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CASE NO.: Appeal (crl.)  544 of 1997 Appeal (crl.)  546 of 1997

PETITIONER: Shiv Nandan Dixit                                

RESPONDENT: State of U.P.                                    

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 19/12/2003

BENCH: N. Santosh Hegde & B.P. Singh.

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T

SANTOSH HEGDE, J.                  The two appellants in these appeals were convicted by  the Special Judge, Anti-Corruption (Central), U.P., Lucknow  for offences punishable under sections 120B IPC, 161, 5(1)(d)  read with section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act,  1947 (for short ’the Act’) and sentenced to undergo 2 years’ RI  under section 161 IPC and section 5(1)(d) read with section  5(2) of the Act, and were further directed to pay a fine of  Rs.500 for an offence punishable under sections 120B and 161  IPC and section 5(2) of the Act; in default to undergo further  sentence of 6 months’ RI. In an appeal filed by the appellants,  the High Court of Allahabad, Lucknow, while dismissing the  said appeals, reduced the sentence to one year RI. It is against  the said order of the High Court that the two appellants are  before us in these two appeals. The basic facts necessary for the  disposal of these appeals are as follows :

       At the relevant time, Suleman Tayyab A-1 was working  as a LDC in ’B’ Ward, Circle II, Income Tax Office, Lucknow  and also as a Record Keeper. S.N. Dixit A-2, the appellant in  the connected appeal before us was then working as a Class IV  employee in the same office and was assigned the work of a  ’Farash’. One Surendra Kumar PW-3 who was a partner in the  firm M/s. Singhal Paper Products had applied to the ITO  concerned to return the copy of the partnership deed filed in the  said office since he wanted the same for obtaining a loan from a  Bank. An application in this regard was moved on 21.5.1980 on  which the concerned ITO passed an order on 26.5.1980 to  return the said document after retaining a copy on record. This  order of the ITO was sent to A-1 through A-2 for compliance. It  is stated that on receiving the said order, A-1 told PW-3 that he  was very busy on that day, hence, he will not be available to  trace out the document immediately. However, PW-3 impressed  upon A-1 as to his urgency in getting the document whereupon  A-1 allegedly demanded Rs.50 as bribe to return the document  on the same day. On PW-3 agreeing to pay the said sum of  money, A-1 told him that the document in question would be  returned to him by about 5.30 p.m. that day at India Coffee  House, Hazratganj and that he should pay the amount of Rs.50  when the document is delivered. The further case of the  prosecution is though PW-3 agreed to pay the said amount, he  was angered by the said demand hence he went and lodged a  complaint Ex. Ka-7. The S.P./CBI/SPE, Lucknow, ordered   registration of the case upon which FIR Ex. Ka-9 was  registered. Said SP/CBI entrusted the case to Inspector R.K.

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Singh, PW-6, for laying a trap. For the purpose of having  independent witnesses, the investigating agency wrote a letter  to the Central Excise Department to depute two Inspectors to  the office of the CBI on the same day. The Assistant Collector,  Central Excise then directed V.K. Saxena PW-1 and S.L.  Banodha PW-2 to attend the CBI office on the same day which  they did at about 4.15 p.m. After recording the statement of  PW-3, PW-6, the Inspector directed PW-3 the complainant to  procure the money which was to be paid as bribe and on receipt  of 5 ten-rupee notes the said notes were treated with  phenolphthalein powder and PW-3 was instructed to give the  said notes to A-1 when he receives the document. At about 5.25  p.m. when PW-3 and rest of the party had taken their allotted  place in and near the Coffee House, they noticed A-2 coming  over to PW-3 and handing over the document to him and  obtaining a receipt for the same and immediately thereafter it  was noticed that he collected the money also. On being  signalled the concerned officers approached A-2 and identified  themselves at which point of time it is stated that A-2 gave the  money to PW-6. Since at that place a large number of people  had gathered they took A-2 and PW-3 along with other  witnesses to the nearby fire station and on testing the fingers of  A-2 by phenolphthalein test, it was noticed that A-2 had  handled the said currency. It is based on the said result of the  trap and further investigation conducted by the CBI, a  chargesheet was filed against the appellants herein and as stated  above, the two courts below have found the appellants guilty  and convicted them.

