http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 17  

PETITIONER: SHER SINGH (DEAD) BY LRS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: JOINT DIRECTOR OF CONSOLIDATION & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT05/05/1978

BENCH: SINGH, JASWANT BENCH: SINGH, JASWANT UNTWALIA, N.L. PATHAK, R.S.

CITATION:  1978 AIR 1341            1978 SCR  (3) 982  1978 SCC  (3) 172

ACT: U.P.  Consolidation  of  Holdings  Act,  1953  Section   48- Revisional  powers of the Joint Director  of  Consolidation- Scope of.

HEADNOTE: By lease deed dated July 20, 1945 for a period of ten  years beginning  from the year 1353 fasli to the end of  the  year 1362 fasli, registered in his favour, the original appellant Sher  Singh  obtained  possession  of  ten  plots  of   land admeasuring  6.63  acres  situate  in  Mahal  Safed,   Mouza Mahendri,  Sikandarpur, Pargana Amroha, District  Moradabad, U.P. and was mutated in the Revenue Record as a  "hereditary tenant".  Later, on September 6, 1945 a sale deed in respect of the proprietary right and interest in the said lands were executed by the Zamindars in favour of Kaley Singh,  Harbans Singh and Nihal Singh, brothers of Sher Singh and one Chajju Singh.   Asserting their right of preemption in  respect  of the  aforementioned  sale on the ground of  they  being  co- sharers  in the Mahal in which the said plots were  situate, Jai  Kumar Singh and Roop Chand Singh, respondents 2  and  3 herein brought four suits in the Court of Munsif,  Moradabad against  the aforesaid vendors and vendees and the  original appellant Sher Singh for possession of the land as also  for cancellation  of  the lease in favour of Sher Singh  on  the ground  that  it  was  fictitious  and  fraudulent  and  was executed  with a view to defeat their right of  pre-emption. The  suits were decreed as prayed for and on further  appeal confirmed  by  the  Civil Judge,  Moradabad.   Although  the vendees  did  not carry an appeal,  the  original  appellant preferred  a  further appeal to the High  Court.   The  High Court  allowed  the appeal, holding that the  revenue  court alone had jurisdiction to entertain the suits seeking relief of  ejectment  of  the lessee and the  civil  court  had  no jurisdiction,  set  aside  the decree  passed  against  him. Meanwhile  the  U.P. Zamindari Abolition and  Land  Reforms. Act,  1950 (U.P. Act 1 of 1951) came into force with  effect from  the  commencement of the 1360 fasli in July  1,  1952. Pursuant to the observations of the High Court,  Respondents 2 & 3 filed ejectment suits against Sher Singh under section 209  of Act 1 of 1951, which were dismissed.  First  appeals

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 17  

preferred  against  them also proved  abortive.   In  second appeals the High Court stayed the orders of the Courts below on   account  of  the  commencement  of  the   consolidation operations  in the village.. Thereafter Respondents 2 and  3 filed  objections  under section 9(2) of the  U.P.  Consoli- dation  of Holdings Act, 1953 disputing the  correctness  of the  entries in the record showing Sher Singh as  "Bhumidar" and  praying  that the latter’s name be  expunged  from  the records  and  in  his place their names  be  substituted  as Bhumidars,  but the same was rejected by  the  Consolidation Officer IV at Kanth.  The Settlement Officer in first appeal and  the Deputy Director, Consolidation, Lucknow  in  second appeal  confirmed it.  In the revision application under  s. 48  of  the 1953 Act, the Joint  Director  of  Consolidation allowed  it, holding that the lease in favour of Sher  Singh was fictitious with intention to defraud the pre-emptors and that the claim of respondents 2 and 3 was covered by Section 18  of  the  Act.   The  Director,  therefore,  ordered  the substitution of their names in the revenue record as holders of  the land as "Khudkhast"  (self-cultivating  possession). The  appellant  challenged the said order by way of  a  writ petition which was dismissed. Allowing the appeal by special leave, the Court HELD : (1) Section 48 of the U.P. Consolidation of  Hollings Act, as it stood on the relevant date, before its  amendment by  Act No. VIII of 1963 is pari materia with S. 115 of  the Civil  Procedure Code.  The revisional jurisdiction  of  the High  Court  is confined to cases of  illegal  or  irregular exercise  or  non  exercise or  illegal  assumption  of  the jurisdiction by the subordinate courts. 983 If a subordinate court is found to possess the  jurisdiction to  decide  a  matter,  it cannot be  said  to  exercise  it illegally or with’ material irregularity even it it  decides the  matter wrongly.  In other words, it is not open to  the High  Court while exercising its jurisdiction under  section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure to correct errors of fact howsoever gross or even errors of law unless the errors have relation  to  the  jurisdiction  of the  Court  to  try  the ;dispute itself. [987 F-H] Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure empowers the High Court  to  satisfy itself on three matters :  (a)  that  the order  of the subordinate court is within its  jurisdiction; (b)  that the case is one in which the Court ought  to  have exercised jurisdiction and failed to do so; and (c) that  in exercising  jurisdiction the Court has not acted  illegally, that  is,  in  breach of some provisions  of  law,  or  with material irregularity by committing some error of  procedure in the course of the trial which is material in that it  may have  affected the ultimate decision. And if the High  Court is satisfied that   there  is no error in regard to  any  of these  three  matters, it has no power to  interfere  merely because  it differs from the conclusions of the  subordinate court  on questions of fact or law.  A distinction  must  be drawn between the errors committed by subordinate courts  in deciding  questions  of law which have relation to,  or  are concerned  with,  questions  of  jurisdiction  of  the  said Courts,  and  errors of law which have no such  relation  or connection.  An erroneous decision on a question of fact  or of  law  reached  by  the subordinate  court  which  has  no relation  to question of jurisdiction of that court,  cannot be corrected by the High Court under Section 115. [989  F-G, 990 A-B] Applying  the  tests to the facts of the instant,  case,  it must  be  held  that the  Joint  Director  of  Consolidation

