  

education  and  courses  of  instructions  prescribed  by  that  

University, and it  agrees to follow the uniform courses of study.  

Therefore, measures which will regulate the courses of study, the  

qualifications  and  appointment  of  teachers,  the  conditions  of  

employment of teachers, the health, hygiene of students and the  

other  facilities  are  germane to  affiliation  of  minority  institutions.  

With  regard  to  grant  of  an  appropriate  protection  of  such  

community in  terms of Article 30 of the Constitution,  the Court  

held as under :-

“12. The real reason embodied in Article 30  (1) of the Constitution is the conscience of the  nation that the minorities, religious as well as  

36

linguistic, are not prohibited from establishing  and  administering  educational  institutions  of  their  choice  for  the  purpose  of  giving  their  children the best  general  education to make  them  complete  men  and  women  of  the  country.    The  minorities  are  given  this  protection  under  Article  30  in  order  to  preserve   and  strengthen  the  integrity  and  unity of the country   The sphere of general  secular education is intended to develop the  commonness  of  the  boys  and  girls  of  our  country.   This is in the true spirit  of liberty,  equality and fraternity through the medium of  education.   If religious or linguistic minorities  are  not  given protection  under  Article  30 to  establish  and  administer  educational  institutions  of  their  choice,  they  will  feel  isolated  and  separate.    General  secular  education  will  open doors of  perception  and  act  as  the  natural  light  of  mind  for  our  countrymen to live in the whole.

xxx xxx xxx      xxx           xxx

30. Educational  institutions  are  temples  of  learning.    The virtues of human intelligence  are mastered and harmonized by education.  Where  there  is  complete  harmony  between  the teacher and the taught, where the teacher  imparts and the student receives, where there  is compete dedication of the teacher and the  taught  in  learning,  where  there  is  discipline  between the  teacher  and  the  taught,  where  both are worshippers of learning, no discord  or  challenge  will  arise.  An  educational  institution  runs  smoothly  when  the  teacher  and the taught  are engaged in the common  ideal of pursuit of knowledge.   It is, therefore,  

37

manifest  that the appointment  of teachers is  an  important  part  in  educational  institutions.  The  qualifications  and  the  character  of  the  teachers are really important.    The minority  institutions  have  the  right  to  administer  institutions.   This right implies the obligation  and duty of the minority institutions to render  the very best to the students.   In the right of  administration,  checks  and  balances  in  the  shape of regulatory measure are required to  ensure the appointment of good teachers and  their  conditions  of  service.    The  right  to  administer  is to be tempered with regulatory  measures to facilitate smooth administration.  The best administration will reveal no trace or  color of minority.   A minority institution should  shine  in  exemplary  eclectism  in  the  administration  of  the  institution.    The  best  compliment  that  can  be  paid  to  a  minority  institution  is  that  it  does  not  rest  on  or  proclaim its minority character.”

As is evident from the above noticed dictum of the Court the  

emphasis  had been laid on the right  of  the minority institutions to  

administer institution.  Appointment of teacher is an important part of  

administration of educational institution and administrative freedom of  

the minority in that regard.

1. Now we may refer  to  a  judgment  of  this  Court  in  the  case  of  

Managing  Committee,  Khalsa  Middle  School  v.  Mohinder  Kaur  

[(1993) Supp. 4 SCC 26].   In this case, the Court was concerned  

38

with the amendments made in the Rules and Regulations of the  

Society.  The date of passing of the resolution or its registration,  

which  would  be  the  effective  date  while  dealing  with  the  

termination of service of a teacher without obtaining the approval  

of the Director of Education, could not be annulled for violating the  

provisions  of  the  DSE  Act.    While  registering  the  Khalsa  

Education Society, which was running a school known as Khalsa  

Primary  School,  belonging  to  a  minority,  it  lost  its  status  of  

minority,  which  was  restored  in  July,  1979.    The  action  was  

initiated  during  the  interregnum  period  when  the  Society  was  

working as non-minority institution, the Court took the view that as  

a  non-minority  institution,  it  was  required  to  comply  with  the  

conditions of the DSE Act and the Rules framed thereunder, but  

once  the  character  of  minority  institution  was  restored,  the  

provisions will not be attracted.   In this regard, the Court held as  

under :-

“10………..Here  we  are  concerned  with  the  amendment in the Rules and Regulations of  the  Society.    In  the  absence  of  any  requirement in the Societies Registration Act  that  the  alteration  in  the  Rules  and  Regulations  must  be  registered  with  the  Registrar,  it   cannot be held that registration  

39

of the amendment is a condition precedent for  such an alteration to come into effect.   It is,  therefore,  not  possible  to  accept  the  contention of Shri Mehta that the amendment  which was made in the Rules and Regulations  by resolution dated July 1, 1979 did not come  into  effect  till  March  13,  1980  when  the  amended  Rules  and  Regulations  were  registered  with  the  Registrar,  Firms  and  Societies.    The said amendment should be  treated to have come into effect from the date  on  which  the  resolution  making  the  said  amendment  was  passed,  i.e.  July  1,  1979.  As  a  result  of  the  said  amendment  in  the  Rules  and  Regulations  of  the  Society,  the  alterations made in the Rules and Regulations  in 1963 were reversed and the position as it  stood  prior  to  the  amendment  of  1963  was  restored.    Consequently,  the  school  which  was a minority institution till the amendment of  the Rules and Regulations in 1963 and had  ceased to be a minority institution as a result  of the amendment in 1963 regained its status  as  a  minority  institution  after  July  1,  1979,  when  the  rules  and  regulations  were  amended  and  the  original  position  was  restored.    In  view of  the  restoration  of  the  minority  character  of  the  institution  the  provisions  of  the  Education  Act  and  the  Education  Rules  ceased to  be applicable  to  the  institution  after  July  1,  1979.    The  impugned order  of  termination  order  of   the  services  of  the  respondent  was  passed  on  December 31, 1979, i.e., after the school had  become a minority institution.   The said order  cannot, therefore, be held to be invalid on the  ground that it was passed in contravention of  Section 8 of the Education Act.    The order  passed by the Delhi High Court quashing the  said  order  as  well  as  the  disciplinary  

40

proceedings  cannot,  therefore,  be  upheld.  The respondent was placed under suspension  on  August  11,  1972  and  continued  under  suspension  till  April  9,  1973  on  which  date  Education  Act  came  into  force.    In  other  words she was under  suspension  at  a  time  when  the  Education  Act  was  not  in  force.  The order of suspension  cannot be judged on  the basis  of  the provisions of  the Education  Act  and  the  Education  Rules.    We  are,  therefore,  unable  to  uphold  the  direction  of  the  High  Court  quashing  her  order  of  suspension.”

The aforesaid judgment states principle of law of far reaching  

consequences, i.e. an institution which is run by a minority linguistic  

or religious would not be controlled exclusively by the provisions of  

the  DSE  Act  and  the  Rules  framed  thereunder,  as  the  grant  of  

approval would tantamount to interfere in the internal management of  

a minority institution.

1. Now, we may refer to the case of T.M.A. Pai (supra) which has  

been strongly relied upon by learned counsel appearing from both  

the sides before us.   In this judgment, the Court had practically  

discussed the entire case law on the subject and particularly, the  

case of Kerala Education Bill, 1957 (supra) as well as Ahmedabad  

St. Xavier’s case (supra).   It may be noticed that the law stated by  

41

the  Seven-Judge  Bench  in  Kerala  Education  Bill,  1957  case  

(supra), to some extent, has been diluted.   Various aspects of this  

case, we shall shortly proceed to discuss, but let us first examine  

what the Court  has held and in  what context.    It  is  really not  

necessary for  us  to  get  into  detailed  factual  matrix  and all  the  

principles that have been enunciated by the Eleven-Judge Bench.  

It will be better for us to restrict ourselves to the discussion only in  

relation to the question of involvement in the present case.  The  

learned Additional Solicitor General relied upon paras 72, 73, 107,  

136,  138,  141,  144 and 450 of  the  judgment  in  support  of  his  

submissions.   

1. On the contrary, the learned counsel for the appellants submitted  

that  the  paragraphs  relied  upon  by  the  respondents  are  the  

minority view and not the part of the majority judgment.   With this,  

he placed reliance upon paras 89, 116 and 123 of the judgment.  

In order to avoid any ambiguity or confusion, we must clarify at the  

outset that till paragraph 161, it is the majority view of the T.M.A.  

Pai’s  case  (supra)  whereafter  different  Judge/Judges  have  

expressed their  views and given independent   conclusions and  

answers to the questions framed.   Thus, it will be expected from  

42

us  and  we would only  refer  to  the  decision  and  finding  of  the  

majority view, which is binding on the Court.   

1. The respondents have placed reliance upon the law stated by the  

Bench  that  any regulation  framed  in  the  national  interest  must  

necessarily  apply to  all  educational  institutions,  whether  run  by  

majority  or  the  minority.   Such  a  limitation  must  be  read  into  

Article 30.    The rule under Article 30(1) cannot  be such as to  

override the national interest or to prevent the Government from  

framing  regulations  in  that  behalf.    It  is,  of  course,  true  that  

Government regulations cannot destroy the minority character of  

the institution or make a right to establish and administer a mere  

illusion,  but the right under Article 30 is not so absolute as to be  

above the law.  The appellant also seek to derive benefit from the  

view that the Courts have also held that the right to administer is  

not  absolute  and  is  subject  to  reasonable  regulations  for  the  

benefit  of  the institutions as the vehicle of education consistent  

with the national interest.  Such general laws of the land would be  

also applicable to the minority institutions as well.    There is no  

reason  why  regulations  or  conditions  concerning  generally  the  

welfare  of  the  students  and  teachers  should  not  be  made  

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applicable in order to provide a proper academic atmosphere.  As  

such, the provisions do not, in any way, interfere with the right of  

administration or management under Article 30(1).   Any law, rule  

or regulation, that would put the educational institutions run by the  

minorities  at  a disadvantage,  when compared to the institutions  

run by the others, will have to be struck down.  At the same time,  

there may not be any reverse discrimination.   

 1. It was observed in St. Xavier’s case (supra), at page 192 of the  

judgment that the whole object of conferring the right on minorities  

under Article 30 is to ensure that there will be equality between  

the majority and the minority.  If the minorities do not have such  

special protection, they will be denied equality. The emphasis by  

the appellants is more on paragraphs 88 to 90 to say that Articles  

29  and  30  are  a  group  of  articles  relating  to  cultural  and  

educational rights.  Article 29(1) gives the right to any section of  

the citizens having a distinct language, script or culture of its own,  

to  conserve  the  same.   Article  29(2)  refers  to  admission  to  a  

educational  institution  established  by  anyone,  but  which  is  

maintained by the State or receives aid out of State funds. In other  

words, State-maintained or aided educational institutions, whether  

44

established  by  the  Government  or  the  majority  or  a  minority  

community cannot deny admission to a citizen on the ground of  

religion, race, caste or language.  Article 30(1) states the right of  

minorities  to  establish  and administer  educational  institutions  of  

their  choice,  as  provided  under  that  Article.  The  fundamental  

freedom is to establish and to administer educational institutions.  

It  is  a right  to  establish  and administer  institutions  to  cater  the  

educational needs of the minorities or sections thereof.

1. Before we really analyze the dictum of  this  Court  in its  various  

judgments and examine the scope of their application to the facts  

of the present case, it would be necessary for us to refer to certain  

specific paragraphs of the judgment, besides the above portions  

which have been relied upon by the learned counsel appearing for  

the respective parties.  The basic questions which would arise for  

consideration with regard to the facts of the present case are the  

extent  of  the  right  to  establish,  administer  and management  of  

institution  by  the  linguistic  minorities,  the  extent  of  control  or  

restrictions that can be imposed by the State and obviously the  

right of a minority institution to receive grant-in-aid.   In the case of  

T.M.A.  Pai  (supra),  the Court  was primarily  concerned  with the  

45

ambit and scope of grant of admission to the students in various  

academic courses in the minority institutions aided or unaided.  In  

that  case,  the  Court  was  basically  not  concerned  with  the  

methodology to  be adopted  by the  minority institutions  and the  

restrictions that can be imposed by the Government with regard to  

the recruitment of teachers like Rule 64(1)(b) of the DSE Rules.  

So to  understand,  the  impact  of  the  dictum in  T.M.  Pai’s  case  

(supra),  we  may  usefully  refer  to  certain  paragraphs  of  the  

judgment itself.

