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PETITIONER: SMT. GULWANT KAUR & ANOTHER

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: MOHINDER SINGH & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT20/07/1987

BENCH: REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J) BENCH: REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J) SHETTY, K.J. (J)

CITATION:  1987 AIR 2251            1987 SCR  (3) 576  1987 SCC  (3) 674        JT 1987 (3)   121  1987 SCALE  (2)82  CITATOR INFO :  D          1991 SC1581  (9,10)

ACT:     Hindu  Succession  Act,  1956--Section  14--Hindu   lady receiving  land from husband in lieu of  maintenance--Suffi- cient  title  to  enable ripening of  possession  into  full ownership.

HEADNOTE:     The  appellant-wife and her husband were  estranged  and living apart. The husband, by a letter dated July 28,  1956, entrusted.to  the  appellant the land in  dispute  alongwith another piece of land and a house and agreed to pay a sum of Rs.100 per mouth for her maintenance. After a few years, the husband  conceived the idea of selling the land in  dispute. The  appellant protested by her letter dated June  15,  1966 and  implored  him not to sell the land. Despite  this,  the husband sold the said land to the plaintiff-respondents.     The  purchaser instituted a suit for an  injunction  re- straining  the appellants from interfering with  possession, which  was contested initially on the ground that  the  land had been gifted to the appellant orally by the husband,  and that  title had been acquired by adverse possession.  Later, the  written  statement was amended and a further  plea  was taken  that the said land had been given in lieu of  mainte- nance and that she had become the absolute owner of the land under  Section  14 of the Hindu Succession Act.  All  courts found that there was no oral gift.     A Single Judge of the High Court held that the land  was given to the appellant by her husband in lieu of maintenance and that by Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, she  had become full owner of the property.     On appeal under the Letters Patent, a Division Bench  of the High Court held that "The reading of the letter left  no meaning  of doubt that there was never any intention on  the part  of the husband to give away the land to the  lady  and that instead of sending the total amount in cash he  allowed her to utilise the amount of ckakota for meeting her day  to day  expenses",  that she did not at all  acquire  any  such right or interest in the property as could be termed ’limit- ed ownership’ so as to permit

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       577 her  to take the benefit of the provisions of Section  14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, that "if the husband had  given over  the land in dispute completely to the lady,  then  the question  of sending more money could not have  arisen"  and reversed the Judgment of the Single Judge.     The  appellant appealed to this Court. On behalf of  the respondents,  it  was contended that even if  the  land  was given  to the appellant in lieu of maintenance, it  must  be established that what was given to her was a limited  estate in  the sense of ownership without the right  of  alienation and  that under Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act  only such a limited estate would blossom into an absolute estate. Allowing the appeal, this Court,     HELD:  1.1 Section 14 is aimed at removing  restrictions or limitations on the right of a female Hindu to enjoy, as a full owner, property possessed by her so long as her posses- sion is traceable to a lawful origin, that is to say, if she has a vestige of a title. It makes no difference whether the property is acquired by inheritance or devise or at a parti- tion or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance  or by gift or by her own skill or exertion or by purchase or by prescription or in any other manner whatsoever. The Explana- tion to the Section expressly refers to property acquired in lieu of maintenance and the widow is not required to  estab- lish  her further title before she could claim  full  owner- ship,  under Section 14(1) in respect of property  given  to her and possessed by her in lieu of maintenance. [582F-H]     1.2 The very right to receive maintenance is  sufficient title to enable the ripening of possession into full  owner- ship  if  she is in possession of the property  in  lieu  of maintenance. Sub-section (2) of Section 14 is in the  nature of  an exception to Section 14(1) and provides for a  situa- tion  where property is acquired by a female Hindu  under  a written  instrument or a decree of court and not where  such acquisition  is  traceable to any antecedent  right.  [582H; 583A]     2.  If a female Hindu is put in possession  of  property pursuant to or in recognition of a right to maintenance,  it cannot  be denied that she has acquired a limited  right  or interest in the property and once that position is accepted, it  follows that the right gets enlarged to  full  ownership under  Section  14(1)  of the Act. That is  clear  from  the language of Section 14(1) of the Act. [586B-C] 3.1  In the instant case, the question was not  whether  the husband 578 intended  to  give away the land in dispute  absolutely  but whether the land was given to her in lieu of maintenance.  A perusal of the letters exchanged between the husband and the appellant-wife clearly establishes that the land in  dispute was  given by the husband in lieu of maintenance. The  Divi- sion Bench of the High Court was wrong in making distinction between day-to-day expenses and maintenance. [581F-G]     3.2  It  is rather late in the day to contend  that  the land which was given to the appellant in lieu of maintenance did not vest in her absolutely. [586F]     [The  Judgment of the Division Bench of the  High  Court set aside and that of the Single Judge restored. ] Eramma  v.  Verrupanna  & Ors., [1966] 2  SCR  626,  distin- guished.     Badri  Pershad  v.  Smt. Kanso Devi, [1970]  2  SCR  95; Naraini Devi v. Smt. Rano Devi and Ors., [1976] 3 SCR 55; V. Tulasamma & Ors. v. V. Sesha Reddi (Dead) by L.Rs., [1977] 3 SCR  261; Bai Vajia (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Thakorbhai  Chelabhai