         Mr. P P Malhotra and Mr. S C Maheshwari, learned  senior counsel appearing for the appellants, firstly contended  that in view of the provisions of section 196(2) of the Code of  Criminal Procedure, 1898 (the Code), the trial court could not  have taken cognizance of the offence punishable under section  120B IPC without the consent in writing  of the State  Government or the District Magistrate concerned. Cognizance  of the offence punishable under section 120B IPC can be taken  without consent under the aforesaid provisions only if the  offence is one punishable with death, imprisonment for life or  rigorous imprisonment for a term of two years or upwards. In  the instant case, according to them, since no such consent was  taken, the trial court could not have taken cognizance of the  offence punishable under section 120B IPC. Section 120B IPC  makes it abundantly clear that whoever is charged of a criminal  conspiracy to commit an offence punishable with death,  imprisonment for life or rigorous imprisonment for a term of  two years or upwards, shall where no expressed provision is  made in the Code, for the punishment of such a conspiracy, be  punished in the same manner as if he had abetted such offence.  In the instant case the appellants were charged of having  conspired to commit an offence punishable under section 161  IPC.  

         A mere perusal of section 161 IPC and section 5(1)(d) of  the Act would make it obvious that the maximum punishment  which can be imposed under section 161 IPC (as it then stood)  is imprisonment of either description which may extend to three  years or with fine or with both. For the offence under section  5(1)(d) of the Act, the punishment prescribed is imprisonment  for a term which shall not be less than one year but which may  extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine. Thus, the  conspiracy to commit either of the offences was punishable  with imprisonment for a term exceeding two years rigorous  imprisonment and, therefore, in our view section 196(2) of the  Code had no application because in respect of both the

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offences, the Court had jurisdiction to pass a sentence of over  two years’ rigorous imprisonment. The submission that it was  permissible for the Court to award simple imprisonment for any  term subject to the maximum prescribed and, therefore, section  196(2) of the Code was applicable, cannot be accepted. Equally  without substance is the submission that the conspiracy alleged  must be compulsorily punishable with rigorous imprisonment  for a term exceeding two years, leaving no discretion in the  Court to pass a lesser sentence. The true test is whether the  conspiracy alleged was punishable with a term of imprisonment  exceeding two years’ rigorous imprisonment and, as we have  noticed earlier, it was so in the instant case having regard to the  punishment prescribed for the offences under section 5(1)(d) of  the Act as well as section 161 IPC. Therefore this argument of  the appellants has to be rejected.

         It was then contended that the presumption of guilt  available to the prosecution under section 4 of the Act would  not be available for an offence punishable under section 5(1)(d)  of the Act. This argument is based on the language of section  5(1)(d) which reads thus :        

"5. Criminal misconduct.\027(1) A public servant is  said to commit the offence of criminal misconduct  --             (a) to (c)      x       x       x

       (d) if he, by corrupt or illegal means or by  otherwise abusing his position as public servant,  obtains for himself or for any other person any  valuable thing or pecuniary advantage."

       According to learned counsel for the appellants, since  according to the prosecution case itself the bribe in question  was not received by A-1 himself, the said presumption is not  available to the prosecution. This argument again has to be  noted only to be rejected because that is not the intendment of  section 4 or 5(1)(d) of the Act. The words "obtains for himself"  connote not only receiving the bribe personally but receipt of  any bribe either directly or indirectly. The interpretation given  by learned counsel for the appellants to section 5(1)(d) if  accepted, would do violence to that section hence this argument  is also rejected.

