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PETITIONER: SHAMSHER SINGH & ANR

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF PUNJAB

DATE OF JUDGMENT23/08/1974

BENCH: RAY, A.N. (CJ) BENCH: RAY, A.N. (CJ) PALEKAR, D.G. MATHEW, KUTTYIL KURIEN CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. ALAGIRISWAMI, A. BHAGWATI, P.N. KRISHNAIYER, V.R.

CITATION:  1974 AIR 2192            1975 SCR  (1) 814  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1975 SC 613  (45,50)  RF         1975 SC 638  (11)  F          1975 SC1096  (3)  R          1975 SC1208  (24)  R          1975 SC1633  (1)  F          1975 SC1755  (6,7,8)  RF         1976 SC1766  (57)  R          1976 SC1841  (12,18)  F          1976 SC1899  (28)  RF         1976 SC2490  (24)  RF         1976 SC2547  (19,21)  RF         1977 SC 451  (6)  F          1977 SC 629  (6)  RF         1977 SC1361  (169)  RF         1977 SC1619  (13)  F          1977 SC2328  (41)  D          1978 SC 363  (5,11,13)  R          1979 SC 193  (38)  R          1980 SC  42  (12,20)  RF         1980 SC1242  (9)  RF         1980 SC1896  (52)  RF         1980 SC2147  (61)  RF         1981 SC 957  (5)  R          1981 SC2138  (4)  F          1982 SC 149  (134,333,624,696,709,718,794,9  RF         1982 SC1029  (6)  R          1984 SC 636  (11)  RF         1984 SC 684  (55)  R          1984 SC1110  (6)  E&R        1985 SC1416  (58)  RF         1986 SC1626  (27)  RF         1986 SC1790  (11)  E&R        1987 SC 331  (29,32)  F          1987 SC1953  (8)  R          1987 SC2106  (5,6)  R          1987 SC2408  (5)  R          1988 SC1388  (16)  R          1990 SC1308  (25)  E&R        1991 SC 101  (279)

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ACT: President and Governors--Whether formal heads--Whether bound to  act on aid and advice of Council  of  Ministers--Artkles 166(3), 154(1), 53(1) of constitution of India. Constitution  of India--Article 311--termination of  service by innocuously worded order whether hit by article 311. Civil  service  probationer  whether can  be  deemed  to  be confirmed on the expiry of probation period. Punjab Civil Service (Judicial Branch) Rules 1951 rr. 7, 9. Constitution  of India Article 235--High Court  whether  can depute  an executive authority to inquire  into  allegations made against subordinate judiciary. Constitution   of   India,  Article   234--Appointment   and determination  of  services of subordinate judges if  to  be made by Governor personally.

HEADNOTE: The  appellant  Shamsher Singh was a  Subordinate  Judge  on probation.   His services were terminated by the  Government of  Punjab  in the name of Governor of Punjab  by  an  order which did not give any reasons for the termination. Likewise,  the  services of Ishwar Chand Agarwal  were  also terminated  by  the  Government of Punjab  in  the  name  of Governor  on  the  recommendation of the  High  Court.   The appellants    contended   that   the   Governor    as    the constitutional. or the formal head of the State can exercise powers  and functions of appointment and removal of  members of  the  subordinate judicial service only  personally.  the appellants placed reliance on the decision of this Court  in Sardari  Lal’s case where it is held that  the  satisfaction for  making  an  order under Article  311  is  the  personal satisfaction  of the President or the Governor.  The  State, on  the  other hand, contended that the  Governor  exercises powers  of  appointment and removal conferred on him  by  or under  the Constitution like executive powers of  the  State Government  only  on the aid and advice of  his  council  of Ministers and not personally.  The Governor is by and  under the  Constitution  required  to act  in  his  discretion  in several matters.  Articles where the expression "acts in his discretion" is used in relation to the powers and  functions of   the   Governor  are  those  which  speak   of   special responsibilities of the Governor.  Our constitution embodies generally the parliamentary or cabinet system of  Government of  the British model.  Under this system the  President  is the constitutional or formal head of the Union and exercises his  powers and functions conferred on him by or  under  the Constitution  on  the  aid  and advice  of  his  council  of Ministers.   Under  the cabinet system  of  Government,  the Governor  is the constitutional or formal head of the  State and exercises all his powers and functions conferred on  him by  or under the Constitution on the aid and advice  of  his council of Ministers, save in spheres where the Governor  is required  by  or  under the  Constitution  to  exercise  his functions in his discretion.  These appeals have been placed before  a larger bench to consider whether the  decision  in Sardari Lal’s case correctly lays down the law. It   was  further  contended  that  since  the   probationer continued in service after the expiry of the maximum  period of probation he became confirmed that the termination was by way  of punishment and was in violation of article 311;  and that the High Court failed to act in terms of the provisions of  art. 235 of the Constitution and abdicated  the  control over  subordinate  judiciary  by asking  the  government  to

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enquire through the vigilance department. 815 (Per   A.   N.  Ray  C.J.  Palekar,   Mathew,   Chandrachud. Alagiriswami, JJ). HELD :-The decision in Sardari Lal’s case that the President has  to  be satisfied personally in  exercise  of  executive power  or function and that the functions of  the  President cannot be delegated is not the correct statement of law, and is against the established and uniform view of this Court as embodied in several decisions.  The President as well as the Governor  is  the constitutional head or formal  head.   The President  as well as the Governor exercises his powers  and functions  conferred on him by or under the Constitution  on the  aid  and  advice of his council of  Ministers  save  in spheres  where  the  Governor is required by  or  under  the Constitution  to exercise his functions in  his  discretion. [833C-F] Sardari Lal’s case overruled. HELD FURTHER : The President or the Governor acts on the aid and  advice  of  the Council of  Ministers  with  the  Prime Minister at the head in the case of the Union and the  Chief Minister  at  the head in the case of State in  all  matters which  vests  in the executive whether those  functions  are executive   or  legislative  in  character.    Neither   the President  nor  the Governor is to  exercise  the  executive functions  personally.   The  present  appeals  concern  the appointment  of  persons other than District Judges  to  the Judicial  Service  of the State which is to be made  by  the Governor as contemplated in Article 234 of the  constitution after consultation with the State Public Service  Commission and the High Court.  Appointment or dismissal or removal  of persons  belonging to the Judicial Service of the  State  is not a personal function but is an executive function of  the Governor  exercised  in accordance with the  rules  in  that behalf under the Constitution. [836B-D] HELD FURTHER : No abstract proposition can be laid down that where  the  services of probationer are  terminated  without saying anything more in the order of termination that it can never amount to a punishment in the facts and  circumstances of  the case.  If a probationer is discharged on the  ground of misconduct or inefficiency or for similar reason  without a  proper  enquiry  and without  his  getting  a  reasonable opportunity of showing cause against his discharge it may in a  given  case  amount to removal from  service  within  the meaning of Article 311(2) of the Constitution. [837 F] HELD  FURTHER  :  In the absence of any  rules  governing  a probationer the authority may come to the conclusion that on account  of inadequacy for the job or for any  temperamental or  other  object  not involving moral  turpitude  the  pro- bationer  is  unsuitable  for  the job  and  hence  must  be discharged,  the same does not involve any punishment.   The authority may in some cases be of the view that the  conduct of  the  petitioner may result in dismissal  or  removal  on enquiry  but  in those cases the authority may not  hold  an enquiry and may simply discharge the petitioner With a  view to  giving him a chance to make good in other walks of  life without  a  stigma.  The fact of holding an enquiry  is  not always conclusive.  What is decisive is whether the order is really by way of punishment.  It the facts and circumstances of the case indicate that the substance of the order is that the termination is by way of punishment then the  petitioner is entitled to attract Article 311.  Where the  departmental enquiry  is contemplated and if any enquiry is not  in  fact proceeded with, Article 311 will not be- attracted unless it can  be shown that the order though unexceptionable in  form

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is  made following a report based on misconduct.  [837  G-A; 838 C; F&G] HELD  FURTHER  :  Rule7(1)  of  the  Punjab  Civil   Service (Judicial Branch) Rules 1951 provides that every Subordinate Judge in the first instance would be appointed on  probation for 2 years but the said period might be extended from  time to  time expressly or impliedly so that the total period  of probation  including  extension  if any does  not  exceed  3 years.   The  explanation  to rule 7(1)  provides  that  the probation  shall  be  deemed  to have  been  extended  if  a Subordinate,  Judge, is not confirmed on the expiry  of  his probation.  Any confirmation by implication is negatived  in the  present case because before the completion of  3  years the High Court found Prima facie that the conduct as well as the  work of the appellant was unsatisfactory and  a  notice was  given  to  the appellant to show cause as  to  why  his services should not be terminated.  Explanation to rule 7(1) shows  that the period of probation shall be deemed to  have been  extended  impliedly  if a  subordinate  Judge  is  not confirmed  on the expiry of probation.  Therefore,  no  con- firmation  by  implication can arise in  the  present  case. [839B; E-G] 816 HELD FURTHER : The High Court for the reasons which are  not stated  decided to depute the Director of Vigilance to  hold an enquiry.  It is indeed strange that the High Court  which had control over the judiciary asked the Government to  hold an enquiry through the Vigilance Department.  The members of the subordinate judiciary are not only, under the control of the  High Court but are also under the care and  custody  of the High Court.  The High Court failed to discharge the duty of preserving its control.  The request by the High Court to hold an enquiry through the Director of Vigilance was an act of  self abnegations.  The High Court should have  conducted the enquiry preferably through District Judges.  The members of the Subordinate judiciary look up to High Court not  only for  discipline but also for dignity.  The  enquiry  officer nominated   by  the  Director  of  Vigilance  recorded   the statements  of witnesses behind the back of  the  appellant. The  enquiry  was to ascertain the truth of  allegations  of misconduct.  Neither the report nor the statements  recorded by  the Enquiry Officer reached the appellant.  The  Enquiry Officer gave his findings on allegations of misconduct.  The High Court accepted the report of Enquiry Officer and  wrote to  the  Government  that in the light of  the  report,  the appellant  was  not  a suitable person  to  be  retained  in service. [841C-F] The  order  of termination of the services of  Ishwar  Chand Agarwal  is  clearly by way of punishment in the  facts  and circumstances  of the case.  The High Court not only  denied Ishwar  Chand  merely the protection under Article  311  but also   denied   itself  the  dignified  control   over   the subordinate  judiciary.   The  form  of  the  order  is  not decisive  as to, whether the order is by way of  punishment. Even an innocuously worded order terminating the service may in the facts and circumstances of the case establish that an enquiry  into allegations of serious and grave character  of misconduct  involving stigma has been made in infraction  of the  provisions  of  Article  311.   In  such  a  case   the simplicity  of  the  form of the order  will  not  give  any sanctity.   The order of termination is illegal and must  be set aside. [841 G-H] In  case of Shamsher Singh the orders of termination of  the services  are  set  aside.   The  appellant  Shamsher  Singh succeeds by setting aside the order of termination. in  view