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and Ors., [1979] 3 SCR 291; Santhanam v. Subramanya AIR 1977 SC  2024  and Jagannathan Pillai  v.  Kunjithapadam  Pillai, [1987] 2 SCC 572, referred to.

JUDGMENT:     CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1112  of 1980.     From  the  Judgment and Order dated 13.5.  1980  of  the Punjab and Haryana High Court in L.P.A. No. 521 of 1976. Ms. Kamini Jaiswal for the Appellants.     V.M.  Tarkunde,  Harbans Singh and S.K.  Bagga  for  the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     CHINNAPPA  REDDY, J. Major General Gurbux Singh and  his wife  Gulwant  Kaur were estranged and  were  living  apart. Their son and daughter-in-law were living with Gulwant  Kaur at Chandigarh. Gulwant Kaur was apparently complaining  that Major  General Gurbux Singh was not providing her with  ade- quate maintenance. Therefore, on July 28, 1958, he wrote her a letter, the relevant parts of which are as follows:.  579               "To,               Shrimati Gulwant Kaur,                        You have been complaining that I have               not paid even a penny for maintenance for  the               last  seven/eight months. Here is  an  account               from November 1957 to July, 1958, the  details               of which run as under:               XXXXXXXXXXXXX               XXXXXX                    XXXXX               XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX                    XXXXXX               Now, so far as the question of future expenses               is  concerned, the maintenance shall  be  like               this:               FOR YOURSELF:                        1.  The  land and house  situated  at               Mangwal,   which  was  constructed  with   the               earning of my whole life, is entrusted to you,               the  half portion of which already  stands  in               your  name and in lieu of the produce  thereof               Madanjit  shall provide to you, if  not  more,               free   lodging  and  boarding  (expenses   for               maintenance). You stay in your own home.                        2.  The  land  at  Khurana  is   also               entrusted  to you. Its produce,  lease  money,               etc.  will  fetch you a minimum  of  Rs.  1200               annually   i.e.   Rs.  100   per   month   for               maintenance.               3.  I  shall  pay  Rs.  100  every  month  for               maintenance.               xxxxxxx          xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx               XXXXXX The  letter  of Gurbux Singh suggested that  he  was  making adequate provision for meeting the expenses of Gulwant  Kaur even  at the cost of great inconvenience and  discomfort  to himself  and so. Gulwant Kaur was not entitled to  complain. Gulwant Kaur apparently felt disgusted and frustrated at the tone  of the letter and by her letter dated August 5,  2958, she queried if she was not to take maintenance from 580 Gurbux  Singh from who else was she to get any  maintenance.