“123. After  referring  to  the  earlier  cases  in  relation to the appointment of teachers, it was  noted  by  Khanna,  J.,  that  the  conclusion  which followed was that a law which interfered  with a minority’s choice of qualified teachers,  or  its  disciplinary  control  over  teachers  and  other members of the staff  of the institution,  was void, as it was violative of Article 30(1).  While it was permissible for the State and its  educational  authorities  to  prescribe  the  qualifications  of  teachers,  it  was  held  that  once  the  teachers  possessing  the  requisite  qualifications were selected by the minorities  for  their  educational  institutions,  the  State  would have no right  to  veto the selection of  those  teachers.  The  selection  and  appointment  of  teachers  for  an  educational  institution  was  regarded  as  one  of  the  essential ingredients under Article 30(1).  The  Court’s attention was drawn to the fact that in  Kerala  Education  Bill,  1957  case  this  Court  had opined that  clauses 11 and 12 made it  obligatory  for  all  aided  schools  to  select  teachers  from  a  panel  selected  from  each  district by the Public Service Commission and  that no teacher of an aided school could be  

46

dismissed,  removed  or  reduced  in  rank  without  the  previous  sanction  of  the  authorized officer. At SCR p. 245, Khanna, J.,  observed  that  in  cases  subsequent  to  the  opinion  in  Kerala  Education  Bill,  1957  case  this  Court  had  held  similar  provisions  as  clause  11  and  clause  12  to  be  violative  of  Article  30(1)  of  the  minority  institution.  He  then observed as follows:  (SCC p.792,  para  109)

“The opinion expressed by this  Court  in  Re  Kerala  Education  Bill,  1957 was  of  an  advisory  character  and  though  great  weight  should  be  attached  to  it  because  of  its  persuasive  value,  the  said  opinion  cannot  override the opinion subsequently expressed  by this Court in contested cases. It is the law  declared  by  this  Court  in  the  subsequent  contested cases which would have a binding  effect.  The words ‘as at present advised’ as  well as the preceding sentence indicate that  the view expressed by this Court in Re Kerala  Education  Bill,  1957 in  this  respect  was  hesitant and tentative and not a final view in  the matter.”

124. In  Lily  Kurian v.  Sr.  Lewina this  Court  struck down the power of the Vice-Chancellor  to  veto  the  decision  of  the  management  to  impose a penalty  on a teacher.  It  was held  that  the power of  the Vice-Chancellor,  while  hearing  an appeal  against  the  imposition  of  the penalty,  was uncanalized  and unguided.  In  Christian  Medical  College  Hospital   Employees’  Union v.  Christian  Medical  College  Vellore  Assn. this  Court  upheld  the  application  of  industrial  law  to  minority  colleges,  and  it  was  held  that  providing  a  remedy  against  unfair  dismissals  would  not  infringe  Article  30.  In  Gandhi  Faiz-e-am  College v.  University  of  Agra a  law  which  sought  to  regulate  the  working  of  minority  institutions  by  providing  that  a  broad-based  management  committee  could  be  reconstituted by including therein the Principal  

47

and the seniormost teacher, was valid and not  violative of the right under Article 30(1) of the  Constitution.  In  All  Saints  High  School v.  Govt.  of  A.P. a  regulation  providing that  no  teacher  would  be  dismissed,  removed  or  reduced  in  rank,  or  terminated  otherwise  except  with  the  prior  approval  of  the  competent  authority,  was held  to  be invalid,  as  it  sought  to  confer  an unqualified  power  upon  the  competent  authority.  In  Frank  Anthony  Public  School  Employees’  Assn. v.  Union  of  India the  regulation  providing  for  prior  approval  for  dismissal  was  held  to  be  invalid,  while  the  provision  for  an  appeal  against the order of dismissal by an employee  to  a  tribunal  was  upheld.  The  regulation  requiring prior approval before suspending an  employee  was  held  to  be  valid,  but  the  provision,  which  exempted  unaided  minority  schools from the regulation that equated the  pay  and  other  benefits  of  employees  of  recognized schools with those in schools run  by the authority,  was held to  be invalid and  violative of the equality clause. It was held by  this Court  that the regulations regarding pay  and allowances for teachers and staff  would  not violate Article 30.

xxx xxx xxx      xxx           xxx    

135. We  agree  with  the  contention  of  the  learned Solicitor-General that the Constitution  in  Part  III  does  not  contain  or  give  any  absolute right. All rights conferred in Part III of  the Constitution are subject to at least other  provisions  of  the  said  Part.  It  is  difficult  to  comprehend  that  the  framers  of  the  Constitution  would  have  given  such  an  absolute  right  to  the  religious  or  linguistic  minorities,  which  would  enable  them  to  establish  and  administer  educational  institutions in a manner so as to be in conflict  with the other  Parts  of  the Constitution.  We  find  it  difficult  to  accept  that  in  the  establishment  and  administration  of  

48

educational  institutions  by  the  religious  and  linguistic minorities, no law of the land, even  the  Constitution,  is  to  apply  to  them.

136. Decisions of this Court have held that the  right to administer does not include the right  to  maladminister.  It  has also been held that  the  right  to  administer  is  not  absolute,  but  must be subject to reasonable regulations for  the benefit of the institutions as the vehicle of  education,  consistent  with  national  interest.  General  laws  of  the  land  applicable  to  all  persons  have been held to be applicable  to  the minority institutions also — for  example,  laws  relating  to  taxation,  sanitation,  social  welfare, economic regulation, public order and  morality.

137. It  follows  from the  aforesaid  decisions  that  even though  the  words  of  Article  30(1)  are  unqualified,  this  Court  has  held  that  at  least certain other laws of the land pertaining  to health, morality and standards of education  apply.  The  right  under  Article  30(1)  has,  therefore,  not  been  held  to  be  absolute  or  above  other  provisions  of  the  law,  and  we  reiterate  the  same.  By  the  same  analogy,  there  is  no  reason  why  regulations  or  conditions concerning,  generally,  the welfare  of students and teachers should not be made  applicable  in  order  to  provide  a  proper  academic atmosphere, as such provisions do  not  in  any  way  interfere  with  the  right  of  administration  or  management  under  Article  30(1).

xxx xxx xxx      xxx           xxx

141. The grant  of  aid  is  not  a constitutional  imperative. Article 337 only gives the right to  assistance by way of grant to the Anglo-Indian  community for a specified period of time. If no  aid is granted to anyone, Article 30(1) would  not justify a demand for aid, and it cannot be  said that the absence of aid makes the right  

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under  Article  30(1)  illusory.  The  founding  fathers  have  not  incorporated  the  right  to  grants in Article 30, whereas they have done  so  under  Article  337;  what,  then,  is  the  meaning,  scope  and effect  of  Article  30(2)?  Article  30(2)  only  means  what  it  states  viz.  that  a  minority  institution  shall  not  be  discriminated  against  where  aid  to  educational  institutions  is  granted.  In  other  words the State cannot,  when it  chooses to  grant aid to educational institutions, deny aid  to  a religious  or  linguistic  minority institution  only on the ground that  the management  of  that institution is with the minority. We would,  however,  like  to  clarify  that  if  an  abject  surrender of the right to management is made  a condition of aid, the denial of aid would be  violative of Article 30(2). However, conditions  of aid that do not involve a surrender of the  substantial right of management would not be  inconsistent  with  constitutional  guarantees,  even  if  they  indirectly  impinge  upon  some  facet of administration. If,  however, aid were  denied  on  the  ground  that  the  educational  institution  is  under  the  management  of  a  minority,  then  such  a  denial  would  be  completely invalid.

142. The implication  of  Article  30(2)  is  also  that  it  recognizes that  the minority nature of  the  institution  should  continue,  notwithstanding  the  grant  of  aid.  In  other  words, when a grant is given to all institutions  for  imparting  secular  education,  a  minority  institution is also entitled to receive it, subject  to the fulfilment  of the requisite  criteria,  and  the  State  gives  the  grant  knowing  that  a  linguistic or minority educational institution will  also receive the same. Of course,  the State  cannot  be  compelled  to  grant  aid,  but  the  receipt of aid cannot be a reason for altering  the  nature  or  character  of  the  recipient  educational institution.

143. This means that  the right  under Article  30(1) implies that  any grant  that is given by  

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the  State  to  the  minority  institution  cannot  have such conditions attached to it, which will  in any way dilute or abridge the rights of the  minority institution to establish and administer  that  institution.  The  conditions  that  can  normally be permitted to be imposed, on the  educational  institutions  receiving  the  grant,  must be related to the proper utilization of the  grant  and fulfilment  of  the  objectives  of  the  grant.  Any  such  secular  conditions  so  laid,  such  as  a  proper  audit  with  regard  to  the  utilization  of  the  funds  and  the  manner  in  which  the  funds  are  to  be  utilized,  will  be  applicable  and would not  dilute  the  minority  status  of  the  educational  institutions.  Such  conditions  would  be  valid  if  they  are  also  imposed  on  other  educational  institutions  receiving the grant.

144. It  cannot  be argued that  no conditions  can be imposed while giving aid to a minority  institution.  Whether it  is an institution run by  the majority or the minority, all conditions that  have relevance to the proper utilization of the  grant-in-aid by an educational  institution can  be imposed. All that Article 30(2) states is that  on the ground that an institution is under the  management of a minority, whether based on  religion  or  language,  grant  of  aid  to  that  educational institution cannot be discriminated  against,  if  other  educational  institutions  are  entitled  to  receive  aid.  The  conditions  for  grant  or  non-grant  of  aid  to  educational  institutions  have  to  be  uniformly  applied,  whether  it  is  a  majority-run  institution  or  a  minority-run  institution.  As  in  the  case  of  a  majority-run institution, the moment a minority  institution obtains a grant of aid, Article 28 of  the  Constitution  comes  into  play.  When  an  educational  institution  is  maintained  out  of  State  funds,  no  religious  instruction  can  be  provided therein. Article 28(1) does not state  that it  applies only to educational institutions  

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that  are  not  established  or  maintained  by  religious or linguistic minorities. Furthermore,  upon  the  receipt  of  aid,  the  provisions  of  Article  28(3)  would  apply  to  all  educational  institutions  whether  run  by  the  minorities  or  the non-minorities. Article 28(3) is the right of  a  person  studying  in  a  State-recognized  institution  or  in  an  educational  institution  receiving  aid  from  State  funds,  not  to  take  part in any religious instruction, if imparted by  such  institution,  without  his/her  consent  (or  his/her guardian’s consent if such a person is  a  minor).  Just  as  Articles  28(1)  and  (3)  become  applicable  the  moment  any  educational  institution  takes  aid,  likewise,  Article  29(2)  would  also  be  attracted  and  become  applicable  to  an  educational  institution maintained by the State or receiving  aid out of State funds.  

It was strenuously contended that the right to  give  admission  is  one  of  the  essential  ingredients of the right to administer conferred  on the religious or linguistic minority, and that  this  right  should  not  be  curtailed  in  any  manner. It is difficult to accept this contention.  If  Articles  28(1)  and  (3)  apply  to  a  minority  institution that receives aid out of State funds,  there is nothing in the language of Article 30  that  would  make  the  provisions  of  Article  29(2)  inapplicable.  Like  Article  28(1)  and  Article  28(3),  Article  29(2)  refers  to  “any  educational  institution  maintained  by  the  State or receiving aid out of State funds”.  A  minority institution would fall within the ambit  of Article 29(2) in the same manner in which  Article  28(1)  and  Article  28(3)  would  be  applicable to an aided minority institution. It is  true  that  one  of  the  rights  to  administer  an  educational institution is to grant admission to  

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the  students.  As  long  as  an  educational  institution,  whether belonging to the minority  or  the majority community, does not  receive  aid, it  would, in our opinion, be its right and  discretion to grant admission to such students  as it chooses or selects subject to what has  been clarified before. Out of the various rights  that  the  minority  institution  has  in  the  administration of  the institution,  Article  29(2)  curtails  the  right  to  grant  admission  to  a  certain  extent.  By virtue  of  Article  29(2),  no  citizen can be denied admission by an aided  minority  institution  on  the  grounds  only  of  religion, race, caste, language or any of them.  It  is  no  doubt  true  that  Article  29(2)  does  curtail  one  of  the  powers  of  the  minority  institution,  but on receiving aid, some of the  rights that an unaided minority institution has,  are also curtailed by Articles 28(1) and 28(3).  A minority educational institution has a right to  impart  religious  instruction  —  this  right  is  taken  away by Article  28(1),  if  that  minority  institution  is  maintained  wholly  out  of  State  funds. Similarly on receiving aid out of State  funds or on being recognized by the State, the  absolute right of a minority institution requiring  a  student  to  attend  religious  instruction  is  curtailed by Article 28(3). If the curtailment of  the right to administer a minority institution on  receiving aid or being wholly maintained out of  State funds as provided by Article 28 is valid,  there  is  no reason why Article  29(2)  should  not be held to be applicable. There is nothing  in  the  language  of  Articles  28(1)  and  (3),  Article 29(2) and Article 30 to suggest that, on  receiving aid, Articles 28(1) and (3) will apply,  but  Article  29(2)  will  not.  Therefore,  the  contention  that  the  institutions  covered  by  Article 30 are outside the injunction of Article  29(2) cannot be accepted.”

