03 September 1996
Supreme Court
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SHRI BENOY MAZUMDAR (DEAD) BY LRS. Vs THE COLLECTOR OF CACHAR

Bench: RAMASWAMY,K.
Case number: Appeal (civil) 1843 of 1994


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PETITIONER: SHRI BENOY MAZUMDAR (DEAD) BY LRS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE COLLECTOR OF CACHAR

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       03/09/1996

BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. FAIZAN UDDIN (J)

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                          O R D E R      This  appeal  by  special  leave  arises  from  a  very elaborate and  well considered  judgment of    the  Division Bench of  the Assam  High Court made on February 26, 1982 in First Appeal  No. 29/65.  The   admitted position is that on February 13, 1959, 60 bighas of land was requisitioned under the Assam  Land (Requisition  and  Acquisition)  Act,  1948. Ultimately,  by  publication  of  the    notification  under Section 8(1A)  of   the Act  the land  was acquired for  the public  purpose   for  settlement   of  the   refugees  from Bangladesh.  The   Land  Acquisition  Officer  applying  the provisions of  Section  7(1A)  of  the  Act  determined  the compensation @  Rs. 297.69  rounded off   to  Rs. 300/-  per bigha. On  appeal, the Division Bench has confirmed the same but  awarded   interest  at  6%  from  the  date  of  taking possession till  date  of  payment.  Thus,  this  appeal  by special leave.      Shri Choudhary,  learned  counsel  for  the  appellant, contended  that  the  land  was  taken  on  grant  from  the Government  on  August  8,  1872  for  special  cultivation. Therefore, the  compensation was  required to  be determined under Section  23(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894) (for short, the "Act") as envisaged under Section 7(1) of the  Act. As specified in sub-section (1) of Section 7 of the Act,  his contention  focuses  mainly  on  the  question whether  the   land  is  lying  fallow  or  is  for  special cultivation. The  learned counsel  contends that  the courts below have  not properly  understood  the  contents  of  the documents and  interpreted  the law in that perspective and, therefore, this  Court is required to go into that question. He further  contended   that though Section 7(1A) of the Act which has  been specifically  incorporated in the Assam Land (Requisition and  Acquisition) Act,  1964 reiterates what is stated in  Section 11 thereof, it is violative of Article 14 of the  constitution. In  support thereof,  he places strong reliance on   a dissenting judgment dated September 28, 1981 of one of the Judges of a Full Bench of five Judges in  C.R.

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No. 28/67  and batch. Shri Chaudhary, learned senior counsel appearing for the State, placing reliance on the judgment of this Court, H.P. Baruah vs. The Collector of Sibsagar, Assam [AIR 1976  SC 68],  contended that  the controversy has been concluded by  the   said judgment  in which is was held that for uncultivated  or fallow  land and    that  Section  7(1) stands applicable.  In view  of the  respective contentions, the question  that arises  for consideration  is what is the nature of the land acquired ?      The reference  Court raised issued No. 3 in that behalf and considered the question elaborately. It held thus :      "From the  perusal of Ext.12 I find      that there  are certain  limitation      even though  the lands are redeemed      grants. I  do not  find anything in      support of  the claimant at XXV and      XXVI of  introduction of Assam Land      Revenue Manual,  Vol  I,  that  the      lands acquired  were not grains but      fee simple  estate pure and simple.      It is  an undisputed  fact that the      acquired lands  were assessed  with      revenue by  Assam Act.  No. XXIV of      1948 which  Act was  passed  before      the  passing   of  the  Assam  Land      (Requisition and  Acquisition) Act,      1948. It may be true that the words      "special  cultivation"   might  not      appear in  the rules  passed before      1876 but  that does  not go to show      that the  acquired lands  were sold      to  the   company  as   fee  simple      Estate,  pure  and  simple  and  by      virtue of  that the  company became      the proprietor of land as like that      of a fee simple estate. These rules      passed  in   different  times   are      embodies in  the Assam Land Revenue      Manual and  those rules from a part      of   this    book.   Under    these      circumstances, I  am convinced that      the acquired  lands are  grants for      special cultivation.      From  the  evidence  placed  before      above, I  am not  in a  position to      accept  the   contention   of   the      claimant that  there  were  thatch,      shed tress  and seedlings etc. when      the lands  were requisitioned. From      the evidence  it is also found that      even seedlings were sometime raised      on the  slope of  the tilla  by the      garden labourers on payment of rent      to the  garden. So  this cannot  be      construed  as   that   lands   were      utilised  by  the  garden  for  the      purpose for which those were given.      The claimant  has  failed  to  show      with any  documentary evidence that      paddy and  thatch  were  raised  in      some portion  of the acquired lands      before     the      lands      were      requisitioned. On  the other  hand,      the objector’s  witnesses, some  of      whom are  official witnesses,  said