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She  said  that she was not demanding anything and  made  no claim  on  him and that everything including  the  land  and kothi  belonged  to him. The Khurana land also  belonged  to him.  He might give her maintenance or not give her  mainte- nance as he chose. She said that she was nothing more than a heap  of dust and her life was not worth living. In  another portion  of the letter, she mentioned that the Khurana  land had not yet been leased and that there had been some  delay. Other correspondence passed between the parties which is not important  for the present case. Later, after a  few  years, Gurbux Singh conceived the idea of selling the Khurana land. The wife protested. Her letter dated January 15, 1966 was as follows:-               "Most respected husband,               Sat Siri Akal;                        Previously   in  the   summer,   Col.               Gurcharan Singh told us that you want to  sell               the  land  of  Khurana. Now, on  the  day  you               visited  Sangrur, it was learnt from you  that               you  were  interested in selling the  land.  I               also  told you that we depend upon only  that.               This land was given to me by you  voluntarily.               You had written letters to me and Madanjit  on               July  28, 1958 copy whereof is being  sent  to               you  by  me. Therein, it was  decided  that  I               would  continue enjoying the  produce  thereof               till my life. Now, on hearing that you want to               sell      it,     I     was     very      much               shocked  ................  Now this letter  is               being written to you in order to impress  upon               you  not to sell the land of  Khurana  because               Madanjit  and I depend upon it. You  are  very               well  aware  that we do not  possess  anything               else   ...................  I fully hope  that               you will continue giving me this land and  the               maintenance grants to me as per your  decision               and  will not think of selling this land.  You               are  aware  how  we  are  hardly   mai               ntaining ourselves. I have made this prayer to               you.  I have full right over it. I  hope  that               you will reply soon." Gulwant  Kaur’s  letter  did not have any  effect  on  Major General  Gurbux Singh. Instead of replying her, he sold  the Khurana land to the plaintiff-respondents on June 18,  1968. The  purchaser instituted the present suit out of which  the appeal arises for an injunction restraining Gulwant Kaur and Madanjit  Singh from interfering with their possession.  The defendants  contested the suit initially on the ground  that the  581 land had been gifted to Gulwant Kaur orally by Major General Gurbux  Singh.  It was also claimed that  Gulwant  Kaur  had acquired  title  by adverse possession.  Later  the  written statement was amended and a further plea was taken that  the land  in dispute had been given to Gulwant Kaur in  lieu  of maintenance  and that she had become the absolute  owner  of the land under sec. 14 of the Hindu Succession Act. All  the courts  found that there was no oral gift. A learned  single Judge  of  the High Court who heard the second  appeal  held that  the  Khurana  Land was given to Gulwant  Kaur  by  her husband  Major General Gurbux Singh in lieu  of  maintenance and  that by virtue of sec. 14 of the Hindu Succession  Act, she  had  become full owner of the property.  On  an  appeal under the Letters Patent, a Division Bench of the High Court of  Punjab & Haryana held that Gulwant Kaur was  merely  al-

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lowed  to  receive the proceeds of the land  in  dispute  in order  to meet her day-to-day expenses and that she did  not at all acquire any such right or interest in the property as could  be termed ’limited ownership’ so as to permit her  to take  the  benefit of the provisions of sec.  14(1)  of  the Hindu  Succession Act. According to the learned Judges,  "If the General had given over the land in dispute completely to the  lady then the question of sending more money could  not have  arisen   .....  The reading of the  letter  leaves  no manner  of doubt that there was never any intention  on  the part of the General to give away the land of village Khurana to the lady and that instead of sending the total amount  in cash,  the  General  allowed her to utilise  the  amount  of ckakota  for meeting her day-to-day expenses." The  Division Bench reversed the judgment of the learned Single Judge.     We  are  unable  to agree with the  conclusions  of  the Division  Bench  of  the High Court. The  question  was  not whether Major General Gurbux Singh intended to give away the Khurana land absolutely to Gulwant Kaur but whether the land was  given to her in lieu of maintenance. A perusal  of  the letter  dated July 28, 1958 from Major General Gurbux  Singh to Gulwant Kaur and the letter dated January 15, 1966 clear- ly establish that the Khurana land was given to Gulwant Kaur by Gurbux Singh in lieu of her maintenance. We are unable to understand  the distinction made by the High  Court  between day-today  expenses and maintenance. It was argued  by  Shri Tarkunde,  learned counsel for the respondents that even  if the  land was given to Gulwant Kaur in lieu of  maintenance, it  must  be established that what was given to  her  was  a limited  estate in the sense of ownership without the  right of alienation and that under sec. 14 of the Hindu Succession Act  only such a limited estate would blossom into an  abso- lute  estate. We are unable to agree with the submission  of Shri Tarkunde. Shri 582 Tarkunde  invited  our attention to some decisions  of  this court  as supporting the preposition stated by him. We  will presently refer to all of them.               Sec.  14  of the Hindu Succession  Act  is  as               follows:               "(1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu,               whether   acquired   before   or   after   the               commencement of this Act, shall be held by her               as  full  owner thereof and not as  a  limited               owner.                          Explanation--In  this  sub-section,               "property" includes both movable and immovable               property   acquired  by  a  female  Hindu   by               inheritance  or devise, or at a partition,  or               in   lieu   of  maintenance  or   arrears   of               maintenance,  or  by  gift  from  any  person,               whether a relative or not, before, at or               after  her  marriage, or by her own  skill  or               exertion,  or by purchase or by  prescription,               or  in any other manner whatsoever,  and  also               any  such  property held by her  as  stridhana               immediately  before the commencement  of  this               Act.                             (2)  Nothing contained  in  sub-               section  (1)  shall  apply  to  any   property               acquired by any of gift or under a will or any               other instrument or under a decree or order of               a  civil  court or under an  award  where  the               terms of the gift, will or other instrument or               the   decree,  order  or  award  prescribe   a