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1. The Court then proceeded to discuss the concept of equality and  

secularism and noticed that for a healthy family, it is important that  

each member  is  strong  and healthy and all  members  have the  

same constitution, whether physical or mental.   For harmonious  

growth and health,  it  is but natural for the parents to give more  

attention and food to the weaker child, so as to help him or her to  

become  stronger.   Noticing  recognition  and  preservation  of  

different  types  of  people  with  diverse  languages  and  different  

beliefs is essential, the Court answered the 11 questions framed  

therein .   It is not necessary for us to refer to all the questions and  

answers, suffices, it would be to notice the relevant questions and  

answers given by the majority in para 161 of the judgment.

“Q. 1. What is the meaning and content of the  expression  “minorities”  in  Article  30  of  the  Constitution of India?

A. Linguistic  and  religious  minorities  are  covered  by  the  expression  “minority”  under  Article  30  of  the  Constitution.  Since  reorganization of the States in India has been  on linguistic lines, therefore,  for the purpose  of determining the minority, the unit will be the  State  and  not  the  whole  of  India.  Thus,  religious  and  linguistic  minorities,  who have  been put  on a par in Article  30, have to be  considered Statewise.

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xxx xxx xxx      xxx           xxx  

Q. 4.  Whether  the admission  of  students  to  minority educational institution, whether aided  or  unaided,  can  be  regulated  by  the  State  Government or by the university to which the  institution is affiliated?

A. Admission of students to unaided minority  educational  institutions  viz.  schools  and  undergraduate  colleges where the scope for  merit-based selection is practically nil, cannot  be  regulated  by  the  State  or  university  concerned,  except  for  providing  the  qualifications  and  minimum  conditions  of  eligibility  in  the  interest  of  academic  standards.

The right to admit students being an essential  facet  of  the  right  to  administer  educational  institutions  of  their  choice,  as  contemplated  under Article 30 of the Constitution, the State  Government  or  the  university  may  not  be  entitled to interfere with that right, so long as  the  admission  to  the  unaided  educational  institutions is on a transparent basis and the  merit is adequately taken care of. The right to  administer, not being absolute, there could be  regulatory measures for ensuring educational  standards and maintaining excellence thereof,  and it is more so in the matter of admissions  to professional institutions.

A minority institution does not cease to be so,  the  moment  grant-in-aid  is  received  by  the  institution.  An  aided  minority  educational  institution, therefore, would be entitled to have  the right of admission of students belonging to  the  minority  group  and  at  the  same  time,  would  be  required  to  admit  a  reasonable  extent  of  non-minority  students,  so  that  the  rights under Article 30(1) are not substantially  impaired and further the citizens’ rights under  Article 29(2) are not infringed. What would be  a  reasonable  extent,  would  vary  from  the  

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types of institution, the courses of education  for which admission is being sought and other  factors  like  educational  needs.  The  State  Government  concerned  has  to  notify  the  percentage of the non-minority students to be  admitted  in  the  light  of  the  above  observations.  Observance  of  inter  se merit  amongst  the  applicants  belonging  to  the  minority group could be ensured. In the case  of  aided professional  institutions,  it  can also  be  stipulated  that  passing  of  the  common  entrance  test  held  by  the  State  agency  is  necessary  to  seek  admission.  As  regards  non-minority students who are eligible to seek  admission for the remaining seats, admission  should  normally  be  on  the  basis  of  the  common  entrance  test  held  by  the  State  agency  followed  by  counselling  wherever  it  exists.  

Q.  5. (a) Whether  the  minorities’  rights  to  establish  and  administer  educational  institutions  of  their  choice  will  include  the  procedure  and  method  of  admission  and  selection of students?

A. A  minority  institution  may  have  its  own  procedure  and method of  admission as well  as selection of students, but such a procedure  must  be  fair  and  transparent,  and  the  selection  of  students  in  professional  and  higher  education  colleges  should  be  on  the  basis  of  merit.  The  procedure  adopted  or  selection made should not be tantamount  to  maladministration.  Even  an  unaided  minority  institution  ought  not  to  ignore  the  merit  of  the  students  for  admission,  while  exercising  its  right  to  admit  students  to  the  colleges  aforesaid,  as  in  that  event,  the  institution will fail to achieve excellence.

Q.  5. (b)  Whether  the  minority  institutions’  right of admission of students and to lay down  procedure  and method of  admission,  if  any,  would be affected in any way by the receipt of  State aid?

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A. While giving aid to professional institutions,  it would be permissible for the authority giving  aid to prescribe bye-rules or regulations,  the  conditions  on  the  basis  of  which  admission  will be granted to different aided colleges by  virtue  of  merit,  coupled  with  the  reservation  policy of the State qua non-minority students.  The merit may be determined either through a  common  entrance  test  conducted  by  the  university  or  the  Government  concerned  followed by counselling, or on the basis of an  entrance  test  conducted  by  individual  institutions — the method to be followed is for  the  university or  the  Government  to  decide.  The authority may also devise other means to  ensure that admission is granted to an aided  professional institution on the basis of merit.  In  the  case  of  such  institutions,  it  will  be  permissible  for  the  Government  or  the  university to provide that consideration should  be  shown  to  the  weaker  sections  of  the  society.

Q.  5. (c) Whether  the  statutory  provisions  which regulate the facets of administration like  control  over  educational  agencies,  control  over governing bodies, conditions of affiliation  including  recognition/withdrawal  thereof,  and  appointment  of  staff,  employees,  teachers  and  principals  including  their  service  conditions and regulation of fees, etc.  would  interfere  with  the  right  of  administration  of  minorities?

A. So  far  as  the  statutory  provisions  regulating  the  facets  of  administration  are  concerned,  in  case  of  an  unaided  minority  educational institution, the regulatory measure  of  control  should  be  minimal  and  the  conditions  of  recognition  as  well  as  the  conditions of affiliation to a university or board  have to be complied with, but in the matter of  day-to-day management, like the appointment  of  staff,  teaching  and  non-teaching,  and  administrative  control  over  them,  the  

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management  should  have  the  freedom  and  there  should  not  be any external  controlling  agency. However, a rational procedure for the  selection  of  teaching  staff  and  for  taking  disciplinary action  has to  be evolved by the  management itself.

For  redressing  the grievances of  employees  of  aided  and  unaided  institutions  who  are  subjected to punishment  or termination  from  service, a mechanism will have to be evolved,  and in our opinion, appropriate tribunals could  be  constituted,  and  till  then,  such  tribunals  could be presided over by a judicial officer of  the rank of District Judge.

The  State  or  other  controlling  authorities,  however, can always prescribe the minimum  qualification, experience and other conditions  bearing on the merit of an individual for being  appointed as a teacher or a principal  of any  educational institution.

Regulations can be framed governing service  conditions  for  teaching  and  other  staff  for  whom aid  is  provided  by  the  State,  without  interfering  with  the  overall  administrative  control of the management over the staff.

Fees  to  be  charged  by  unaided  institutions  cannot be regulated but no institution should  charge capitation fee.

xxx xxx xxx      xxx           xxx

Q.  9. Whether  the  decision  of  this  Court  in  Unni Krishnan,  J.P. v.  State of  A.P. (except  where  it  holds  that  primary  education  is  a  fundamental  right)  and  the  scheme  framed  thereunder  require  reconsideration/  modification and if yes, what?

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A. The scheme framed by this Court in  Unni  Krishnan case and the direction to impose the  same,  except  where  it  holds  that  primary  education  is  a  fundamental  right,  is  unconstitutional.  However,  the  principle  that  there  should  not  be  capitation  fee  or  profiteering is correct. Reasonable surplus to  meet cost of expansion and augmentation of  facilities  does  not,  however,  amount  to  profiteering.”

1. The  above  paragraphs  and  the  conclusions  arrived  at  by  the  

Court,  certainly  suggest  that  the  Court  did  not  specifically  or  

impliedly over ruled or expressed any different view than what was  

taken by the Court in Ahmedabad St. Xavier’s  case (supra) as  

well as discussed the impact of Kerala Education Bill, 1957 case  

(supra) with reference to Clauses 11 and 12, then the Court held  

that  the  view  expressed  in  Kerala  Education  Bill,  1957  case  

(supra) was tentative.   The view of the Court is that it is not an  

absolute right of the minority institution, but a right where certain  

conditions could be applied but such conditions should not, in any  

way, destroy or completely diminish the status and constitutional  

direction available to             that minority.

1. With the passage of time this Court had the occasion to deal with  

the  clarificatory  enunciation  of  law stated  in  T.M.A.  Pai’s  case  

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(supra) and dealt with different cases depending on the facts and  

circumstances  of  those  cases.   In  the  case  of  Brahmo Samaj  

Education Society (supra), a Bench of this Court was concerned  

with the appointment of persons to the post of teachers including  

principal  under  the  West  Bengal  College Teachers  (Security  of  

Services)  Act,  1975,  the  West  Bengal  College  Services  

Commission,  1978  and  the  Regulations  framed  thereunder.   A  

particular  procedure  was  stated  under  these  rules  for  making  

these appointments as per the regulations, National Eligibility Test  

(NET) is conducted by UGC (University Grants Commission) for  

determining teaching eligibility criteria of the candidate, which was  

added as an essential qualification for appointment as a teacher  

and, even further, restrictions were introduced by adding College  

Service Commission and appointments were sought to be made  

through this Commission.  The Brahmo Samaj Education Society  

challenged this procedure and being a religious minority claiming  

benefit  under  Articles  25,  26  and  30  (1)  of  the  Constitution,  

questioned  the  constitutional  validity  of  these  provisions.   The  

Court  considered  the  question  whether  the  appointment  of  

teachers  in  an  aided  institution  by  the  College  Service  

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Commission by restricting the petitioner’s right to appointment is a  

reasonable  restriction.   After  following the  law stated  in  T.M.A.  

Pai’s case (supra), the Court held as under :  

“6.  The question now before us is to decide  whether  the  appointment  of  teachers  in  an  aided  institution  by  the  College  Service  Commission by restricting the petitioners’ right  to appointment  is a reasonable restriction in  the  interest  of  general  public  or  not.  The  petitioners  have  a  right  to  establish  and  administer  educational  institution.  Merely  because the petitioners are receiving aid, their  autonomy of  administration cannot  be totally  restricted  and  institutions  cannot  be  treated  as  a government-owned one.  Of  course the  State  can  impose  such  conditions  as  are  necessary  for  the  proper  maintenance  of  standards  of  education  and  to  check  maladministration…..

7.  But that control cannot extend to the day- to-day  administration  of  the  institution.  It  is  categorically  stated  in  T.M.A.  Pai (SCC  at  p. 551,  para 72) that  the State can regulate  the  method of  selection  and appointment  of  teachers  after  prescribing  requisite  qualification for  the same.  Independence  for  the selection of teachers among the qualified  candidates is fundamental to the maintenance  of the academic and administrative autonomy  of an aided institution. The State can very well  provide  the  basic  qualification  for  teachers.  Under the University Grants Commission Act,  1956,  the  University  Grants  Commission  (UGC)  had  laid  down  qualifications  to  a  teaching  post  in  a  university  by  passing  Regulations.  As per these Regulations UGC  conducts  National  Eligibility  Test  (NET)  for  determining teaching eligibility of candidates.  UGC has also authorised accredited States to  conduct  State-Level  Eligibility  Test  (SLET).  Only a person who has qualified NET or SLET  will be eligible for appointment as a teacher in  an aided institution. This is the required basic  

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qualification  for  a  teacher.  The  petitioners’  right  to  administer  includes  the  right  to  appoint  teachers  of  their  choice  among  the  NET-/SLET- qualified candidates.

8.  Argument  on behalf  of  the State that  the  appointment  through  the  College  Service  Commission is to maintain the equal standard  of education all throughout the State of West  Bengal,  does  not  impress  us.  The  equal  standard of  teachers are already maintained  by  NET/SLET.  Similarly,  receiving  aid  from  State  coffers  can  also  not  be  treated  as  a  justification  for  imposition  of  any restrictions  that cannot be imposed otherwise.”

