12 November 1979
Supreme Court
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SHARIF-UD-DIN Vs ABDUL GANI LONE

Case number: Appeal (civil) 2005 of 1978


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PETITIONER: SHARIF-UD-DIN

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: ABDUL GANI LONE

DATE OF JUDGMENT12/11/1979

BENCH: VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J) BENCH: VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J) TULZAPURKAR, V.D.

CITATION:  1980 AIR  303            1980 SCR  (1)1177  1980 SCC  (1) 403  CITATOR INFO :  D          1983 SC 558  (40)  R          1984 SC 305  (13)  D          1984 SC 956  (15)

ACT:      Jammu and  Kashmir Representation  of the  People  Act, 1957, Section  89(3)-Whether  mandatory-Attestation  by  the counsel for  the election  petitioner as  "true copy" is not valid-Attestation  should  be  under  the  petitioner’s  own signature and  the absence  thereof is  a  material  defect- Object of section 89(3).      Rules of  construction of  law, as  to  whether  it  is mandatory or directory, explained.

HEADNOTE:      Section 89(3)  of the Jammu & Kashmir Representation of the People  Act, 1957 reads: "Every election petition should be accompanied  by as  many  copies  thereof  as  there  are respondents mentioned  in the  petition and  every such copy shall be  attested by the petitioner under his own signature to be true copy of the petition". Under Section 94(1) of the Act, "The  High Court  shall dismiss  an  election  petition which does  not comply  with the provisions of Section 89 or Section 90  or Section 125". Sections 89(3) and 94(1) of the Act are in pari materia with sections 81(3) and 86(1) of the Central Act 43 of 1951.      In the  election petition filed by the appellant in the J &  K High  Court challenging  the verdict of the Returning Officer declaring  the respondent  as a successful candidate from the  Handwara Constituency  to the  State  Legislature, both the  copies of  the  election  petition  contained  the endorsement  "Attested   true  copy.   Piare   Lal   Handoo, Advocate". The  question arose  whether it  was a sufficient compliance within  the provisions  of Section  89(3) of  the Act.      Dismissing the appeal, the Court ^      HELD: 1.  The requirement  in Section  89(3) of  J &  K Representation of  People Act,  1957 that  every copy of the election petition  which is  intended  for  service  on  the respondent should  be attested  by the  petitioner under his own signature  is  a  mandatory  requirement  and  the  non-

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compliance  with  that  requirement  should  result  in  the dismissal of  the petition  as provided  in Section 94(1) of the Act. [1189 F-G]      2. The  object of  requiring  a  copy  of  an  election petition to  be attested  by the  petitioner under  his  own signature to  be a  true copy  of the  petition is  that the petitioner should  take full responsibility for its contents and that  the respondent or respondents should have in their possession a  copy of  the petition  duly attested under the signature of  the petitioner  to be  the true  copy  of  the petition at the earliest possible opportunity to prevent any unauthorised alteration  or tampering  of  contents  of  the original petition  after it  is filed  into Court. No doubt, the records and documents in the custody of Courts are taken due care  of by  the Courts  and the  Courts  would  not  by themselves give 1178 any scope  for tampering  with them.  Still  allegations-not always without  basis-are sometimes made that records in the Court have  been tampered with, notwithstanding the care and caution taken  by Courts.  To obviate  any scope for such an allegation being  made or  to protect  the interest  of  the respondent, the  Legislature thought of enacting sub-section (3) of Section 89 of the Act so that the respondent may rely on the  copy served  on him  when he finds that the original document in  the Court  contains allegations  different from those in  the copy  in his  custody. A  respondent would not have the same degree of assurance if a copy served on him is one  attested  by  any  person  other  than  the  petitioner himself. The  attestation by the advocate for the petitioner cannot be  treated as  the equivalent  of attestation by the petitioner under  his own  signature. If  the requirement of the second  part of  section 89(3) that copy of the petition should contain  the signature  of the  petitioner himself is not one  of substance,  there was no need to enact it as the first part of sub-section (3) of section 89 of the Act would have been  sufficient for  it provides  that every  election petition shall  be accompanied  by as many copies thereof as there are respondents mentioned in the petition and the word "copies" mentioned  therein can only mean "true copies". The importance of  the provision  contained in section 94 of the Act which  makes it obligatory on the part of the High Court to dismiss a petition when it is established that section 89 of the  Act had  not  been  complied  with  also  cannot  be overlooked in this context. [1188 G-H, 1189 A-E]      3. It  is true  that section 89(3) of the Act is purely procedural in  character and  that ordinarily procedural law should not  be given  that primacy by courts as would defeat the ends  of justice.  But if  a law  even though  it may be procedural in  character insists that an act must be done in a  particular  manner  and  further  provides  that  certain consequences should  follow if  the act  is not done in that manner, courts  have no  option but to enforce the law as it is. A  rule of  limitation, for  example, which is generally considered as  procedural in  character is strictly enforced by courts  since the  rule lays  down that  no  court  shall entertain a  suit, an  appeal or  an  application  which  is barred by time.                                                   [1187 F-H]      An election  to a Legislative Assembly can be called in question  only  by  filing  an  election  petition  and  not otherwise. The  right to challenge the election by filing an election petition  is a statutory right and not a common law right. A  successful candidate  is  entitled  to  enjoy  the privileges attached  to the  membership of  the  Legislative