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 17  

ignored the limitation that existed on his power under S. 48 of  the  1953  ’Act as it stood on  the  relevant  date  and illegally  assumed  jurisdiction which he did  not  possess. [990 B-C] Rajah  Amir Hassan Khan v. Sheo Baksh Singh, [1884]  LR.  11 I.A. 237; Balakrishna Udayar v. Vasudeva Aiyar, [1917] LR 44 I.A.  261;  N. S. Venkatagiri Ayyangar  v.  Hindu  Religious Endowments Board, Madras, [1948-49] LR 76 I.A. 67;  Manindra Land  and Building Corporation Ltd. v. Bhutnath  Banerjee  & Ors., [1964] 3 SCR 495; Vora Abbashhai Ali-mohammed v.  Haji Gulamnabi  Haji Safibhai,, AIR, 1964 SC 134; D.L.F.  Housing Construction Co. Pvt.  Ltd. New Delhi v. Sarup Singh & Ors., [1930]  2 SCR 368; Pandurang Dhoni Chougute v.  Maruti  Hari Jadhav,  [1956]  1 SCR 102 and M. L. Sethi v. R.  P.  Kapur, [1973] 1 SCR 697 applied. (2)(a) The Joint Director of Consolidation was not competent to   interfere,  with  the  decisions  of  the   subordinate consolidation  authorities who have not acted  illegally  in exercising  their  jurisdiction.  It is not  and  cannot  be disputed  that the consolidation authorities subordinate  to the  Joint  Director  possessed  plenary  jurisdiction   and competence  to  go into the question of the  correctness  or otherwise  of the entries in the revenue records.   Relating to  Sher  Singh’s  possession  over the  plots  of  land  in question  and they arrived at. a concurrent finding of  fact that Sher Singh was in actual possession of the land on  his own  behalf  on  the  relevant date  on  the  basis  of  the aforesaid valid lease deed and that neither the vendees  had even  held  the land in question as  khukhasht  holders  nor could they be deemed to be so. [990 C-D, 991 E-D] (b)  Mere relationship of Sher Singh with three out of  four vendees  on  which the Joint Director of  Consolidation  has relied  was  not  enough to warrant  the  finding  that  the aforesaid  lease grated in his favour was  fictitious.  Even the subsequent transfer of the land in question in favour of his nephew to which reference has been made in a casual  and laconic manner by the Joint Director of Consolidation cannot lead  to the conclusion that the lease was  fictitious.   No evidence which may indicate as to when the said transfer was made  nor has any material been placed before the  Court  to show  that   the  nephew  in  whose  favour  the  land   was transferred  was  the son of any one of Sher  Singh’s  three brothers who were povendees with Chajju Singh.  The 984 nature and character of the so called transfer by Sher Singh in favour of his nephew is also shrouded in mystery.  In the circumstances,   the  finding  of  the  Joint  Director   of Consolidation  that  the aforesaid lease in favour  of  Sher Singh was fictitious cannot be sustained. [991 D-F] (3)The  1953  Act  was designed  by  the  State  Legislature principally  to  do  away with the  zamindary  system  which involved  intermediaries between the tiller of the soil  and the  State in Uttar Pradesh, to provide for the  acquisition of  their rights, title and interest and to reform  the  law relating  to  land  tenure  consequent  upon  the  aforesaid abolition  and  acquisition.   To attain  this  object,  the legislature  empowered  the State Government to  declare  by means  of a notification that as from a specified date,  all estates  situate  in Uttar Pradesh or in specified  area  or areas  thereof  shall  vest in the State  and  as  from  the beginning  of that date (which would be called the  date  of vesting),  all such estates shall stand transferred  to  and vest  except as provided in the Act, in the State free  from all encumbrances. [991 G-H, 992 A] A close scrutiny of the facts and circumstances of the  case

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 17  

in the light of the provisions of Section 3(28) read with S. 3(9)  of and Sections 6, 7, 18, 19, 20, 131, 134, 135,  136, of  the 1953 Act, leaves no room for doubt that Sher  rights of a Bhumidar.  There is nothing on the record lease deed in favour  of  Sher Singh was fictitious or  that  the  revenue record  on  the basis of that deed were not conform  to  the true factual position and that Sher Singh      of the fields in question on  his own behalf.  Consequently as Sher  Singh was  holding the said fields as a hereditary tenant  on  the date  immediately preceding the date of vesting,  he  became entitled  to retain possession thereof as a Sirdar under  S. 19  of the Act and on depositing to the credit of the  State Government  in the manner provided in section 134 and  other allied  provisions of the Act an amount equal to  ten  times the  land revenue payable or deemed to be payable he  became entitled to a declaration that he had acquired the rights of a  Bhumidhar mentioned in section 137 of the Act in  respect of the said fields and to the grant of a certificate to that effect. [998 E-H]

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 4 of 1969. Appeal  by special leave from the Judgment and  Decree/Order dated 31-10-67 of the Allahabad High Court in Special Appeal No. 238 of 1966. R.   K.  Garg,  S.  C. Agarwal and V.  J.  Francis  for  the Appellant. B.   P. Singh for Respondents Nos. 2-3. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by JASWANT SINGH, J. The litigation culminating in this  appeal by special leave has a long and chequered history which  may be summarised thus By  deed dated July 20, 1945, registered on July  30,  1945, Chaudhary  Vijay  Kunwar singh and  virendra  kunwar  Singh, Zamin- dars of Mithanpur (U.P) leased out ten plots of  land admeasuring 6.63 acres situate in Mahal Safed Mouza Mahendri Sikandarpur Pargana  Amroha District Moradabad which were in their possession as khudkhast’ (self-cultivating possession) to  Sher Singh the original  appellant, for a period of  ten years  beginning from the year 1353 Fasli to the end of  the year  1362 Fasli.  Nearly a month and a half later  i.e.  on September 6, 1945 the said Chaudhary, Vijay Kunwar Singh 985 and  Virendra  Kunwar  Singh alongwith  their  mother,  Smt. Savitri  Kunwar  Singh, executed a sale deed in  respect  of their proprietary right and interest in the aforesaid  plots of  land in favour of Kaley Singh, Harbans Singh  and  Nihal Singh, brothers of Sher Singh, and one Chajju Singh.  On the basis  of  this  lease deed, Sher  Singh,  claimed  to  have obtained  possession of the aforesaid plots of land and  was recorded  as a hereditary tenant in respect thereof  in  the revenue  record.   Asserting their right of  pre-emption  in respect  of the aforesaid transaction of sale on the  ground of  their  being co-sharers in the Mahal in which  the  said plots  of land are, situate, Jai Kumar Singh and Roop  Kumar Singh, respondents 2 and 3 herein, brought four suits in the Court of the Munsif, Moradabad against the aforesaid vendors and  vendees  and Sher Singh for possession of the  land  as also for cancellation of the aforesaid lease deed in  favour of  Sher  Singh  on the ground that it  was  fictitious  and fraudulant  and  was executed with a view  to  defeat  their right  of  pre-emption.   These suits were  decreed  by  the Munsif  in favour of respondents 2 and 3 on April 26,  1947.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 17  

