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PETITIONER: TEJ SINGH RAO

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

DATE OF JUDGMENT19/08/1992

BENCH: KULDIP SINGH (J) BENCH: KULDIP SINGH (J) RAMASWAMY, K.

CITATION:  1993 AIR 1227            1992 SCR  (3) 929  1992 SCC  Supl.  (2) 554 JT 1992 (4)   520  1992 SCALE  (2)199

ACT:           Maharashtra   Agricultural   Land   (Ceiling    on Holdings)  Act, 1961:      Section  12-Lands-Subject-matter  of a  grant  made  by former ruler of Princely State-Whether covered by  sovereign legislative grant flowing from a sovereign authority-Whether unaffected by Act of Legislature.

HEADNOTE:      The  appellant, a lineal male descendant of one of  the Generals of a former ruler was holding 294.61 acres of land, which  was the subject-matter of a grant made by the  former ruler at the time of his daughter’s marriage.  The appellant filed   return   under  Section  12   of   the   Maharashtra Agricultural  Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961  without prejudice  to  his claim that the lands were  covered  by  a sovereign  legislative  grant  flowing  from  the  sovereign authority of the ruler of the erstwhile princely State,  and as  such  did not come within the purview of the  Act.   The Special  Deputy  Collector (Land  Reforms)  declared  176.91 acres  of  the land as surplus.  The  land  owner  preferred appeal before the State Revenue Tribunal under Section 33 of the Act.  The Tribunal dismissed the appeal.  The  appellant challenged the order of the Special Deputy Collector and  of the  Tribunal  before the High Court.  The High  Court  also dismised  the writ petition.  Hence the appeal,  by  special leave.      On  behalf of the appellant, it was contended that  the grant in question was sovereign legislative grant made by  a sovereign  ruler;  it was recognised and  continued  by  the British  Government; it was thus a special law in favour  of General’s  family, and as this law was existing on the  date of  the  commencement of the Constitution of India,  it  was protected  by Article 372 of the Constitution and should  be deemed  to be in force and could not be abrogated except  by an Act of the legislature specially made in that respect.      Dismissing the appeal, by Special Leave, this Court      HELD : The High Court was right in holding that even in the case                                                        930 of  a  ruler  who combined in  himself  both  executive  and

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legislative powers of his Government and was undisputed head of  the  State,  the  jurisprudential  distinction   between legislative  enactment  and executive action  had  not  been obliterated  and  the question, whether a  particular  grant was  a legislative grant or not, depended on the  facts  and circumstances  of each case, and that the grant in  question was a gift pure and simple and was not a legislative Act  on the part of the ruler.  [934G, 932B-D]      Umad  Mills Ltd. v. U.O.I. AIR 1963 S.C.953;  State  of Gujarat  v. Vora Fidda Ali, AIR 1964 S.C.1043; Raj Kumar  v. State  of  Orissa,  AIR 1964 S.C. 1793; Union  of  India  v. Gwalior Rayon Silk Manufacturing Company, AIR 1964 S.C. 1903 and  State of Madhya Pradesh v. Lal Bhargavendra Singh,  AIR 1966 S.C. 704, referred to.