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Assembly  unless   his  right   to  do  so  is  successfully challenged  in   an  election   petition  filed  within  the prescribed period  and in accordance with law. Section 89(3) of the  Act consists  of two  parts. The first part requires that every election petition shall be accompanied by as many copies thereof  as there  are respondents  mentioned in  the petition and  the second  part requires that every such copy shall be  attested by the petitioner under his own signature to be  a true  copy of  the  petition.  The  copies  of  the election petition  should be  filed alongwith it in order to prevent the delay in the disposal of the election petitions. Sub-section (3)  of section  89 of  the Act  provides that a copy of  the petition  shall be  attested by  the petitioner "under his own signature". But the same expression is not to be found  in Section 91(1)(c) of the Act which provides that an election  petition shall  be signed by the petitioner and verified in  the manner  laid down  in the Jammu and Kashmir Code  of   Civil  Procedure   (Act  X   of  1977),  for  the verification of 1179 pleadings. Sub-section  (3) of  section 89  of the  Act  was inserted by  Jammu and  Kashmir Act I of 1962. Section 94 of the Act which requires the High Court to dismiss an election petition when  the petitioner  has  not  complied  with  the provisions of  section 89 was enacted in the place of former section 94 of the Act by Jammu and Kashmir Act XI of 1957 by the Legislature  with the full knowledge of the requirements of section 89(3) of the Act. [1188 A-G]      Satya Narain  v. Dhuja  Ram and  Ors., [1974] 3 SCR 20; applied.      4. The question whether a provision of law is mandatory or not,  depends upon  its language, the context in which it is  enacted   and  its  object.  The  difference  between  a mandatory rule and a directory rule is that while the former must be  strictly  observed,  in  the  case  of  the  latter substantial compliance  may be  sufficient  to  achieve  the object regarding  which the  rule is  enacted. Certain broad propositions which  can be deduced from several decisions of courts regarding  the rules  of construction  that should be followed in  determining  whether  a  provision  of  law  is directory or mandatory are as follows:      The fact  that the  statute uses the word ’shall’ while laying down a duty is not conclusive on the question whether it is  a mandatory  or directory provision. In order to find out the  true character of the legislation, the Court has to ascertain the  object which the provision of law in question is to subserve and its design and the context in which it is enacted. If  the object  of a  law is to be defeated by non- compliance with  it, it has to be regarded as mandatory. But when a  provision of  law relates  to the performance of any public  duty  and  the  invalidation  of  any  act  done  in disregard of  that provision  causes  serious  prejudice  to those for  whose benefit  it is enacted and at the same time who have  no control  over the performance of the duty, such provision should  be  treated  as  a  directory  one.  Where however, a  provision of  law prescribes  that a certain act has to  be done  in a particular manner by a person in order to acquire  a right and it is coupled with another provision which confers  an immunity  on another  when such act is not done in  that manner,  the former  has to  be regarded  as a mandatory one.  A procedural  rule ordinarily  should not be construed as  mandatory if  the defect  in the  act done  in pursuance of  it can  be  cured  by  permitting  appropriate rectification to be carried out at a subsequent stage unless by according  such permission to rectify the error later on,