On appeal, the Civil Judge, Moradabad, by Ms judgment  dated November 9, 1948 affirmed the judgment and decree passed  by the  trial  court.  Although the vendors,  Kaley  Singh  and others did not prefer an appeal from the pre-emption  decree passed  against  them, Sher Singh did not rest  content  and took  the  matter  in further appeal to the  High  Court  of Judicature  at  Allahabad  in so far as  his  right  to  and ejectment   from   the  plots  of  land  in   question   and cancellation of the aforesaid lease deed in his favour  were concerned.  By its judgment and decree dated April 13, 1953, the  High  Court allowed’ the appeal of Sher  Singh  holding that the revenue courts alone had jurisdiction to  entertain the  suit  seeking relief of ejectment of the  lessee  (Sher Singh)  and the civil courts had no such jurisdiction.   The High  Court accordingly set aside the decree passed  against Sher Singh.  Meanwhile the Uttar Pradesh Legislature  passed the  U.P.  Zamindari Abolition and Land  Reforms  Act,  1950 (U.P.  Act No. 1 of 1951) (hereinafter referred to  as  ’the Act’).   ’though  the Act came into force in  the  State  on January 26, 1951, the issue of notification under section  4 thereof  was made to coincide with the commencement of  1360 Fasli i.e. July 1, 1952.  Pursuant to the observations  made by the High Court in its aforesaid judgment dated April  13, 1953,  disposing of the appeal of Sher Singh, respondents  2 and 3 filed ejectment suits against Sher Singh under section 209  of the Act which were dismissed on November  20,  1953. The  first appeals preferred against the dismissal of  these suits  also  proved  abortive  as  they  were  dismissed  on September  1, 1959.  Respondents 2 and 3 thereupon took  the matter  in second appeal to the High Court which was  stayed on   account  of  the  commencement  of  the   consolidation operations  in  the village. in which the plots of  land  in question are situate.  Thereafter respondents 2 and 3  filed objections  under section 9(2) of the U.P. Consolidation  of Holdings  Act,  1953  (hereinafter called  ’the  1953  Act’) disputing  the  correctness of the entries  in  the  records showing  Sher  Singh as ’Bhumidar’ of the plots of  land  in question and praying that the latter’s name be expunged from the records and in his place, their names be substituted  as Bhumidars  but the same were rejected by  the  Consolidation Officer IV at Kanth vide his orders dated December 24, 1961. The order passed by the 12-329SCI/78 986 Consolidation  Officer, Kanth, rejecting the  objections  of respondents 2 and 3 to the entries in the records was upheld by  the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, Amroha, in  first appeal as also by the Deputy Director, Consolidation,  U.P., Lucknow  in second appeal by orders made on April  16,  1961 and  August 21, 1962 respectively.  Dissatisfied with  these orders of the Consolidation authorities, respondents 2 and 3 took the matter in revision under section 48 of the 1953 Act to the Joint Director of Consolidation, U.P. who allowed the same   and   set  aside  the  concurrent   orders   of   the Consolidation  Officer,,  the  Settlement  Officer  and  the Deputy  Director, Consolidation, holding that the  lease  in favour of Sher Singh was fictitious; that the basis of  Sher Singh’s  title  viz. the aforesaid  lease  being  fictitious intended to defraud the preemptors, the recorded entries  in favour  of Sher Singh could confer no title upon  him;  that Sher Singh’s position could be deemed to be only that of  an agent carrying on cultivation on behalf of his brothers, the vendees,  who were entitled to the land in view of the  sale in their favour till it was pre-empted and that ’the  effect of  his finding would be that the possession of  Sher  Singh

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 17  

after  execution  of  the Patta shall be deemed  to  be  the possession of the vendees as Sher Singh bad himself no title to the land.’ Finally holding that the case of respondents 2 and  3  was covered by section 18 of the Act  and  that  the possession of the vendees would ensure to the benefit of the pre-emptors,  the Joint Director ordered their names  to  be substituted  in  the relevant records  observing  that  they would  be deemed to be holders of the land  as  ’kbudkbast’. It is this order of the Joint Director which was  challenged before  the  High Court by Sher Singh  in  writ  proceedings under  Article  226 of the Constitution and on  the  failure thereof has been impugned before us. Appearing  for the appellants, Mr. Garg has  contended  that since  the jurisdiction exercisable by the  Joint  Director, Consolidation, under section 48 of the 1953 Act as it  stood on  the  relevant  date was limited to cases  of  errors  of jurisdiction  and  the orders passed  by  the  Consolidation Officers subordinate to him did not suffer from any such in- firmity the Joint Director, Consolidation, clearly  exceeded the limits of his power by reversing the concurrent findings of  fact arrived at and the orders passed by them.   He  has further  urged that the finding of the Joint  Director  that the lease in favour of Sher Singh was fictitious cannot also be  upheld as there is no material on the record to  sustain that  finding  and  all  the  authorities  below  the  Joint Director  bad concurrently held that the lease in favour  of Sher  Singh  was  valid  and that he  had  not  merely  been recorded  in the revenue records as being in  possession  of the  land  in  question  but  was  found  to  be  in  actual possession  thereof  pursuant  to the lease  deed.   He  has further urged that as Sher Singh actually held the land as a hereditary tenant on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting he became sirdar of the land under section 19  of the Act and on deposit to the credit of the State Government an  amount equal to ten times the land revenue, in terms  of section 134 of the Act he became a Bhumidar.  He has in  the alternative urged that as Sher Singh was in self-cultivating occupation of the land on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting  987 and was recorded as such  in the relevant records, he at any rate  acquired the right of an adhivasi under section  20(b) (ii) of the Act. Mr. Lalnarayan Sinha has, on the other hand, urged that  the subordinate   consolidation  officers  having   omitted   to determine  the vital question of the validity of  the  lease deed  in  favour  of  Sher  Singh,  the  Joint  Director  of Consolidation  was  justified  in going into  the  same  and coming  to  the  conclusion  (on  the  basis  of  the  close relationship  of  Sher  Singh  with  the  vendees  and   the subsequent transfer by him of the plots of land in  question in  favour of his nephew) that the transaction of the  lease was  sham and fictitious.  He has further urged that  actual physical occupation of the land is not essential to  attract the  applicability  of  section  18  of  the  Act  and   the requirement   of  the  section  is  satisfied   even.   when subsisting  right and title to possession over the  land  on the date of vesting on the basis of decree of pre-emption as in  the instant case is established.  He has  further  urged that  the entries in the revenue records in favour  of  Sher Singh  being fictitious and his possession of the  plots  of land in question being merely on behalf of the vendees, Sher Singh could neither acquire sirdari rights under section  19 nor adhivasi rights under section 20(b) (ii) of the Act., The  principal question that falls for our determination  in

