http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 7  

PETITIONER: SHRAMIK UTTARSH SABHA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: RAYMOND WOOLEN MILLS LTD. & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT07/02/1995

BENCH: BHARUCHA S.P. (J) BENCH: BHARUCHA S.P. (J) AHMADI A.M. (CJ)

CITATION:  1995 AIR 1137            1995 SCC  (3)  78  JT 1995 (2)   284        1995 SCALE  (1)533

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT: 1.   Delay condoned. 2    Leave granted. 3.   The question for consideration in this appeal is : does a representative union under the Bombay Industrial Relations Act,  1946 (BIR Act) have the exclusive right  to  represent the  employees  of  the  concerned  industry  in  complaints relating  to unfair labour practices under  the  Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions And Prevention of Unfair  Labour Practices  Act,  1971 (MRTU & PULP Act)  other  than-  those specified in items 2 and 6 of Schedule IV 296 thereof? 4.   The  question  arises  in an appeal  by  special  leave against  the judgment and order of the High Court at  Bombay dismissing a writ petition filed by the appellant. 5.   The  first respondent is a public limited company  with an industrial establishment   at  Bombay.  It is covered  by the provisions of the B.I.R. Act.  The second respondent  is a trade union recognised as the representative union for the concerned industry under the provisions of the BIR Act.  The appellant  is a trade union registered under the  provisions of the Trade Unions Act, 1926. 6.   The  first  respondent  filed a  complaint  before  the Industrial  Court  alleging  the  unfair  labour   practices mentioned  in  items 5 and 6 of Schedule III of the  MRTU  & PULP  Act.   Item  5 of Schedule III states that  it  is  an unfair  labour  practice on the part of a  trade  union  "to stage, encourage or instigate such forms of coercive actions as  willful ’go slow’, squatting on the work premises  after working  hours  or  gherao’ of any of  the  members  of  the managerial  or other staff".  Item 6 of Schedule III  states that it is an unfair labour practice on the part of a  trade union  "to  stage demonstrations at the  residences  of  the employers or the managerial staff members".  The  Industrial court made an ad-interim order restraining the commission of

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 7  

the unfair labour practices.  The ad-interim order was  made absolute after the second respondent had been heard.  It  is the  appellant’s  case that the first  respondent  told  the Industrial  Court  that it had no objection to  -such  order being passed, and that this was done because the members  of the  first  respondent were deserting it in  favour  of  the appellant.   The-  appellant moved  an  application  seeking impleadment in the complaint proceedings on the ground  that employees of the first respondent had sought its  membership and  that the complaint had been filed by the first  respon- dent   in  collusion  with  the  second   respondent.    The application was opposed by the first and second respondents. The Industrial Court rejected the application. the appellant filed  a  writ  petition impugning  the  Industrial  Court’s order.  The High Court held that the only ground for  moving the  impleadment application was that several  employees  of the  first respondent had approached the appellant with  the intention  of  becoming its members and that  there  was  no material to support this ground.  Upon consideration of  the provisions  of  the BIR and the MRTU & PUIL Acts,  the  High Court   concluded  that  the  second  respondent,   as   the representative union, had the sole privilege of representing employees in the industry of the first respondent.  The writ petition was, accordingly, dismissed. 7.It is advantageous to consider at the outset the  relevant provisions of the B.I.R. and the MRTU & PULP Acts. 8.The  BIR  Act, which is the earlier statute,  was  enacted because  "it was expedient to provide for the regulation  of the relations of employers and employees in certain  matters to consolidate and amend the law relating to the  settlement of  industrial  disputes and to provide  for  certain  other purposes".   Section 3(2) defines "approved union" to  be  a union  on  the approved list.  Section 3(14)  states,  inter alia, that an ’employer’ includes an association or a  group of employers.  Section 3(28) defines "primary union" to mean a 287 union registered as a primary union under the Act.   Section 3(29)  defines "qualified union" to mean a union  registered as  a qualified union under the Act.  Section 3(30)  defines "registered union" to mean a union registered under the Act. Section 3(33) defines "representative union" to mean a union registered as a representative union under the Act.  Section 3(38)  defines  "union" to mean a trade union  of  employees which  is  registered  under the  Trade  Unions  Act,  1926. Chapter  HI  of the Act deals with registration  of  unions. Section  13 states that any union which has for  the  period specified  therein  that percentage of the total  number  of employees  employed in any industry in any local area as  is specified   therein   may  apply  for  registration   as   a representative  union for such industry in such local  area. Section 14 empowers the Registrar to registrar a union which has  made  an  application  under section  13  and  issue  a certificate in that behalf Section 15 empowers the Registrar to cancel the registration of a union on the grounds  stated therein.  Section 16 empowers the Registrar to register  any union  in place of the existing registered union if  at  any time any other union makes an application in this behalf and meets  the conditions therein stated.  Chapter V deals  with the   representatives   of  employers  and   employees   and appearance  on their behalf Section 27A therein states  that except  as  provided in section 32, 33 and 33A  no  employee should be allowed to appear or act in any. proceeding  under the  Act  except through the  representative  of  employees. Section 30 sets out who the representative of employees  is.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 7  