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of the fact that Shgamsher Singh is already employed in  the Ministry  of  Law,  no relief  accepting  salary  and  other monetary  benefits  which accrued to him upto  the  time  he obtained employment in the Ministry of Law is given. (Per Krishna lyer J. for himself and Bhagwati J. concurring) (i)  The  argument about the oath of office of President  to defend  the Constitution is sometimes put forward  by  inti- ministerialist   advocates.   The  President   defends   the Constitution not by denying its spiritual essence of Cabinet responsibility-indeed   he  subverts  it  that  way-but   by accepting   as   his  Constitutional   function   what   his responsible’  ministers  have  decided.   Can  a  Judge,  in fulfillment  of the oath of his office, ignore  all  binding precedents  and decide according to the ad hoc  dictates  of his uninformed conscience ?  Tribhovandas’s case answers the point  in the negative.  If every functionary who takes  the oath  by  the Constitution interprets it  according  to  his lights,  this solemn document would be the source  of  chaos and  collusion and the first casualty would be the  rule  of law.  Such mischief cannot merit juristic acceptance. [856H; 85-A-B] It  is clear from article 74(1) that it is the  function  of the  Council of Ministers to advise the President  over  the whole  of  the  Central  field.   Nothing  is  left  to  his discretion or excepted from that field by this article.   By way  of contract see Article 163 which is the  corresponding provision for Governors and which expressly excepts  certain matters   in  which  the  Governor  is,  by  or  under   the constitution,  required to act in his discretion.  There  is no such exception in the case of the President. [858FG] However,  Article  75(3)  makes  the  Council  of  Ministers responsible to the House of the People.  If, therefore,  the President  acted  contrary to advice,  the  ministers  would either  resign or, since the advice tendered  reflected  the view of the House of the People, they would be thrown out of office by the House of the People.  For the same reason,  no one else 817 would  then  be  able to form a  government.  The  President would, therefore be compelled to dissolve the House.   Apart from  the  technical  difficulty of carrying  out  the  many details  of  a  general election in  such  a  situation  the President  might have to dismiss the Ministry and install  a caretaker’  government to co-operate with him in ordering  a general election--the consequences of the election might  be most  serious.  if  the electorate should  return  the  same government  to  power,  the President might  be  accused  of having sided with Opposition and thrown the country into the turmoil and expense of a general--election in a vain attempt to get rid of a Ministry that had the support of  Parliament and  the people.  This would gravely impair the position  of the President. [858G-H; 859A-B] If  we hold that in a conflict between the Ministry and  the President,  the  President’s  Voice should  prevail  in  the last resort, either generally or even in a particular  class of cases, this would mean the elimination to that extent  of the authority of a Ministry which is continuously subject to control or criticism by the house of the People in favour of the  authority  of a President who is not  so  subject.   It would   thus  result  in  a  reduction  of  the  sphere   of responsible  government. So important a subtraction must  be justified  by some express provisions in  out  constitution. [859C-D]  If the President, in a particular case, where his own views differ  front  those of his  Ministers,  ultimately  accepts

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their  advice  in defence to a well  understood  convention, then  even  if  the act should result in a  breach  of  some fundamental right, or directive principle’ enunciated in the constitution,  the  responsibility  will  be  that  of   the ministers and not of the President. [859D-E] The  President under the Indian Constitution is not  a  mere figure head.  Like,, the King in England he will still  have the right to be consulted, to encourage and to wam Acting on ministerial  advice  does  not  necessarily  mean  immediate acceptance of the Ministry’s first thoughts.  The  President can  state  all his objections to any  purposed.  course  of action  and ask his Ministers in Council, if  necessary,  to reconsider the matter. it is only in the last resort that he must accept their final advice. [859F-G] The President in India is not at all a glorified cipher.  Ho represents the majesty of the State, is at the apex,  though only  symbolically,  and ha,, rapport with  the  people  and parties  being above politics.  His vigilant presence  makes for good government if only he uses, what Bagehot  described as the    right  to  be consulted, to warn  and  encourage.’ Indeed, Article 78 wisely     sad,  keeps the  President  in close  touch with the Prime Minister on matters of  national importance  and policy significance, and there is  no  doubt that the imprint of his personality may chasten and  correct the  political government, although the actual  exercise  of the  functions entrusted to him. by law is in effect and  in law carried on by his duly appointed mentors, i.e. the Prime Minister and his colleagues.  In short, the President,  like the’ King, has not merely been constitutionally romanticized but  actually  vested  with a  persuasive  role.   Political theorists are quite conversant with the dynamic role of  the Crown  which  keeps  away from politics and  power  and  yet influences  both.   While he plays such a role he is  not  a rival  centre of power in any sense and must abide,  by  and act  on  the advice tendered by his Ministers  except  in  a narrow  territory which is sometimes slippery.   Of  course, there is some qualitative difference between the position of the  President and the Governor.  The former, under Art.  74 hag  no discretionary powers; the latter too has none.  save in the tiny strips covered by Arts. 163 (2), 371A(1)(b)  and (d),  371A(2)(b)  and  (f); VI Schedule para  9(2)  (and  VI Schedule para 18(3), until omitted recently with effect from 21-1-1972).   These  discretionary powers exist  only  where expressly spelt out and even these are not left to the sweet will of the Governor but are remote-controlled by the  Union Ministry  which  is  answerable  to  Parliament  for   those actions.   Again, a minimal area centering round reports  to be  dispatched  under  Art. 356 may not, in  the  nature  of things, be amenable to ministerial advice. [867F-H; 868A-C] L192SupCI/75 818 If only we expand the ratio of Sardarilal and Jayantilal  to every  A  function  which the Article  of  the  Constitution confer  on  the  President on  the  Governor,  Parliamentary democracy  will  become  a dope  and  national  elections  a numerical  exercise  in  expensive  futility.  we  will   be compelled  to hold that there are two  parallel  authorities exercising  powers of governance of the country, as  in  the dyarchy  days,  except  that  Whitehall  is  substituted  by Rashtrapati  Bhavan  and  Rai  Bhawan.   The  cabinet   will shrinkat   Union   and  State  levels   in   political   and administrative  authority and, having solemn regard  to  the gamut of his powers and responsibilities, the Head of  State will  be reincarnation of Her Majesty’s Secretary  of  State for  India,  untroubled  by even the  British  Parliament  a

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little taller in power than the American President.  Such  a distortion,  by  interpretation,  it appears  to  us,  would virtually amount to a subversion of the structure, substance and vitality of our Republic, particularly when we  remember that  Governors  are  but appointed  functionaries  and  the President  himself is elected on a limited  indirect  basis. [869G-H; 870A-B] HELD FURTHER: The  President  means,  for  all  practical  Purposes,   the Minister or the Council of Ministers as the case may be, and his  opinion, satisfaction of decision  is  constitutionally secured   en   his  Ministers  arrive   at   such   opinion, satisfaction   or   decision.   The  independence   of   the judiciary, which is a cardinal principle of the Constitution and has been relied on to justify the deviation, is  guarded by  the relevant Article making consultation with the  Chief Justice  of  India  obligatory.  In  all  conceivable  cases consultation  with that highest dignitary of Indian  justice will  and should be accepted by the Government of India  and the  Court will have an opportunity to examine if any  other extraneous  circumstances have entered into the  verdict  of the  Minister, if he departs from the counsel given  by  the Chief Justice of India.  In practice the last word in such a sensitive subject must belong to the Chief Justice of India, the  rejection  of his advice being ordinarily  regarded  as prompted by oblique considerations vitiating the order.   In this  view  it is immaterial whether the  President  or  the Prime Minister or the Minister for Justice formally  decided the issue. [873A-C] HELD FURTHER: Nor  is  Sardarilal  of such antiquity  and  moment  that  a reversal  would upset the sanctity of stare  decisis.   Some rulings, even of the highest Court. when running against the current  of  case  and the clear  stream  of  Constitutional thought, may have to fall into the same class as  restricted railroad ticket, good for the day and train only,’ to  adopt the  language  of Justice Roberts (Smith v.  Alleright,  321 U.S. 649, 665). [875E-F] In short the law of this branch of our constitution is  that the President and Governor, Custodians of all executive  and other  powers  under various Articles shall,  by  virtue  of these  provisions,  exercise  their  formal   constitutional powers only upon and in accordance with the advice of  their Ministers  save in a few well-known exceptional  situations. Without  being  dogmatic  of  exhaustive,  these  situations relate to (a) the choice of Prime Minister (Chief Minister), restricted   though   this  choice  is  by   the   paramount consideration  that  he  should command a  majority  in  the House; (b) the dismissal of a Government which has lost  its majority  in the House but refuses to quit office;  (c)  the dissolution of the House where an appeal to the country.  is necessarily, although in this area the Head of State  should avoid  getting involved in politics and must be  advised  by his Prime Minister (Chief Minister) who will eventually take the  responsibility  for  the step.  We do  not  examine  in detail the constitutional proprieties in these  predicaments except  to utter the caution that even here the action  must be compelled by the peril to democracy and the appeal to the House  or to the country must become  blatantly  obligatory. [875F-H] (ii) So far as the appeals are concerned, the effect is that there  is no infirmity in the impugned orders on  the  score that  the  Governor has not himself perused  the  papers  or passed the orders. [876C-D] 819

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The orders of terminations are liable to be quashed and  set aside  on the facts set out in the judgment of  the  learned Chief Justice. Arguments on behalf of the appellant : Article 234 of the Constitution confers on the Governor  the power  first  to frame rules in consultation with  the  High Court  and the Public Service Commission and  then  requires him  to  appoint persons to judicial service of a  State  in accordance  with  the Rules so made.  The power  to  appoint includes  The  power to dismiss or  terminate  according  to section 16 of the general Clauses Act read with Article  367 of the Constitution. The power of the Governor under Article 234 as regulated  by the  rules framed thereunder is not the executive  power  of the  State  as  contemplated under  Article  154  and  under Article  162  of  the Constitution and  is,  therefore,  not exercisable under Article 154 through subordinate  officers, which,  includes  Ministers but must, on the  language,  the purpose and the setting of the Article, be exercised by  the Governor  as  a power exercisable by himself.  Even  Rule  7 framed  in consultation with the High Court and  the  Public Service  Commission  of the Punjab Civil  Service  (Judicial Branch  Rules)  confers  the power  of  termination  on  the Governor  alone  and being bound by those  rules  he  cannot leave exercise thereof to a subordinate officer.  Since  the impugned order of termination dated 15th December, 1969  was passed admittedly without even placing the papers before the Governor  the  same  is  in  contravention  of  and  is  not authorized by Article 234 and the rules framed thereunder. Under Article 163 of the Constitution the Governor is to act on  the  aid and advice of his Council of Ministers  in  the exercise  of  Ms functions except in so far as he is  by  or under the Constitution required to exercise his functions in his discretion.  The power of termination conferred by  Rule 7  is  a power conferred by and under the  Constitution  and since Rule 7 requires the Governor in his own discretion  to decide  whether  or  not  to terminate  the  services  of  a probationer judicial officer the function could be exercised by  the  Governor  even without the aid and  advice  of  his Council  of Ministers.  Article 163(2)  further  strengthens this  submission in as much as it confers on  the  Governors the  power even to decide whether a matter is or is not  one in his discretion. Alternatively  and assuming that the function under  Article 234  read  with  Rule  7  was  not  within  the   Governor’s discretion  in terms of Article 163, the power conferred  by Article  234  and said Rule 7 was  not  exercisable  through subordinates   under   Article  154  although  it   may   be exercisable  by  the Governor on the aid and advice  of  his Council  of Ministers since the power is not  the  executive power of the State, but a law making cum executive power  of the Governor himself. Under  Article 235 of the Constitution it is the High  Court alone which is vested with the control over the  subordinate judiciary  in  all  matters  including  the  initiating  and holding  of enquiries against judicial officers.  Since  the dismissal  or  termination of the  appellant’s  services  is based   on   the   Superintendent   of   Police,   Vigilance Department’s  findings  of guilt the order is in  breach  of Article 235 of the Constitution. The  appellant having completed his maximum period of  three years probation. a legal right to be confirmed in favour  of the  appellant.  Thereafter he ceased to be  a  probationer. Since the appellant had acquired a right to be confirmed his services  could not have been terminated without  compliance