In the above case, the Court did not rest with laying down the  

above law but even directed the State Government to take due notice  

of the declarations made in the T.M.A. Pai’s case (supra) and to take  

appropriate steps in that regard.

1. Thereafter, a Five-Judge Bench of this Court in Islamic Academy  

of  Eduation  v.  State  of  Karnataka  [(2003)  6  SCC  697],  while  

dealing with the right of the minorities, aided as well as unaided  

institutions  including  professional  educational  institutions,  in  

relation to the process of admission and fee structure, specified  

that the constitution of committees for admission and fee structure  

process was improper in relation to unaided minority institutions  

while certain  other  specifications  were given with regard to  the  

minority aided institutions but the Court specifically noted that non-

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minority educational institutions, in certain matters, cannot and do  

not stand on the same footing as minority educational institutions  

which enjoys the protection of Article 30 and the preferential right  

to admit students of their own community.  Further noticing that  

the whole object of conferring the right on minority is that they will  

be on equality with the majority, the Court further held as under :  

“9……..Undoubtedly,  at  first  blush  it  does  appear  that  these  paragraphs  equate  both  types of educational institutions. However, on  a  careful  reading  of  these  paragraphs  it  is  evident  that  the  essence  of  what  has  been  laid  down  is  that  the  minority  educational  institutions have a guarantee or assurance to  establish  and  administer  educational  institutions of their choice. These paragraphs  merely  provide  that  laws,  rules  and  regulations  cannot  be such  that  they favour  majority institutions over minority institutions.  We do not  read  these  paragraphs  to  mean  that  non-minority  educational  institutions  would  have  the  same  rights  as  those  conferred on minority educational  institutions  by Article 30 of the Constitution of India. Non- minority  educational  institutions  do not  have  the protection  of  Article  30.  Thus,  in  certain  matters  they cannot  and do not  stand on a  similar  footing  as  minority  educational  institutions. Even though the principle behind  Article 30 is to ensure that the minorities are  protected  and are  given an equal  treatment  yet  the  special  right  given  under  Article  30  does  give  them certain  advantages.  Just  to  take  a  few examples,  the  Government  may  decide to nationalise education. In that case it  may  be  enacted  that  private  educational  institutions will not be permitted. Non-minority  

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educational  institutions  may  become  bound  by  such  an  enactment.  However,  the  right  given under Article 30 to minorities cannot be  done  away  with  and  the  minorities  will  still  have  a  fundamental  right  to  establish  and  administer  educational  institutions  of  their  choice.  Similarly,  even  though  the  Government  may  have  a  right  to  take  over  management  of  a  non-minority  educational  institution,  the  management  of  a  minority  educational  institution  cannot  be  taken  over  because of the protection given under Article  30. Of course, we must not be understood to  mean that even in national interest a minority  institute  cannot  be  closed  down.  Further,  minority  educational  institutions  have  preferential  right  to  admit  students  of  their  own  community/language.  No  such  rights  exist  so  far  as  non-minority  educational  institutions are concerned.

xxx xxx xxx      xxx           xxx

14…….Whilst discussing Article 30 under the  heading “To what  extent can the rights of  aided  private  minority  institutions  to  administer be regulated” reliance has been  placed, in the majority judgment, on previous  judgments in the cases of  Kerala Education  Bill,  1957, Re,  Sidhajbhai Sabhai v.  State of  Gujarat,  Rev.  Father  W.  Proost v.  State  of   Bihar,  State  of  Kerala v.  Very  Rev.  Mother  Provincial and  Ahmedabad  St.  Xavier’s  College Society v.  State of Gujarat. All these  cases have recognised and upheld the rights  of  minorities  under  Article  30.  These  cases  have  held  that  in  the  guise  of  regulations,  rights under Article 30 cannot be abrogated. It  has  been  held,  even  in  respect  of  aided  minority  institutions  that  they must  have full  autonomy in administration of that institution.  It  has been held that  the right to administer  includes  the  right  to  admit  students  of  their  own community/ language.  Thus an unaided  

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minority  professional  college  cannot  be in  a  worse  position  than  an  aided  minority  professional college. It is for this reason that  paragraph  68  provides  that  a  different  percentage can be fixed for unaided minority  professional  colleges.  The  expression  “different percentage for minority professional  institutions”  carries  a different  meaning than  the  expression  “certain  percentage  for  unaided  professional  colleges”.  In  fixing  the  percentage for unaided minority professional  colleges the State must keep in mind, apart  from  local  needs,  the  interest/need  of  that  community  in  the  State.  The  need  of  that  community, in the State, would be paramount  vis-à-vis the local needs.”

1. In an attempt to clarify the matters beyond controversy, a Seven-

Judge Bench of this Court in the case of P.A. Inamdar v. State of  

Maharashtra [(2005) 6 SCC 537], discussed the entire gamut of  

law in relation to minority educational institutions and noticed that  

the  right  conferred  by  Article  30  was  more  in  the  nature  of  

protection  for  minorities.   It  protects  minority  institutions  from  

regulatory legislations  framed under Article  19 (6),  but  still  they  

were not immune from regulatory control.  The Court was primarily  

concerned in that case with admission of the students to different  

institutions where it observed that even within the scope and ambit  

of  Article  30(1)  there  was  a  need  for  imposing  reasonable  

restrictions  even on the minority institutions,  and such direction  

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would not vitiate and hurt the minority status.  There are two basic  

concepts - one relating to imposition of conditions with regard to  

the management of the institutions and secondly the power of the  

State  to  step  in  where there  are questions  of  national  interest.  

The Court did approve the permitted operation of the committees  

with  reference  to  rationality  and  reasonableness  and  the  two  

significant matters were decided by the Court as follows :   

“103. To establish an educational institution is  a  fundamental  right.  Several  educational  institutions have come up. In  Kerala  Education  Bill6 “minority  educational  institutions”  came to  be classified  into  three  categories,  namely,  (i)  those  which  do  not  seek either aid or recognition from the State;  (ii) those which want aid; and (iii) those which  want only recognition but not aid. It was held  that  the  first  category  protected  by  Article  30(1) can “exercise that right to their hearts’  content”  unhampered  by  restrictions.  The  second category is most  significant.  Most  of  the educational  institutions  would fall  in that  category as no educational institution can, in  modern times, afford to subsist and efficiently  function without some State aid. So it is with  the  third  category.  An educational  institution  may survive without aid but would still stand in  need of recognition  because in the absence  of  recognition,  education  imparted  therein  may not really serve the purpose as for want  of recognition the students passing out from  such  educational  institutions  may  not  be  entitled  to  admission  in  other  educational  

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institutions  for  higher  studies  and  may also  not  be  eligible  for  securing  jobs.  Once  an  educational  institution  is  granted  aid  or  aspires  for  recognition,  the  State  may grant  aid  or  recognition  accompanied  by  certain  restrictions  or  conditions  which  must  be  followed as essential to the grant of such aid  or  recognition.  This  Court  clarified  in  Kerala  Education Bill that “the right to establish and  administer  educational  institutions”  conferred  by Article 30(1) does not include the right to  maladminister,  and  that  is  very  obvious.  Merely  because  an  educational  institution  belongs to a minority it cannot ask for aid or  recognition  though  running  in  unhealthy  surroundings, without any competent teachers  and  which  does  not  maintain  even  a  fair  standard of teaching or which teaches matters  subversive  to  the  welfare  of  the  scholars.  Therefore,  the  State  may  prescribe  reasonable  regulations  to  ensure  the  excellence of the educational institutions to be  granted aid or to be recognised. To wit, it  is  open to the State to lay down conditions for  recognition such as, an institution must have  a particular amount of funds or properties or  number of students or standard of education  and  so  on.  The  dividing  line  is  that  in  the  name  of  laying  down  conditions  for  aid  or  recognition  the  State  cannot  directly  or  indirectly defeat the very protection conferred  by Article  30(1)  on the  minority  to  establish  and  administer  educational  institutions.  Dealing with the third category of institutions,  which seek only recognition but not aid, Their  Lordships held that “the right to establish and  administer  educational  institutions  of  their  choice” must mean the right to establish real  institutions  which  will  effectively  serve  the  needs  of  the  community  and  scholars  who  

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resort  to  these  educational  institutions.  The  dividing  line  between how far  the  regulation  would  remain  within  the  constitutional  limits  and  when  the  regulations  would  cross  the  limits and be vulnerable is fine yet perceptible  and has been demonstrated in several judicial  pronouncements  which  can  be  cited  as  illustrations.  They  have  been  dealt  with  meticulous  precision  coupled  with brevity by  S.B.  Sinha,  J.  in  his  opinion  in  Islamic  Academy.  The  considerations  for  granting  recognition  to  a  minority  educational  institution  and  casting  accompanying  regulations would be similar as applicable to a  non-minority  institution  subject  to  two  overriding considerations: (i) the recognition is  not  denied  solely  on  the  ground  of  the  educational institution being one belonging to  minority,  and  (ii)  the  regulation  is  neither  aimed at  nor has the effect  of  depriving the  institution of its minority status.

xxx xxx xxx      xxx           xxx

134. However, different considerations would  apply for graduate and postgraduate level of  education,  as  also  for  technical  and  professional  educational  institutions.  Such  education  cannot  be  imparted  by  any  institution  unless  recognised  by  or  affiliated  with any competent authority created by law,  such as a university, Board, Central or State  Government  or  the  like.  Excellence  in  education and maintenance of high standards  at  this  level  are  a  must.  To  fulfil  these  objectives, the State can and rather must, in  national  interest,  step  in.  The  education,  knowledge  and  learning  at  this  level  possessed  by  individuals  collectively  constitutes national wealth.”

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The apparent analysis was that the emphasis has to be on the  

need for preserving its minority character so as to enjoy the privilege  

of protection under Article 30(1).

1. Still, in the case of Kanya Junior High School, Bal Vidya Mandir v.  

U.P.  Basic  Shiksha  Parishad  [(2006)  11  SCC  92],  this  Court  

observed that the law did not contemplate granting of any higher  

rights to the minority as opposed to majority and it only conferred  

additional  protection.   Referring to P.A. Inamdar’s case (supra),  

the Court declared that the object underlying Article 30(1) is to see  

the desire of minorities that their children should be brought up  

properly,  efficiently  and  acquire  eligibility  for  higher  university  

education.  It further noticed that under the provisions of law, the  

approval  of  District  Basic  Education  Officer  was not  necessary  

before terminating the services of a teacher, as the institution was  

recognized as a minority institution.  Last of the judgment, which  

has some bearing on the subject in question, is on the principle  

reiterated by a Bench of this Court in the case of Secy. Malankara  

Syrian Catholic College (supra), where the Court again dealt with  

the  aided  minority  educational  institutions  and  terms  and  

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conditions of services of employees.  The Court in para 12 of the  

judgment framed the following two questions :   

“12. The  rival  contentions  give  rise  to  the  following questions:

(i) To what extent, the State can regulate the  right  of  the  minorities  to  administer  their  educational  institutions,  when  such  institutions receive aid from the State?

(ii) Whether the right to choose a Principal is  part  of  the  right  of  minorities  under  Article  30(1) to establish and administer educational  institutions  of  their  choice.  If  so,  would  Section 57(3) of the Act violate Article 30(1) of  the Constitution of India?”

The Answer to question no. 1 was provided in para 21 while  

question no. 2 was answered in para Nos. 27 and 28 of the judgment  

which read as under :

“21. We may also recapitulate  the extent  of  regulation by the State, permissible in respect  of  employees  of  minority  educational  institutions  receiving  aid  from  the  State,  as  clarified  and  crystallised  in  T.M.A.  Pai.  The  State can prescribe:

(i) the minimum qualifications, experience and  other  criteria  bearing  on  merit,  for  making  appointments,

(ii)  the  service  conditions  of  employees  without  interfering  with  the  overall  administrative  control  by  the  management  over the staff,

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(iii)  a  mechanism  for  redressal  of  the  grievances of the employees,

(iv) the conditions for the proper utilisation of  the aid by the educational institutions, without  abridging or diluting the right to establish and  administer educational institutions.