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 608  of 1982.      From  the Judgment and Order dated 4/5.12.1979  of  the Bombay High Court in S.C.A. No. 1252 of 1970.      T.S. Krishnamurthy Iyer, Ranjit Kumar, D.K. Dubey, S.V. Nand, V. Balakrishna and Mrs. P.P. Mange for the Appellant.      R.B. Masodkar and A.S. Bhasme for the Respondent.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      KULDIP  SINGH,  J.  Tej  Singh Rao  is  a  lineal  male descendant  of Pratap Rao Gujar who was one of the  Generals of  Shivaji the Great.  He is holding 294.61 acres  of  land which  is  situated in the Bhiwapur Taluk of  the  erstwhile Nagpur  State.  He  filed return under  Section  12  of  the Maharashtra  Agricultural Lands (ceiling on  holdings)  Act, 1961 (the Act) without prejudice to his claim that the lands are  covered by a sovereign legislative grant  flowing  from the sovereign authority of Raghoji II, the Bhonsle Ruler  of Nagpur State, and as such did not come within the purview of the  Act.   The  Special  Deputy  Collector  (Land  reforms) declared  176.91  acres of the land as  surplus.   The  land owner  preferred  appeal  before  the  Maharashtra   Revenue Tribunal  under  Section   33  of  the  Act.   The  Tribunal dismissed the appeal.  Tej Singh Rao challenged the order of the Special Deputy Collector and of the Tribunal before  the Nagpur  Bench of Bombay High Court by way of  writ  petition under Article 226/227 of the                                                        931 Constitution  of India.  The High Court dismissed  the  writ petition with costs.  This appeal by Tej Singh Rao by way of special  leave petition is against the judgment of  he  High Court.      The lands in question were subject-matter of the  grant which was made in the year1793 by Raghoji II, the then ruler of  Nagpur  State, at the time of marriage of  his  daughter Banubai to Vyankatrao alias Nanasaheb, son of Ramrao, a male descendant  of  Pratap  Rao Gujar. As  both  Vyankatrao  and Banubai  were  minor,  the grant was made  in  the  name  of Ramrao.  All villages in Bhiwapur Taluq and six villages  in other  Taluqs and annual cash allowance of Rs.  17,415  were the subject matter of the grant.      Raghuji II died in the year 1816.  It is not  necessary for  us  to trace the history of Bhonsle  family  and  Gujar family as the same is not relevant for deciding the question which has survived for our consideration.      The  orders of the Special Deputy Collector and of  the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal were challenged before the High Court  on  two grounds.  The first was  that  the  appellant

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being the direct descendant of a sovereign ruler, the  lands held  by him for his personal use could not be the  subject- matter of ceiling laws. The second ground was that the grant in  question  was  a sovereign  legislative  grant  made  by Raghuji II, who was then the full sovereign ruler of  Nagpur State and the said grant constituted a special Law in favour of  Gujar family which could not be affected by any  general legislation like the Act.      The  High  Court decided both the  points  against  the appellant.  The learned counsel appearing for the  appellant has not challenged before us the findings of the High  Court on the first point.  The only question raised by the learned counsel  before  us  is  that  the  grant  in  question  was sovereign  legislative grant made by a sovereign  ruler,  it was  recognised and continued by the British Government,  it is thus a special law in favour of Gujar family, and as this law  was  existing on the date of the  commencement  of  the Constitution of India it is protected by Article 372 of  the Constitution and shall be deemed to be in force be abrogated except  by an Act of the legislature specially made in  that respect.      The question whether a grant made by a sovereign  ruler amounts to                                                        932 law and if so under what circumstances, was examined by  the High  Court  at  length.  The High  Court  referred  to  the decisions  of this Court in Umad Mills Ltd. v.  U.O.I.,  AIR 1963  S.C.953; State of Gujarat v. Vora Fidda Ali, AIR  1964 S.C.1043;  Raj Kumar v. State of Orissa, AIR 1964  S.C.1793; Union of India v. Gwalior Reins Silk Manufacturing  Company, AIR  1964  S.C.1903  and  State of  Madhya  Pradesh  v.  Lal Bhargavendra  Singh,  AIR  1966  S.C.704  and  came  to  the conclusion that even in the case of a ruler who combined  in himself  both  executive  and  legislative  powers  of   his government  and  was  undisputed  head  of  the  state,  the jurisprudential  distinction between  legislative  enactment and  executive  action  has not  been  obliterated  and  the question, whether a particular grant is a legislative  grant or not, depends on the facts and circumstances of each case.      The  High Court examined the evidence on the record  in detail and finally came to the conclusion that the grant  in question  was  a  gift  pure  and  simple  and  was  not   a legislative  Act on the part of the ruler.  The  High  Court reasoning is as under :          "So far as the grant in question is concerned,  the          exact manner in which the grant was conferred,  the          procedure  followed for that purpose and the  exact          words  in  which it was couched are not  known  and          cannot   be  ascertained  from  the   material   on          records...............The  only evidence about  the          grant  is the entries in the  settlement  register,          styled as Register of Maufi Holdings for the  years          1866-1894   and  1913-14.   The  entries   in   the          registers  of Maufi Holdings of the year 1866  show          that  the grant was made by Raghuji II in  1783  in          favour of Ramrao Gujar.  In Column No. 10  detailed          account  of  the State and terms  of  occupancy  is          given as follows:               ‘Original   grantee   Ramrao,    the               father-in-Law   of   Bannobai,   the               daughter of Raghuji II from whom  it               descended,  to  her  husband,   than               Banubaie’s   own  son  having   been               adopted  by Prusoji Bhonsla as  heir               to  the  throne,  she  adopted   her