It  states  the order of preference in this behalf  and  the most preferred category is "a representative union for  such industry".   Section 32 states that the Industrial court  or other  tribunal  may,  for the ends of  justice,  permit  an individual to appear before it.  Its proviso reads thus:               Provided  that  subject to the  provisions  of               section  33A,  no such  individual   shall  be               permitted  to appear in any proceedings  (not.               being  a  proceeding court or  the  Industrial               legality or propriety of an order of dismissal               discharge removal, retrenchment termination of               service or suspension of an employee is  under               consideration)  in   which  a   Representative               Union  has appeared as the representative   of               employer.  Section 33 states that an  employee               or a representative union shall be entitled to               appear, inter alia, in all proceedings  before               the  Industrial Court Section 33A  relates  to               proceedings  where  the  dispute  is   between               employees inter se. 9.   The  MRTU  & PULP Act was enacted "to provide  for  the recognition of trade unions for facilitating collective bar- gaining  for certain undertaking to state their rights,  and obligations;  to  confer  certain  powers  on   unrecognised unions;  to provide for declaring certain strikes and  lock- outs as illegal strikes and lock-outs; to define and provide for  the prevention of certain unfair labour  practices;  to constitute  courts (as independent machinery)  for  carrying out  the purposes of according recognition to  trade  unions and   for  enforcing  the  provisions  relating  to   unfair practices;  and  to provide for matters connected  with  the purposes  aforesaid".  Section 3 is the definition  section. Sub-section  (1) states that the "Bombay Act" means the  BIR Act  and sub-section (2) says that the "Central  Act"  means the  Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.  "’Employee" is  defined by  subsection  (5) to mean, in relation to an  industry  to which the BIR Act applies, an employee as defined in section 3(13) 288 thereof  Similarly,  an  "employer" and  an  "industry"  are defined  by  sub-sections  (6)  and  (7)  respectively,   in relation  to an industry to which the BIR Act applies,  with reference  to  the  meanings  of  these  words  therein.   A "recognised union" is defined by sub-section (13) to mean  a union  which  has been issued a certificate  of  recognition under  Chapter  III  of the Act.   Subsection  (16)  defines "unfair  labour practices" to mean those defined in  section 26. Sub-section 17 says that "union" means a trade union  of employees registered under the Trade Unions Act, 1926.  Sub- section  (18) states that words and expressions used in  the Act  and  not defined therein but defined in  the  BIR  Act, shall,  in  relation  to an industry to which  the  BIR  Act applies, have the meanings assigned to them by the BIR  Act. Chapter III deals with the recognition of unions and section 10(2)  therein  states that the provisions  of  the  Chapter shall not apply to undertakings and industries to which  the provisions of the BIR Act apply.  Chapter IV deals with  the obligations  and rights of recognised unions,  other  unions and  certain employees.  Section 20 sets out the  rights  of recognised unions.  These include the right to collect  sums payable  by  members to it on the premises where  wages  are paid  and  to hold discussions with the  employees  and  the employer.   It also states that where there is a  recognised union  for any undertaking, no employee shall be allowed  to appear  or  act  or  be allowed to  be  represented  in  any

