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PETITIONER: SHRI P. G. GUPTA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF GUJRAT & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT14/12/1994

BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. MOHAN, S. (J) VENKATACHALA N. (J)

CITATION:  1995 SCC  Supl.  (2) 182 JT 1995 (2)   373  1995 SCALE  (1)653

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT: ORDER 1.         Since  common question of law  has  been  raised, these appeals are being disposed of together.  The  Division Bench  of  the  Gujarat High Court  in  its  judgment  dated November  7, 1987, decided Civil Application  No.980/80  and batch.  One of the questions therein raised was, whether the persons  falling  in  categories  (iii)  and  (vi)  in   the Government  Resolution dated February 18, 1975 are  entitled to  priority in allotment of government quarters under  hire purchase   scheme?    The  High   Court,   after   elaborate consideration, had concluded that "In view of the  aforesaid discussion,  it must be held that the  impugned  resolutions dated  18.2.75  and  10.3.80 are legal and  valid  save  and except priority categories (iii) and (vi) contained  therein which  are, quashed and set aside.  Rest of the  resolutions shall  be  operated upon and implemented by  the  respondent authorities". 2.In these appeals, we are concerned onlywith regard  to category Nos. (iii) and  (vi).Admittedly, in the  Lower Income    GroupHousing   Scheme,   396   houses    were constructed at Pahari at Ahmedabad and were allotted to  the government  employees  on rental basis.   Subsequently,  the State  Government  had obtained sanction  from  the  Central Government  in  May  1969 to convert the  scheme  into  hire purchase scheme and for allotment to the govern- 375 ment  employees on the criteria indicated  therein,  namely, continuous residence for five years and also the eligibility criteria  excluding the government servants who had  already retired  from service.  Thereafter on April 17, 197  1,  the government  passed  a resolution converting 200 out  of  396 houses  for allotment on hire purchase basis.  On a  further resolution  dated  June 22, 1972, all the  396  houses  were pooled  for  allotment  on hire  purchase  scheme.   In  the

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offending  resolution  the allotment was also sought  to  be given to category (iii), such of those employees working  in Sachivalay  (Secretariat) and originally allotted the  house at  Pahari  at  Ahmedabad  but  later  they  shifted   their residence  and  they  voluntarily  vacated  the  houses  and shifted  to the houses allotted at Gandhi Nagar with  better accommodation on concessional basis.  It was also sought  to be given to such of those employees in Category (vi) who had been  transferred  outside Ahmedabad on a  permanent  basis. The  entitlement under the scheme came to be  challenged  by some of the employees in the High Court.  As stated earlier, the  High  Court while upholding other  criteria  for  other categories,  quashed  the entitlement to  the  allotment  to category  (iii)  and (vi). Thus, these  appeals  by  special leave. 3.   Shri Dave, learned counsel for the appellants, contends that  initially  when  the Government  of  India  had  given permission  for converting these houses for  allotment  from rental   scheme  to  hire  purchase  basis,  the   requisite qualification  of five years’ stay therein  was  applicable. In  view  of  the compulsion by the  State  Government,  the category   III   employees  had  shifted  from   Pahari   to Gandhinagar.   Therefore, they cannot be deprived  of  their entitlement to allotment on hire purchase basis. 4.   Shri  Mehta,  learned  senior  counsel  appearing   for category (vi), urges that the impugned government resolution militates against the statutory regulation of allotment made pursuant to s.74 of the Gujarat Housing Board Act, 1961 (for short, ’the Act’).  The government have, therefore, no power under s.82 of the Act to pass any resolution contrary to the statutory regulations.  It is also contended that the  lower income  group  housing scheme was initiated to  benefit  the people  of  lower income group having an  annual  income  of Rs.6,000/-  to purchase the houses on hire purchase  scheme. The  initial scheme to give benefit to the poorer  employees has  been  given a go-bye hitting hard the  weaker  segments among  the  employees  and their  rights  and  allotment  on priority  basis  was,  therefore,  defeated.   The  criteria adopted  by  the government are, therefore,  irrational  and arbitrary  and  it  has  no  nexus  between  the  object  of allotment on hire purchase basis and the policy.  The denial thereof to category (vi) employees violates Articles 14,  19 and  21  of  the Constitution.  It is  also  contended  that though  none has challenged the entitlement to allotment  of category (vi) employees, the High Court, after reserving the cases for consideration, had denied them the benefit in  the judgment.  Therefore, the High Court has committed  manifest error of law 5.   Having   given   our  anxious  consideration   to   the contentions raised by the earned counsel for the appellants, we are of the considered view that there is no force in  any of  them.  It is true that initially when the Government  of India  had  given sanction for converting 396  lower  income group  houses  from rental scheme to hire  purchase  scheme, category  (iii) employees were in occupation of the  respec- tive allotted houses.  It ’s seen that they 376 had  vacated the respective premises as they  were  allotted government houses having better accommodation at Gandhinagar with  concessional rates.  As on the date of the  resolution passed  by  the  government, admittedly, they  were  not  in possession  of the houses at Pahari or some of them were  in illegal occupation.  In these circumstances, the  conclusion reached by the High Court that the category (iii)  employees are  not entitled to the allotment, is just and  reasonable.