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             restricted estate in such property."     It is obvious that sec. 14 is aimed at removing restric- tions  or  limitations  on the right of a  female  Hindu  to enjoy, as a full owner, property possessed by her so long as her  possession is traceable to a lawful origin, that is  to say, if she has a vestige of a title. It makes no difference whether the property is acquired by inheritance or devise or at  a  partition  or in lieu of maintenance  or  arrears  of maintenance or by gift or by her own skill or exertion or by purchase or by prescription or in any other manner whatsoev- er. The explanation expressly refers to property acquired in lieu of maintenance and we do not see what further title the widow  is  required to establish before she can  claim  full ownership  under sec. 14(1) in respect of property given  to her  and possessed by her in lieu of maintenance.  The  very right  to receive maintenance is sufficient title to  enable the ripening of possession into full ownership if she is  in possession of the property in lieu of maintenance.  Sub-sec. 2 of sec. 14 is in the nature of an exception to sec.       583 14(1)  and  provides for a situation where property  is  ac- quired  by  a female Hindu under a written instrument  or  a decree of court and not where such acquisition is  traceable to any antecedents right.     In  Bramma v. Verrupanna, [1966] 2 SCR 626 on the  death of  the  last male holder, his two step mothers who  had  no vestige  of  title to the properties got possession  of  the properties  and in answer to a suit by the  rightful  heirs, one  of them claimed that she had become full owner  of  the property  under  sec. 14 of the Hindu  Succession  Act.  The Supreme Court pointed out that the object of sec. 14 was  to extinguish  the estate called limited estate and to  make  a Hindu  woman who would otherwise be a limited owner, a  full owner of the property but it was not to confer a title on  a female  Hindu,  who did not in fact possess any  vestige  of title. The case did not deal with the case of Hindu a  woman who  was given property in lieu of maintenance and  in  whom therefore a right or interest was created in the property.     In  Badri Pershad v, Smt, Kanso Devi, [1970] 2  SCR  95. The Court pointed out that a Hindu widow who after the death of  her husband obtained properties under a partition  award between herself and her sons, would be entitled to an  abso- lute  estate  under sec. 14(1) of the Act  and  that  merely because the partition was by means of an arbitration  award, sec.  14(2) would not be attracted. It was made  clear  that sec. 14(2) was in the nature of a proviso or an exception to sec. 14(1) and that it came into operation only if the Hindu woman required the property in any of the methods  indicated therein  for  the first time without their  being  any  pre- existing right in her to the property. The principle of  the case far from supporting Shri Tarkunde’s submission supports the submission of the appellants,     In Naraini Devi v. Smt. Rano Devi and Ors., [1976] 3 SCR 55 the case of Badri Pershad v. Smt. Kanso Devi (supra)  was distinguished on the ground that the widow had no pre-exist- ing right in the property which she obtained under an  award and  therefore, the case fell squarely within sec. 14(2)  of the Hindu Succession Act.     In  Tulasamma v. Sesha Reddi, [1977] 3 SCR 261,  it  was clearly  laid  down that sec. 14(1) would be  applicable  to property given to a female Hindu in lieu of maintenance.  It was  also  made clear that sec. 14(2) would  apply  only  to cases where the acquisition of property was made by a  Hindu female without any pre-existing right. It was said. "It will, therefore, be seen that sub-sec. (1) of sec.