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another  rule  would  be  contravened.  Whenever  a  statute prescribes that  a  particular  act  is  to  be  done  in  a particular manner  and also lays down that failure to comply with the  said requirement  leads to a specific consequence, it would  be difficult  to hold  that the requirement is not mandatory and  the specified  consequence should not follow. [1182 E-H, 1183 A-C, 1188 D]      K. Kamaraja  Nadar v.  Kunju Thevar and Ors. [1959] SCR 583, Subbarao v. Member, Election Tribunal Hyderabad, [1964] 6 SCR  213, Kamalam  (M.) v.  Dr. V. A. Syed Mohd., [1978] 3 SCR 446 at p. 452; referred to.      Satya Narain  v. Dhuja  Ram and  Ors., [1974] 3 SCR 20; applied.      Jagat Kishore  Prasad Narain  Singh v.  Rajendra  Kumar Poddar and Ors., [1971] 1 SCR 821; held inapplicable. 1180

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2005 of 1978      Appeal under  section 123  of  the  Jammu  and  Kashmir Representation of  People Act,  1957 from  the Judgment  and Order dated  the 6th September 1979 of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court in Election Petition No. 3 of 1977      D. V.  Patel, Vineet  Kumar and  A. Srivastava  for the Appellant.      Z. A.  Shah, M.  Veerappa, J. R. Das and R. N. Nath for the Respondent.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      VENKATARAMIAH, J.  This appeal  is filed  under section 123 of  the Jammu  and Kashmir  Representation of the People Act, 1957  (hereinafter referred  to as  ’the Act’)  by  the appellant against  the judgment of the High Court of Jammu & Kashmir in  Election Petition  No. 3  of 1977  dismissing an election petition filed by him on the ground that he had not complied with section 89(3) of the Act.      At the  general election held in the year 1977 to elect members to  the Legislative Assembly of the State of Jammu & Kashmir, the  appellant and  the respondent  were candidates for the  seat  to  be  filled  from  the  Handwara  Assembly Constituency. The  respondent was declared as the successful candidate by the Returning Officer. Thereafter the appellant filed an  election petition before the High Court of Jammu & Kashmir  challenging   the  validity   of  the  respondent’s election on  various  grounds.  The  respondent  raised  two preliminary objections to the election petition-(1) that the petition had  not been  presented in  accordance  with  sub- section (1)  of section  89 of the Act and (2) that the copy of the  election petition  had  not  been  attested  by  the appellant under  his own  signature to be a true copy of the petition as  required by  section  89(3)  of  the  Act.  The respondent contended  that the  petition was  liable  to  be dismissed in  view of  section 94  of the Act which provided that the  High Court  should dismiss  an  election  petition which did  not comply  with the  provisions of section 89 or section 90  or section  125 of the Act. We are not concerned with the  first ground as it has been held by the High Court that the  petition had  been validly presented in accordance with section 89(1) of the Act. The appellant while admitting that the  copies of  the  election  petition  had  not  been attested by him under his own signature to be true copies of the petition  pleaded that section 89(3) of the Act had been substantially complied  with as  the copies  of the election