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It is not vitiated by any error of law. 6.   With regard to the exercise of power by the State under s.82 of the Act vis-a-vis the regulations made under s.74 of the Act, we need not go into that question.  The reasons are eloquent.   Though the lower income group Houses  were  con- structed for the allotment to the weaker sections, from  the funds  allotted  by  the  Government  of  India,  after  the bifurcation  of the Bombay State, Gujarat State was  formed, the capital of the State of Gujarat was shifted from  Bombay to Ahmedabad in the year 1970.  Thereafter at the request of the  State  Government, the Government of  India  had  given permission  for allotment of those houses to the  government employees.   The statutory exercise of power under s.82  and operation of the regulations under s.74, under these circum- stances,  have  no bearing in relation to the  allotment  of these houses to the government employees in question.  Thus, it is unnecessary for us to go into the question of legality of  the exercise of the power by the government  under  s.82 vis-a-vis  the statutory regulations made under s.74 by  the Board with previous consent of the State Government. 7.   It  is true that Gujarat Housing Board had  constructed houses  under low income group scheme for allotment  to  the poorer  segments  of the society  within  prescribed  annual income.   Article 19(1)(e) protects the right  to  residence and  settlement in any part of the territory of India.   The protection  of life assured under Article 21 has been  given expanded  meaning of right to life.  It is settled law  that all  the related provisions under the Constitution  must  be read together and given meaning of widest amplitude to cover variety  of  rights which go to  constitute  the  meaningful right  to life.  The preamble to the Constitution says  that the  people of India resolved to secure to all our  citizens social  and  economic justice also have made it  subject  to equality of status and of opportunity to promote the dignity of  the  individual  in the united  and  integrated  Bharat. Article 37 declares the rights in Part IV or fundamental law in  the  governance of the country.  Article  39(b)  enjoins that the ownership and control of the material resources  of the  community are to promote the welfare of the  people  by securing social and economic justice to the weaker  sections so   as  to  subserve  the  common  good  to  minimise   the inequalities   in   income  and   endeavour   to   eliminate inequalities  in  status.  The State, thereby,  evolved  the scheme  to  provide  facilities  and  opportunities  to  the individuals  and also groups of people to have no houses  of their  own.   Article 46, in particular,  enjoins  that  the State shall promote with special care the economic  interest of  the  weaker sections of the people and to  protect  them from social injustice., 8.   Article   11(1)  of  the  International   Covenant   on Economic,  Social  and Cultural Rights laid  down  that  the States’ parties to the Convenant recongnise the "right 377 to  everyone to an adequate standard of living  for  himself and for his family including food, clothing and housing  and to  the continuous improvement of living  conditions".   The State  parties  will take appropriate steps  to  ensure  the realisation of these rights.  Recognising these  obligations of the State and to give effect to the essential  importance of  International cooperation, the directions  contained  in Arts.38,  39  and 46, the Housing Scheme  for  allotment  to lower  income group of the people was made.   Possession  of real property is the basis for and the symbol of wealth  and influence in society.  To the poor, settlement with a  fixed abode  and  right to residence  guaranteed  by  Art.19(1)(e)