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 17  

this  case  is whether in passing the  impugned  order,  the Joint Director of Consolidation, exceeded the limits of  the jurisdiction  conferred on him under section 48 of the  1953 Act.   For  a  proper  decision  of  this  question,  it  is necessary  to  advert to section 48 of the 1953  Act  is  it stood  on the relevant date before its amendment by Act  No. VIII of 1963               "Section  48  of  the  U.P.  Consolidation  of               Holdings  Act: The Director  of  Consolidation               may  call  for the record of any case  if  the               Officer  (other than the Arbitrator)  by  whom               the case was decided appears to have exercised               a jurisdiction not vested in him by law or  to               have   failed  to  exercise  jurisdiction   so               vested,  or to have acted in the  exercise  of               his jurisdiction illegally or with substantial               irregularity  and may pass such orders in  the               case as it thinks fit." As the above section is pari materia with section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it will be profitable to  ascertain the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High  Court. It  is now well settled that the revisional jurisdiction  of the High Court is confined to cases of illegal or  irregular exercise  or  non-exercise  or  illegal  assumption  of  the jurisdiction  by the subordinate courts.  If  a  subordinate court  is  found  to possess the jurisdiction  to  decide  a matter,  it cannot be said to exercise it illegally or  with material irregularity even if it decides the matter wrongly. In other words, it is not open to the High Court while exer- cising  its  jurisdiction under section 115 of the  Code  of Civil Procedure to correct errors of fact howsoever gross or even  errors of law unless the errors have relation  to  the jurisdiction of the- court to try the dispute itself. 988 The  legal  position was succinctly laid down by  the  Privy Council  as early as 1884 in Rajah Amir Hassan Khan v.  Sheo Baksh Singh(1) in the following words :-               "The  question then is, did the judges of  the               lower Courts in this case, in the exercise  of               their  jurisdiction,  act  illegally  or  with               material  irregularity.  It appears that  they               had   perfect  jurisdiction  to   decide   the               question  which was before them, and they  did               decide  it.  Whether they decided  rightly  or               wrongly, they had jurisdiction to decide  the,               case;  and even if they decided wrongly,  they               did not exercise their jurisdiction  illegally               or with material irregularity." Again  in Balakrishna Udayar v. Vasudeva Aiyar(2) the  Privy Council  while  discussing the scope of section 115  of  the Code of Civil Procedure observed :               "It will be observed that the section  applies               to jurisdiction alone, the irregular  exercise               or   non-exercise  of  it,  or   the   illegal               assumption of it.  The section is not directed               against  conclusions of law or fact  in  which               the question of jurisdiction is not involved." In N. S. Venkatagiri Ayyangar v. Hindu Religious  Endowments Board,  Madras(3), the Privy Council observed that  "section 115  empowers  the  High Court to satisfy  itself  on  three matters,  (a)  that the order of the  subordinate  court  is within  its jurisdiction; (b) that the case is one in  which the  Court  ought to exercise jurisdiction and (c)  that  in exercising  jurisdiction the Court has not acted  illegally, that  is,  in  breach  of some provision  of  law,  or  with

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 17  

material irregularity, that is, by committing some error  of procedure  in the course of the trial which is  material  in that it may have affected the ultimate decision.  And if the High  Court is satisfied on those three matters, it  has  no power  to interfere because it differs from the  conclusions of the subordinate court on questions of fact or law." The above quoted observations made by the Privy Council have been  approved  and affirmed by this Court in  a  number  of cases.   In Manindra Land and Building Corporation  Ltd.  v. Bhutnath  Banerjee & Ors. (4) Vora Abbashhal Ali-mohomed  v. Haji  Gulamnabi  Haji  Safibhai(5)  and  D.L.F.  Housing   & Construction Company Private Ltd., New Delhi v. Sarup  Singh &  Ors.(6), this Court, however, draw a distinction  between the  errors  committed  by subordinate  courts  in  deciding questions  of law which have relation to, or  are  concerned with, question of jurisdiction of the said court, and errors of law which have no such relation or connection. (1)  (1884) LR. 11 LA. 237. (2)  (1917) LR 44 I.A. 261. (3)  (1948-49) LR 76 I.A. 67. (4)  [1964] 3 S.C.R. 495. (5)  AIR 1964 SC 1341. (6)  [1970] 2 S.C.R. 368.  989 Again  in Pandurang Dhoni Chougate v. Maruti Hari  Jadhav(1) this Court held :               "The  provisions  of s. 115 of the  Code  have               been examined by judicial decisions on several               occasions.  While exercising its  jurisdiction               under s. 115, it is not competent to the  High               Court to correct errors of fact however  gross               they may be, or even errors of law, unless the               said errors have relation to the  jurisdiction               of  the Court to try the dispute  itself.   As               clauses  (a), (b) and (c) of s. 115  indicate,               it  is  only in cases  where  the  subordinate               Court has exercised a jurisdiction not  vested               in  it  by law, or has failed  to  exercise  a               jurisdiction  so vested, or has acted  in  the               exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with               material  irregularity  that  the   revisional               jurisdiction of the High Court can be properly               invoked.  It is conceivable that points of law               may  arise  in proceedings  instituted  before               subordinate   courts  which  are  related   to               questions of jurisdiction.  It is well settled               that  a  plea of limitation or a plea  of  res               judicata  is a plea of law which concerns  the               jurisdiction  of  the court  which  tries  the               proceedings.   A  findings on these  pleas  in               favour  of the party raising them  would  oust               the  jurisdiction  of  the court  and  so,  an               erroneous decision on these pleas can be  said               to be concerned with questions of jurisdiction               which fall within the purview of s. 115 of the               Code.  But an erroneous decision on a question               of law reached by the subordinate court  which               has  no relation to questions of  jurisdiction               of that court cannot be corrected by the  High               Court under S. 115."               Again  in M. L. Sethi v. R. P. Kapur(2),  this               Court observed               "The  ’jurisdiction’ is a verbal coat of  many               colours.   Jurisdiction  originally  seems  to               have had the meaning which Lord Reid  ascribed