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584 14 is large in its amplitude and covers every kind of acqui- sition  of property by a female Hindu including  acquisition in lieu of maintenance and where such property was possessed by   her  at  the  date  of  commencement  of  the  Act   or subsequently  acquired and possessed, she would  become  the full owner of the property. Now, sub-section (2) of sec.  14 provides that nothing contained in sub-sec. (1) shall  apply to another property acquired by way of gift or under a  will or  any  instrument or under a decree by order  of  a  civil court or under an award when the terms of the gift, will  or other instrument or the decree, order or award prescribed  a restricted  estate in such property. This provision is  more in  the nature of a proviso or an exception to sub-sec.  (1) and  it was regarded as such by this court in Badri  Pershad v. Kanso Devi (supra)  ................................... ........................................................... It is, therefore, clear that under the Shastric Hindu Law  a widow  has  a  right to be maintained out  of  joint  family property  and  this right would ripen into a charge  if  the widow  takes the necessary steps for having her  maintenance ascertained  and  specifically charged in the  joint  family property  and  even if no specific charge is  created,  this right would be enforceable against joint family property  in the  hands  of  a volunteer or a purchaser  taking  it  with notice of her claim. The right of the widow to be maintained is  of course not a jus in rem, since it does not  give  her any interest in the joint family property but it is certain- ly  jus  ad  rem, i.e., a right  against  the  joint  family property.  Therefore, when specific property is allotted  to the  widow in lieu of her claim for maintenance, the  allot- ment would be in satisfaction of her jus ad rem, namely, the right to be maintained out of the joint family property.  It would  not be a grant for the first time without any  preex- isting  right, in the widow. The widow would be getting  the property in virtue of her pre-existing right, the instrument giving  the  property being merely a  document  effectuating such  pre-existing  right  and not making  a  grant  of  the property  to her for the first time without  any  antecedent right  ’or title. There is also another consideration  which is  very relevant to this issue and it is that, even if  the instrument  were  silent as to the nature  of  the  interest given  585               to  the widow in the property and did not,  in               so many terms, prescribe that she would have a               limited interest, she would have no more  than               a  limited interest in the property under  the               Hindu Law ’as it stood prior to the  enactment               of  the  Act  and hence  a  provision  in  the               instrument  prescribing  that she  would  have               only a limited interest in the property  would               be, to quote the words of this Court in Nirmal               Chand’s  case (supra), "merely  recording  the               true  legal  position"  and  that  would   not               attract  the applicability of sub-section  (2)               but  would be governed by sub-section  (1)  of               section  14.  The  conclusion  is,  therefore,               inescapable that where property is allotted to               a widow under an instrument, decree, order  or               award  prescribes a restricted estate for  her               in the property and sub-section (2) of section               14 would have no application in such a case."               In Bai Vajia v. Thakorbhai Chelabhai, [1979] 3               SCR  291,  the court referred to  the  earlier