In other words, all laws made by the State to  regulate  the  administration  of  educational  institutions  and  grant  of  aid  will  apply  to  minority  educational  institutions  also.  But  if  any such regulations interfere with the overall  administrative  control  by  the  management  over the staff, or abridges/dilutes, in any other  manner, the right to establish and administer  educational  institutions,  such  regulations,  to  that  extent,  will  be  inapplicable  to  minority  institutions.

xxx xxx xxx      xxx           xxx

27. It is thus clear that the freedom to choose  the person to be appointed as Principal has  always been recognised as a vital facet of the  right to administer the educational institution.  This  has  not  been,  in  any  way,  diluted  or  altered  by T.M.A.  Pai.  Having regard  to  the  key  role  played  by  the  Principal  in  the  management  and  administration  of  the  educational institution, there can be no doubt  that  the  right  to  choose  the  Principal  is  an  important  part  of  the  right  of  administration  and even if the institution is aided, there can  be no interference with the said right. The fact  that  the  post  of  the  Principal/Headmaster  is  also  covered  by  State  aid  will  make  no  difference.

28. The appellant contends that the protection  extended  by  Article  30(1)  cannot  be  used  

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against  a member of  the teaching staff  who  belongs to the same minority community. It is  contended  that  a  minority  institution  cannot  ignore the rights of eligible lecturers belonging  to the same community, senior to the person  proposed to be selected, merely because the  institution has the right to select a Principal of  its  choice.  But  this  contention  ignores  the  position that the right of the minority to select  a Principal  of  its  choice is  with reference to  the assessment  of  the person’s outlook and  philosophy  and  ability  to  implement  its  objects.  The  management  is  entitled  to  appoint the person, who according to them is  most  suited to head the institution,  provided  he possesses the qualifications prescribed for  the posts. The career advancement prospects  of the teaching staff, even those belonging to  the same community, should have to yield to  the  right  of  the  management  under  Article  30(1) to establish and administer educational  institutions.”

The above answers to the questions formulated demonstrates  

that the Court has kept a clear line of distinction between laws made  

by the State to regulate the administration of educational institutions  

receiving  grant-in-aid  but  if  such  regulations  interfere  with  overall  

administrative control by the management over the staff or abridges  

or dilutes, in any other manner, the right to establish and administer  

educational institutions, in that event, to such extent, the regulations  

will be inapplicable to the minorities.  

Discussion  on  constitutional  provisions  read  in  conjunction  with the provisions of the Delhi School Education Act,1973 and  

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the  Rules  framed  thereunder  with  reference  to  the  legal  principles above enunciated

1. Undoubtedly,  the  Preamble  of  our  Constitution  mandates  ‘to  

secure to all  its citizens justice - social,  economic and political’.  

The Constitution has been held to be a living and organic thing  

and not a mere law and it is expected to be construed broadly and  

liberally.   Thus,  these  expressions  must  be  given  liberal  

construction  so  as  to  further  the  constitutional  mandate.   The  

social  and  economic  justice  would  take  within  its  ambit  the  

progress and development of the entire nation without reference  

to caste, creed, colour or the section of the society to which they  

belong.   

1. Article 14 of the Constitution commands equality before law or the  

equal protection of laws.  The concept of equality is wide enough  

to include equality in advantages available to the public at large as  

a  result  of  State  action.   The Constitution  has  itself  made out  

certain  exceptions  to  the  general  rule  of  equality  in  terms  of  

Articles 15 and 16.  Article 15 (1) spells out a prohibitory intent  

against the State that it would not discriminate against any citizen  

on the ground only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or  

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any of them.  In other words, the State cannot deny the equality  

on the basis  of  the aforestated  factors.   Despite  this  mandate,  

Article 15(3) spells out an exception to Article 15(1) and 15(2) as  

well as to the concept of basic equality and empowers the State to  

make special  provisions  for  women and children.   Similarly,  by  

Article  15(4),  which  was  introduced  by  1st Constitutional  

Amendment of 1951, the State is further empowered to make any  

special  provisions  for  advancement  of  any  socially  and  

educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled  

Castes  and  Scheduled  Tribes.   Article  15(5),  which  was  

introduced by 93rd Constitutional Amendment of 2005, made out  

another  exception  to  the  general  rule  of  equality  and this  sub-

Article, while giving power to the State to enact special laws, also  

carves out an exception in regard to which this power cannot be  

exercised,  i.e.  minority  educational  institutions  referred  to  in  

clause (1) of Article 30.  Article 15(5) reads as under :  

“Nothing in this article or in sub-clause (g) of  Clause (1) of Article 19 shall prevent the State  from making any special provision, by law, for  the  advancement  of  any  socially  and  educationally backward classes of citizens or  for  the  Scheduled  Castes  or  the  Scheduled  Tribes  insofar  as  such  special  provisions  relate  to  their  admission  to  the  educational  institutions  including  private  educational  institutions, whether aided or unaided by the  

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State,  other  than  the  minority  educational  institutions  referred  to  in  Clause  (1)  of  Article 30.”

1. Article 16 further guarantees to the citizens equality of opportunity  

in  matters  of  public  employment.   Article  16(2)  again  prohibits  

discrimination in respect  of any employment or office under the  

State on the ground of religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place of  

birth, residence or any of them.  These factors cannot render any  

citizen ineligible for appointment for public employment.  Clauses  

(3) to (4B) are the provisions which empowers the State to make  

any  law  in  regard  to  a  class  or  classes  of  employment  or  

appointment to an office under the Government of, or any local or  

other authority within, a State or Union Territory, any requirement  

as to a residence within that State or Union Territory, prior to such  

employment  or  appointment.   It  also  empowers  the  State  from  

making any provision for the reservation of appointments or posts  

in favour of any backward class which, in the opinion of the State,  

is not adequately represented in the service under the State.   The  

State is also vested with the power of reserving the vacancies in a  

particular  year  and  make  reservation  in  favour  of  Scheduled  

Castes  and  Scheduled  Tribes,  which  are  not  adequately  

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represented in service of the State, in matters of promotion with  

consequential seniority.  Putting it simply, the State is entitled to  

make law and reservations in different fields for Scheduled Castes  

and  Scheduled  Tribes  and  the  persons  belonging  to  backward  

class in the services under the State, in accordance    with law.   

1. While dealing with the cultural  and educational  rights under the  

Constitution,  the framers  have devoted specific  attention  to  the  

minorities in our country while enacting Articles 29 and 30.  Article  

29  grants  complete  protection  to  any  section  of  the  citizens  

residing in the territory of India having a distinct language, script or  

culture of its own and freedom to conserve the same.  Besides  

granting this freedom, this Article also mandates that no citizen  

shall  be  denied  admission  to  any  educational  institution  

maintained by the State or receiving aid out of the State funds on  

the grounds of discrimination stated in Articles 15 and 16 of the  

Constitution.  Article 30 gives certain rights to the minorities, i.e.  

all  minorities  whether  religious  or  linguistic,  have  the  right  to  

establish  and administer  educational  institutions  of  their  choice.  

Article 30(2) has to be noticed with some emphasis.  It requires  

the State not to discriminate against any educational institution on  

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the ground that it is under the management of a minority, whether  

based  on  religion  or  language,  while  granting  aid  to  the  

educational institution.  The Article reads as under :  

“30.  Right  of  minorities  to  establish  and  administer  educational  institutions.—(2)  The  State shall not, in granting aid to educational  institutions,  discriminate  against  any  educational institution on the ground that it is  under the management of a minority, whether  based on religion or language.”

1. The principle of free primary education had been introduced as a  

constitutional right by this Court in Unni Krishnan, J.P. V. State of  

A.P. [(1993) 1 SCC 645].  The Court, while dealing with the case  

of T.M.A. Pai (supra), not only reiterated the same with approval  

but made right to receive secondary education as a fundamental  

right.   The  dictum  of  this  Court  then  led  to  86th constitutional  

amendment by Amendment Act of 2002 wherein Article 21-A was  

introduced placing a clear obligation on the State to provide free  

and compulsory education to  all  children of  the age of  6 to 14  

years in such manner as the State may by law determine.  The  

judgments  of  the  Court  and the  constitutional  law introduced  a  

new dimension to the right of the children to receive education.  

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To  achieve  this  object,  the  State  had  to  introduce  various  

incentives and policies to invite the private sector into the field of  

dispensation  of  education.   This  obviously,  led  to  certain  

liberalization in the field of private sector dealing with the different  

levels of education.  All the schools, which then came up, had to  

be recognized by the competent  authority and they had to work  

under  the  regulatory  measures  declared  by  the  State  but  in  

accordance with law.  The private sector could be dissected into  

two sectors – aided and non-aided schools.  The aided schools  

could further  be divided into  two sections – minority institutions  

receiving grant in aid and, non-minority institutions receiving grant-

in-aid.   

1. As is evident from the above narrated principles, the Government  

does  not  enjoy  identical  control  over  the  management  of  the  

schools belonging to the minority and/or majority schools.  In view  

of the above ground reality and amendment in law, Article 30(2)  

provides a definite protection to the minority institutions that they  

would not be discriminated against providing of grant-in-aid.  This  

aspect is further dealt with some clarity in Chapter VI relating to  

grant-in-aid  under  the  provisions  of  the  DSE  Rules,  1973.   In  

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terms of Rule 60, every aided school will continue to get the aid  

subject to the provisions of the DSE Rules.  Rule 64 of DSE Rules  

contemplates  that  aid  to  be  given  upon  furnishing  of  suitable  

undertaking by the managing committee.  The grant-in-aid, then,  

would be given only upon satisfaction of the conditions stipulated  

in Rule 65.  Second proviso to Rule 10 requires that  wherever a  

linguistic  minority  school  decides  to  impart  education  in  a  

language other  than the language of  such linguistic  minority,  in  

that event the Administrator shall  not be under any obligation to  

give grant-in-aid to such schools.  In other words, a school run by  

linguistic minority would be entitled to receive grant-in-aid if  it is  

imparting education in the language of the minority, of course, by  

satisfying other stated conditions.  The right to receive grant thus  

has to be accepted as a legitimate  right  in contra-distinction or  

opposed to legal right to get recognition including the case of a  

minority  institution.   This  principle  has  been  reiterated  by  this  

Court in catena of judgments including the judgments referred by  

us  above.   The  logical  impact  of  Article  30(2)  read  with  the  

provisions of  the  DSE Act  and the  Rules  framed thereunder  is  

that, to receive grant-in-aid is a legitimate right of a school subject  

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to satisfying the requirements of law.  Article 30(2) thus, has been  

worded  in  a  negative  language  not  permitting  the  State  to  

discriminate  the  minority institution  in  relation  to  the  matters  of  

grant-in-aid.   

1. Article 15(5) of the Constitution excludes the minority educational  

institutions from the power of the State to make any provision by  

law for the advancement of any social or backward classes of the  

citizens or for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in relation  

to  their  admission  to  educational  institutions  including  private  

educational institutions whether aided or unaided.  This Article is  

capable of very wide interpretation and vests the State with power  

of  wide magnitude to achieve the purpose stated in the Article.  

But,  the  framers  of  the  Constitution  have  specifically  excluded  

minority  educational  institutions  from  operation  of  this  clause.  

Article  16  which  ensures  equality  of  opportunity  in  matters  of  

public  employment  again  has  been  worded  so  as  to  prohibit  

discrimination and, at the same time, vests the State with power to  

make provisions, laws and reservations in relation to a particular  

class or classes of persons.  It is of some significance to notice  

that power of the State to exercise such power is in relation to the  

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‘service under the State’.  This expression has been used in all the  

clauses of  the Article  which relates  to providing of  employment  

and framing of  laws/reservations  in  those categories.   Upon its  

true  construction,  this  expression  itself  is  capable  of  a  wide  

construction  and  must  be  construed  liberally  and  cannot  be  

restricted to its narrow sense.  The expression ‘service under the  

State’  would  obviously  include  service  directly  under  the  State  

Government or its instrumentalities and/or even the sectors which  

can be termed as a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the  

Constitution.   Once an organization  or  society  falls  outside  the  

ambit of this circumference, in that event, it will be difficult for the  

Courts to hold that the State has a right to frame such laws or  

provisions  or  make  reservations  in  the  field  of  employment  of  

those societies.   

1. The interpretation of the word ‘State’ really does not require any  

deliberation as this aspect is no more  res-integra and has been  

settled by the law stated in the case of Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib  

Sehravardi [(1981) 1 SCC 722], where this Court spelt out the test  

that would be applicable in determining whether a Corporation or a  

Government Company or a private body is an instrumentality or  

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agency of the State.  Primarily, there are different type of controls,  

which  can  be  exercised  by the  State  over  any other  authority,  

society, organization or private body to bring it within the ambit of  

the expression ‘State’ or ‘other authority’ appearing in Article 12 of  

the  Constitution.   These  are  financial  control,  managerial  and  

administrative control and functional control.  To put it differently,  

what is the administrative control that the Government exercises  

upon  such  a  body,  whether  functions  of  that  body  are  

governmental  functions  or  closely  related  thereto,  quantum  of  

State  control,  volume  of  financial  assistances,  character  and  

structure of the body and cumulative effect of these factors etc.  