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 9 of 17  

             to  it  in  Anisminic  Ltd.  v.  Foreign  Com-               pensation  Commissioner  (1969)  2  A.C.  147,               namely,  the  entitlement ’to enter  upon  the               enquiry   in  question’.   If  there  was   an               entitlement to enter upon an enquiry into  the               question, then any subsequent error could only               be   regarded   as   an   error   within   the               jurisdiction." The  position  that  emerges from these  decisions  is  that section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure empowers the High Court  to  satisfy itself on three matters :  (a)  that  the order  of the subordinate court is within its  jurisdiction; (b)  that the case is one in which the court ought  to  have exercised  jurisdiction;  and failed to do so  (c)  that  in exercising  jurisdiction the Court has not acted  illegally, that  is,  in  breach of some provisions  of  law,  or  with material irregularity by committing some error of  procedure in the course of the trial which is material in that it  may have affected the) ultimate decision.  And if the High Court is  satisfied  that there is no error in regard  to  any  of these  three  matters, it has no power to  interfere  merely because it differs from (1)  [1956] 1 S.C.R. 102. (2)  [1973] 1 S.C.R. 697. 990 the  conclusions  of the subordinate court on  questions  of fact or law.  A distinction must be drawn between the errors committed by subordinate courts in deciding question of  law which have relation to, or are concerned with, questions  of jurisdiction  of  the said courts, and errors of  law  which have no such relation or connection.  An erroneous  decision on  a question of fact or of law reached by the  subordinate court  which has no relation to question of jurisdiction  of that  court,  cannot be corrected by the  High  Court  under section 115. Applying  the tests as extracted above to the facts  of  the instant  case,  we have no hesitation in  holding  that  the Joint Director of Consolidation ignored the limitation  that existed on his power under section 48 of the 1953 Act as  it stood   on   the  relevant  date   and   illegally   assumed jurisdiction which he did not possess. It  is  not and cannot be disputed  that  the  consolidation authorities   subordinate   to   the   Joint   Director   of Consolidation possessed plenary jurisdiction and  competence to  go into the question of the correctness or otherwise  of the entries in the revenue records relating to Sher  Singh’s possession  over the plots of land in question.   That  they arrived at a concurrent finding of fact that Sher Singh, was in  actual possession of the land on his own behalf  on  the relevant date on the basis of the aforesaid valid lease deed is also evident from the following observations made by  the Settlement  Officer, Consolidation, Amroha in his  aforesaid decision dated April 16, 1962 :-               "I have carefully gone through the record  and               also  heard  the  learned  counsels  for   the               parties  at length and also perused  the  case               law.  It is admitted that the appellants  have               never been able to obtain possession over  the               disputed land.  In the revenue records name of               respondent  Sher Singh exists throughout  from               1353  F upto the date of vesting  and  onwards               also.  Appellant’s allegation is that actually               the  brothers of Sher Singh who purchased  the               land in dispute are in possession but there is               absolutely no oral or documentary evidence  in

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 10 of 17  

             support  of  this contention.   Appellant  Jai               Kumar  Singh himself admits that in the.  land               purchased  by Kaley Singh, Chajjoo  Singh  and               others,  Sher Singh has no interest and  these               brothers  also take food separately.  I  agree               with  the learned Consolidation  Officer  that               the  simple fact that the  proprietary  rights               have been transferred to the brothers of  Sher               Singh  is not at all sufficient to prove  that               the  lease was a fictitious document  executed               simply  to  deprive the  appellants  of  their               rights of pre-emption.  It is worth mentioning               that  the  lease  was  executed  in  1945  and               zamindari  abolished  in 1952.   It  does  not               appeal  to me that any one could have an  idea               that  the interests of the landlords  will  be               extinguished in this manner and therefore  the               vendors executed a fictitious deed to  deprive               the appellant of his rights of pre-emption. ..               The  vendees Kaley Singh and others  had  only               purchased proprietary interest in the disputed               land   and  they  were  not  its  khud   kasht               holders......  It is obvious that Kaley  Singh               and  other the original vendees purchased  the               land subject to               991               the  possession of respondent Sher  Singh  and               their proprietary interest would have come  to               an   end   at  the  date   of   vesting.......               Considering  the entire evidence on record,  I               hold  that the land in dispute could not  have               been the khudkasht of the original vendees and               they could not have acquired Bhumidhari rights               u/s  18 of the Z.A. & L.R. Act  and  therefore               the  appellants who stepped into  their  shoes               cannot have better rights...... It may also be               mentioned  that respondent Sher Singh has  not               been in possession as a trespasser but on  the               basis of a valid lease." It   may  also  be  noted  that  the  Deputy   Director   of Consolidation  after  discussing  the  entire  evidence  and holding that Sher Singh was lessee in possession of the land and  neither the vendees had ever held the land in  question as  khudkhast  holders nor could they be deemed  to  be  the khudkhast holders thereof dismissed the appeal preferred  by respondents 2 and 3 with the following observations :-               "The  concurrent finding of the  lower  courts               was therefore correct and justified." Thus  the subordinate Consolidation authorities  not  having acted illegally in exercising their jurisdiction, the  Joint Director  of  Consolidation was not competent  to  interfere with their decisions. It  would be appropriate at this stage to observe that  were relationship of Sher Singh with three out of four vendees on which the Joint Director of Consolidation has relied was not enough  to  warrant  the finding that  the  aforesaid  lease granted  in his favour was fictitious.  Even the  subsequent transfer of the land in question in favour of his nephew  to which reference has been made in a casual and laconic manner by  the Joint Director of Consolidation cannot lead  to  the conclusion that the lease was fictitious.  Our attention has not been drawn to any evidence which may indicate as to when the said transfer was made nor has any material been  placed before us to show that the nephew  in whose favour the  land was transferred was the son of any one of    Sher    Singh’s