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with the provisions of Article. 311 of the Constitution. The impugned order of termination though innocuous in  form, is  really  an  order  by way  of  punishment  removing  the appellant  from  service on the basis of  charges  of  gross misconduct   found  established  by  an   ex-parte   enquiry conducted  by  the S.P. Vigilance Department with  the  only object of ascertaining the truth, of the alleged  misconduct and for the purpose of dismissing or removing the petitioner if the charges were found established.  It was ultimately on the  basis of specific findings recorded by  S.P.  Vigilance that the appellant’s services were terminated.  The  enquiry was clearly in breach of Article 311 of the Constitution  as also in breach of rules of Natural justice.  The enquiry  by SP.   Vigilance was essentially and in character and  object different from the infor- 820 mal  enquiry into the suitability of the appellant  held  by the two District Judges (Ferozpur and Bhatinda) towards the, end of the maximum period of probation. The report of the Vigilance Department which formed the very basis of the termination is therefore, based on an  entirely uncommunicated material. Even  the  adverse  reports referred to  by  the  Respondent Government  were  not made the subject matter  of  the  show cause notice proposing termination so that in terms of  Rule 9  the  petitioner never had the opportunity to  show  cause against  them.  Although the said reports related to a  pre- show  cause  notice, period they were not made  the  subject matter of the show cause notice )so that the impugned  order of termination, which, is admittedly based on these  adverse reports also is in breach of Rule 9. The  appellant’s  service have thus been terminated  on  the basis  of  grounds  entirely extraneous to  the  show  cause notice and since the appellant was not applied of these  new grounds and allegations and was not given an opportunity  to submit an explanation with regard to the same, the order  of termination dated 15th December, 1969 has clearly been  made in breach of mandatory provisions of rule 9 and is liable to be quashed. Arguments on behalf of the Respondent It is a fundamental principle of English Constitutional  law that  there  must be no conflict between the  King  and  his people,  and consequently no conflict between the  King  and the,  House  of Commons which represents the people.  It  is this principle which is responsible for three settled  rules of  English Constitutional Law : (i) That for  every  public act  of the King, his Ministers must accept  responsibility, (ii)  That  the  Sovereign must never act on  his  own  res- ponsibility  that is, he must always have advisers who  will bear responsibility for his acts; and (iii) The Power of the Sovereign  to  differ  from  or  dismiss  his  Ministers  is conditioned  by the practical rule that the Crown must  find advisers  to  bear responsibility for his action  and  those advisers  must have the confidence of the house of  Commons. This  rule of English Constitutional Law is incorporated  in the  Constitution of India.  See Articles 74(1),  75(3)  and 361(1)  and  second  proviso  which  clearly  point  to  the conclusion   that  the  Indian  Constitution   envisages   a Parliamentary or "responsible" form of Government and not  a Presidential  form  of  Government.   The  powers  of   the, Governor as constitutional head are no different-See Article 163(1), 164(2) and 361(1) and second proviso. The  Supreme Court of India has consistently taken the  view that  the  powers  of the President and the  powers  of  the Governor  under  the  Indian Constitution are  akin  to  the

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powers of the Crown under the British Parliamentary  system. See Ramajawari Kapur v. State of Punjab [1955] 2 SCR at 236- 237  (Mukherjea, CJ.), A. Sanjeevi Naidu v. State of  Madras [1970]  3  SCR 505 at 511 (Hegde J.); U. N.  Rao  v.  Indira Gandhi  [1971] Supp.  SCR p. 46 (Sikri, C.J.). In  the  last case  this Court held that Article 74(1) was  mandatory  and therefore  the  President could not exercise  the  executive power  without the aid and advice of Council  of  Ministers; but  the principle of the decision is not restricted to  the exercise  of  executive power alone.  A  similar  view  with regard to the powers of the President and the Governor under our  Constitution  is expressed by  Constitutional  lawyers. (See,  for  instance, Jennings Constitutional  Laws  of  the Commonwealth 1952 p. 365 where the author characterizes  the description  of  the  Indian  Constitution  as  a  Sovereign Democratic Republic as "wholly accurate" but that "it  might also  be  described as a constitutional monarchy  without  a monarch". The  Governor  is  at  the apex of  the  Executive  and  the executive  power  of  the State is vested  in  the  Governor [Article 154(1)].  The Governor is also at the annex of  the State Legislature (Article 169). In both these capacities the Governor has several  functions to perform.  The word functions’ includes powers and duties- The  nature of these functions and the capacity in which  he examines them is set out in the Explanatory Note appended to this written argument. The power to terminate the engagement of a member of a State Public Service Commission such as a Sub-Judge is part of the executive power of 821 the State. (Art. 162 read will Entry 41 of List 11).  It can be  allocated  to a Minister under Art. 166(3).  It  can  be exercised by subordinate officials if this is in  accordance with the rules of allocation. In any case the executive power of the State extends to, but is  not limited to, matters in respect of which  legislature has  power  to make laws.  Neither the appointment  nor  the termination  of  the services of a District  Judge  (Article 233)  nor  the appointment or termination of  service  of  a member of the Subordinate Judicial Service (Article 234)  is a  matter with respect to which the Governor is required  to act  in  his  discretion.  The argument (on  behalf  of  the Interveners)  that  the "Governor" in Articles 233  and  234 mean  the  Governor personally and not  acting  through  any other  agency is contrary to the plain language of  articles 154(1), 162(1) and 166.  It is also contrary to the  concept "responsible" Government.  That the actions of "responsible" Ministers should be scrutinized by a nominated Governor, who is  responsible  to  no  one,  is  a  strange  argument  the confidence in the personal opinion of a nominated individual may  or may not be justified; but it is not warranted  in  a Parliamentary system of democracy.  There is nothing in  the form  of the oath taken by the Governor to militate  against the  State’s  submissions.  If the Governor is true  to  his oath  he  cannot  ignore  or refuse  to  follow  a  ride  of constitutional  Law-which is that he must act as  a  consti- tutional  head  of  a State having a  Council  of  Ministers responsible  to  the  State Legislature.   In  fact  such  a contention   runs   counter  to  the   theory   of   Cabinet responsibility on which our Constitution is based. The  argument  founded on article 167 does not  advance  the case  of  the  petitioners.  The Governor has  no  right  to refuse  to  act on the advice of the Council  of  Ministers. Such   a  position  is  antithetical  to  the   concept   of

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"responsible’ Government.  Article 167 was inserted for  the limited  purpose  of enabling him to obtain  information  so that  he could discharge the constitutional functions  of  a Governor.  It was not intended to give the Governor power to interfere  in the administration and as such a  result  does not flow from the language used in article 167. A person appointed to a permanent post in Government service on probation has no right to continue to hold that post  any more  than  a  servant employed on probation  by  a  private employer is entitled to do.  Termination’ of the services of the  probationer  during  or at the end  of  the  period  or probation will not ordinarily and by itself be a  punishment attracting the provisions of article 311.  If termination of service of a probationer is founded on a right flowing  from the  contract or the service rules, then prima facie  it  is not a punishment and article 311 is not attracted.  The test is  :  Is termination sought to be brought  about  otherwise than  by  way of punishment ? If yes, article 311  will  not apply.  This is ordinarily to be ascertained by reference to the order terminating the service. Though termination of the service of a probationer during or at  the end of the period of probation will  not  ordinarily and  by itself be a punishment-the  circumstances  attending the  termination would be relevant to determine  whether  or not the termination was by way of punishment.  An  important circumstance would be the fact that disciplinary action  was contemplated  and  taken.  The form of the order is  not  by itself conclusive. An  order of termination of service in unexceptionable  form preceded  by an inquiry launched by the superior  authority- whether under specific rules or otherwise for the purpose of ascertaining  whether the public servant should be  retained in service does not attract the operation of article 311. Even where a departmental inquiry is initiated and a  charge sheet   submitted  followed  by  an  explanation  from   the probationer  the  provisions  of article 311  would  not  be attracted  if the inquiry was not proceeded with  and  there was a termination of service simpliciter. But where the inquiry is held under rules giving the  public servant on probation an opportunity of showing cause why the probationer’s appointment should not be terminated and  such a  show cause notice is given and an inquiry held under  the relevant rule. the order of discharge of the probationer  if unexceptionable in form, will not amount to "dismissal". In  the.  present case Rule 9 was invoked and  was  applied. The    confidential   reports   themselves    disclose    an unsatisfactory record implying unsuitability for 822 further  service.  This itself is sufficient to dispose  of. the  petitioner’s contentions on merits.   The  confidential reports  were  available with the Government  as  they  were forwarded  by  the  High  Court.   The  explanation  of  the petitioner  was considered by the High Court both  prior  to the issue of a show cause notice by the Chief Secretary  and after, and the explanation of the petitioners was also  con- sidered  by the High Court.  The record does not  show  that the view of the High Court was in any way perverse.  On  the contrary,  it is clearly warranted by the facts  on  record. The  contention that the show cause notice should have  been under  the specific directions of the Chief Minister is  not warranted  either by the Allocation Rules of 1966 nor is  it justified  on  a true construction of Rule 9 of  the  Punjab Civil Service (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1952.