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petition had  been signed  by his advocate and that they had been authenticated to be true copies of the petition. On the basis of the above pleadings, the High Court raised 1181 two preliminary  issues-one relating  to the validity of the presentation of the election petition and the other relating to the effect of the absence of attestation of the copies of the election  petition by the appellant. After recording the evidence led  by the  parties on  the preliminary issues and hearing the counsel for the parties, the High Court disposed of the  petition by the judgment under appeal. In the course of its  judgment while the High Court upheld the case of the appellant that the petition had been validly presented under section 89(1)  of the  Act came  to the  conclusion that the petition was  liable to  be dismissed as required by section 94 of  the Act  on the  ground that section 89(3) of the Act had not  been complied  with by  the appellant. Accordingly, the petition was dismissed. Hence this appeal.      Section  89(3)   of  the  Act  reads:  "Every  election petition shall  be accompanied  by as many copies thereof as there are  respondents mentioned  in the  petition and every such copy  shall be attested by the petitioner under his own signature to be true copy of the petition."      Section 94(1)  of the  Act provides:  "The  High  Court shall dismiss  an election  petition which  does not  comply with the  provisions of  section 89 or section 90 or section 125".      Section 89(3)  and section  94(1) of the Act correspond to section  81(3) and  section  86(1)  respectively  of  the Representation of  the People Act, 1951 (Act No. 43 of 1951) (hereinafter referred  to as ’the Central Act’). There is no difference between  the language of section 89(3) of the Act and the  language of  section 81(3)  of the Central Act. The language of  section 94(1)  of the  Act and  the language of section 86(1)  of the  Central Act  are similar  except with regard to  the numbers  of  sections  referred  to  therein. Whereas in Section 94 of the Act, the High Court is required to dismiss  an election  petition which does not comply with the provisions of section 89 or section 90 or section 125 of the Act,  section 86(1) of the Central Act requires the High Court to  dismiss an election petition which does not comply with the  provisions of  section 81 or section 82 or section 117 of  the Central  Act. The  topics dealt with by sections 89, 90  and 125  of the Act are the same as the topics dealt with by  sections 81, 82 and 117 of the Central Act. Section 89 of  the Act  and section  81 of the Central Act deal with presentation of  election petitions.  Section 90  of the Act and section  82 of  the Central Act deal with the parties to the petition  and section  125 of the Act and section 117 of the Central Act deal with security for costs. 1182      It is  admitted that  neither of  the two copies of the election petition  which had  been filed  along with  it had been signed  by the  appellant. Both  the  copies  contained identical endorsements at the foot which read:           "Attested true copy, Piyare Lal Handoo, Advocate".      The  advocate   had  presented  the  election  petition alongwith his Vakalatnama.      The crucial part of section 89(3) of the Act with which we are  concerned provides  that "every  such copy  shall be attested by  the petitioner  under his own signature to be a true copy  of the  petition" and  the critical words in this part  are  "under  his  own  signature".  The  case  of  the respondent is  that the  requirement of section 89(3) of the Act that  the  copy  of  the  election  petition  should  be