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 11 of 17  

three brothers who were co-vendees with Chajju Singh.  The nature and character of the so called transfer by Sher Singh in favour of his nephew is also shrouded in mystery.  In the circumstances,   the  finding  of  the  Joint  Director   of Consolidation  that  the aforesaid lease in favour  of  Sher Singh was fictitious cannot be sustained. Let  us now see whether Sher Singh acquired the rights of  a Bhumidhar,  or  a sirdar or an Adhivasi under the  Act.   It would  be apposite for this purpose to refer to  the  object and a few relevant provisions of the Act.  As apparent  from its preamble, the Act was designed by the State  Legislature principally  to  do  away with the  Zamindari  system  which involved  intermediaries between the tiller of the soil  and the  State in Uttar Pradesh, to provide for the  acquisition of  their rights, title and interest and to reform  the  law relating  to  land  tenure  consequent  upon  the  aforesaid abolition  and  acquisition.   To attain  this  object,  the Legislature empowered the, State Government to declare by 992 means  of a notification that as from a specified date,  all estates  situate  in Uttar Pradesh or in specified  area  or areas  thereof  shall  vest in the State and  as  from  the beginning  of that date (which would be called the  date  of vesting),  all such estates shall stand transferred  to  and vest  except as provided in the, Act in the State free  from all  encumbrances.  As already stated, though the  Act  came into force on January 25, 1951, the notification alluded  to in  section 4 was issued and published in the  Extraordinary issue  of the State Gazette on July 1, 1952 which  coincided with the commencement of 1360 Fasli. The  consequences of the vesting of an estate  ensuing  from the  notification  issued under section 4  are  detailed  in section 6 of the Act which, in so far as it is relevant  for the purpose of the case, provides as under               "6.  Consequences of the vesting of an  estate               in  the  State.When  the  notification   under               section  4 has been published in  the  Gazette               then,  notwithstanding anything  contained  in               any  contract or document or in any other  law               for  the  time  being in force  and  save  as,               otherwise  provided  in  this  Act,  the  con-               sequences as hereinafter set forth shall, from               the  beginning of the date of vesting,  ensure               in the area to which the notification related,               namely-               (a)   all  rights, title and interest  of  all               the intermediaries-               (i)   in  every estate in such area  including               land   (cultivable  or  barren),   grove-land,               forests  whether  within  or  outside  village               boundaries, trees (other than trees in village               abadi,  holding or grove),  fisheries,  tanks,               ponds,  water  channels,  ferries,   pathways,               abadi  sites,  hats, bazars and  melas  [other               than hats, bazars and melas held upon land  to               ,Which  clauses (a) to (c) of sub-section  (1)               of section 18 apply.], and               (ii)  in   all   sub-soil  in   such   estates               including   rights,  if  any,  in  mines and               minerals, whether being worked or not;               shall  cease  and be vested in  the  State  of               Uttar      Pradesh     free      from      all               encumbrances;........               (i)   all suits and proceedings of the  nature               to  be prescribed pending in any court at  the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 12 of 17  

             date of vesting, and all proceedings upon  any               decree  or  order passed in any such  suit  or               proceeding  previous to, the date of  vesting,               shall be stayed.........." Section  7 of the Act which deal with saving in  respect  of certain  rights inter alia lays down that nothing  contained in  Chapter  11 shall in any way affect the  right  of  any person-(aa) being a bhumidhar, sirdar, adhivasi, or asami of any land, to continue to enjoy any assessment or any similar right  for the more beneficial enjoyment of the land, as  he was enjoying on the date immediately preceding the date,  of vesting. 993 It would be convenient at this stage to notice sections  18, 19  and  20 of the Act which are couched  in  the  following terms :-               "18.    Settlement  of  certain   lands   with               intermediaries or cultivators as bhumidhars.-               (1)   Subject  to the provisions  of  Sections               10, 15, 16 and 17, all lands-               (a)   in possession of or held or deemed to be               held  by an intermediary as sir, khudkasht  or               an intermediary’s grove,               (b)   held  as a grove by, or in the  personal               cultivation of a permanent lessee in Avadh.               (c)   held  by a fixed-rate tenant or a  rent-               free grantee as such, or               (d)   held as such by-               (i)   an occupancy tenant,               (ii)  a hereditary tenant,               (iii) a tenant on patta dawami or to  transfer               the holdinstamrari referred to in  section 1 7               (e) held   by a grove-holder                possessing the right               to transfer the holding by sale               on the date immediately preceding the date  of               vesting  shall be deemed to be settled by  the               State   Government  with  such   intermediary,               lessee,  tenant, grantee or grove  holder,  as               the  case  may be, who shall, subject  to  the               provisions of this Act, be entitled to take or               retain possession as bhumidhar thereof.               (2)   Every  person  belonging  to  the  class               mentioned  in Section 3 or sub-section (2)  of               Section   3-A   of   the   United    Provinces               Agricultural    Tenants    (Acquisition     of               Privileges)  Act, 1949, who has  been  granted               the  declaration referred to in section  6  of               the  said  Act in respect of  any  holding  or               share thereof shall, unless the declaration is               subsequently  set aside, be deemed to  be  the               bhumidhar  of  the  holding or  the  share  in               respect of which the declaration has been made               :-and continues in force.               (3)   Notwithstanding  anything  contained  in               the  United  Provinces  Agricultural   Tenants               (Acquisition  of  Privileges) Act,  1949,  any               declaration  granted  under section 6  of  the               said  Act in favour of a tenant to  whom  sub-               section  (2) of ’Section 10 applies, shall  be               and   is  hereby  cancelled  and  the   amount               deposited  by him under Section 3 or 6 of  the               said  Act  shall, after deducting  the  amount               which  might have been paid or be  payable  by               the  State Government to his landholder  under