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JUDGMENT: CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos.  2289  of 1970 and 632 of 1971. From  the Judgment and Order dated 28-4-70 of the appeal  by Special  Leave from the Judgment and order dated 8-10-70  of the  Punjab  &  Haryana High Court in  Civil  Regular  First Appeal No. 446/69 and L.P.A. No. 656 of 1970 respectively. Appellant appeared in person (In CA No. 2289170). G.   L.  Sanghi,  S. P. Agarwala, A. T. M.  Sampath,  A.  K. Sanghi  and E. C. Agarwala, for the Appellant (In  C.A.  No. 632/71). F.S.  Nariman, Addl.  Sol.  Gen. of India, H. R. Khanna  and O. P. Sharma; for Respondent No. 1 (In CA.  No. 2289/70). V.   M.  Tarkunde,  S.  K. Mehta and O. P.  Sharma  for  the Respondent (In CA. 632/71). Niren  De,  Att.  Gen., P. P. Rao and S. P. Nayar;  for  the Attorney General of India. B.   R. L. iyengar and Bishamber Lal for the Intervener (Mr. B. L. Gupta)  Anand Swarup, A. K.Sen and Harbans Singh Marwaha for Inter- vener (Punjab & Haryana). The  Judgment  of  A. N. Ray, C.J., D.,  G.  Palekar,K.   K. Mathew,  Y  V.  Chandrachud and  A.  Alagiriswami,  JJ.  was delivered  by  Ray,  C.J., V. H. Krishna  Iyer,  J.  gave  a separate Opinion on behalf of P.   N. Bhagwati J. and himself. RAY  C.  J. These two appeals are from the judgment  of  the Punjab and Haryana High Court. The  Appellants  joined the Punjab Civil  Service  (Judicial Branch).  They were both on probation. By  an  order  dated 27th April, 1967 the  services  of  the appellant Shamsher Singh were terminated.  The order was  as follows :               "The   Governor  of  Punjab  is   pleased   to               terminate the services of Shri Shamsher Singh,               Subordinate Judge, on probation, under Rule  9               of the Punjab Civil Services (Punishment’  and               Appeal) Rules, 1952 with immediate effect.  It               is requested that these orders may be conveyed               to  the officer concerned under intimation  to               the Government."               By  an  order  dated  15  December,  1969  the               services   of  the   appellant  Ishwar   Chand               Agarwal  were  terminated.  The order  was  as               follows:               "On  the recommendation of the High  Court  of               Punjab and Haryana, the Governor of Punjab  is               pleased to dispense with               823               the  services  of Shri Ishwar  Chand  Agarwal,               P.C.S.   (Judicial  Branch),  with   immediate               effect,  under  Rule 7(3) in Part  D’  of  the               Punjab Civil Services (Judicial Branch) Rules,               1951, as amended from time to time". The   appellants   contend   that  the   Governor   as   the Constitutional or the formal head of the State can  exercise powers  and functions.of appointment and removal of  members of  the Subordinate Judicial Service only  personally.   The State  contends  that  the  Governor  exercises  powers   of appointment  and  removal conferred on him by or  under  the Constitution  like  execute powers of the  State  Government only  on the aid and advice of his Council of Ministers  and not personally. The appellants rely on the decision of this Court in Sardari

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Lal v. union of India & Ors. (1971)3 S.C.R. 461 where it has been  held that where the President or the Governor, as  the case  may  be, if satisfied, makes an  order  under  Article 311(2)  proviso(c) that in the interest of the  security  of the  State  it  is  not expedient to  hold  an  enquiry  for dismissal or removal or reduction in rank of an officer, the satisfaction  of  the  President  or  the  Governor  is  his personal  satisfaction.  The appellants on the authority  of this   ruling  contend  that  under  Article  234   of   the Constitution  the appointment as well as the termination  of services of subordinate Judges is to be made by the Governor personally. These  two  appeals  were placed before a  larger  Bench  to consider whether the decision in Sardari Lal’s case  (supra) correctly lays down the law that where the President or  the Governor is to be satisfied it is his personal satisfaction. The appellants contend that the power of the Governor  under Article  234 of the Constitution is to be exercised  by  him personally for these reasons. First there are several constitutional functions, powers and duties of the  Governor.   These  are conferred  on  him  eo nomine  the  Governor.  The Governor, is, by and  under  the Constitution,  required to act in his discretion in  several matters.   These constitutional functions and powers of  the Governor eo nomine as well as these in the discretion of the Governor  are not executive powers of the State  within  the meaning of Article 154 read with Article 162. Second, the Governor under Article 163 of the  Constitution. can take aid and advice of his Council of Ministers when  he is  exercising executive power of the State.   The  Governor can exercise powers and functions without the aid and advice of his Council of Ministers when he is required by or  under the  Constitution  to  act in his discretion,  where  he  is required to exercise his Constitutional functions  conferred on him eo nomine as the Governor. Third, the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers  under Article 163 is different from the allocation of business  of the  Government of the state by the Governor to the  Council of Ministers under Article 824 166(3)  of the constitution.  The allocation of business  of Govt.  under Article, 166(3) is an instance  of exercise  of executive  power  by  the Governor through  his  council  by allocating  or delegating his functions. The aid and  advice is a constitutional restriction on the exercise of executive powers of the State by the Governor.  The Governor will  not be  constitutionally competent to exercise  these  executive powers  of  the  State without the aid  and  advice  of  the Council of Ministers. Fourth, the executive powers of the State are vested in  the Governor  under Article 154(1).  The powers  of  appointment and removal of Subordinate Judge under Article 234 have  not been allocated to the Ministers under the Rules of  Business of  the State of Punjab.  Rule 18 of the Rules  of  Business States  that except as otherwise provided by any other  rule cases  shall  ordinarily  be disposed of  by  or  under  the authority  of  the  Minister-in-Charge  who  may,  by  means of   Standing orders, give such directions as he thinks  fit for the disposal of cases  in his department.  Rule 7(2)  in Part  D  of the Punjab civil Rules which  states  that  the, Governor  of Punjab may on the, recommendation of  the  High Court  remove from service without assigning any  cause  any subordinate  Judge  or revert him to  his  substantive  post during  the, period of probation is incapable of  allocation to a Minister.  Rule 18 of the, Rules of Business is subject

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to exceptions and rule 7(2) of the Service Rules is such  an exception.  Therefore, the appellants contend that the power of  the Governor to remove Subordinate Judges under  Article 234  read with the aforesaid Rule 7(2) of the Service  Rules cannot be allocated to a Minister. The Attorney General for the Union, the Additional Solicitor General for the State of Punjab and Counsel for the State of Haryana contended that the President is the,  constitutional head  of  the Union and the Governor is  the  constitutional head of the State and the President as well as the  Governor exercises  all powers and functions conferred on them by  or under the Constitution on the aid and advice of the  Council of a Ministers. In  all the Articles which speak of powers and functions  of the President, the expressions used in relation thereto  are is  satisfied’, is of  opinion as he thinks fit’ and  if  it appears  to.   In the case of nor, the expressions  used  in respect of his powers and functions are is satisfied’, if of opinion’ and as he thinks fit’. Article  163(1)  states  that there shall be  a  Council  of Ministers  with  the Chief Minister at the head to  aid  and advice the Governor in the exercise of Was functions, except in  so far as he is by or under this Constitution,  required to  exercise  his  functions  or any of  them  in  his  dis- cretion.  Article 163(2) states that if any question  arises whether  any matter is or is not a matter as respects  which the  Governor is by or under this Constitution  required  to act  in his discretion, the decision of he Governor  in  his discretion shall be final and the validity of anything  done by  the  Governor  shall not be called in  question  on  the ground  that  the ought or ought not to have  acted  in  his discretion.   Extracting  the words "in his  discretion"  in relation  to exercise of functions, the  appellants  contend that the Council of Ministers may aid and advise the 825 Governor   in   Executive   functions   but   the   Governor individually and personally in his discretion will  exercise the  constitutional functions of appointment and removal  of officerS in State Judicial Service and other State Services. It is noticeable that though in Article 74 it is stated that there  shall  be  a  Council of  Ministers  with  the  Prime Minister at the head to aid and advise the President in  the exercise of his functions, there is no provision in  Article 74  comparable  to Article 163 that the aid  and  advice  is except  in  so  far  as he  is  required.  to  exercise  his functions or any of them in his discretion. It  is  necessary to find out as to why the  words,  in  his discretion’  ire  used  in relation to some  powers  of  the Governor and not in the case of the President. Article 143 in the Draft Constitution became Article 163  in the Constitution.  The draft constitution in Article  144(6) said  that the functions of the Governor under Article  with respect to the appointment and dismissal of Ministers  shall be exercised by him in his discretion.  Draft Article 144(6) was  totally omitted when Article 144 became Article 164  in the Constitution.  Again Draft Article 153(3) said that  the functions  of  the  Governor under clauses (a)  and  (c)  of clause  (2) of the Article shall be exercised by him in  his discretion.   Draft Article 153(3) was totally omitted  when it  became Article 174 of our Constitution.   Draft  Article 175 (proviso) said that the Governor " may in his discretion return the Bill together with a message requesting that  the House.  will  reconsider the Bill".  Those words  that  "the Governor may in his discretion" were omitted when it  became Article 200.  The Governor under Article 200 may return  the

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Bill   with  a  message  requesting  that  the  House   will reconsider   the  Bill.   Draft  Article  188   dealt   with provisions  in case of grave emer s. clauses (1) and (4)  in Draft  Article  188  used to words  "in  his  discretion  in relation  to  exercise  of power  by  the  Governor.   Draft Article 188 was totally omitted Draft Article 285(1) and (2) dealing  with  composition  and  staff  of  Public   Service Commission  used  the  expression  "in  his  discretion"  in relation  to exercise of power by the Governor in regard  to appointment  of  the  Chairman and  Members  and  makIng  of regulation.   The words "in his discretion" in  relation  to exercise  of  power  by the Governor were  omitted  when  it became  Article  316.   In Paragraph 15  (3)  of  the  Sixth Schedule  dealing  with annulment or suspension of  acts  or suspension of acts and resolutions of District and  Regional Councils  it  was said that the functions  of  the  Governor under  the  Paragraph  shall  be exercised  by  him  in  his discretion.   Sub-paragraph 3 of Paragraph 15 of  the  Sixth Schedule  was  omitted  at  the time  of  enactment  of  the Constitution. It  is,  therefore, understood in the  background  of  these illustrative  draft  articles as to why Article 143  in  the Draft   Constitution  which  became  Article  163   in   our Constitution  used  the expression "in  his  discretion"  in regard to some powers of the Governor. Articles  where the expression "acts in his  discretion"  is used  in  relation  to  the. powers  and  functions  of  the Governor  are those which speak of Special  responsibilities of  the Governor.  These Articles are 371A(1)  (b),  371A(1) (d), 371A (2) (b) and 371A(2) (f).  There 826 are two Paragraphs in the Sixth Schedule., namely, 9(2)  and 18(3)  where  the  words "in his  discretion"  are  used  in relation to certain powers of the Governor.  Paragraph 9 (2) is  in  relation  to determination of  amount  of  royalties payable   by  licensees  or  lessees  prospecting  for,   or extracting  minerals  to the  District  Council.   Paragraph 18(3) has been omitted with effect from 21 January, 1972. The  provisions contained in Article 371A (1) (b)  speak  of the Special responsibility of the Governor of Nagaland  with respect  to  law  and order in the  State  of  Nagaland  and exercise  of his individual judgment as to the action to  be taken.  The proviso states that the decision of the Governor in his discretion shall be final and it shall not be  called in question. Article  371A(1) (d) states that the Governor shall  in  his discretion  make rules providing for the composition of  the regional council for the Tuensang District. Article  371A(2)(b) states that for periods mentioned  there the  Governor  shall  in  his  discretion  arrange  for   an equitable allocation of certain funds, between the  Tuensang District and the rest of the State. Article  371A(2) (f) states that the final decision  on  all matters  relating to the Tuensang District shall be made  by the Governor in his discretion. The executive power of the Union is vested in the  President under  Article 53(1).  The executive power of the  State  is vested   in  the  Governor  under  Article  154  (1).    The expression "Union" and "State," occur in Articles 53(1)  and 154(1)  respectively to bring about the  federal  principles embodied  in  the  Constitution.  Any action  taken  in  the exercise  of the executive power of the Union vested in  the President under Article 53(1) is taken by the Government  of India in the name of the President as will appear in Article 77(1).   Similarly, any action taken in the exercise of  the