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    that at the time of requisition the      lands   were    lying   patty.   I,      therefore, find no substance in the      argument that  the lands  were  not      fallow,   uncultivated    or    not      utilised at  the  time  when  these      were requisitioned."      After elaborate  consideration, it  was held  that  the land was  fallow uncultivated and not unutilized at the time when the  property was  requisitioned. The Division Bench of the High  Court again  elaborately considered  the nature of the grant,  nature of  the acquisition and the nature of the factual possession  of the  land as  on   the  date  of  the requisition  and  it  relied  upon  another  Division  Bench judgment of that Court in First Appeal Nos. 67-68/69 decided on February 23, 1982 and concluded thus :      "The expression   in  the  ease  of      land  with  respect  to  which  any      settlement  has   been   made   for      special  cultivation  or  which  is      included in any grant, if such land      is lying  fallow or uncultivated or      is not  utilised for the purpose or      which the  grant or  settlement was      made   or      for   the   purposes      unidentical  thereto",  has  to  be      given   coherent    and    pragatic      interpretation, the  words ’fallow’      or    ’cultivated’    also    being      understood in  the context  of  the      concept of  special cultivation for      which     the  grant   was   meant.      "Fallow"       according   to   the      Webster’s  New   Twentieth  Century      Dictionary,  means   and  that  has      laid a  year or  more   untilled or      unseeded to  kill weeds,  make  the      soil richer  etc.  land  which  has      been ploughed  or  tilling  of  and      without sowing it  for a season. It      means left  cultivated or  planted.      According   to the same Dictionary,      utilisation  means   utilising   or      being utilised.  To utilise  is  to      profitable account  or use, to make      useful,  as    to  utilise  natural      resources.  Thus,   all  the  three      expressions,  namely,  fallow,  the      three expressions,  namely, fallow,      uncultivated and  not utilised have      to be  understood in the context of      special cultivation  for which  the      grant was  made. Cultivation of the      land  for   a  purpose  foreign  to      special cultivation  or utilisation      of  the   land     for  a   purpose      different from that which the grant      was  made,  would  be  as  much  as      cultivation or unutilisation."      Applying the  above principle we do      not  find   any  infirmity  in  the      findings of  the   Reference  Court      that the land involved in this case      was covered by Section 7(1A) of the      Act and  it would  not  fall  under

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    Section 7(1)  of the  Act. In  this      view of  the matter  the sale deeds      and  the  Jamabardi  classification      which does  not indicate the use of      the   land    become    irrelevant.      Besides, the Jamabandi is dated the      5th November,  1959 while  the land      become  irrelevant.   Besides,  the      Jamabandi   is    dated   the   5th      November, 1959  while the  land was      requisitioned    in     1954    and      subsequently acquired  in  1959  by      notification dated 13.2.1959.      The said  ratio was  applied to  the facts in this case and  it   was  held  that  since    the  lands  were  fallow uncultivated lands   they  got attracted and accordingly, it was held  that Section  7(1A) was  inapplicable. Though Shri Choudhary sought to impress upon us that land is fallow and, therefore, the  land falls  within Section 7(1A), that would be seen  under recital  grant that  would establish that the lands were  assigned by  a grant  for  special  cultivation. Under the  Assam Act  of 1964,   with  a view  to remove the ambiguity as  to the "special cultivation’ under sub-section (2) of  Section 11, the expression has been defined  to mean cultivation which  involves, either  owing to  the nature of the crop  or owing  to the  process of  cultivation, a  much larger expenditure  of capital  per acre than is incurred by most  of   the  cultivators  in    the  State  and  includes cultivation of  tea. It  would  be  seen  that  the  special cultivation was  meant to include cultivation higher capital outlay  per   acre  than   the  expenditure   incurred   for cultivation by  the cultivators  in the  State  and  also  a cultivation of  the  tea  which  is  against    the  special cultivation involves  higher investment  of  higher  capital outlay. In  view of  the concurrent findings recorded by the reference Court  as well  as the  High Court  that the  land remained as fallow, uncultivated or barren land, necessarily the conclusion  would be  that the grant contained that  the land  was   meant  for  special  cultivation.  Consequently, Section 7(1)  has no application to the determination of the compensation as  per prevailing  market value as on the date of the  acquisition under  the Act. We do not find that  the Act is  arbitrary. The  full Bench  of five  Judges in above judgment,  per  majority,  has  elaborately  gone  into  the question and  concluded that Section 7(1A) is not arbitrary. The reason  appears to be that the land having been assigned by the  Government,  when it is needed for a public purpose, what the  assignee would  get in return is the land revenue; after use  and enjoyment  thereof, he  would be  compensated with   the payment  of  the  land  revenue  envisaged  under Section 7  (1A) of  the Act. It is settled law by catena  of judgments of  this Court  including one  by the Constitution Bench  that   the  prescription   of   the   principle   for determination  of  the  compensation  is  not  violative  of Article 14  of the  Constitution. Even  in Bhim  Singhji vs. Union of  India, the  Constitution Bench  of this  Court has held that  the payment   of  compensation  for  the  surplus vacant land  acquired under  the Ceiling Act under Section 6 (11)  in  the  sum  of  Rs.  2,00,000/-  was  not  illusory. Considered from this perspective, we hold that determination of the  compensation under Section 7(1A) is not violative of Article 14  of the  Constitution. The  majority of  the Full Bench of the five Judges of the Assam High Court has rightly concluded the  issue. Accordingly,  we hold that there is no illegality in the impugned judgment. Moreover, when the High

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Court  has   consistently  interpreted  a  local  law  in  a particular way,  this Court  would be  slow to disturb their interpretation unless  compelling circumstances  so warrant. The High  Court has  not applied  wrong principle  of law in determining the compensation warranting interference.      The appeal is accordingly dismissed but, in the circumstances, without costs.