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 13 of 17  

             Sections 7 and 8 of the said Act, be  refunded               to  the person entitled in such manner as  may               be prescribed."               994               19.Land in the holding to be settled with  the               tenants  thereof as sirdar.-All land, held  or               deemed   to  have  been  held  on   the   date               immediately  preceding the date of vesting  by               any person as-               (i)   a  tenant  holding on special  terms  in               Avadh               (ii)  an ex-proprietary tenant               (iii) an occupancy tenant               (iv)  a hereditary tenant               (v)   a grantee at favourable rate of rent               (vi)  a  non-occupancy tenant of  tea  estates               notified  as  such in  a  notification  issued               under  sub-section  (5) of section 30  of  the               United Provinces Tenancy Act, 1939,               (vii) a sub-tenant referred to in  sub-section               (4)  of  section 47 of  the  United  Provinces               Tenancy Act, 1939 and               (Viii)...               (ix)  all land referred to in section 17  held               on the said date by any person on patta dawami               or istamrari, shall,  save  in cases Provided for in clause  (d)  of  sub- section  (1) of Section 18, be deemed to be settled  by  the State Government with such person, who shall, subject to the provisions  of this Act, be entitled, except as provided  in sub-section (2) of section 18, to take or retain  possession as a sirdar thereof.               20.   A  tenant   of  sir,  sub-tenant  or  an               occupant to be an adhivasi-Every person who-               (a)   on  the date immediately  preceding  the               date  of vesting was or has been deemed to  be               in accordance with the provisions of this  Act               (i)   except as provided in sub-clause (i)  of               clause  (b),  a  tenant of sir  other  than  a               tenant  referred to in clause (ix) of  section               19 or in whose favour hereditary rights accrue               in  accordance with the provisions of  Section               10,.or               (ii)  except as provided in sub-clause (i)  of               clause  (b),  a sub-tenant other than  a  sub-               tenant  referred to in proviso to  sub-section               (3)  of  Section 27 of the  United,  Provinces               Tenancy  (Amendment)  Act, 1947,  or  in  sub-               section  (4)  of  Section  47  of  the  United               Provinces Tenancy Act, 1939, of any land other               than grove-land               995               (b) was    recorded as occupant               (i)   of  any  land other than  grove-land  or               land  to  which  Section 16  applies  or  land               referred to in the proviso to sub-section  (3)               of Section 27 of the U.P. Tenancy  (Amendment)               Act,  1947, in the Khasra or Khatauni of  1356               F.   prepared   under  sections  28   and   33               respectively  of  the U.P. Land  Reforms  Act,               1901,  or  who  was on  the  date  immediately               preceding  the  date of  vesting  entitled  to               regain possession thereof under clause (c)  of               sub-section  (1) of section 27 of  the  United               Provinces Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1947, or

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 14 of 17  

             (ii)  of any land to which Section 16 applies,               in  the  khasra  or  khatauni  of  1356  Fasli               prepared under sections 28 and 33 respectively               of the United Provinces Land Reforms Act, 1901               but who was hot in possession in the year 1359               F.,               shall, unless he has become a bhumidhar of the               land under sub-section (2) of Section 18 or an               asami  under  clause  (h) of  section  21,  be               called adhivasi of the land and shall, subject               to the provisions of this Act, be entitled  to               take or retain possession thereof.               Explanation  1-Where a person referred  to  in               clause  (b)  was evicted from the  land  after               June   30,  1948,  he  shall   notwithstanding               anything in any order or decree, be deemed  to               be  a person entitled to regain possession  of               the land.               Explanation II-Where any entry in the  records               referred  to in clause (b) has been  corrected               before  the  date  of  vesting  under  or  in,               accordance  with  the provisions of  the  U.P.               Land Revenue Act, 1901, the entry so corrected               shall,  for the purposes of the  said  clause,               prevail.               Explanation    III.-For   the   purposes    of               Explanation  II  an entry shall be  deemed  to               have been corrected before the date of vesting               if  an  order or decree of a  competent  court               requiring  any correction in records had  been               made before the said date and had become final               even  though the correction may not have  been               incorporated in the records.               Explanation  IV.-For purposes of this  section               ’occupant’  as  respects  any  land  does  not               include  a  person  who  was  entitled  as  an               intermediary to the land or any share  therein               in the year 1356 Fasli." The  expression ’Khudkasht’ not having been defined  in  the Act,  we  shall have, as ordained by section 3 (26)  of  the Act, to refer to section 3(9) of the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939, to find out its meaning: 996               "Section 3(9) of the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939  :               "khudkasht"   means   land  other   than   sir               cultivated by a landlord, and under-proprietor               or  a permanent tenure-holder as  such  either               himself or by servants or by hired labour." We  may now advert to sections 131, 134, 135, 136, 137,  139 and 09 of the Act which are also material for our purpose :               "131.  Sirdar-Every person belonging to Any of               the following classes shall be called a sirdar               and  shall have all rights and be  subject  to               all the liabilities conferred or imposed  upon               sirdars by or under this Act, namely-               (a)   every  person who., as a consequence  of               the  acquisition or estates, becomes a  sirdar               under section 19,               (b)   every  person who is admitted as  sirdar               of  vacant land under the provisions  of  this               Act, and               (e)   every  person  who in any  other  manner               acquires  the rights of a sirdar under  or  in               accordance with the provisions of this Act  or               of any other law for the time being in force."