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executive  power of the State vested in the  Governor  under Article  154(1) is taken by the Government of the  State  in the name of the Governor as will appear in Article 166(1). There  are  two  significant  features  in  regard  to   the executive  action taken in the name of the President  or  in the  name  of the Governor.  Neither the President  nor  the Governor may sue or be sued for any executive action of  the State.   First,  Article 300 States that the  Government  of India  may sue or be sued in the name of the Union  and  the Governor  may  sue  or be sued in the  name  of  the  State. Second,  Article 361 states that proceedings may be  brought against  the Government of India and the Government  of  the State  but  not  against  the  President  or  the  Governor. Articles 300 and 361 indicate that neither the President nor the  Governor  can  be sued for  executive  actions  of  the Government.   The reason is that neither the  president  nor the Governor exercises the executive functions  individually or  personally.  Executive action taken in the name  of  the President  is  the action of the  Union.   Executive  action taken in the name of the Governor is the executive action of the State. 827 Our  Constitution  embodies generally the  Parliamentart  or Cabinet  system of Government of the British model both  for the Union and the States.  Under this system the,  President is  the  Constitutional or formal head of the Union  and  he exercises  his powers and functions conferred on him  by  or under the Constitution on the aid and advice of his  Council of  Ministers  Article 103 is an exception to  the  aid  and advice of the Council of- Ministers because it  specifically provides  that  the  President acts only  according  to  the opinion  of  the  Election Commission.   This  is  when  any question  arises as to whether a member of either  House  of Parliament   has   become  subject  to  any  of   the   dis- qualifications mentioned in clause (1) of Article 102. Under  the Cabinet system of Government as embodied  in  our Constitution  the Governor is the constitutional  or  formal head  of  the  State and be exercises  all  his  powers  and functions  conferred on him by or under the Constitution  on the  aid  and  advice of his Council of  Ministers  save  in spheres  where  the  Governor is required by  or  under  the Constitution to exercise his functions in his discretion. The  executive power is generally described as  the  residue which  does  not  fall within the  legislative  or  judicial power.  But executive power may also partake of  legislative or  judicial  actions.   All powers  and  functions  of  the President  except his legislative powers as for  example  in Article 123 viz., ordinance making power and all powers  and functions  of the Governor except his legislative  power  as for example in Article 213 being ordinance making powers are executive powers of the Union vested in the President  under Article 5 3 ( 1) in one case and are executive powers of the State  vested  in the Governor under Article ‘54(1)  in  the other  case.  Clause (2) or Clause (3) of Article 77 is  not limited  in  its operation to the executive  action  of  the Government  of  India  under  clause  (1)  of  Article   77. Similarly,  clause (2) or clause (3) of Article 166  is  not limited  in  its operation to the executive  action  of  the Government  of  the State under clause (1) of  Article  166. The  expression  "Business of the Government  of  India"  in clause  (3) of Article 77, and the expression  "Business  of the  Government of the State" in clause (3) of  Article  166 includes all executive business. In  all  cases  in  which  the  President  or  the  Governor exercises  his  functions conferred on him by or  under  the

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Constitution  with  the  aid and advice of  his  Council  of Ministers  he  does  so  by  making  rule-.  for  convenient transaction  of the business of the Government of  India  or the  Government of the State respectively or  by  allocation among his Ministers of the saidbusiness, in accordance  with Article  77  (3)  and  166(3)  respectively.  Wherever   the Constitution  requires  the satisfaction of  Presidents  the Governor  for the exercise of any power or function  by  the President  or  the  Governor, as the case  may  be,  as  for example  in  Articles’ 123, 21-3, 311(2) proviso  (c),  317, 352(1),  356  and  360  the  satisfaction  required  by  the Constitution  is  not  the  Personal  satisfaction  of   the President or of the Governor but is the satisfaction of  the President  or  of the Governor in the  Constitutional  sense under  the  Cabinet system of Government.  The  reasons  are these.  It is the satisfaction of the, Council of  Ministers on  whose  aid  and advice the  President  or  the  Governor generally  exercises all his powers and functions.   Neither Article 77(3) nor Article 166(3) provides for any delegation of power.  Both Articles 77(3) and 166(3) provide 828 that  the  President under Article 77(3)  and  the  Governor under   Article  166(3)  shall  make  rules  for  the   more convenient  transactions of the business of  the  Government and  the allocation of business among the ministers  of  the said  business.   The rules of business and  the  allocation among  the Ministers of the said business all indicate  that the  decision of any Minister or officer under the rules  of business  make under these two Articles viz., Article  77(3) in the case of the President and Article 166(3) in the  case of  the  Governor  of  the State  is  the  decision  of  the President or the Governor respectively. Further  the  rules of business and allocation  of  business among   the  Ministers  are  relatable  to  the   provisions contained  in  Article 53 in the case of the  President  and Article 154 in the case of the Governor, that the  executive power  shall be exercised by the President or  the  Governor directly   or   through  the  officers   subordinate.    The provisions  contained  in  Article 74 in  the  case  of  the President  and Article 163 in the case of the Governor  that there shall be a Council of Ministers to aid and advise  the President or the Governor as the case may be, arc sources of the  rules  of  business.   These  provisions  are  for  the discharge  of  the  executive powers and  functions  of  the Government  in  the name of the President or  the  Governor. Where functions entrusted to a Minister are performed by  an official  employed in the Minister’s Department there is  in law  no  delegation  because  constitutionally  the  act  or decision  of  the official is that of  the,  Minister.   Ile official  is merely the machinery for the discharge  of  the functions  entrusted to a Minister (See Halsubry’s  laws  of England 4th Ed.  Vol. I paragraph 748 at p. 170 and Carleton Ltd. v. Works Commissioners (1943) 2 AU. (E.R. 560) It is a fundamental principle of English Constitutional  law that   Ministers  must  accept  responsibility   for   every executive act.  In England, the sovereign never acts on  his own   responsibility.   The  power  of  the   sovereign   is conditioned  by the practical rule that the Crown must  find advisers  to  bear  responsibility for  his  action.   Those advisers  must have the confidence of the House of  Commons. This  rule of English constitutional law is incorporated  in our  Constitution.   The  Indian  Constitution  envisages  a parliamentary  and  responsible form of  Government  at  the Centre  and  in the States and not a  Presidential  form  of Government.    Tie   powers   of   the   Governor   as   the

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Constitutional head are not different. This  Court has consistently taken the view that the  powers of the President and the powers of the Governor are  similar to  the powers of the Crown under the British  Parliamentary system. (See Ram Jawaya Kapur v. State of Punjab (1952) 2 S. C.  R. 225 at 236237, A. Sanjeevi Naidu v. State  of  Madras (1970)  3  S. C. R. 505 at 511. U. N. Pao v.  Indira  Gandhi (1971)  Supp.   S.  C. R. 46.  In Ram  Jawaya  Kapur’s  case (supra)  Mukherjea, C. J. speaking for the Court stated  the legal  position as follows.  The executive has  the  Primary responsibility  for the formulation of  governmental  policy and  its transmission into law.  The condition precedent  to the  exercise of this responsibility is that  the  executive retains  the  confidence of the legislative  branch  of  the State.   The initiation of legislation, the  maintenance  of order, the promotion of Social and economic welfare, the 829 direction  of foreign policy, the, carrying on  the  general administration  of  the State are ail  executive  functions. The  executive  is  to act subject to  the  control  of  the legislature.  Ile executive power of the Union is vested  in the   President.    The   President   is   the   formal   or constitutional  head of the executive.  The  real  executive powers are vested in the Ministers of the Cabinet.  There is a  Council of Ministers with the Prime Minister as the  head to  aid  and  advise the President in the  exercise  of  his functions. The  functions  of the Governor under rules of  business  of Madras Government in regard to a scheme for  nationalization of  certain  bus  routes were considered by  this  Court  in Sanjeevi  Naidu’s case (supra).  The validity of the  scheme was  challenged on the ground that it was not formed by  the State  Government  but by the Secretary  to  the  Government pursuant  to powers conferred on him under Rule 23-A of  the Madras Government Business Rules. The Scheme was upheld for these reasons.  The Governor makes rules   under  Article  166(3)  for  the   more   convenient transaction  of business the Government of the  State.   The Governor can not only allocate the various subjects  amongst the Ministers but may go further and designate a  particular official  to  discharge any particular function.   But  that could  be done on the, advice of the Council  of  Ministers. The  essence of Cabinet System of Government responsible  to the   Legislature   is  that  an  individual   Minister   is responsible for every action taken or omitted to be taken in his Ministry.  In every administration, decisions are  taken by the civil servants.  The Minister lays down the policies. The Council of Ministers settle the, major policies.  When a Civil  Servant  takes  a decision, he does not do  it  as  a delegate  of  his  Minister.  Ho does it on  behalf  of  the Government.   The officers are the limbs of  the  Government and  not its delegates.  Where functions are entrusted to  a Minister and these are performed by an official employed  in the  Ministry’s  department, there is in law  no  delegation because constitutionally the act or decision of the official is that of the Minister. In  Rao’s  case (supra) this Court had to  consider  whether House  of  People  being dissolved by the  President  on  27 December,  1970,  the Prime Minister ceased to  hold  office thereafter.   Our  Constitution is modeled  on  the  British Parliamentary   system.   The  executive  has  the   primary responsibility for the formation of Government policy.   The executive  is to act subject to control by the  Legislature. The  President acts on the aid and advice of the Council  of Ministers with the Prime Minister at the head.  The  Cabinet

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enjoying   as  it  does  a  majority  in   the   Legislature concentrates   in  itself  the  virtual  control   of   both legislative  and executive functions.  Article  74(1)  Which states  that there shall be a Council of Ministers with  the Prime  Minister at the head to aid and advise the  President in  the legislative functions is mandatory.  The  contention in  that  case that on the President dissolving  the  House, there will be no Prime Minister was not accepted because  it would change the entire content of the executive Government. 830 If there will be no Council of Ministers, the President will not have a Prime Minister and Ministers to aid and advise in the exercise of his functions.  As there will be no  Council of Ministers, nobody will be responsible to the House of the People.   Article 75 states that the Prime Minister will  be appointed by the President and the other Ministers shall  be appointed  on  the advice of the  Prime  Minister.   Article 75(3)  states that the Council of Ministers is  collectively responsible  to  the  Government.   This  is  the  basis  of responsible  Government.   Article 75(3) by itself  may  not apply  when the House of People, is dissolved or  prorogued. But  the  harmonious reading of the mandatory  character  of Article  75(1) along with Articles 75(2) and 75(3)  is  that the  President cannot exercise executive powers without  the aid  and advice of the Council of Ministers with  the  Prime Minister  at the head.  In that context, Articles 77(3)  and 78 have full operation for duties of the Prime Minister  and allocation of business among Ministers. These  decisions  of  this  Court  are  based  on  the  root authority in King Emperor v. Sibnath Banerji & Ors. 72 I. A. 241.   Section  59(3) of the Government of India  Act,  1935 referred to as the 1935 Act contained provisions similar  to Article  166(3)  of our Constitution.   The  question  arose there  as to whether the satisfaction of the Governor  meant the personal satisfaction as to matters set out in the  rule 26,  of the Defence of India Rules.  It was held that  these matters  could be dealt with by him in the normal manner  in which the executive business of the Provincial Government is carried  on and in particular under Section 49 of  the  1935 Act  and the provisions of the Rules of Business made  under the  aforesaid  Section 59 of the 1935 Act.  The  orders  of detention  were  held  to be  regular  and  appropriate.   A presumption  of  constitutionality was also  to  be  implied under  the  Rules of Business.  The  presumption  of  course could be rebutted. The Judicial Committee observed that the executive authority in its broad sense included both a decision as to action and the  carrying out of such decision.  The Judicial  Committee said that such matters, as those which fell to be dealt with by the Governor under Rule 26 of the Defence of India  Rules would be dealt with by him in the normal manner in which the executive business of the Provincial Government was  carried on under the provisions of the Act of 1935 and in particular under Rules of Business. This  Court in Bejoy Lakshmi Cotton Mills Ltd. v.  State  of west  Bengal  and  ors.  reported in  (1967)  2  S.C.R.  406 considered  the  validity of a notification  signed  by  the Assistant  Secretary in the Land and Revenue  Department  of the  State Government.  It was contended that the  executive power  of the State is vested in the Governor under  Article 154(1) of the Constitution, and, therefore. the satisfaction of the Governor was contemplated under Section-, 4 and 6  of the  Land  Development  and Planning  Act  under  which  the notification  would  be made.  Under the Rules  of  Business made  by  the Governor under Article  166(3),  the  Governor