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 7  

proceedings  under the Industrial Disputes Act, not being  a proceeding in which the legality or propriety of an order of dismissal,  discharge  or the like is  under  consideration, except  through the recognised union, and the  decision  ar- rived  at or order made in such proceeding shall be  binding on all the employees in  such undertaking and the provisions of  the Industrial Disputes Act shall stand amended in  this behalf, as specified in Schedule 1 to the said Act.  Section 21  states that no employee in an undertaking to  which  the provisions  of  the Industrial Disputes Act apply  shall  be allowed to appear or act or be represented in any proceeding relating to unfair labour practices specified in items 2 and 6  of  Schedule  IV except  through  the  recognised  union. Schedule  IV deals with general unfair labour  practices  on the  part  of  employers.  Item 2  thereof  deals  with  the abolition  of  work  of  a  regular  nature  being  done  by employees  and the giving of such work to contractors  as  a measure  of  breaking  a  strike.. Item  6  deals  with  the employment of employees as ’badlis’, casuals or  temporaries and  to continue them as such for years with the  object  of depriving them of the status and privileges of permanent em- ployees.   Section  22 sets out the rights  of  unrecognised unions and gives them the right to meet and discuss with  an employer the grievance of any individual member relating  to his  discharge,  removal  and the like.   It  also  entitles unrecognised  unions  to appear on behalf of  their  members employed in the undertaking in any domestic or  departmental inquiry.  Unfair labour practices are dealt with by  Chapter IV and section 26 defines them to mean the practices  listed in  Schedules II, III and IV, Schedule 11 deals with  unfair labour  practices  on the part of  employers,  Schedule  III deals  with  unfair labour practices on the  part  of  trade unions  and  Schedule IV deals with  general  unfair  labour practices  on  the  part of employers.   Section  27  debars employers, unions and employees from engaging in any  unfair labour  practice.   Section 28 sets out  the  procedure  for dealing with complaints relating to unfair 289 labour  practices.   The order of the court thereon  is,  by reason of section 29, binding on, inter alia, all parties to the  complaint  and  those summoned to appear  be  fore  the court.   Where  the party to the complaint  or  summoned  to appear  before  the  court is  composed  of  employees,  all persons  who on the date of the complaint were  employed  in the  undertaking  to  which the complaint  relates  and  all persons subsequently employed therein are bound by the order of the court. 10.Four judgments of this court may now be noted.  In  Girja Shankar  Kashi  Ram v. The Gujarat Spinning  &  Weaving  Co. Ltd., 1962 Supp. (2) SCR 890, it was held that ’Section  27A of the B.I.R. Act provides that no employee shall be allowed to  appear  or act in any proceeding under  the  Act  except through the representative of employees, the only  exception being  the  provisions of sections 32  and  33.   Therefore, section 27A completely bars the appearance of an employee or any  one  oh  his  behalf in any  proceeding  after  it  has commenced  except through the representative  of  employees. In  Santuram  Khudai v. Kimatrai Printers &  Processors  (P) Ltd. & Ors., 1978 (2) SCR 387, this view was reaffirmed.  It was  held that neither the appellant in that matter nor  his co-employees  had  any  locus standi to  appear  or  act  in proceeding   initiated   by  the  employer  in   which   the representative  union had the right to appear and  act,  and did  appear and act.  The new union to which  the  appellant and some co-employees belonged had no right to appear or act

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 7  

on  their  behalf in these proceedings as it  had  not  been registered  and  recognised as the representative  union  of employees.  In Balmer Lawrie Workers’ Union, Bombay and Anr. v.   Balmer Lawrie and Co. Ltd. 7nd ors., 1985 (2) SCR  492. The judgments aforementioned were relied upon.  It was  held that while interpreting section 20(2)(b) of the M.R.T. U.  & P.U.L.P. act it had to be remembered that a workman who  had an  individual dispute with his employer arising out of  his dismissal,  discharge  or  the  like  would  not  suffer   a disadvantage  if  the recognised union did not  espouse  his cause  for he would be able to pursue his remedy  under  the Industrial Disputes Act.  Once this was assured, it had  not be seen whether the status to represent workmen conferred on a recognised union to the exclusion of an individual workman who  was not a member of the recognised union would deny  to him  a  fundamental  freedom.  Conferring the  status  of  a recognised union, it was held, on a union satisfying certain prerequisites, which another union was not in a position  to satisfy, did not deny the right to form an association.  The legislature  had  made  a  clear  distinction  between   the individual  grievance of a workman and a  dispute  affecting all  or a large number of workmen.  An  un-recognised  union enjoyed  the  statutory  right  to  meet  and  discuss   the grievance  of an individual workman with his  employer.   It also  enjoyed the statutory right to appear and  participate in domestic or departmental inquiry in which its member  was involved.    This  was  statutory  recognition  of  an   un- recognised union.  Its exclusion was partial and the embargo placed upon it barring it from representing a workman was in the larger interest of the industry, the public interest and the  national interest. in Crescent Dyes and Chemicals  Ltd. v.  Ram Naresh Tripathi, (1993) 2 SCC 115, the question  was whether  a delinquent was entitled to be  represented by  an office  bearer of another  trade union who was not a  member of either the recognised union or an un- 290 recognised union functioning within the undertaking in which the  delinquent was employed.  This court held that the  Act was   enacted   to  provide  for   facilitating   collective bargaining  for  certain  undertakings;  to  confer  certain powers  on un-recognised unions; to define and  provide  for the  prevention of certain unfair labour practices;  and  to constitute courts for carrying out the purpose of  according recognition to trade unions and for enforcing the provisions relating to unfair labour practices.  It was made applicable to industries to which the B.I.R. Act applied.  It was clear from the scheme of the Act that, with a view to facilitating collective  bargaining in certain undertakings, the  concept of  recognition of unions was introduced and  certain  obli- gations  and  rights  came to be imposed  and  conferred  on recognised unions. 11.  Ms.  Jaisingh,  learned  counsel  for  the   appellant, submitted that the B.I.R. Act and the M.R.T.U. and  P.U.L.P. Act  operated in different fields.  The former did not  deal with the subject of unfair labour practices, which was dealt with  by the latter.  Since the object of the latter was  to prevent unfair labour practices, it allowed access to courts to  any union, recognised, representative or  otherwise,  to any employee and even to a labour officer to ensure that  an unfair   labour  practice  was  prevented.   Since  an   un- recognised  union could file a complaint, there was  nothing incongruous  about it being heard as a respondent.   Section 21 was emphasised, and it was submitted that exclusivity was conferred only in regard to items 2 and 6 of Schedule IV  of the  M.R.T.U.  and P.U.L.P. Act and an  un-recognised  union