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attested by  the petitioner  under his  own signature  is  a mandatory one.  It is  his further case that the language of section 89(3)  of the  Act does not permit of any other mode of compliance  and, therefore,  the attestation  made by the counsel for  the petitioner  filing the election petition is no  compliance   with  that  provision.  It  is,  therefore, contended by him that the petition is liable to be dismissed as required by section 94 of the Act. On the other hand, the appellant’s case  is that  since the  copies of the petition had been  signed by  his advocate  who had been empowered to act for  him in the case it should be treated as substantial compliance with section 89(3) of the Act which having regard to its object must be considered to be directory.      The difference between a mandatory rule and a directory rule is  that while the former must be strictly observed, in the case  of  the  latter,  substantial  compliance  may  be sufficient to achieve the object regarding which the rule is enacted. Certain  broad propositions  which can  be  deduced from several  decisions of  courts regarding  the  rules  of construction that  should be followed in determining whether a  provision  of  law  is  directory  or  mandatory  may  be summarised thus:  The fact  that the  statute uses  the word ’shall’ while  laying down  a duty  is not conclusive on the question whether  it is  a mandatory or directory provision. In order  to find out the true character of the legislation, the Court has to ascertain the object which the provision of law in  question is  to subserve  and  its  design  and  the context in which it is enacted. If the object of a law is to be defeated by non-compliance with it, it has to be regarded as mandatory.  But when  a provision  of law  relates to the performance of  any public  duty and the invalidation of any act done in disregard of 1183 that provision  causes serious  prejudice to those for whose benefit it  is enacted  and at  the same  time who  have  no control over  the performance  of the  duty, such  provision should be  treated as  a directory  one.  Where  however,  a provision of  law prescribes  that a  certain act  has to be done in  a particular manner by a person in order to acquire a right  and it  is coupled  with  another  provision  which confers an  immunity on another when such act is not done in that manner,  the former  has to  be regarded as a mandatory one. A procedural rule ordinarily should not be construed as mandatory if  the defect  in the act done in pursuance of it can be  cured by  permitting appropriate rectification to be carried out  at a  subsequent stage unless by according such permission to rectify the error later on, another rule would be  contravened.   Whenever  a  statute  prescribes  that  a particular act is to be done in a particular manner and also lays down  that failure  to comply with the said requirement leads to  a specific  consequence, it  would be difficult to hold that the requirement is not mandatory and the specified consequence should not follow.      We shall now proceed to deal with some of the decisions cited before us at the hearing of the appeal.      In one  of the  connected appeals which was disposed of by this Court by its common Judgment in K. Kamaraja Nadar v. Kunju Thevar  &  Ors.,(1)  the  person  who  had  filed  the election petition had deposited in the Government Treasury a sum of Rs. 1,000/- towards security under section 117 of the Central  Act  for  the  costs  in  favour  of  the  Election Commission instead  of in  favour of  the Secretary  to  the Election Commission  as required by that section as it stood then. It  was contended  that section 117 of the Central Act had been  contravened thereby  and  that  the  petition  was

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liable to  be dismissed under section 90(3) (since repealed) of the  Central Act  which required the Election Tribunal to dismiss an  election petition  which  did  not  comply  with sections 81,  82 and  117 of the Central Act notwithstanding that it  had not  been dismissed  by the Election Commission under section  85  (since  repealed)  of  the  Central  Act. Without going  into the  relationship between  the  Election Commission on the one hand and the Secretary to the Election Commission on  the other  for the  purpose of  examining the correctness of  the said contention, this Court proceeded to negative it with the following observations vide at page 606 :- 1184           "It would be absurd to imagine that a deposit made      either in  a Government Treasury or in the Reserve Bank      of India  in favour  of the  Election Commission itself      would not  be sufficient compliance with the provisions      of s. 117 and would involve a dismissal of the petition      under s.  85 or  s. 90(3).  The above  illustration  is      sufficient to  demonstrate that the words "in favour of      the Secretary  to the  Election Commission"  used in s.      117 are directory and not mandatory in their character.      What is of the essence of the provision contained in s.      117 is  that the petitioner should furnish security for      the costs  of the  petition, and  should enclose  along      with the petition a Government Treasury receipt showing      that a  deposit of one thousand rupees has been made by      him either  in a  Government Treasury or in the Reserve      Bank of  India, is  at the  disposal  of  the  Election      Commission  to   be  utilised   by  it  in  the  manner      authorised by  law and is under its control and payable      on a  proper application  being made  in that behalf to      the  Election   Commission  or   to  any   person  duly      authorised by  it  to  receive  the  same,  be  he  the      Secretary to the Election Commission or any one else."      It is  seen from  the above  decision that  this  Court regarded the  words "in  favour  of  the  Secretary  to  the Election Commission"  used in section 117 of the Central Act directory as  the essence  of section 117 of the Central Act was that  the petitioner should deposit the amount by way of security for  the costs  of the  petition and  that the said amount should be at the disposal and control of the Election Commission to be used by it in the manner authorised by law. As the  amount was  in fact  at the disposal of the Election Commission, the  Court held  that section 117 of the Central Act had  been  complied  with  by  the  petitioner  in  that election petition  as there was nothing else in the relative provisions which precluded the Court from taking that view.      In  Ch.   Subbarao  v.   Member,   Election   Tribunal, Hyderabad(1) the  question of  non-compliance  with  section 81(3) of  the Central  Act directly arose for consideration. The facts  of that case were these: The petitioner had filed alongwith the  election petition sufficient number of copies as required  by  section  81(3)  of  the  Central  Act.  The election petition  was type-written  and  the  copies  which accompanied the  petition were  carbon copies  of the  type- script. Each 1185 of the  copies bore  the signature  of the  petitioner.  The petitioner had  not, however, inserted the words ’true copy" before or  above  his  signature.  Without  going  into  the question whether  section 81(3)  of the  Central Act  or any portion of it was merely directory, this Court held that the signatures in  original found on the copies were intended to authenticate the  documents to  which they were appended and