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allocated to the Minister certain matters.  The Minister-in- charge issued a Standing Order specifying the matters  which were required to.be referred to him. 831 The Rules of Business in the Bejoy Lakshmi Cotton Mills case (supra) indicated that the business of the Government was to be  transacted  in  various  departments  specified  in  the Schedules.   Land  and  Land Revenue was  allocated  as  the business  of  the  Department  of  the  Minister  with  that portfolio.    The  Minister-in-charge  had  power  to   make standing Order regarding disposal of cases.  This Court held that the decision of any Minister or officer under Rules  of Business  is  a decision of the President  or  the  Governor respectively.   The Governor means, the Governor  aided  and advised by the Ministers.  Neither Article 77(3) nor Article 166(3)  provides for any delegation of power.  Although  the executive  power  of  the State is vested  in  the  Governor actually  it  is  carried on by  Ministers  under  Rules  of Business  made  under  Article 166(3).   The  allocation  of business of the Government is the decision, of the President or the Governor on the aid and advice of Ministers. This  Court in Jayantilal Amritlal Shodhan v. F. N.  Rana  & Ors.  [1964]  5 S. C. R. 294 considered the  validity  of  a notification issued by the President under Article 258(1) of the   Constitution  entrusting  with  the  consent  of   the Government  of Bombay to the Commissioners of  Divisions  in the State of Bombay the functions of the Central  Government under   the  Land  Acquisition  Act  in  relation   to   the acquisition of land for the purposes of the Union within the territorial   jurisdiction   of  the   Commissioners.    The notification  issued  by the President was  dated  24  July, 1959.  The Commissioner of Baroda Division, State of Gujarat by  notification published on 1 September, 1960,  exercising functions  under  the notification issued by  the  President notified under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act that certain  land  belonging to the appellant was needed  for  a public   purpose.    On  1  May,  1960  under   the   Bombay Reorganization  Act, 1960 two States were carved out,  viz., Maharashtra  and Gujarat.  The appellant contended that  the notification  issued by the President under  Article  258(1) was  ineffective  without the consent of the  Government  of the, newly formed State of Gujarat. This  Court  in Jayantilal Amritlal Shodhan’s  case  (supra) held  that  Article  258  enables the  President  to  do  by notification  what the Legislature could do by  legislation, namely,  to entrust functions relating to matters  to  which executive  power of the Union extends to officers  named  in the notification.  The notification issued by the  President was  held  to have the force of law.  This Court  held  that Article  258 (1) empowers. the President to entrust  to  the State the functions which are vested in the Union, and which are exercisable by the President on behalf of the Union  and further  went on to say that Article 258 does not  authorize the President to entrust such power as are expressly  vested in the President by the Constitution and do not fall  within the  ambit of Article 258(1).  This Court  illustrated  that observation  by stating that the power of the  President  to promulgate  Ordinances under Articles 268 to 279  during  an emergency, to declare failure of constitutional machinery in States  under Article 356, to declare a financial  emergency under Article 360; to make rules regulating the  recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed 832 to posts and services in connection with the affairs of  the Union  under  Article  309  are  not  powers  of  the  Union

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Government   but  are  vested  in  the  President   by   the Constitution  and  are  incapable  of  being  delegated   or entrusted  to any other body or authority under Article  258 (1).  The ratio in Jayantilal Amritlal Shodhan’s case (supra)  is confined  to  the  powers  of the  President  which  can  be conferred  on  States  under Article  258.   The  effect  of Article  258  is to make a blanket  provision  enabling  the President to exercise the power which the Legislature  could exercise  by  legislation,  to  entrust  functions  to   the Officers to be specified in that behalf by the President and subject to the conditions Prescribed thereby.  The result of the notification by the President under Article 258 is  that wherever  the expression appropriate Government"  occurs  in the  Act in relation to provisions for acquisition  of  land for  the  purposes  of the  Union,  the  words  "Appropriate Government  or  the  Commissioner  of  the  Division  having territorial jurisdiction over the area in which the land  is situate" were deemed to be substituted. The  distinction  made by this Court between  the  executive functiong  of the Union and the executive functions  of  the President does not lead to any conclusion that the President is not the constitutional head of Government.  Article 74(1) provides  for the Council of.  Ministers to aid  and  advise the  President  in the exercise of his  functions..  Article 163(1) makes similar provision for a Council of Ministers to aid  and advise the Governor.  Therefore, whether the  func- tions exercised by the President are functions of the  Union or  the functions of the President they have equally  to  be exercised  with  the  aid  and  advice  of  the  Council  of Ministers,  and  the same is true of the  functions  of  the Governor  except  those  which he has  to  exercise  in  his discretion. In  Sardari  Lal’s  case (supra) an order was  made  by  the President under sub-clause (c) to clause (2) of Article  311 of  the  Constitution.  The order was :  "The  President  is satisfied  that you are unfit to be retained in  the  public service  and  ought  to  be  dismissed  from  service.   The President  is  further  satisfied under  sub-clause  (c)  of proviso  to  clause (2) of Article 311 of  the  Constitution that in the interest of the security of the State it is  not expedient to hold an inquiry".  The order was challenged  on the ground that the order was signed by the Joint  Secretary and  was an order in the name of the President of India  and that the Joint Secretary could not exercise the authority on behalf of the President. This Court in Sardari Lal’s case (supra) relied on two deci- sios  of this Court.  One is Moti Ram Deka etc.  v.  General Manager N.E.F. Railway, Maligaon, Pandu [1964] 5 SCR 683 and the other is Jayantilal Amritlal Shodhan’s case (supra) Moti Ram  Deka’s  case (Supra) was relied on in  support  of  the proposition  that the power to dismiss a Government  servant at  pleasure is outside the scope of Article 53 and  154  of the Constitution and cannot be delegated by the President or the  Governor to a subordinate officer and can be  exercised only by the President or the Governor in the 833 manner  prescribed by the Constitution.  Clause (c)  of  the proviso to Article 311(2) was held by this Court ii  Sardari Lal’s  case  (supra)  to  mean that  the  functions  of  the President under that provision cannot be delegated to anyone else  in  the case of a civil servant of the Union  and  the President  has  to  be  satisfied  personally  that  in  the interest of the security of the State it is not expedient to hold an inquiry prescribed by Article 311(2).  In support of

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this view this Court relied on the observation in Jayantilal Amrit  Lal  Shodhan’s case (supra) that the  powers  of  the President  under Article 311(2) cannot be  delegated.   This Court  also  stated in Sardari Lal’s case (supra)  that  the general  consensus  of the decisions is that  the  executive functions  of  the nature entrusted by certain  Articles  in which  the President has to be: satisfied himself about  the existence  of  certain facts or state of affairs  cannot  be delegated by him to anyone else. The decision in Sardari Lal’s case that the President has to be  satisfied personally in exercise of executive  power  or function  and that the functions of the President cannot  be delegated  is with respect not the correct statement of  law and  is  against the established and uniform  view  of  this Court  as embodied in several decisions to  which  reference has  already been made.  These decisions are from  the  year 1955  upto the years 1971.  The decisions are Rai Saheb  Ram jawaya  Kapur  v. State of Punjab [1955] 2  S.C.R.  225,  A. Sanjeevi Neidu v. State of Madras [1970] 3 S.C.R. 505 and U. N.  R. Rao v. Smt.  Indira Gandhi [1971] Suppl.  S.C.R.  46. These  decisions  neither  referred  to  nor  considered  in Sardari Lal’s case (supra). The President as well as the Governor is the  Constitutional or  formal  head.   The President as well  as  the  Governor exercises  his powers and functions conferred on him  by  or under the Constitution on the aid and advice of his  Council of Ministers, save in spheres where the Governor is required by  or under the Constitution to exercise his  functions  in his  discretion.   Wherever the  Constitution  requires  the satisfaction of the President or the Governor for the  exer- cise  by  the  President or the Governor  of  any  power  or function, the   satisfaction required by the Constitution is not  the personal satisfaction of the President or  Governor but  the  satisfaction of the President or Governor  in  the Constitutional  sense in the Cabinet system  of  Government, that  is, satisfaction of his Council of Ministers on  whose aid  and  advice  the President or  the  Governor  generally exercise all his powers and functions.  The decision of  any Minister  or officer under rules of business made under  any of these two Articles 77(3)   and 166(3) is the decision  of the President or the Governor respectively.  These  articles did not provide for any delegation.  Therefore, the decision of  Minister or officer under the rules of business  is  the decision of the President or the Governor. In  Moti Ram Deka’s case (supra) the question  for  decision was  whether  Rules  148(3) and 149(3)  which  provided  for termination of the service of a permanent Government servant by  a stipulated notice violated Article 311.  The  Majority opinion  in  Moti  Ram Deka’s case (supra)  was  that  Rules 148(3)  and  149(3)  were  invalid  inasmuch  as  they   are inconsistent with the provisions of Article 311(2). 7---L192SupCI/75 834 The  decision  in  Moti  Ram Deka’s case  supra  is  not  an authority  for the proposition that the power to  dismiss  a servant at pleasure is outside the scope of Article 154  and cannot  be  delegated  by  the  Governor  to  a  subordinate officer. This Court in State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. v. Babu Ram Upa- dhya [1961] 2 S.C.R. 679 held that the power of the Governor to dismiss at pleasure, subject to the provisions of Article 311,  is  not  an executive power under Article  154  but  a Constitutional  power and is not capable of being  delegated to officers subordinate to him.  The effect of the  judgment in  Babu  Ram Upadhya’s case (supra) was that  the  Governor