        Nextly, it was argued by the learned counsel that under  section 161 IPC as it stood at the relevant point of time made it  an offence only if the bribe is received/obtained with a view to  render any service with the Government concerned. In the  instant case it is submitted that even according to the  prosecution, giving of the bribe was for the purpose of  receiving a document back from the custody of the Department  which cannot be treated as an act of the Government. This  argument also in our opinion is without any substance. The  document in question was produced before the income-tax  authorities for some official purpose and was in its custody.  When the ITO directed the return of the document, he was  doing an official duty on behalf of the Government. The order  that he passed for the return of the document was an official  order and any act which has to be done to fulfil or comply with  the said order will also be an official act hence when A-1 was  directed to return back the document, A-1 was not acting in a  private capacity, he was doing an official act hence if in that  process he demands bribe, it would be an offence under section  161 IPC as it stood then.

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       Having considered the legal arguments we will now  consider the factual arguments. Learned counsel appearing for  A-2 argued that there is no material to show that A-2 was a  party to the conspiracy to demand and receive bribe and the  prosecution has failed to establish that the money collected by  A-2 was bribe money therefore A-2 cannot be held to be guilty  for merely receiving Rs.50 for and on behalf of A-1 in the  absence of any material to show that either he had a share in the  money or he had knowledge that he was collecting this money  on behalf of A-1. This argument also has no legs to stand. It is  seen from the evidence led by the prosecution that when the  ITO passed the order on 26.5.1980 and directed A-2 to take that  order to A-1, he took the same along with PW-3 and was  present when A-1 made the demand for Rs.50, therefore, A-2  had the knowledge as to the demand made by A-1. The  necessary inference therefore should be that A-2 who was also  present when the bribe money was demanded definitely knew  the money he was collecting was bribe money. This is more so  in the background of the fact that no explanation has been given  by A-2 in this regard in his statement under section 313 of the  Code. If A-2 was present when the bribe money was demanded,  he definitely knew that it was being asked for delivering the  document. That apart, the fact that he carried the document to  the Coffee House and refused to reduce the amount by saying  that A-1 would be suspicious of him, would clearly indicate the  fact that A-2 was receiving the money knowing it to be a bribe  for and on behalf of A-1, therefore, in our opinion, that part of  the conspiracy and acceptance of the bribe money knowingly  stands proved.

       The learned counsel tried to take support from the  evidence of DW-2, the lawyer, who applied for the return of the  document. Having perused the same we do not find any  material in the evidence of this witness which would help the  appellant.

       Mr. S C Maheshwari, learned senior counsel, in support  of his arguments relied on three judgments of this Court in  M.K. Harshan v. State of Kerala (1996 (11) SCC 720),  Sadashiv Mahadeo Yavaluje and Gajanan Shripatrao Salokhe v.  State of Maharashtra (1990 (1) SCC 299); and State of Madhya  Pradesh v. J.B. Singh [JT 2000 (7) SC 539]. We do not think  that the said judgments are based on any principle of law and  the same were decided on facts of those cases and the facts of  this case being not similar, we are of the opinion that the said  judgments are of no assistance to the appellants.

       Then it is argued on behalf of the appellants that the  incident in question having taken place nearly 23 years ago, the  appellants have already suffered sufficiently and we should take  a lenient view of the matter and award a lesser sentence. We  notice that the two appellants who were Government servants  have since lost their jobs and all retiral benefits and the  prolonged litigation has caused considerable loss and suffering.  Bearing in mind the fact that both the appellants have crossed  60 years of age, we think it appropriate that the sentence of 1  year RI imposed by the High Court should be further reduced to  a period of 6 months. Therefore, for the reasons recorded  hereinabove, we alter the sentence awarded by the High Court  for offences punishable under section 120B IPC, 161, 5(1)(d)  read with 5(2) of the Act to 6 months’ RI. We do not think it is  necessary to award separate sentences under other provisions of

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the Act for which they have been sentenced by the trial court.  The sentence already undergone, if any, will be given set off.  The appellants are on bail. Their bail-bonds shall stand  cancelled. They shall surrender to their bail-bonds. The appeals  are partly allowed.