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that in  the circumstances  of that case, the absence of the words "true  copy"  above  the  signature  of  the  election petitioner in  the copies was not fatal. The Court held that there was  substantial compliance  with the  requirement  of section 81(3) of the Central Act.      In Jagat  Kishore Prasad Narain Singh v. Rajendra Kumar Poddar &  Ors.(1) this  Court dismissed an election petition on the  ground of  non-compliance with  section 81(3) of the Central Act  as  the  copies  furnished  to  the  contesting respondents were  not true  copies as  there was  divergence between  the  allegations  made  in  the  petition  and  the allegations made in the copies. This decision has no bearing on the question involved in this case.      In Satya  Narain v. Dhuju Ram & Ors.(2) this Court held that the  first part  of section  81(3) of  the Central  Act which  required   that  the   election  petition  should  be accompanied  by   as  many  copies  thereof  as  there  were respondents mentioned  in  the  petition  was  mandatory  in character and  non-compliance  with  it  was  fatal  to  the petition in  view of  section 86(1)  of the Central Act. The Court was not concerned in that case with the second part of section 81(3) of the Central Act.      In Kamalam  (M.) v.  Dr. V.  A. Syed  Mohammed,(3)  the signature   of   the   election   petitioner   by   way   of authentication appeared  at the  foot of  the  copy  of  the affidavit  but   there  was  no  such  signature  separately appended at  the foot  of the copy of the election petition. The respondent  by  way  of  preliminary  objection  to  the election petition  contended that  since  the  copy  of  the election petition  had not  been attested  by the petitioner under her  own signature  to be  a true  copy, there  was no compliance with  section 81(3)  of the Central Act and hence the petition  was liable  to be  dismissed. The  High  Court accepted the  said contention and dismissed the petition. In appeal, 1186 this Court  held that  section 81(3)  of the Central Act had been complied with for the following reasons:-           "Now, it is true that no signature was appended by      the appellant  on the  copy of  the  election  petition      proper and the signature was placed only at the foot of      the copy  of the  affidavit, but  that, in our opinion,      was sufficient  compliance with  the requirement of the      last part of sub-section (3) of section 81. The copy of      the affidavit  was, for reasons already discussed, part      of the  copy of  the election  petition  and  when  the      appellant put  his signature at the foot of the copy of      the affidavit  it was tantamount to appending signature      on the  copy of the election petition. The law does not      require that  the authenticating signature must be made      by the  petitioner at  any particular place in the copy      of the  election petition.  It may be at the top of the      copy or  in the  middle or at the end. The place of the      signature is  immaterial so  long as it appears that it      is intended  to authenticate  the copy.  When  original      signature is  made by the petitioner on the copy of the      election  petition,  it  can  safely  be  presumed,  as      pointed out  by  this  Court  in  Ch.  Subbarao’s  case      (supra), that  the signature  is made by the petitioner      by way of authenticating the document to be a true copy      of the  election  petition.  Now,  here  the  appellant      placed her  signature in  original at  the foot  of the      copy of the affidavit and the copy of the affidavit was      part of  a composite  document,  namely,  copy  of  the      election petition,  and  hence  the  signature  of  the