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remain  more  a teasing illusion unless the  State  provides them  the means to have food, clothing and shelter so as  to make their life meaningful and worth-living with dignity. 9.In  Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, (1985)  3 SCC 545 at 572 para 32, when the squatters and the  pavement dwellers  were  sought  to be  ejected  by  the  respondent, without due process of law, they invoked the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32.  A Constitution Bench held that their   eviction   from  the  dwellings  would   result   in deprivation  of their livelihood.  Right to life  under  Ar- ticle 21 includes right to livelihood and so if  deprivation of  livelihood  is  effected  without  reasonable  procedure established by law, it would be violative of Article 21.  In that context, this Court held the sweep of the right to life conferred  by  Article 21, is wide and far  reaching.   Life means  more than animal existence.  It does not mean  merely that  life  cannot  be extinguished or taken  away  as,  for example’,  by  imposition of execution  of  death  sentence, except  according to procedure established by law.  That  is but one aspect of right to life.  An equally important facet of  that right to livelihood is no person can  live  without the  means of living, that is, the means of livelihood.   If the  right  to livelihood is not treated as a  part  of  the constitutional right to life, the easiest way of depriving a person  of his right to life would be to deprive him of  his means  of livelihood to the point of abrogation.  Such  dep- rivation  would  not only denude the life of  its  effective content and meaningfulness but it would make life impossible to live.  There is, thus, a close nexus between life and the means  of livelihood and as such that, which alone makes  it possible to live, leave aside what makes life liveable, must be deemed to be an integral component of the right to life. 10.  In Shantistar Builders v. Narayan Khimalal Totame,  AIR 1990  SC  630, a Bench of three Judges, to which one  of  us (K.Ramaswamy, J.) was a Member, held that :-               "The right to life would take within its sweep               the right to food, the right to clothing,  the               right  to decent environment and a  reasonable               accommodation  to  live  in.   The  difference               between  the  need of an animal  and  a  human               being  for  shelter has to be, kept  in  view.               For  the animal it is the bare  protection  of               the  body,  for a human being it has to  be  a               suitable  accommodation which would allow  him               to grow in every aspect - physical, mental and               intellectual.    The  Constitution   aims   at               ensuring  fuller development of  every  child.               That would be possible only if the child is in               a proper home.  It is not necessary that every               citiZen  must be ensured of living in a  well-               built comfortable house but a reasonable  home               particularly  for people in India can even  be               mud-built thatched house or a               378               mud-built fire-proof accommodation. 11.  As   stated  earlier,  the  right  to   residence   and settlement is a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(e) and it is a facet of inseparable meaningful right to life  under Article  21.  Food, shelter and clothing are  minimal  human rights.  The State has undertaken as its economic policy  of planned  development  of  the  country  and  has  undertaken massive  housing schemes.  As its part, allotment of  houses was adopted, as is enjoined by Arts.38, 39 and 46,  Preamble and  19(1)(e),  facilities and opportunities to  the  weaker sections of the society of the right to residence, make  the

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life meaningful and liveable in equal status with dignity of person.   It  is,  therefore, imperative  of  the  State  to provide  permanent housing accommodation to the poor in  the housing  schemes undertaken by it or  its  instrumentalities within  their  economic means so that they  could  make  the payment of the price in easy instalments and have  permanent settlement and residence assured under Article 19(1)(e)  and 21  of the Constitution.  Thus for there is no  problem  but the  crucial  question  is  whether  that  right  is   still available to the appellants in category (vi). 12.  It  is  seen  that after the  capital  was  shifted  to Ahmedabad,  these houses were allotted to  Govt.  employees. That  came with the shifting of the capital.  Initially,  on April  17, 1971, 200 houses were got converted  from  rental basis  scheme to the hire purchase scheme.   Thereafter  the Govt. have re-considered the matter and by resolution  dated June  22, 1972, resolved to allot all the 396 houses to  the Government  employees  on hire purchase scheme.   Thus,  the diversion became compulsive necessity.  Therefore, the  High Court  has taken the criteria of June 22, 1972 as last  date for  fixing the entitlement for the priorities mentioned  in the offending resolutions and allotment of the houses to the Govt.  employees.  It is true, that a date has to  be  fixed with reference to a particular case and fixation of any date always may appear to be arbitrary.  But some connection  has to be established for fixation of the date for allotment  of the  houses.  In this case, since the government  had  taken decision on June 22.1972, to convert the rental basis scheme into hire purchase scheme that date bears rational  relation to the object of allotment.  Therefore, it cannot be said to be  arbitrary  or  irrational offending Article  14  of  the Constitution. 13.  It  is contended that appellants in  category(vi)  were taken by surprise of the adverse order like a bolt from  the blue  from the decision of the High Court without  arguments nor  challenge  made  to it, has  no  substance.   From  the judgment  it  is clear that category (iii) persons  who  had vacated  the houses were treated. on par with category  (vi) employees  transferred from’ the capital to  the  districts. From  the  material  on  record it  would  appear  that  the eligibility   of  category  of  (vi)  employees   was   also questioned.   Though  some  of them  managed  to  remain  in possession, they cannot claim right to allotment under  hire purchase  scheme.   Therefore, the High  Court  has  rightly considered that when category (iii) employees were  excluded on the ground that they shifted their residence from  Pahari to  Gandhinagar,  the  same  parity  should  be  applied  to category  (vi) employees who have been transferred from  the capital to the districts. 14.  In  these circumstances, we do not find any  illegality in excluding employees 379 of  categories  (iii)  and (vi) for  allotment    under  hire purchase scheme.  The appeals are accordingly dismissed.  No costs. 380