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             grandson  Chitkojirao  as her  heir,               he then came into possession of  all               the   villages  forming  the   Taluq               Bhiwapur  and  has  held  them  ever               since.’                                                        933          The remarks made by the Investigation Officer  with          whom  the Settlement Commissioner  concurred  finds          place in column 12 of the register and they read as          follows:               ‘Old  record  show  that  in   1203,               Fausli A.D. 1793, this village  with               several villages forming the talooka               of Bhiwapur were granted to  grantee               and that they have been held in  the               family eversince.  The grantee holds               in  addition  to this  talooks,  the               Mokassa  village of  Kodamendhi  and               Kundala in the Ramtek Tahsil and the               Mukta villages of Deolee  Bhamdalee,               Peethechha  its Dakhilee and  Peepra               in the Nagpur Tahseelee and receives               besides  a  cash  allowance  of  Rs.               17,415 per annum.  The grant is  for               support  of a member of  the  ruling               family,  and I recommend  that  this               village be continued revenue free in               perpetuity to present holder and his               heirs.’      Entries  in  Maufi register for the years  1894-95  are practically  the  same.  The entries in  Maufi  register  of 1913-14 are also not very much different, except that in the entry for the year 1866, it is mentioned that the grant  was for  support of a member of the ruling family, while in  the entries of later years the grant is considered to be for the support of the ruling family.  It will also be seen from all these  entries  that the proposal that the grant  should  be continued in perpetuity revenue free to the claimant and his awful heirs was accepted by the Settlement Commissioner  and the  Chief Commissioner.  There is nothing in these  entries to  suggest that it was a legislative grant.  It was a  gift pure  and  simple  made by Raghuji II at  the  time  of  his daughter’s  marriages.   It was made in the name  of  Ramrao because both Banubai and her husband were minors.          Relying  on  the letter dated 16.12.1867  from  the          India  Office, London, to the Governor General,  it          was sought to be urged on behalf of the  petitioner          that  a  fresh  grant was  made  by  her  Majesty’s          Government,   in   exercise  of   its   legislative          function,  in  favour  of  Chitkojirao   Gujar   in          respect of the subject-matter of                                                        934          the grant of 1793.  The letter reads as follows:               ‘Having  considered in Council  your               Excellency’s  letter of the 23rd  of               May  No.  94-A,  Foreign  Department               (Political)   with   the    enclosed               correspondence.     I   have    much               satisfaction  in  recommending    to               you  the sanction of her   Majesty’s               Government to the recommendation  of               your Excellency in Council in favour               of the proposed Grant to Chitkojirao               Babasahib   Gujar,  of  the   Bhosla               Family of Nagpur and its continuance

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             to  his adopted son  Kooshanjee  and               his  lineal  male  issues  in   each               generation  as  an  act  of  special               indulgence.’          There  is  nothing in this letter to  show  that  a          fresh  grant  was made in respect of  the  subject-          matter of grant of 1793 or that the said grant  was          allowed  to  be continued.  Except this  letter  no          other  record  is available to  the  petitioner  to          establish  the  connection of  the  proposed  grant          sanctioned  by  His Majesty’s  Government  and  the          grant  in question. Moreover,  there is nothing  in          this  letter to indicate that the sanction  to  the          proposed  grant  was  accorded  by  her   Majesty’s          Government   in   exercise   of   her   legislative          functions.   There is no enactment of  the  British          Parliament  sanctioning  the said  grant.   It  is,          therefore,  difficult  to accepted  the  contention          that   the  grant  in  question  was  a   sovereign          legislative  grant and that it was an existing  law          as defined by Article 366 (10) of the Constitution,          which  continued to be operative till this date  by          virtue of Article 372(1) of the Constitution."      We  find no infirmity  in the High Court  judgment.  We agree  with  the  reasoning  and  the  conclusions   reached therein.      The appeal is dismissed with costs. N.P.V.                                     Appeal dismissed.                                                        935