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    appellant must  be regarded  as having been appended on      the copy of the election petition. In fact, the copy of      the affidavit  constituted the  end-portion of the copy      of the  election petition  and the  signature placed by      the appellant  at the foot of the copy of the affidavit      was, therefore,  clearly referable  to the  entire copy      preceding it and it authenticated the whole of the copy      of the  election petition to be a true copy. We cannot,      in the  circumstances, accept  the  contention  of  the      respondent that  the copy  of the election petition was      not attested  by the  appellant under her own signature      to be  a true  copy of the petition. The requirement of      the last  part of  sub-section (3)  of section  81  was      complied with  by the appellant inasmuch as the copy of      the election  petition was  authenticated to  be a true      copy by  the appellant  by placing her signature at the      foot of the copy of the affidavit which 1187      formed part  of the  copy of the election petition. The      High Court  was clearly  in  error  in  dismissing  the      election petition under sub-s. (1) of sec. 86."      It is seen from the above decision that this Court held that the second part of section 81(3) of the Central Act had been complied  with after  holding  that  the  copy  of  the petition and the affidavit filed alongwith it as required by law constituted  one single  document and  the signature  in original of  the petitioner  at the  foot of  the  affidavit satisfied the  requirements of  section 81(3) of the Central Act. In  none of  the decisions  of this  Court referred  to above it  has been held that the absence of the signature of the election  petitioner on  the copies  of the petition was not a material defect.      It was  argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that the object of enacting sub-section (3) of section 89 of the Act  which was merely procedural in character being that the respondents  should be  able to  secure  copies  of  the election petition  as early  as possible  to enable  them to file their  statement of objections to it early, it would be sufficient compliance  with the  said provision  if the true copies are filed alongwith it and since in the instant case, there had  been no  allegation that  the copies  which  were filed  were  not  exact  copies  of  the  original  election petition, the  petition should  have been disposed of on its merits instead of dismissing it under section 94 of the Act. He contended  that the  attestation made  by the advocate on the copies  was sufficient to assure the respondent that the copy served  on him  was in  reality  a  true  copy  of  the election  petition.   He  also  contended  that  if  a  suit instituted in  a civil  court was not to be dismissed on the ground that  the copy of the plaint was not authenticated to be a  true copy  by the  plantiff under  his own  signature, there was  no justification  for treating the second part of section 89  of the Act as mandatory. It is true that section 89(3) of  the Act is purely procedural in character and that ordinarily procedural  law should  not be given that primacy by courts  as would defeat the ends of justice. But if a law even though  it may  be procedural in character insists that an act  must be  done in  a particular  manner  and  further provides that  certain consequences should follow if the act is not  done in  that manner,  courts have  no option but to enforce the law as it is. A rule of limitation, for example, which is  generally considered as procedural in character is strictly enforced by courts since the rule lays down that no court shall  entertain a  suit, an  appeal or an application which is barred by time.