This  has  been  followed consistently  in  the  case  of  Zoroastrian  

Coop. Housing Society Ltd. v. District Registrar, Coop. Societies  

(Urban) [(2005) 5 SCC 632] and in a very recent judgment in the  

case of State of U.P. v. Radhey Shyam Rai [(2009) 5 SCC 577],  

wherein  this  Court  held  that  Uttar  Pradesh  Ganna  Kishan  

Sansthan  (Sansthan)  is  a  State  because  these  criteria  were  

satisfied and even the State could take over the functions of the  

Sansthan.  Unless all these three aspects are established or they  

are stated to be satisfied,  it  will not be permissible to term that  

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society, organization or body as a ‘State’.   

1. There is no doubt,  that there may be minority institutions which  

are  receiving  grant-in-aid  from  the  Government.   But,  merely  

receiving  grant-in-aid  per  se  would  not  make  such  school  or  

institution  ‘State’  within  the  meaning  of  Article  12  of  the  

Constitution of India.  Even this aspect we need not discuss in any  

great detail as the question stands settled by the judgment of this  

Court in the case of V.K. Sodhi (supra),  wherein this Court has  

dealt  with  the  question  whether  State  Council  of  Education,  

Research and Training is not State or other authority within the  

meaning of Article 12.  The Court returned the finding that though  

the  finances  were  being  provided  by  the  State,  the  State  

Government does not have deep and pervasive control over the  

working  of  the  Council  and it  was an independent  society  and  

thus, is not a State.  The Court  held as under :  

“11. The two elements, one, of a function of  the  State,  namely,  the  coordinating  of  education and the  other, of the Council being  dependant  on  the  funding  by   the  State,  satisfied  two  of  the  tests  indicated  by  the  decisions of this Court.  But, at the same time,  from that alone it could not be assumed that  SCERT is  a State.   It  has  to  be noted that  though finance is made available by the State,  in the matter of administration of that finance,  

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the Council is supreme.  The administration is  also completely with the Council.  There is no  governmental  interference  or  control  either  financially,  functionally  or  administratively,  in  the working of the Council.   These were the  aspects  taken  note  of  in  Chander  Mohan  Khanna  (supra)  to  come  to  the  conclusion  that NCERT is not a State or other authority  within  the  meaning  of  Article  12  of  the  Constitution of India.   No doubt,  in Chander  Mohan Khanna (supra), the Bench noted that  the fact  that  education was a State function  could not make any difference.   This part of  the  reasoning  in  Chander  Mohan  Khanna  (supra)  case  has  been  specifically  disapproved  by  the  majority  in  Pradeep  Kumar  Biswas  (supra).   The  majority  noted  that the objects of forming Indian Institute of  Chemical  Biology  was  with  the  view  of  entrusting  it  with  a  function  that  is  fundamental to the governance of the country  and  quoted  with  approval  the  following  passage  in  Rajasthan  SEB  v.  Mohan  Lal  [(1967) 3 S.C.R. 377]:  "The State,  as defined in Article  12,  is  thus  comprehended to include bodies created for  the purpose of promoting the educational and  economic interests of the people." The majority then stated: "We  are  in  respectful  agreement  with  this  statement of the law.  The observations to the  contrary  in  Chander  Mohan  Khanna  v.  NCERT  relied  on  by  the  learned  Attorney- General in this context, do not represent the  correct legal position."

xxx xxx xxx      xxx           xxx  

13. We also  find  substantial  differences  in  the  two  set  ups.   Sabhajit  Tewary  (supra),  after  referring  to  the rules  of  the Council  of  Scientific and Industrial Research which was  registered  under  the  Societies  Registration  Act, concluded that it was not a State within  the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution.  While  overruling  the  said  decision,  the  majority  in  Pradeep  Kumar  Biswas  (supra)  

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took the view that the dominant role played by  the  Government  of  India  in  the  governing  body  and  the  ubiquitous  control  of  the  Government in the Council and the complete  subjugation of the Governing Body to the will  of the Central Government, the inability of the  Council to lay down or change the terms and  conditions of service of its employees and the  inability  to  alter  any  bye-law  without  the  approval of the Government of India and the  owning  by  the  Central  Government  of  the  assets  and  funds  of  the  Council  though  normally owned by the  society,  all  indicated  that there was effective and pervasive control  over the functioning of the Council and since it  was  also  entrusted  with  a  Governmental  function, the justifiable conclusion was that it  was a State within the meaning of Article 12  of the Constitution.  The majority also noticed  that on a winding up of that Council, the entire  assets  were  to  vest  in  the  Central  Government  and  that  was  also  a  relevant  indication.   Their  Lordships  in  the  majority  also specifically overruled as a legal principle  that a Society registered under the Societies  Registration  Act  or  a  company incorporated  under the Companies Act,  is  by that  reason  alone  excluded  from  the  concept  of  State  under  Article  12 of  the  Constitution.   In  the  case of SCERT, in addition to the operational  autonomy  of  the  Executive  Committee,  it  could also amend its bye-laws subject to the  provisions of the Delhi Societies Registration  Act though with the previous concurrence of  the  Government  of  Delhi  and  that  the  proceedings  of  the  Council  are  to  be made  available  by  the  Secretary  for  inspection  of  the  Registrar  of  Societies  as  per  the  provisions  of  the  Societies  Registration  Act.  The records and proceedings of the Council  have also to be made available for inspection  by the Registrar of Societies.  In the case of  dissolution  of  SCERT,  the  liabilities  and  assets are to be taken over at book value by  the Government of Delhi which had to appoint  a liquidator  for  completing  the dissolution  of  the  Body.   The  creditors'  loans  and  other  liabilities of SCERT shall have preference and  bear  a  first  charge  on  the  assets  of  the  Council at the time of dissolution.  This is not  

85

an  unconditional  vesting  of  the  assets  on  dissolution  with  the  Government.   It  is  also  provided that  the provisions of  the Societies  Registration  Act,  1860  had  to  be  complied  with in the matter of filing list of office-bearers  every year with the Registrar and the carrying  out of the amendments in accordance with the  procedure laid down in the Act of 1860 and  the dissolution being in terms of Sections 13  and 14 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860  and making all the provisions of the Societies  Registration  Act  applicable  to  the  Society.  These  provisions,  in  our  view,  indicate  that  SCERT is subservient to the provisions of the  Societies Registration Act  rather  than to the  State Government and that the intention was  to keep SCERT as an independent body and  the role of  the State Government cannot  be  compared to that of the Central Government  in  the  case  of  Council  of  Scientific  and  Industrial Research.

14. As  we  understand  it,  even  going  by  paragraph  40  of  the  judgment  in  Pradeep  Kumar Biswas (supra), which we have quoted  above, we have to consider the  cumulative  effect of all the facts available in the case.  So  considered,  we  are  inclined  to  hold  that  SCERT is not a State or other authority within  the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution  of India.  As we see it, the High Court has not  independently  discussed  the  relevant  rules  governing the functioning  and administration  of SCERT.  It has proceeded on the basis that  in the face of Pradeep Kumar Biswas (supra)  decision,  the  decision  in  Chander  Mohan  Khanna (supra) must be taken to be overruled  and no further  discussion of  the question is  necessary.  But,  in our view, even going by  Pradeep  Kumar  Biswas  (supra),  each  case  has  to  be  considered  with  reference  to  the  facts  available  for  determining  whether  the  body concerned is a State or other authority  within  the  meaning  of  Article  12  of  the  Constitution of India.  So considered, we find  that the Government does not have deep and  pervasive control over the working of SCERT.  It does not have financial control in the sense  that once the finances are made available to  

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it,  the administration of those finances is left  to  SCERT  and  there  is  no  further  governmental  control.   In  this  situation,  we  accept  the  submission  on  behalf  of  the  appellants and hold that SCERT is not a State  or other authority within the meaning of Article  12 of the Constitution of India.  After all, the  very  formation  of  an  independent  society  under  the  Societies  Registration  Act  would  also  suggest  that  the  intention  was  not  to  make  the  body  a  mere  appendage  of  the  State.   We  reverse  the  finding  of  the  High  Court on this aspect.”

1. The  principle  above  enunciated  clearly  shows  that  it  is  the  

cumulative effect  of all  the three essential  features which would  

finally  help  in  determining  whether  a  society,  body  or  an  

association  is  ‘State’  or  not.   We  have  referred  to  various  

provisions of the DSE Act, 1973 and particularly, the Rules framed  

thereunder.   The  DSE  Rules  specifically  contemplate  that  the  

State  Government  will  not  have  any  strict  control  over  the  

management of these institutions.  Even the members, who are  

nominated by the Director of Education, would only have a right of  

limited participation with no right of voting.  Rule 59(b)(iv), requires  

two other persons who are or have been teachers of any other  

school or college, to be nominated by the Advisory Board on the  

Managing Committee of a school.  However, this clause shall not  

apply to a minority institution in terms of the proviso to the said  

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Rule. The limited extent of control exercisable by the authorities is  

demonstrated  in DSE Rules 44,  59 and 96(3A) & (3B).   Every  

school is required, when it desires to establish a new school, to  

give  intimation  in  writing  to  the  Administrator  or  its  office  to  

establish  such  a  school  to  specifically  exempt  the  minorities’  

institutions from application of this detailed provision.  In addition  

to this, the management of a minority school cannot be taken over  

by the authorities in terms of Section 20 of the DSE Act as the  

statute itself prohibits the application of Section 20 to such school  

in  terms  of  Section  21  of  the  Act.   Besides  these  statutory  

provisions and the scheme under the DSE Act, various judgments  

of this Court have also consistently taken the view that the State  

has no right  of  interference  in the establishment,  administration  

and management of a school run by linguistic minority except the  

power to regulate         as specified.   

1. The right to establish and administer  includes a right to appoint  

teachers.   Thus,  except  providing  grant-in-aid  as  per  the  DSE  

Rules  and  having  no  power  to  discriminate  in  terms  of  Article  

30(2)  of  the  Constitution,  the  Government  has  a  very  limited  

regulatory  control  over  the  minority  institutions  and  no  control  

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whatsoever on the managing committee, internal management of  

the school  and,  of  course,  has no power to take over such an  

institution.   This  Court  has  also  expressed  the  view  in  some  

judgments that in respect of minority or even minority institutions,  

steps can be taken even for  closure  of  such institutions  in  the  

national interest which of course may be a rare exception.  Once  

the  State  lacks  basic  power  of  jurisdiction  to  make  special  

provisions  and  reservations  in  relation  to  minority  institutions,  

which do not form part of service under the State, it will be difficult  

for the Court to hold that Rule 64(1)(b) can be enforced against  

aided minority institution.  There are still other aspects which can  

usefully be examined to analyze this issue in a greater detail.  In  

T.M.A.  Pai’s  case (supra)  the right  to establish  an institution is  

provided.  The Court held that the right to establish an institution is  

provided  in  Article  19(1)(g)  of  the  Constitution.   Such  right,  

however,  is  subject  to  reasonable  restriction,  which  may  be  

brought  about  in  terms  of  clause  (6)  thereof.   Further,  that  

minority, whether based on religion or language, however, has a  

fundamental  right  to  establish  and  administer  educational  

institution of its own choice under Article 30(1).   

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1. The right under clause (1) of Article 30 is not absolute but subject  

to reasonable restrictions which, inter alia, may be framed having  

regard to the public interest and national interest of the country.  

Regulation can also be framed to prevent mal-administration as  

well  as  for  laying  down  standards  of  education,  teaching,  

maintenance of discipline, public order, health, morality etc.  It is  

also well settled that a minority institution does not cease to be so,  

the moment grant-in-aid is received by the institution.  An aided  

minority education institution, therefore, would be entitled to have  

the right of admission of students belonging to the minority group  

and, at the same time, would be required to admit a reasonable  

extent  of  non-minority  students,  to  the  extent,  that  the  right  in  

Article 30(1) is not substantially impaired and further, the citizen’s  

right under Article 29 (2) is not infringed.     