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could not delegate his pleasure to any officer nor could any law provide for the exercise of that pleasure by an  officer with the result that statutory rules governing dismissal are binding  on  every officer though they were subject  to  the overriding  pleasure of the Governor.  This would mean  that the officer was bound by the Rules but the Governor was not. In Babu Ram Upadhya’s case (supra) the majority view  stated seven propositions at p. 701 of the report.  Proposition No. 2 is that the power to dismiss a public servant at  pleasure is outside the scope of Article 154 and therefore cannot  be delegated  by the Governor to a subordinate officer and  can be  exercised  by him only in the manner prescribed  by  the Constitution.   Propositions  No. 3 and 4  are  these.   The tenure of a public servant is subject to the limitations  or qualifications mentioned in Article 311 of the Constitution. The  Parliament or the Legislatures of States cannot make  a law  abrogating  or modifying this tenure so as  to  impinge upon  the overriding power conferred upon the  President  or the Governor under Article 310 as qualified by Article  311. Proposition No. 5 is that the Parliament or the Legislatures of  States  can  make a law  regulating  the  conditions  of service  of such a member which includes proceedings by  way of disciplinary action, without affecting the powers of  the President   or  the  Governor  under  Article  310  of   the Constitution  read with Article 311.  Proposition No.  6  is that the Parliament and the Legislatures also can make a law laying  down  and regulating the scope and  content  of  the doctrine  of  "reasonable opportunity" embodied  in  Article 311, but the said law would be subject to judicial review. All these propositions were reviewed by the majority opinion of this Court in Moti Ram Deka’s case (supra) and this Court restated that proposition No. 2 must be read along with  the subsequent propositions specified as propositions No. 3,  4, 5 and 6. The ruling in Moti Ram Deka’s case (supra) is  that a  law can be framed prescribing the procedure by which  and the  authority by whom the said pleasure can  be  exercised. The pleasure of the President or the Governor to dismiss can therefore  not  only  be delegated but is  also  subject  to Article  311.   The true position as laid down in  Moti  Ram Deka’s  case  (supra) is that Articles 310 and 311  must  no doubt be read together but once the true scope and effect of Article  311 is determined the scope of Article 310(1)  must be limited in the sense 835 That  in  regard to cases falling under Article  311(2)  the pleasure  mentioned in Article 310(2) must be exercised  in- accordance with the requirements of Article 311. The  majority view in Babu Ram Upadhya’s case (supra) is  no longer  good law after the decision in Moti Ram Deka’s  case (supra).  The theory that only the President or the Governor is personally to exercise pleasure of dismissing or removing a public servant is repelled by express words in Article 311 that no person who is a member of the Civil service or holds a  civil post under the Union or a State shall be  dismissed or removed by authority subordinate to that by which he  was appointed.  The words "dismissed or removed by an  authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed" indicate that the  pleasure of the President or the Governor is  exercised by  such  officers on, whom the President  or  the  Governor confers or delegates power. The  provisions of the Constitution which expressly  require the  Governor to exercise, his powers in his discretion  are contained in Articles to which reference has been made.   To illustrate,  Article 239(2) states that where a Governor  is appointed  an Administrator of an adjoining Union  Territory

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he  shall  exercise  his  functions  as  such  administrator independently  of  his  Council  of  Ministers.   The  other Articles  which speak of the discretion of the Governor  are paragraphs 9(2) and 18(3) of the Sixth Schedule and Articles 371(1)(b),  371A(1)(d) and 371A(2)(b) and  371A(2)(f).   The discretion  conferred  on  the Governor means  that  as  the constitutional  or  formal head of the State  the  power  is vested  in him.  In this connection, reference may be,  made to  Article  356 which states that the Governor can  send  a report to the President that a situation has arisen in which the  Government  of  the  State cannot  be,  carried  on  in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution.   Again Article   200   requires  the  Governor   to   reserve   for consideration  any  Bill which in his opinion if  it  became law, would so derogate from the powers of the High Court  as to endanger the position which the High Court is designed to fill under the Constitution. In  making a report under Article 356 the Governor  will  be justified in exercising his discretion even against the  aid and advice of his Council of Ministers.  The reason is  that the  failure of the Constitutional machinery may be  because of   the  conduct  of  the  Council  of   Ministers.    This discretionary  power is given to the Governor to enable  him to  report  to the President who, however, must act  on  the advice of his Council of Ministers in all matters.  In  this context  Article 163(2) is explicable that the  decision  of the  Governor  in  his discretion shall  be  final  and  the validity shall not be called in question.  The action  taken by  the  President on such a report is a  different  matter. The  President  acts  on  the  advice  of  his  Council   of Ministers.  In all other matters where the Governor acts  in his  discretion he will act in harmony with his  Council  of Ministers.   The  Constitution does not aim at  providing  a parallel  administration  within the State by  allowing  the Governor  to  go  against  the  advice  of  the  Council  of Ministers. 836 Similarly  Article 200 indicates another instance where  the Governor may act irrespective of any advice from the Council of  Ministers  In  such matters where  the  Governor  is  to exercise his discretion has must discharge his duties to the best  of his judgment.  The Governor is required  to  pursue such courses which are not detrimental to the State. For the foregoing reasons we hold that the President or  the Governor  acts  on  the aid and advice  of  the  Council  of Ministers with the Prime Minister at the head in the case of the Union and the Chief Minister at the head in the case  of State  in all matters which vests in the  executive  whether those  functions are executive or legislative in  character. Neither  the President nor the Governor is to  exercise  the executive functions personally.  The present appeals concern the appointment of persons other than District Judges to the Judicial  Service  of the State which is to be made  by  the Governor as contemplated in Article 234 of the  Constitution after consultation with the State Public Service  Commission and the High Court.  Appointment or dismissal or removal  of persons  belonging to the Judicial Service of the  State  is not a personal function but is an executive function of  the Governor  exercised  in accordance with the  rules  in  that behalf under the Constitution. In  the  present  appeals  the two  rules  which  deal  with termination of services of probationers in the Punjab  Civil Service  (Judicia  Branch) are Rule 9 of  the  Punjab  Civil Service (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1952 and Rule 7(3) in Part D of the Punjab Civil.  Service (Judicial Branch) Rules

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1951  hereinafter  referred  to as Rule 9 and  Rule  7.  The services  of  the appellant Samsher  Singh  were  terminated under  Rule  9. The services of Ishwar  Chand  Agarwal  were terminated under Rule 7(3). Rule  9 provides that where it is proposed to terminate  the employment of a probationer, whether during or at the end of the  period  of  probation, for any  specific  fault  or  on account of the unsatisfactory record or unfavorable  reports implying the unsuitability for the service, the  probationer shall be apprised of the grounds of such proPosal, and given an  opportunity to show cause against it, before orders  ate passed   by  the  authority  competent  to   terminate   the appointment. Rule  7(3) aforesaid provides that on the completion of  the period  of  probation  of any member  of  the  service,  the Governor  may,  on  the recommendation of  the  High  Court, confirm  him in his appointment if he is working against  a. permanent vacancy or, if his work Dr conduct is reported  by the  High  Court  to be unsatisfactory,  dispense  with  his services  or revert him to his former substantive  post,  if any,  or extend his period of probation and thereafter  pass such  orders  as he could have passed on the expiry  of  the first period of probation. Rule  9 of the punishment and appeal Rules  contemplates  an inquiry  into  grounds  of proposal of  termination  of  the employment of 837 the probationer.  Rule 7 on the other hand confers power  on the  Governor  on the recommendation of the  High  Court  to confirm or to suspense with the services or to revert him or to extend his period of probation. The position of a probationer. was considered by this  Court in Purshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India [1958] S C.R. 828 Das,  C.J., speaking for the Court said that where a  person is  appointed to a permanent post in Government  service  on probation  the termination of his service during or  at  the end  of  the period of probation win not ordinarily  and  by itself  be  a punishment because the Goverrment  servant  so appointed  has no right to continue to hold such a post  any more  than  a  servant employed on probation  by  a  private employer is entitled to do so.  Such a termination does  not operateas a forfeiture of any right of a servant to hold the post,   for  he  has  no  such  right.   Obviously  such   a termination  cannot be a dismissal, removal or reduction  in rank  by  way  of  punishment.   There  are,  however,   two important  observations  of  Das, C.J.,  in  Dhingra’s  case (supra).  One is that if a right exists under a contract  or service Rules to terminate the service the motive  operating on  the  mind of the Government is wholly  irrelevant.   The other is that if the termination of service is sought to  be founded  on  misconduct, negligence, inefficiency  or  other disqualification,  then  it  is a  punishment  and  violates Article  311 of the constitution.  The reasoning why  motive is said to be irrelevant is that it inheres in the state  of mind  which  is  not  discernible. on  the  other  land,  if termination is founded on misconduct it is objective and  is canifest. No  abstract  proposition can be laid down  that  where  the services  of  a probationer are  terminated  without  saying anything  more  in the, order of termination than  that  the services are terminated it can never amount to a  punishment in   the  facts  and  circumstances  of  the  case.   If   a probationer  is discharged on the ground of  misconduct,  or inefficiency or for similar reason without a proper  enquiry and without his getting a reasonable opportunity of  showing

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cause against his discharge it may in a given case amount to removal from service within the meaning of Article 311(2) of the Constitution. Before a probationer is confirmed the authority concerned is under  an  obligation to consider whether the  work  of  the probationer  is satisfactory or whether he is  suitable  for the  post.   In  the  absence  of  any  Rules  governing   a probationer  in this respect the authority may come  to  the conclusion that on account of inadequacy for the job or  for any  temperamental  or  other  object  not  involving  moral turpitude  the  probationer is unsuitable for  the  job  and hence  must  be discharged.  No punishment is  involved,  in this.   The authority may in some cases be of the view  that the  conduct of the probationer may result in  dismissal  or removal on an inquiry.  But in those cases the authority may not hold an inquiry and may simply discharge the probationer with  a  view to giving him a chance to make good  in  other walks of life without a stigma at the time of termination of probation.  If, on the other hand, 838 the  probationer  is  faced with an enquiry  on  charges  of misconduct  or  inefficiency  or  corruption,  and  if   his services are terminated without following the provisions  of Article  311(2)  he can claim protection.  In  Gopi  Kishore Prasad  v. Union of India A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 689 it  was  said that if the Government proceeded against the probationer  in the direct way without casting any aspersion on his  honesty or  competence, his discharge would not have the  effect  of removal  by way of punishment.  Instead of taking  the  easy course  the  Government  chose the  more  difficult  one  of starting  proceedings  against  him and branding  him  as  a dishonest and imcompetent officer. The  fact  of holding an inquiry is not  always  conclusive. What  is decisive is whether the order is really by  way  of punishment.  (See State of Orissa v. Ramnarain Das [1961]  1 S.C.R.  606).   If  there  is  an  enquiry  the  facts   and circumstances  of the case will be looked into in  order  to find out whether the order is one of dismissal in substance, (See  Madan Gopal v. State of Punjab [1963] 3  S.C.R.  716). In R. C. Lacy v. State of Bihar & Ors. (Civil Appeal No. 590 of  1962  decided on 23 October, 1963) it was held  that  an order   of  reversion passed following an enquiry  into  the conduct of the probationer in the circumstances of that case was  in  the  nature of preliminary inquiry  to  enable  the Government  to decide whether disciplinary action should  be taken.   A probationer whose terms of service provided  that it  could be terminated without any notice and  without  any cause  being  assigned  could not claim  the  protection  of Article  311  (2).  (See R. C. Banerjee v.  Union  of  India [1964] 2 S.C.R. 135.) A preliminary inquiry to satisfy  that there  was  reason  to  dispense  with  the  services  of  a temporary employee has been held not to attract Artiele  311 (See  Champaklal G. Shah v. Union of India [1964]  5  S.C.R. 190).   On  the  other hand, a statement  in  the  order  of termination  that the temporary servant is  undesirable  has been  held to import an element of punishment  (See  Jagdish Mitter v. Union of India A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 449). If the facts and circumstances of the case indicate that the substance of the order is that the termination is by way  of punishment then a probationer is entitled to attract Article 311.   The substance of the order and not the form would  be decisive. (See K. H. Phadnis v. State of Maharashtra  [1971] Supp.  S.C.R. 118). An order terminating the services of a temporary servant  or probationer  under  the  Rules  of  Employment  and  without