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             judgment in Tulsamma’s case and               said,   "All  the  three  Judges   were   thus               unanimous  in  accepting  the  appeal  on  the               ground  that Tulsamma’s right  to  maintenance               was  a  pre-existing  right, that  it  was  in               recognition of such a right that she  obtained               property  under  the compromise and  that  the               compromise  therefore did not fall within  the               ambit of sub-section (2) of section 14 of  the               Act  but would attract the provisions of  sub-               section   (1)   thereof   coupled   with   the               Explanation  thereto.  With  respect  we  find               ourselves  in  complete  agreement  with   the               conclusions  arrived at by Bhagwati and  Fazal               Ali,  JJ., as also the reasons  which  weighed               with them in coming to those conclusions."               Shri   Tarkunde  particulary  relied  on   the               following passage in Bai Vajia v. Thakorbhai’s               case:                        "A  plain reading  of  sub-section(1)               makes it clear that the concerned Hindu female               must have limited ownership in property, which               limited  ownership would get enlarged  by  the               operation  of  that  sub-section.  If  it  was               intended to enlarge any sort of a right  which               could  in no sense be described as  ownership,               the  expression "and not as a  limited  owner"               would  not have been used at all  and  becomes               redundant,   which   is  against   the   well-               recognised               586               principle  of interpretation of statutes  that               the  Legislature does not  employ  meaningless               language." We do not understand the court as laying down that what  was enlarged by sub-sec. 1 of sec. 14 into a full estate was the Hindu woman’s estate known to Hindu law. When the court uses the  word ’limited estate’, the words are used to connote  a right in the property to which the possession of the  female Hindu  may be legitimately traced, but which is not  a  full right  of ownership. If a female Hindu is put in  possession of  property  pursuant to or in recognition of  a  right  to maintenance,  it  cannot be denied that she has  acquired  a limited  right  or interest in the property  and  once  that position  is  accepted, it follows that the right  gets  en- larged  to full ownership under sec. 14(1) of the Act.  That seems  to  us to follow clearly from the  language  of  sec. 14(1) of the Act.     In  Sellammal v. Nellammal, AIR 1977 SC 1265, the  court held that property allotted to a Hindu widow in lieu of  her maintenance in recognition of her pre-existing right  became her the asbolute property.     In  Santnanam  v. Subramanya, AIR 1977 SC 2024,  it  was again held that property in the possession of a widow of the deceased coparcener which had been allotted to her for  life in  lieu of maintenance without power of  alienation  became her absolute property under s. 14(1) of the Act with  powers of alienation.     In  Krishna  Das v. Venkayya, AIR 1978 SC 36 1,  it  was reiterated that where a widow was put in possession of joint family  property  in lieu of her right to  maintenance,  her right  to  the  property became enlarged  into  an  absolute estate  under  s.  14(1). We, therefore, think  that  it  is rather late in the day for Shri Tarkunde to contend that the Khurana  land  which was given to Gulwant Kaur  in  lieu  of

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maintenance did not vest in her absolutely.     We may finally refer to a recent decision of this  Court in Jagannathan Pillai v. Kunjithapadam Pillai, [1987] 2  SCC 572 where Thakkar and Ray, JJ. pointed out.               "      On an analysis of Section 14(1) of  the               Hindu  Succession Act of 1955, it  is  evident               that the legislature has abolished the concept               of  limited  ownership in respect of  a  Hindu               female  and  has  enacted  that  any  property               possessed  by her would thereafter be held  by               her as a full owner. Section 14(1) would  come               into operation if the property                   587               (Sic)  at  the point of time when she  has  an               occasion  to claim or assert a title  thereto.               Or, in other words, at the point of time  when               her right to the said property is called  into               question.  The legal effect of  section  14(1)               would be that after the coming into  operation               of  the  Act  there would be  no  property  in               respect  of  which it could  be  contended  by               anyone  that a Hindu female is only a  limited               owner  and not a full owner. (We are  for  the               moment  not concerned with the fact that  sub-               section(2)  of section 14 which provides  that               Section  14(1)  will not  prevent  creating  a               restricted estate in favour of a Hindu  female               either  by gift or will or any  instrument  or               decree of a civil court or award provided  the               very document creating title unto her  confers               a restricted estate on her). There is  nothing               in  Section 14 which supports the  proposition               that  a  Hindu  female  should  be  in  actual               physical   possession   or   in   constructive               possession of any property on the date of  the               coming   into  operation  of  the   Act.   The               expression  ’proposed’  has been used  in  the               sense  of  having a right to the  property  or               control over the property. The expression ’any               property  possessed by a Hindu female  whether               acquired  before or after the commencement  of               the   Act’  on  an  analysis  yields  to   the               following interpretation:                        (1) Any property possessed by a Hindu               female acquired before the commencement of the               Act  will  be  held by her  as  a  full  owner               thereof and not as a limited owner.                        (2) Any property possessed by a Hindu               female acquired after the commencement of  the               Act  will be held as a full owner thereof  and               not as a limited owner."     In  view of the foregoing discussion, we allow  the  ap- peal,  set aside the judgment of the Division Bench  of  the High Court and restore that of the learned single Judge. N.P.V.                                                Appeal allowed. 588