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 15 of 17  

             134.  Acquisition  of bhumidhari rights  by  a               sirdar- (1)  If a sirdar belonging to the class mentioned in  clause (a)  of  Section 131 pays or offers to pay to the credit  of the  State Government an amount equal to ten times the  land revenue  payable  deemed  to  be  payable  on  the  date  of application for the land of which he is the sirdar, he shall upon an application duly made in that behalf to an Assistant Collector,  be entitled, with effect from the date on  which the amount has been deposited, to a declaration that he  has acquired  the rights mentioned in Section 137 in respect  of such land : Provided  that the right to pay or offer to pay  the  amount aforementioned  shall  cease on the expiry of  three  months from the date to, be notified by the State Government. Explanation  I-In this sub-section ’land’ includes share  in land. Explanation  II-For  the purpose of this  section  the  land revenue payable shall-               (a)   in  respect of land referred to  in  the               proviso  to clause (a) of sub-section 246,  be               an  amount arrived at after all the  increases               have been given effect to; and               (b)   in respect of land to which the  proviso               to   section   247  applies,  be   an   amount               determined  at  hereditary  rates  under  that               section. (2)  The  amount referred to in-sub-section (1) may be  paid in  cash or, if the State Government so prescribes, in  form of bonds or otherwise.  997 135.      Treasury  challan  to  accompany  the  application under  Section 134.-The application referred to  in  Section 134 shall be accompanied where the amount is paid cash, by a treasury challan and in any other case, by such document  or evidence  as  may  be prescribed  showing  that  the  amount aforesaid has been deposited and shall briefly describe  the right in which the applicant claims the land. 136.      Amount to be deposited under section 134.-Where  a sirdar  or  his predecessor-in-interest was’,  on  the  date immediately  preceding  the date of  vesting,  a  hereditary tenant  of  the holding, the amount to  be  deposited  under section  134  shall, notwithstanding anything  contained  in this Act, be equal to ten times the land revenue payable  by him  or, if the said land revenue exceeds an  amount  double that computed at the applicable hereditary rates, ten  times such amount. 137.      Grant of certificate.--(1) If the application  has been duly made and the Assistant Collector is satisfied that the  applicant is entitled to the declaration  mentioned  in Section 134, he shall grant a certificate to that effect. (2)  Upon the grant of the certificate under sub-section (1)  the:  sirdar shall, from the date on which  the  amount referred  to  in  sub-section (1) of section  134  has  been deposited-               (a)   become and be deemed to be a  bhumidhari               of the               holding or the share in respect  of which  the               certificate has been granted, and               (b)   be  liable for payment of  such  reduced               amount  on  account of land  revenue  for  the               holding or his share therein, as the case  may               be, as shall be one-half of the amount of land               revenue payable or deemed to be payable by him               therefor on the date of application.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 16 of 17  

             Provided further that in the cases referred to               in  Explanation II of Section 134  the  sirdar               shall,  during the period a reduced amount  is               payable in accordance with Section 246 or 247,               be  liable  for  payment of  one-half  of  the               amount payable from time to time.               Explanation.-For  purposes of clause  (b)  the               land  revenue payable by a sirdar on the  date               aforesaid  shall, where it exceeds  an  amount               double  that computed at the hereditary  rates               applicable,  be  deemed to be  equal  to  such               amount.               (2-A).   Where the amount referred to in  sub-               section  (1) of section 134 is deposited on  a               date   other  than  the  first  day   of   the               agricultural year, the land revenue payable by               the bhumidhar under clause (b) of  sub-section               (2) for the               998               remainder  of the agricultural year  in  which               the amount is deposited shall be determined in               such manner as may be prescribed.               139.  Acquisition  of bhumidhari rights  by  a               sirdar of the class mentioned in clause (b) of               Section 131.-The provisions of Section 134 and               Sections  135 and 137, shall mutatis  mutandis               apply  to  a  sirdar belonging  to  the  class               mentioned in clause (b) or (c) of section 131.               209.  Ejectment  of  persons  occupying   land               without title-               (1)   A, person taking or retaining possession               of land               otherwise   than   in  accordance   with   the               provisions  of the law for the time  being  in               force, and-               (a)   where the land forms part of the holding               of  a bhumidhar, sirdar or asami  without  the               consent of such bhumidhar, sirdar or asami,               (b)   where the land does not form part of the               holding  of  a  bhumidhar,  sirdar  or   asami               without consent of the Gaon Sabha,               shall  be liable to ejectment on the suit,  in               cases referred to in clause (a) above, of  the               bhumidhar,  sirdar or asami concerned, and  in               cases referred to in clause (b) above, of  the               Gaon  Sabha  and shall also be liable  to  pay               damages.               (2)   To   every  suit  relating  to  a   land               referred to in clause               (a)   of sub-section (1) the State  Government               shall be impleaded as a necessary party." A close scrutiny of the facts and circumstances of the  case in the light of the above quoted provisions of law leaves no room  for  doubt in our mind that Sher  Singh  acquired  the rights  of  a Bhumidhar as hereinafter stated.   As  already indicated,  there  is  nothing on the record  before  us  to establish  that the aforesaid lease deed in favour  of  Sher Singh was fictitious or that the entires made in the revenue record on the basis of that deed were not genuine or did not conform to the true factual position and that Sher Singh was not  in  possession  of the fields in question  on  his  own behalf.   Consequently  as Sher Singh was holding  the  said fields  as  a  hereditary tenant  on  the  date  immediately preceding the date of vesting, he became entitled to  retain possession  thereof as a Sirdar under section 19 of the  Act

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 17 of 17  

and  on depositing to the credit of the State Government  in the  manner  provided  in  section  134  and  other   allied provisions of the Act an amount equal to ten times the  land revenue payable or deemed to be payable, he became  entitled to  a  declaration  that he had acquired  the  rights  of  a Bhumidhar mentioned in section 137- of the Act in respect of the  said fields and to the grant of a certificate  to  that effect. In  view  of our aforesaid findings, it  is  unnecessary  to examine  the  alternate contention raised on behalf  of  the appellants  that  as  Sher  Singh  was  in  self-cultivating possession of the land on the date imme-  999 diately  preceding the date of vesting and was  recorded  as such  in  the relevant record, he in any case  acquired  the right of an Adhivasi under section 20(b) (ii) of the Act  or to  go into the contention of Mr. Lalnarayan Sinha that  the actual  physical possession of the land is not necessary  to attract  the applicability of section 18 of the Act and  the requirement of the section is satisfied even when subsisting right  and title to possession over the land on the date  of vesting is established. For  the foregoing reasons, we allow the appeal,  set  aside the impugned judgments and orders of the High Court as  also the  decision  of the Joint Director  of  Consolidation  and restore  that  of  the  Deputy  Director  of  Consolidation, Lucknow.   In  the facts and circumstances of the  case,  we leave the parties to bear their own costs. S.R. Appeal allowed. 1000