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 7  

could  appear in complaints in respect of all  other  unfair labour  practices’.   Having  regard to  the  provisions  of section  29  of the M.R.T.U. and P.U.L.P. Act,  whereby  any order  passed  would  be binding on the  appellant  and  its members,  they  had a right to be heard  by  the  Industrial Court before any order could be made against them. 12.Mr. A.H. Desai, learned counsel for the first respondent, submitted  that  the  right to  a  representative  union  to represent  the employees in an industry to which the  B.I.R. Act applied remained unfettered and did not change by reason of the fact that the proceedings had been adopted under  the M.R.T.U.  and P.U.L.P. act.  Learned counsel for the  second respondent  adopted the arguments advanced on behalf of  the first respondent. 13.The   M.R.T.U.  and  P.U.L.P.  act  takes  note  of   the provisions  of the B.I.R. Act.  Many of its definitions  are stated to be those contained in the B.I.R. Act Chapter  III, which  deals  with  the recognition of  unions,  states,  in section   10(2),  that  its  provisions  do  not  apply   to undertakings  in industries to which the provisions  of  the B.I.R. Act apply.  The B.I.R. Act was enacted to provide for the regulation of the relation of employers and employees in certain  matters  and to consolidate and amend  the  law  in relation  to  the settlement of  industrial  disputes.   The M.R.T.U.  and  P.U.L.P. Act was enacted to provide  for  the recognition  of  trade unions  for  facilitating  collective bargaining  for certain undertakings; to state their  rights and  obligations; to confer certain powers  on  unrecognised unions;  and  to define and provide for  the  prevention  of unfair  labour practices; and to constitute courts  in  this behalf It cannot, therefore, be said that the B.I.R. Act and M.R.T.U.  and  P.U.L.P.  Act operate  in  different  fields. There is communality in their objects and their pro- 291 visions. the obvious intent of the legislature which enacted them was that they should operate in tandene and  complement each other in respect of industries to which the B.I.R.  Act had  been  made applicable.  The two statutes must  be  read together. 14.Section  21 of the M.R.T.U. and P.U.L.P. Act, upon  which emphasis  was laid on behalf of the appellants, states  that no employee in an undertaking to which the provisions of the Industrial  Disputes Act applies shall be allowed to  appear or  act  or be allowed to be represented in  any  proceeding relating to the unfair labour practices specified in items 2 and  6 of Schedule IV except through the  recognised  union. It  is important to note that the reference is to  employees in  an undertaking to which the Industrial Disputes Act  ap- plies  and not to employees in an undertaking to  which  the B.I.R.  Act applies.  Apart. therefrom, the section  permits an  employee, not an union other than the recognised  union, to  so  appear.   The  provisions  of  section  21  do  not, therefore, lead to the conclusion that an union other than a representative  union can appear in proceedings relating  to all  unfair labour practices other than those  specified  in items 2 and 6 of Schedule IV. 15.  It is true that an order of the Industrial   Court   in the concerned proceedings would    bind all employees of the first  respondent even though there may be some  among  them who  owe allegiance not to the representative union  but  to the appellant. The objective of the provisions of the B.I.R. Act  and the M.R.T.U.  and P.U.L.P.  Act, read together  and the embargo placed upon representation by anyone other  than the  representative of the employees, who for the most  part is  the  representative union, except in matters  pertaining

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 7  

to  an  individual  dispute  between  an  employee  and  the employer,  is  to  facilitate  collective  bargaining.   The rationale is that it is in the interest of industrial  peace and  in the public and national interest that  the  employer should have to deal, in matters which concern all or most of its employees, only with a union which is representative  of them.   It may be that a union which was  representative  of the  employees  may  have in the course of  time  lost  that representative  character,  it  is  then  open,  under   the provisions  of the B.I.R. Act, for a rival union to seek  to replace it. 16.  For the reasons aforesaid, the High Court    was  right in the view that it took. 17.  The appeal is dismissed.  There shall   be no order  as to costs. 294