02 January 1995
Supreme Court
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SHRI M.L. JAGGI Vs MAHANAGAR TELEPHONES NIGAM LTD. & ORS.


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PETITIONER: SHRI M.L. JAGGI

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: MAHANAGAR TELEPHONES NIGAM LTD. & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT02/01/1995

BENCH: K. RAMASWAMY, G.B. PATTANAIK

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                          O R D E R      Leave granted.      The respondents  had issued  bills for Rs.50,219/- from 16.11.1982 to  January 15,  1983; for Rs.20873/- for January 16, 1983  to March  15, 1983; to November 15, 1982. When the appellant filed  the suit,  an objection  was raised  of the availability of  the remedy  under Section  7B of the Indian Telegraph Act,  1985 [for short, "the Act"]. The civil Court referred the  matter to the arbitrator. The arbitrator after giving due consideration to the dispute made the award, Exh. P-3 dated  December 19,  1989 giving some rebate on one bill only  and  confirmed  the  rest  of  the  demand.  When  the appellant filed  the writ  petition, the High Court of Delhi in the  impugned order affirmed the award of the arbitrator. Thus this  appeal by  special leave  against the order dated March 13, 1991 made in W.P. No.800/91.      The only  question raised in this appeal is whether the arbitrator is  enjoined to  assign reasons in support of his award. Section 7B of the Act reads thus:      "7B. Arbitration of disputes. (1) Except      as otherwise  expressly provided in this      Act,  if   any  dispute  concerning  any      telegraph line,  appliance or  apparatus      arises between  the telegraph  authority      and the  person for  whose  benefit  the      line, appliance  or apparatus is, or has      been, provided,  the  dispute  shall  be      determined by arbitration and shall, for      the purpose  of such  determination,  be      referred to  an arbitrator  appointed by      the Central  Government either specially      for the determination of that dispute or      generally  for   the  determination   of      disputes under this Section.      (2)  The   award   of   the   arbitrator      appointed under sub-section (1) shall be      conclusive between  the parties  to  the      dispute and  shall not  be questioned in      any court". It is  a  statutory  remedy  provided  under  the  Act  and,

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therefore, in a dispute as regards the amount claimed in the demand raised,  the  only  remedy  provided  is  by  way  of arbitration under  Section 7B  of the  Act. By  operation of sub-section (2)  thereof, the  award of  the arbitrator made under  sub-section  (1)  shall  be  conclusive  between  the parties to  the dispute  and shall  not be questioned in any court. The statutory remedy under the Arbitration Act, 1940, thus, has been taken away.      The question,  therefore, is:  whether it  is incumbent upon the arbitrator to give reasons in support of the award. In Raipur  Development Authority  & Ors.  v. M/s.  Chokhamal Contractors &  Ors. [(1989)  2 SCC  721], in paragraph 38 at page 753  this Court had held that "having given our careful and anxious  consideration to  the contentions  urged by the parties, we  feel that law should be allowed to remain as it is until  the competent  legislature amends  the law. In the result, we  hold that  an award passed under the Arbitration Act is  not liable to be remitted or set aside merely on the ground that no reasons have been given in its support except where the arbitration agreement or the deed of submission or an order  made by the court such as the one under Section 20 or Section  21 or  Section 34  of the  Act  or  the  statute governing the  arbitration requires  that the  arbitrator or the umpire should give reasons for the award. The award need not contain  the reasons".  It is  seen that the decision in that case  is based  on award  of the  arbitrator under  the Arbitration Act  which itself  is founded  on an arbitration agreement. So this Court had held that when the agreement in non-statutory award  between the parties voluntarily entered into did  not contain a clause to make a speaking award, the need to  make an  award with  reasons was not necessary. The Court explained  the position  in para  35 at  pages  751-52 thus:      "But at the same time it has to be borne      in mind  that what  applies generally to      settlement of  disputes  by  authorities      governed  by  public  law  need  not  be      extended  to  all  cases  arising  under      private law  such as those arising under      the law of arbitration which is intended      for settlement of private disputes." In fact  the observations  have been  made by  this Court in regard to  the arbitration  of disputes concerning the claim against the  Government and  this Court  has emphasised  the need for recording reasons in the awards touching the public exchequer in para 37 at pages 752-53 as under:      "But arbitral awards in dispute to which      the State  and its instrumentalities are      parties affect  public interest  and the      matter of the manner in which government      and its  instrumentalities  allow  their      interes to  be affected by such arbitral      adjudications involve  larger  questions      of   policy    and   public    interest.      Government  and   its  instrumentalities      cannot  simply   allow  large  financial      interests   of    the   State    to   be      prejudicially  affected  by  non-review,      non-speaking  arbitral  awards.  Indeed,      this branch  of the  system  of  dispute      resolution  has,  of  late,  acquired  a      certain  degree   of  notoriety  by  the      manner  in   which  in  many  cases  the      financial interests  of government  have      come to  suffer  by  awards  which  have