1. A minority institution may have its own procedure and method of  

admission as well as the selection of students but it has to be a  

fair and transparent method.  The State has the power to frame  

regulations  which are reasonable  and do not  impinge upon the  

basic character of the minority institutions.  This Court, in some of  

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the decisions, has taken the view that the width of the rights and  

limitations  thereof  of  unaided  institutions,  whether  run  by  a  

majority  or  by a  minority,  must  conform to  the  maintenance  of  

excellence and with a view to achieve the said goal indisputably,  

the regulations can be made by the State.  It is also equally true  

that the right to administer does not amount to the right to mal-

administer  and  the  right  is  not  free  from  regulations.   The  

regulatory measures are necessary for ensuring orderly, efficient  

and sound administration.  The regulatory measures can be laid  

down by the  State  in  the  administration  of  minority institutions.  

The right of the State is to be exercised primarily to prevent mal-

administration and such regulations are permissible regulations.  

These regulations could relate to guidelines for the efficiency and  

excellence of educational standards, ensuring the security of the  

services of  the teachers  or  other employees,  framing rules and  

regulations  governing the  conditions of  service of  teachers  and  

employees and their pay and allowances and prescribing course  

of  study  or  syllabi  of  the  nature  of  books  etc.    Some of  the  

impermissible regulations are refusal to affiliation without sufficient  

reasons,  such  conditions  as  would  completely  destroy  the  

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autonomous status of the educational institution, by introduction of  

outside  authority  either  directly  or  through  its  nominees  in  the  

Governing Body or the Managing Committee of minority institution  

to  conduct  its  affairs  etc.   These  have been illustrated  by this  

Court  in  the  Case  of  State  of  Kerala  v.  Very  Rev.  Mother  

Provincial [1970) 2 SCC 417, All Saints High School v. Govt. of  

A.P. [(1980) 2 SCC 478] and T.M.A. Pai’s case (supra).   Even in  

the Kerala Education Bill, 1957 case (supra), referred for opinion  

by  the  President  under  Article  143(1)  of  the  Constitution,  this  

Court  while  answering  question  No.2  emphasized  upon  the  

freedom  and  extent  of  protection  available  to  the  minority  

institutions.   Referring to the fact that Articles 29 and 30 are set  

out in Part-III  of the Constitution, which guarantees fundamental  

rights,  the text and margin notes of both the Articles show that  

their  purpose  is  to  confer  those  fundamental  rights  on  certain  

sections  of  community,  which  constitute  minority  communities.  

The Court  held that  Article  30(1)  cannot  be limited  and should  

equally  operate  in  favour  of  educational  institution,  whether  

established pre or  post  the commencement  of  the Constitution.  

The  Bench  repelled  the  contention  that  by  admission  of  an  

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outsider,  the minority institution will loose its character  as such,  

and held:

“To  say  that  an  institution  which  receives aid on account of its being a minority  educational  institution  must  not  refuse  to  admit  any  member  of  any  other  community  only  on  the  grounds  therein  mentioned  and  then to  say that  as soon as such institution  admits such an outsider it will cease to be a  minority  institution  is  tantamount  to  saying  that  minority  institutions  will  not,  as  minority  institutions, be entitled to any aid”.   

While admitting non-members, the institution does not shed its  

character  or  ceases to  be a minority institution.    The freedom of  

minority institutions was further  explained by the Bench by saying  

that  it  is  the  choice  of  the  minority  institution,  to  establish  such  

educational  institutions  as  well  serve  both  purposes  that  of  

conserving their religion, language or culture and also the purpose of  

giving a thorough good general education to their children.   So, they  

could even impart education in their own language or in any other  

language,  which  choice  essentially  has  to  be  left  to  the  minority  

institution.   The constitution  itself  uses the word ‘choice’  in Article  

30(1), which indicates the extent of liberty and freedom, the framers  

of  the  Constitution  intended  to  grant  to  the  minority  community.  

Thus, there arises no occasion for the Court to read restrictions into  

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such freedom on the ground of policy.   It may amount to intrusion  

into  the  very  minority  character  and  protection  available  to  the  

community in law.  The right to frame regulations, therefore,  is not  

itself  an  unregulated  right.   It  has  its  own limitations  and  sphere  

within which such regulations would be framed and made operative.   

1. It is not necessary for us to examine the extent of power to make  

regulations,  which  can  be  enforced  against  linguistic  minority  

institutions, as we have already discussed the same in the earlier  

part  of  the  judgment.   No  doubt,  right  conferred  on  minorities  

under Article 30 is only to ensure equality with the majority but, at  

the same time, what protection is available to them and what right  

is granted to them under Article 30 of the Constitution cannot be  

diluted  or  impaired  on  the  pretext  of  framing  of  regulations  in  

exercise  of  its  statutory powers by the  State.   The permissible  

regulations, as afore-indicated, can always be framed and where  

there is a mal-administration or even where a minority linguistic or  

religious school is being run against the public or national interest,  

appropriate steps can be taken by the authorities including closure  

but  in  accordance  with  law.   The  minimum  qualifications,  

experience,  other  criteria  for  making  appointments  etc  are  the  

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matters  which will  fall  squarely within the power of the State to  

frame regulations but power to veto or command that a particular  

person or class of persons ought to be appointed to the school  

failing which the grant-in-aid will be withdrawn, will apparently be a  

subject  which  would  be  arbitrary  and  unenforceable.   Even  in  

T.M.A. Pai’s case (supra), which view was reiterated by this Court  

in the case of Secy. Malankara Syrian Catholic College (supra), it  

was held that the conditions for proper utilization of the aid by the  

educational  institution  was a matter  within the empowerment of  

the State to frame regulations but without abridging or diluting the  

right to establish and administer educational institutions.  In that  

case, while dealing with the appointment of a person as Principal,  

the Court clearly stated the dictum that the freedom to choose the  

person to be appointed as Principal has always been recognized  

as a vital facet to right to administer the educational institution.  It  

being  an  important  part  of  the  administration  and  even  if  the  

institution is aided, there can be no interference with the said right.  

The power to frame regulations and control  the management is  

subject to another restriction which was reiterated by the Court in  

P.A. Inamdar’s case (supra) stating that it  is necessary that the  

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objective of establishing the institution was not defeated.  

1. At last, what is the purpose of granting protection or privilege to  

the  minorities  in  terms  of  Article  29,  and  at  the  same  time,  

applying  negative  language  in  Article  30(2)  in  relation  to  State  

action for releasing grant-in-aid, as well as the provisions of DSE  

Act, 1973 and the rules framed thereunder?  It is obvious that the  

constitutional intent is to bring the minorities at parity or equality  

with the majority as well as give them right to establish, administer  

and run minority educational institutions.   With the primary object  

of Article 21A of the Constitution in mind, the State was expected  

to  expand  its  policy  as  well  as  methodology  for  imparting  

education.   DSE Act, as we have already noticed, was enacted  

primarily for the purpose of better organization and development  

of school education in the Union Territory of Delhi and for matters  

connected therewith or incidental thereto.   Thus, the very object  

and propose of this enactment  was to improve the standard as  

well  as  management  of  school  education.    It  will  be  too  far  

fetched to read into this object that the law was intended to make  

inroads into character and privileges of the minority.   Besides, in  

the given facts and circumstances of the case, the Court is also  

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duty bound to advance the cause or the purpose for which the law  

is enacted.   Different laws relating to these fields, thus, must be  

read  harmoniously,  construed  purposively  and  implemented  to  

further  advancement  of  the  objects,  sought  to  be  achieved  by  

such collective implementation of law. While, you keep the rule of  

purposive  interpretation  in  mind,  you  also  further  add  such  

substantive or ancillary matters which would advance the purpose  

of  the  enactment  still  further.   To  sum  up,  we  will  term  it  as  

‘doctrine  of  purposive  advancement’.    The  power  to  regulate,  

undisputedly,  is  not  unlimited.   It  has  more  restriction  than  

freedom particularly,  in  relation  to  the management  of  linguistic  

minority  institutions.    The  rules,  which  were  expected  to  be  

framed  in  terms  of  Section  28  of  the  DSE  Act,  were  for  the  

purpose  of  carrying  out  the  provisions  of  the  Act.    Even,  

otherwise, it is a settled principle of law that Rules must fall within  

the ambit  and scope of  the principal  legislation.   Section  21 is  

sufficiently indicative of the inbuilt restrictions that the framers of  

the  law intended to  impose upon the  State  while exercising  its  

power in relation to a linguistic minority school.   

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1. To  appoint  a  teacher  is  part  of  the  regular  administration  and  

management  of  the  School.  Of  course,  what  should  be  the  

qualification or eligibility criteria for a teacher to be appointed can  

be defined and, in fact, has been defined by the Government of  

N.C.T. of Delhi and within that specified parameters, the right of  

the linguistic  minority institution  to  appoint  a teacher  cannot  be  

interfered with.   The paramount feature of the above laws was to  

bring  efficiency and excellence  in  the  field  of  school  education  

and, therefore, it is expected of the minority institutions to select  

the best teacher to the faculty.   To provide and enforce the any  

regulation, which will practically defeat this purpose would have to  

be  avoided.    A  linguistic  minority  is  entitled  to  conserve  its  

language and culture by a constitutional mandate.   Thus, it must  

select people who satisfy the prescribed criteria, qualification and  

eligibility and at the same time ensure better cultural and linguistic  

compatibility to the minority institution.  At this stage, at the cost of  

repetition,  we may again  refer  to  the  judgment  of  this  Court  in  

T.M.A.  Pai’s  case  (supra),  where  in  para  123,  the  Court  

specifically noticed that while it was permissible for the State and  

its educational authorities to prescribe qualifications of a teacher,  

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once  the  teachers  possessing  the  requisite  qualifications  were  

selected  by  the  minorities  for  their  educational  institutions,  the  

State would have no right to veto the selection of the teachers.  

Further,  the  Court  specifically  noticed  the  view  recorded  by  

Khanna,  J.  in  reference  to  Kerala  Education  Bill,  1957  case  

(supra), and to clauses 11 and 12 of the Bill in particular, where  

the learned Judge had declared that, it is the law declared by the  

Supreme Court in subsequently contested cases as opposed to  

the Presidential reference, which would have a binding effect and  

said:

“123………The words ‘as at present advised’  as well as the preceding sentence indicate the  view expressed  by  this  Court  in  relation  to  Kerala  Education  Bill,  1957,  in  this  respect  was hesitant and tentative and not a final view  in the matter.”

What the Court had expressed in para 123 above, appears to  

have found favour with the Bench dealing with the case of T.M.A. Pai  

(supra).  In any case, nothing to the contrary was observed or held in  

the subsequent judgment by the larger Bench.

1. The concept of equality stated under Article 30(2) has to be read  

in conjunction with the protection under Article 29 and thus it must  

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then be given effect to achieve excellence in the field of education.  

Providing of  grant-in-aid,  which travels from Article  30(2) to the  

provisions of the DSE Act and Chapter VI of the Rules framed  

thereunder, is again to be used for the same purpose, subject to  

regulations  which  themselves  must  fall  within  the  permissible  

legislative  competence.   The purpose of  grant-in-aid  cannot  be  

construed  so  as  to  destroy,  impair  or  even  dilute  the  very  

character of the linguistic minority institutions.   All these powers  

must  ultimately,  stand  in  comity  to  the  provisions  of  the  

Constitution, which is the paramount law.  The Court will have to  

strike the balance between different facets relating to grant-in-aid,  

right to education being the fundamental right, protection available  

to religious or linguistic minorities under the Constitution and the  

primary object to improve and provide efficiency and excellence in  

school  education.    In  our  considered  view,  it  will  not  be  

permissible to infringe the constitutional protection in exercise of  

State policy or by a subordinate  legislation to frame such rules  

which will impinge upon the character or in any way substantially  

dilute the right of the minority to administer and manage affairs of  

its school.  Even though in the case of Mohinder Kaur (supra), the  

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Bench  of  this  Court  held  that  upon  restoration  of  the  minority  

character of the institution, the provisions of the Act and the rules  

framed thereunder would cease to apply to a minority institution.  

We still would not go that far and would preferably follow the view  

expressed  by  larger  Bench  of  this  Court  in  T.M.A.  Pai’s  case  

(supra)  and even rely upon other subsequent judgments,  which  

have taken the view that  the State has the right  to frame such  

regulations which will achieve the object of the Act.  Even if it is  

assumed that there is no complete eclipse of the DSE Act in the  

Rules  in  the  case  of  minority  institutions,  still  Rule  64(1)(b),  if  

enforced,  would  adversely  effect  and  dilute  the  right  and  

protection available to the minority school under the Constitution.