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1188      An election  to a Legislative Assembly can be called in question  only  by  filing  an  election  petition  and  not otherwise. The  right to challenge the election by filing an election petition  is a statutory right and not a common law right. A  successful candidate  is  entitled  to  enjoy  the privileges attached  to the  membership of  the  Legislative Assembly  unless   his  right   to  do  so  is  successfully challenged  in   an  election   petition  filed  within  the prescribed period  and in accordance with law. Section 89(3) of the  Act consists  of two  parts. The first part requires that every election petition shall be accompanied by as many copies thereof  as there  are respondents  mentioned in  the petition and  the second  part requires that every such copy shall be  attested by the petitioner under his own signature to be a true copy of the petition. The first part of section 89(3) of the Act has been held to be a mandatory requirement by this  Court in  the case  of Satya Narain (supra) as this Court was  of the  view that  the  copies  of  the  election petition should  be filed  alongwith it  in order to prevent the delay  in the  disposal of  the election  petitions. The question whether  a provision of law is mandatory or not, as observed already,  depends upon its language, the context in which it  is enacted  and its  object.  Sub-section  (3)  of section 89  of the  Act provides that a copy of the petition shall  be   attested  by   the  petitioner  "under  his  own signature" to  be a  true copy of the petition. The emphasis in the above provision appears to be on the words "under his own signature".  We do  not find the same expression used in section 91(1)(c)  of the Act which provides that an election petition shall  be signed  by the petitioner and verified in the manner  laid down in the Jammu and Kashmir Code of Civil Procedure  (Act   X  of   1977),  for  the  verification  of pleadings. Sub-section  (3) of  section 89  of the  Act  was inserted by  Jammu and  Kashmir Act I of 1962. Section 94 of the Act which requires the High Court to dismiss an election petition when  the petitioner  has  not  complied  with  the provisions of  section 89  was enacted  in the  place of the former section  94 of the Act by Jammu and Kashmir Act XI of 1967 by  the Legislature  with the  full  knowledge  of  the requirements of  section 89(3)  of the  Act. The  object  of requiring the copy of an election petition to be attested by the petitioner  under his own signature to be a true copy of the petition  appears to  be that the petitioner should take full responsibility for its contents and that the respondent or respondents should have in their possession a copy of the petition duly attested under the signature of the petitioner to be the true copy of the petition at the earliest possible opportunity  to   prevent  any  unauthorised  alteration  or tampering of  the contents of the original petition after it is filed into court. We have no doubt 1189 that the  records and documents in the custody of courts are taken due  care of by the courts and the courts would not by themselves give any scope for tampering with them. But still experience shows  that allegations  are sometimes  made that records in the court have been tampered with notwithstanding the care  and caution  taken by courts. Such allegations may not always  be without  basis. It is probably to obviate any scope for  such an  allegation being  made or to protect the interest of  the  respondent,  the  Legislature  thought  of enacting sub-section  (3) of  section 89  of the Act so that the respondent  may rely  on the  copy served on him when he finds that  the original  document  in  the  court  contains allegations different from those in the copy in his custody.

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A respondent  would not have the same degree of assurance if a copy  served on  him is  one attested  by any person other than the petitioner himself. The attestation by the advocate for the  petitioner cannot  be treated  as the equivalent of attestation by  the petitioner  under his  own signature. If the requirement  of the  second part  of section  89(3) that copy of  the petition  should contain  the signature  of the petitioner himself  is not  one of  substance, there  was no need to  enact it  as the  first part  of sub-section (3) of section 89  of the  Act would  have been  sufficient for  it provides that  every election  petition shall be accompanied by as many copies thereof as there are respondents mentioned in the  petition and the word "copies" mentioned therein can only mean  "true copies".  The importance  of the  provision contained in section 94 of the Act which makes it obligatory on the  part of the High Court to dismiss a petition when it is established  that section  89 of  the Act  had  not  been complied with also cannot be over-looked in this context.      We are,  therefore, of  the view  that the  requirement that every  copy of  the election petition which is intended for service  on the  respondent should  be attested  by  the petitioner  under   his  own   signature  is   a   mandatory requirement and  the non-compliance  with  that  requirement should result  in the  dismissal of the petition as provided in section  94 of  the Act.  The High  Court was, therefore, right in dismissing the petition on the above ground.      For the  foregoing reasons,  the appeal  fails  and  is hereby dismissed with costs. S.R.                                       Appeal dismissed. 1