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    raised eyebrows  by doubts  as to  their      rectitude and  propriety. It will not be      justifiable  for   governments  or  heir      instrumentalities    to    enter    into      arbitration  agreements   which  do  not      expressly  stipulate  the  rendering  of      reasoned    and     speaking     awards.      Governments and  their instrumentalities      should, as a matter of policy and public      interest - if not as a compulsion of law      - ensure  that wherever  they enter into      agreements for resolution of disputes by      resort  to   private  arbitrations,  the      requirement  of   speaking   awards   is      expressly stipulated  and ensured. It is      for      governments      and      their      instrumentalities to  ensure  in  future      this requirement  as a  matter of policy      in the larger public interest. Any lapse      in that  behalf might lend itself to and      perhaps    justify,    the    legitimate      criticism  that   government  failed  to      provide against  possible  prejudice  to      public  interest,   in  regard   to  the      arbitration of  disputes concerning  the      claim against  the Government  and  this      Court  has   emphasised  the   need  for      recording reasons in the awards touching      the public  exchequer. In  other  words,      when the public law element is involved,      in a  public law remedy, public interest      demands that  reasons  should  be  given      even in the award." It is  well-settled law  that in  public law remedy when the order  visits   with  civil  consequences,  natural  justice requires recording  the reasons  as they  are bridge between the order and its maker to indicate how his mind was applied to the  facts presented  and the  decision reached.  Another Constitution Bench  of this Court in S.N. Mukherjee v. Union of India  [(1990) Supp.  1 SCR  44]  considered  the  entire controversy and held thus:      "This  appeal,   by  special  leave,  is      directed against  the order dated August      12, 1981,  passed by  the High  Court of      Delhi dismissing the writ petition filed      by the  appellant. In  the writ petition      the   appellant   had   challenged   the      validity of the finding and the sentence      recorded by the General Court Martial on      November 29,  1978, the  order dated May      11, 1979,  passed by  the Chief  of Army      Staff confirming  the findings  and  the      sentence recorded  by the  General Court      Martial and the order dated May 6, 1980,      passed   by   the   Central   Government      dismissing the  petition  filed  by  the      appellant under  section 164(2)  of  the      Army Act,  1950 (hereinafter referred to      as ‘the Act’).      The   appellant    held   a    permanent      commission,  as   an  officer,   in  the      regular  army   and  was   holding   the      substantive  rank  of  Captain.  He  was      officiating as  a Major. On December 27,      1974, the  appellant took  over  as  the

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    Officer Commanding  of 38 Coy. ASC (Sup)      Type  ‘A’   attached  to   the  Military      Hospital, Jhansi.  In August  1975,  the      appellant had  gone to attend a training      course and he returned in the first week      of November 1975. In his absence Captain      G.C. Chhabra  was the officer commanding      the unit  of the  appellant. During this      period  Captain   Chhabra  submitted   a      Contingent Bill dated September 25, 1975      for Rs.16,280 for winter liveries of the      depot civilian  chowkidars and sweepers.      The said Contingent Bill was returned by      the Controller of Defence Accounts (CDA)      Meerut    with    certain    objections.      Thereupon  the   appellant  submitted  a      fresh Contingent Bill dated December 25,      1975 for a sum of Rs.7029.57. In view of      the difference  in the amounts mentioned      in the  two Contingent  Bills,  the  CDA      reported the  matter to the headquarters      for investigation and a Court of Enquiry      blamed the appellant for certain lapses.      The said  report of the Court of Enquiry      was considered  by the  General  Officer      Commanding, M.P., Bihar and Orissa Area,      who, on January 7, 1977 recommended that      ‘severe displeasure’ (to be recorded) of      the General  Officer Commanding-in-Chief      of the  Central Commandk  be awarded  to      the  appellant.   The  General   Officer      Commanding-in-Chief, Central Command did      not agree  with the  said opinion and by      order dated  August 26,  1977,  directed      that disciplinary  action taken  against      the appellant for the lapses.      In view of the aforesaid order passed by      the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief,      Central Command,  a charge  sheet  dated      July 20,  1978, containing three charges      was served  on the  appellant and it was      directed that  he be  tried  by  General      Court Martial.  The first  charge was in      respect of  the  offence  under  section      52(f) of  the Act,  i.e. doing  a  thing      with  intent   to  defraud,  the  second      charge  was  alternative  to  the  first      charge and  was in  respect  of  offence      under  section   63  of  the  Act,  i.e.      committing an  act prejudicial  to  good      order and  military discipline  and  the      third charge  was  also  in  respect  of      offence under section 63 of the Act." It is,  thus, settled  law that  reasons are  required to be recorded when  it affects  the public  interest. It  is seen that under  Section 7B,  the award  is conclusive  when  the citizen complains  that he  was not correctly put to bill of the calls  he had  made and disputed the demand for payment. The statutory  remedy opened  to him  is one  provided under Section 7B  of the  Act. By  necessary implication, when the arbitrator decides  the dispute  under  Section  7B,  he  is enjoined to give reasons in support of his decision since it is final  and cannot  be questioned  in a  court of law. The only  obvious  remedy  available  to  the  aggrieved  person against the  award is  judicial review  under Article 226 of

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the Constitution.  If the reasons are not given, it would be difficult for  the High  Court to  adjudge as  to under what circumstances the arbitrator came to his conclusion that the amount demanded  by the  Department is correct or the amount disputed by  the citizen  is unjustified.  The reasons would indicate as to how the mind of the arbitrator was applied to the dispute  and how  he arrived  at the  decision. The High Court, though  does not act in exercising judicial review as a court  of appeal  but within  narrow  limits  of  judicial review it would consider the correctness and legality of the award. No  doubt, as  rightly pointed out by Mr. V.R. Reddy, Additional  Solicitor   General  that   the  questions   are technical matters.  But nonetheless,  the reasons in support of his  conclusion should be given. In this case, arbitrator has not  given reasons.  The award  of the arbitrator is set aside and  the matter  is remitted to the arbitrator to make an award and give reasons in support thereof.      Since we have decided this question for the first time, it must  be treated that any decision made prior to this day by any  arbitrator under Section 7B of the Act is not liable to be  reopened. In other words, the order is prospective in its operation.      The  appeal   is  accordingly   allowed  but,   in  the circumstances, with no order as to costs.