1. Now, we will revert back to the facts of the present case.   There is  

no  dispute  to  the  fact  that  the  appellant-school  is  a  linguistic  

minority  institution  and  has  been  running  as  such  for  a  

considerable time.  Admittedly, it was receiving grant-in-aid for all  

this period.  Its minority status was duly accepted and declared by  

the  judgment  of  the  Delhi  High  Court  in  the  case  of  this  very  

institution and which has attained finality.  In this very judgment,  

the Court  also held that  certain  provisions of  DSE Rules,  1973  

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would  not  apply  to  this  minority  school.  Thereafter,  vide  letter  

dated 12th March, 1985, the Managing Committee was required to  

give an undertaking that it would make reservation in service for  

Scheduled Castes and Schedule Tribes, to which the school had  

replied relying upon the judgment of the Delhi High Court in its  

own case. However, vide letter dated 21st March, 1986, Secretary  

(Education),  Government  of  N.C.T.,  Delhi  had  informed  the  

appellants that the circular requiring Government aided schools to  

comply  with  the  provisions  relating  to  reservation  was  not  

applicable to the minority institutions.   In face of the judgment of  

the  Court,  such  a  requirement  was  not  carried  out  by  the  

appellant-school  and the controversy was put  at rest  vide letter  

dated 21st March, 1986 and the institution continued to receive the  

grant-in-aid.   However, in September, 1989, again, a letter was  

addressed  to  all  the  government  aided  schools  including  the  

appellant  stating  that  it  was  a  precondition  for  all  agencies  

receiving  grant-in-aid,  not  only  to  enforce  the  requirement  of  

providing  reservation  in  the  posts  but  even  not  to  make  any  

regular appointments in the general category till the vacancies in  

the reserved category were filled up.   This was challenged before  

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the High Court.   At the very outset, we may notice that we entirely  

do not approve the view expressed by the learned Single Judge of  

the Delhi High Court in the case of Sumanjit Kaur (supra) insofar  

as it held that the regulation would be unconstitutional since they  

are likely to interfere with the choice of the medium of instruction  

as well as minority character of the institution by compelling the  

appointments to the teaching faculty of the persons, who may be  

inimical towards the minority community.    

1. We are of the considered view that the learned Single Judge as  

well  as  the  Division  Bench  erred  in  law  in  stating  the  above  

proposition  as  it  is  contra-legam.   The  Preamble  of  our  

Constitution  requires  the  people  of  India  to  constitute  into  a  

‘Sovereign Socialist  Secular Democratic  Republic’.   Secularism,  

therefore, is the essence of our democratic system.  Secularism  

and brotherhoodness is a golden thread that runs into the entire  

constitutional  scheme  formulated  by  the  framers  of  the  

Constitution.   The  view  of  the  learned  Single  Judge  and  the  

Division Bench in the case of Sumanjit Kaur (supra), runs contra  

to  the  enunciated  law.   We  are  afraid  that  while  deciding  a  

constitutional matter in accordance with law, the Court would not  

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be competent  to raise a presumption of  inimical  attitude of and  

towards one community or the other.  We do not approve the view  

of the High Court that a provision of an Act or a Circular issued  

thereunder  could  be  declared  as  unconstitutional  on  such  

presumptuous ground.  However, to the extent that it may interfere  

with  the  choice  of  medium  of  instructions  as  well  as  minority  

character of the institution to some extent is a finding recorded in  

accordance with law. The Division Bench while entertaining  the  

appeal  against  the  judgment  of  the  learned  Single  Judge,  had  

primarily  concentrated  on  the  point  that  the  selection  of  the  

teacher was valid and not violative of the Rules and accepted the  

findings recorded by the learned Single Judge, resulting in grant of  

relief to the appellants.  Further, in our considered view and for the  

reasons afore-recorded, the judgment of the Division Bench in the  

present  case  while  dismissing  the  writ  petition  filed  by  the  

appellants before that Court cannot be sustained in law.   Further,  

in the judgment under appeal the Division Bench was right in not  

accepting the reason given by the learned Single Judge founded  

on other persons being inimical towards minority.  It was expected  

of the Division Bench to critically analyze other reasons given by  

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the learned Single Judge in the case of  Sumanjit  Kaur (supra),  

which had been followed in the present case.  We could have had  

the benefit of the independent view of the Division Bench as well.  

Reasoning is considered as the soul of the judgment.  The Bench  

referred to the fact that the view in the Kerala Education Bill, 1957  

case (supra) was tentative but still erred in ignoring paragraph 123  

of the T.M.A. Pai’s case (supra) as well as the other judgments  

referred by us,   presumably, as they might not have been brought  

to the notice of the Bench.  The discussion does not analyze the  

various principles enunciated in regard to the protection available  

to the linguistic minorities under Article 29 of the Constitution and  

the result of principle of equality introduced by Article 30(2) of the  

Constitution.   For the detailed reasons recorded in this judgment,  

we are unable to persuade ourselves to accept the view of the  

Division Bench in the Judgment under appeal.   

1. A linguistic minority has constitution and character of its own.  A  

provision of law or a Circular, which would be enforced against the  

general  class,  may  not  be  enforceable  with  the  same  rigors  

against  the  minority  institution,  particularly  where  it  relates  to  

establishment and management of the school.  It has been held  

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that founders of the minority institution have faith and confidence  

in their own committee or body consisting of the persons selected  

by them.  Thus, they could choose their managing committee as  

well  as  they  have  a  right  to  choose  its  teachers.   Minority  

institutions  have some kind of  autonomy in their  administration.  

This would entail the right to administer effectively and to manage  

and conduct the affairs of the institution.  There is a fine distinction  

between  a  restriction  on  the  right  of  administration  and  a  

regulation prescribing the manner of administration.  What should  

be  prevented  is  the  mal-administration.  Just  as  regulatory  

measures are necessary for maintaining the educational character  

and  content  of  the  minority  institutions,  similarly,  regulatory  

measures are necessary for ensuring orderly, efficient and sound  

administration.  Every linguistic minority may have its own socio,  

economic and cultural limitations.  It has a constitutional right to  

conserve such culture and language.  Thus, it would have a right  

to choose teachers, who possess the eligibility and qualifications,  

as provided,  without  really being impressed by the fact  of  their  

religion and community.  Its own limitations may not  permit,  for  

cultural, economic or other good reasons, to induct teachers from  

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a particular class or community.  The direction, as contemplated  

under  Rule  64(1)(b),  could  be  enforced  against  the  general  or  

majority category of the Government aided school but, it may not  

be appropriate to enforce such condition against linguistic minority  

schools.  This may amount to interference with their right of choice  

and,  at  the  same  time,  may  dilute  their  character  of  linguistic  

minority.  It would be impermissible in law to bring such actions  

under the cover of equality which in fact, would diminish the very  

essence  of  their  character  or  status.   Linguistic  and  cultural  

compatibility can be legitimately claimed as one of the desirable  

features of a linguistic minority in relation to selection of eligible  

and qualified teachers.

1. A linguistic minority institution is entitled to the protection and the  

right  of  equality  enshrined in  the provisions of  the Constitution.  

The power is  vested in  the State  to  frame regulations,  with an  

object  to ensure better  organization and development  of  school  

education  and  matters  incidental  thereto.   Such  power  must  

operate within its limitation while ensuring that it does not, in any  

way, dilute or impairs the basic character of linguistic minority.   Its  

right to establish and administer has to be construed liberally to  

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bring it in alignment with the constitutional protections available to  

such communities.  The minority society can hardly be compelled  

to  perform  acts  or  deeds  which  per  se would  tantamount  to  

infringement of its right to manage and control.  In fact, it would  

tantamount to imposing impermissible restriction.  A school which  

has been established and granted status of a linguistic minority for  

years, it will not be proper to stop its grant-in-aid for the reason  

that it has failed to comply with a condition or restriction which is  

impermissible in law, particularly, when the teacher appointed or  

proposed to be appointed by such institution satisfy the laid down  

criteria  and/or  eligibility  conditions.   The minority  has  an inbuilt  

right to appoint persons, which in its opinion are better culturally  

and linguistically compatible to the institution.  

1. To frame policy is the domain of the Government.  If, as a matter  

of  policy,  the  Government  has  decided  to  implement  the  

reservation  policy  for  upliftment  of  the  socially  or  otherwise  

backward classes, then essentially it must do so within the frame  

work of the Constitution and the laws.   The concept of reservation  

has been provided, primarily, under Article 16 of the Constitution.  

Therefore,  it  would be the requirement of law that such policies  

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are  framed and enforced  within  the  four  corners  of  law and to  

achieve the laudable cause of upliftment of a particular section of  

the society.   In regard to the ambit and scope of reservation, this  

Court in the case of M. Nagaraj  v. Union of India [(2006) 8 SCC  

212] held as under :-

“39. Reservation as a concept  is very wide.  Different  people  understand  reservation  to  mean different things. One view of reservation  as a generic concept is that reservation is an  anti-poverty  measure.  There  is  a  different  view  which  says  that  reservation  is  merely  providing a right of access and that it is not a  right to redressal. Similarly, affirmative action  as  a  generic  concept  has  a  different  connotation. Some say that reservation is not  a part of affirmative action whereas others say  that it is a part of affirmative action.

40. Our  Constitution  has,  however,  incorporated the word “reservation” in Article  16(4) which word is not there in Article 15(4).  Therefore, the word “reservation” as a subject  of  Article  16(4)  is  different  from  the  word  “reservation” as a general concept.

41. Applying  the  above  test,  we  have  to  consider the word “reservation” in the context  of  Article  16(4) and it  is  in that  context  that  Article 335 of the Constitution which provides  for  relaxation of  the standards of  evaluation  has to be seen. We have to go by what the  Constitution-framers  intended  originally  and  not  by  general  concepts  or  principles.  Therefore,  schematic  interpretation  of  the  Constitution has to be applied and this is the  basis  of  the  working  test  evolved  by  Chandrachud, J. in the Election case14.”

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1. Thus, the framework of reservation policy should be such, as to fit  

in  within  the  constitutional  scheme of  our  democracy.   As  and  

when the Government changes its policy decision, it is expected  

to give valid reasons and act in the larger interest of the entire  

community  rather  than  a  section  thereof.   In  its  wisdom  and  

apparently in accordance with law Government had taken a policy  

decision and issued the circular dated 21st March, 1986 exempting  

the minority institutions from complying with the requirements of  

the Rule 64(1)(b) of the DSE Rules.  Despite this and judgment of  

the  High Court  there  was a  change  of  mind by the  State  that  

resulted  in  issuance  of  the  subsequent  circular  of  September,  

1989.  From the record before us, no reasons have been recorded  

in  support  of  the  decision  superseding  the  circular  dated  21st  

March, 1986.  It is a settled canon of administrative jurisprudence  

that state action, must be supported by some valid reasons and  

should be upon due application of mind.  In the affidavits filed on  

behalf of the State, nothing in this regard could be pointed out and  

in  fact,  none was pointed  out  during  the  course  of  arguments.  

Absence of reasoning and apparent non-application of mind would  

give colour of arbitrariness to the state action.  This aspect attains  

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greater  lucidity  in  light  of  the  well  accepted  norm that  minority  

institution  cannot  stand  on  the  same footing  as  a  non-minority  

institution.

1. Besides that, State actions should be actio quaelibet it sua via and  

every discharge  of  its  duties,  functions  and governance  should  

also be within the constitutional framework.  This principle equally  

applies to the Government while acting in the field of reservation  

as well.  It would not be possible for the Courts to permit the State  

to impinge upon or violate directly or indirectly the constitutional  

rights  and  protections  granted  to  various  classes  including  the  

minorities.  Thus, the State may not be well within its constitutional  

duty to compel the linguistic minority institution to accept a policy  

decision, enforcement of which will infringe their fundamental right  

and/or  protection.   On  the  contrary,  the  minority  can  validly  

question such a decision of the State in law.  The service in an  

aided linguistic minority school cannot be construed as ‘a service  

under the State’ even with the aid of Article 12 of the Constitution.  

Resultantly,  we have no hesitation  in  coming to  the conclusion  

that  Rule  64(1)(b)  cannot  be  enforced  against  the  linguistic  

minority school.  Having answered this question in favour of the  

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appellant and against the State, we do not consider it necessary  

to go into the constitutional validity or otherwise of Rule 64(1)(b) of  

the Rules, which question we leave open.

 1. For the reasons afore-stated, we allow the appeal and hold that  

Rule  64(1)(b)  and  the  circular  of  September,  1989,  are  not  

enforceable  against  the linguistic  minority school  in the NCT of  

Delhi.   There shall be no order as to costs.

........................................J.  [ DR. B.S. CHAUHAN ]

........................................ J.

     [ SWATANTER KUMAR ] New Delhi July 8, 2010

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