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anything  more  will  not  attract  Article  311.  Where   a departmental  enquiry is contemplated and if an  enquiry  is not in fact proceeded with Article 311 will not be attracted unless it can be shown that the order though unexceptionable in form is made following a report based on misconduct. (See State of Bihar v. Shiva Bhikshik [1971] 2 S.C.R. 191). The  appellant  Ishwar  Chand  Agarwal  contended  that   he completed  his initial period of two years’ probation on  11 November,  1967  and  the maximum  period  of  three  years’ probation  on  11 November, 1968 and by reason of  the  fact that he continued in service after the expiry 839 of the maximum period of probation he became confirmed.  The appellant also contended that he had a right to be confirmed and  there  was  a permanent vacancy in  the  cadre  of  the service on 17 September, 1969 and the same should have  been allotted to him. Rule 7(1) states that every Subordinate Judge, in the  first instance,  be appointed on probation for two years but  this period  may  be  extended from time  to  time  expressly  or impliedly  so that the total period of  probation  including extension,  if  any,  does  not  exceed  three  years.   The explanation  to  Rule 7(1) is that the period  of  probation shall be deemed to have been extended if a Subordinate Judge is not confirmed on the expiry of his period of probation. Counsel  for  the appellant relied on the decision  of  this Court  in State of Punjab v. Dharam Singh [1968] 3 S.C.R.  1 where this Court drew an inference that an employee  allowed to continue in the post on completion of the maximum  period of  probation is confirmed in the post by  implication.   In Dharam  Singh’s case (supra) the relevant rule  stated  that the probation in the first instance is for one year with the proviso  that  the total period of probation  including  ex- tension  shall  not exceed three years.  In  Dharam  Singh’s case (supra) he was allowed to-continue without an order  of confirmation  and  therefore the only possible view  in  the absence of anything to the contrary in the Service Rules was that by necessary implication he must be regarded as  having been confirmed. Any confirmation by implication is negatived in the  present case  because before the completion of three years the  High Court found prima facie that the work as well as the conduct of  the appellant was unsatisfactory and a notice was  given to the appellant on 4 October, 1968 to show cause as to  why his services should not be terminated.  Furthermore, Rule  9 shows  that the employment of a probationer can be  proposed to be terminated whether during or at the end of the  period of probation.  This indicates that where the notice is given at  the  end of the probation the period of  probation  gets extended  till  the  inquiry proceedings  commenced  by  the notice under Rule 9 come to an end.  In this background  the explanation to rule 7(1) shows that the period of  probation shall  be  deemed  to  have been  extended  impliedly  if  a Subordinate  Judge  is not confirmed on the expiry  of  this period  of  probation.   This  implied  extension  where   a Subordinate  Judge  is not confirmed on the  expiry  of  the period  of  probation is not found in  Dharam  Singh’s  case (supra).  This explanation in the present case does not mean that  the  implied extension of the probationary  period  is only  between two and three years.  The explanation  on  the contrary  means  that the provision  regarding  the  maximum period  of probation for three years is I directly  and  not mandatory  unlike in Dharam Singh’s case (supra) and that  a probationer  is  not  in fact confirmed  till  an  order  of confirmation is made.

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In this context reference may be made to the proviso to Rule 7(3).  The proviso to the Rule states that the completion of the  maximum  period  of three years’  probation  would  not confer on him the right to 840 be confirmed till there is a permanent vacancy in the cadre. Rule  7 (3) states that an express order of confirmation  is necessary.  The proviso to Rule 7(3) is in the negative form that  the  completion of the maximum period of  three  years would  not  confer a right of confirmation till there  is  a permanent vacancy in the cadre.  The period of probation  is therefore extended by implication until the proceedings com- menced   against  a  probationer  like  the  appellant   are concluded  to  enable  the Government to  decide  whether  a probationer  should be confirmed or his services  should  be terminated.  No confirmation by implication can arise in the present  case in the facts and circumstances as also by  the meaning and operation of Rules 7(1) and 7(3) as aforesaid.  It  is  necessary  at this stage to  refer  to  the  second proviso  to  Rule  7(3)  which came  into  existence  on  19 November,  1970.  That proviso of course does not  apply  to the facts of the present case.  That proviso states that  if the  report of the High Court regarding  the  unsatisfactory work  or conduct of the probationer is made to the  Governor before  the  expiry  of the  maximum  period  of  probation, further  proceedings in the matter may be taken  and  orders passed  by  the  Governor  of  Punjab  dispensing  with  his services or reverting him to his substantive post even after the  expiry of the maximum period of probation.  The  second proviso  makes explicit which is implicit in Rule  7(1)  and Rule  7(3) that the period of probation gets  extended  till the  proceedings  commenced  by the notice come  to  an  end either by confirmation or discharge of the probationer. In  the  present case, no confirmation  by  implication  can arise  by  reason  of the notice to show cause  given  on  4 October,  1968, the enquiry by the Director of Vigilance  to enquire into allegations and the operation of Rule 7 of  the Service Rules that the probation shall be extended impliedly if a Subordinate Judge is not confirmed before the expiry of the  period of probation.  Inasmuch as Ishwar Chand  Agarwal was not confirmed at the end of the period of probation con- firmation by implication is nullified. The second contention on behalf of Ishwar Chand Agarwal  was that  the termination is by way of punishment.  It was  said to  be an order removing the appellant from service  on  the basis  of  charges of gross misconduct by  ex-parte  enquiry conducted by the Vigilance Department.  The enquiry was said to be in breach of Article 311 as also in violation of rules of natural justice.  The appellant relied on Rule 9 to  show that  he was not only entitled to know the grounds but  also to  an opportunity to represent as a condition precedent  to any  such termination.  The appellant put in  the  forefront that  the  termination  of his services  was  based  on  the findings  of  the Vigilance Department which  went  into  15 allegations  of misconduct contained in about  8  complaints and these were never communicated to him. The High Court under Article 235 is vested with the  control of  subordinate judiciary.  The High Court according to  the appellant  failed to act in terms of the provisions  of  the Constitution  and  abdicated the control by  not  having  an inquiry through Judicial Officers 841 subordinate to the Control of the High Court but asking  the Government to enquire through the Vigilance Department. It  was  submitted on behalf of the State that  the  enquiry

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suggested  by  the  High  Court  through  the  Director   of Vigilance was not to satisfy itself about the  unsuitability of  the  appellant but to satisfy the  Government  that  the recommendation  which  had already been made  by,  the  High Court  for  the termination of the service of  Ishwar  Chand Agarwal should be accepted. The  High Court for reasons which are not  stated  requested the  Government to depute the Director of Vigilance to  hold an enquiry.  It is indeed strange that the High Court  which had  control  over  the  subordinate  judiciary  asked   the Government   to  hold  an  enquiry  through  the   Vigilance Department.   The members of the subordinate  judiciary  are not  only under the control of the High Court but  are  also under  the  care and custody of the High  Court.   The  High Court  failed  to  discharge  the  duty  of  preserving  its control.  The request by the High Court to have the  enquiry through  the  Director  of  Vigilance was  an  act  of  self abnegations.   The  contention of the State  that  the  High Court  wanted the Government to be satisfied  makes  matters worse  The  Governor will act on the recommendation  of  the High  Court.  That is the broad basis of Article  235.   The High  Court  should have conducted  the  enquiry  preferably through  District  Judges.  The members of  the  subordinate Judiciary look up to the High Court not only for  discipline but  also for dignity.  The High Court acted in  total  dis- regard  of Articles 235 by asking the Government to  enquire through the Director of Vigilance. The  enquiry officer nominated by the Director of  Vigilance recorded the statements of the witnesses behind the back  of the  appellant.  The enquiry was to ascertain the  truth  of allegations  of  misconduct.   Neither the  report  nor  the statements  recorded  by  the Enquiry  Officer  reached  the appellant.  The Enquiry Officer gave his finding,; on  alle- gations of misconduct. The High Court accepted the report of the Enquiry Officer and wrote to the Government on 25  June, 1969 that in the light of the report the appellant was not a suitable  person  to be retained in service.  The  order  of termination  was  because  of  the  recommendations  in  the report. The  order  of termination of the services of  Ishwar  Chand Agarwal  is  clearly by way of punishment in the  facts  and circumstances  of the case.  The High Court not only  denied Ishwar  Chand Agarwal the, protection under Article 311  but also   denied   itself  the  dignified  control   over   the subordinate  Judiciary.   The  form  of  the  order  is  not decisive  as to whether the order is by way  of  punishment. Even an innocuously worded order terminating the service may in the facts and circumstances of the case establish that an enquiry  into allegations of serious and grave character  of misconduct involving stigma has been made ill infarction  of the  provision  of  Article  Ill.   In  such   a  case  file simplicity  of  the  form of the order  will  not  give  any sanctity.  That is exactly 842 what has happened in the case of Ishwar Chand Agarwal.   The Order of termination is illegal and must be set aside. The appellant Samsher Singh was appointed on 1 May, 1964- as Subordinate Judge.  He was on probation.  On 22 March,  1967 the  Chief  Secretary issued a notice to  him  substantially repeating  the same charges which had been  communicated  by the  Registrar on 15 December, 1966 and asked the  appellant to show cause a to why his services should not be terminated as he was found unsuitable for the job.  The appellant  gave an answer.  On 29 April, 1967 the services of the  appellant were terminated.

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The appellant Shamsher Singh in the context of the Rules  of Business  contended that the removal of a Subordinate  Judge from  Service  is a personal power of the  Governor  and  is incapable  of being delegated or dealt with under the  Rules of  Business.   We have already held that the  Governor  can allocate the business of the Government to the Ministers and such  allocation is no delegation and it is an  exercise  of executive power by the Governor through the Council or Offi- cers  under  the Rules of Business.  The contention  of  the appellant  that the order was passed by the  Chief  Minister without  the formal approval of the Governor is,  therefore, untenable.  The order is the order of the Governor. The appellant was asked to show cause as to why his services should not be terminated.  There were four grounds.  One was that  the  appellant’s  behavior towards  the  Bar  and  the litigant  public was highly objectionable  derogatory,  non- cooperative  and  unbecoming  of a  judicial  officer.   The second was that the appellant would leave his office  early. The  third  was  the complaint of  Om  Prakash,  Agriculture Inspector   that  the  appellant  abused  his  position   by proclaiming that he would get Om Prakash involved in a  case if  he did not cooperate with Mangal Singh, a friend of  the appellant  and  Block Development Officer,  Sultanpur.   The fourth  was the complaint of Prem Sagar that  the  appellant did  not  give  full  opportunity  to  Prem  Sagar  to  lead evidence.  Prem Sagar also complained that the decree-holder made an application for execution of the decree against Prem Sagar  and  the appellant without  obtaining  office  report incorporated  some  additions in the original  judgment  and warrant of possession. The appellant showed cause.  The appellant said that he  was not  provided  with an opportunity to work  under  the  same superior officer for at least six months so that independent opinion  could  be  formed about  his  knowledge,  work  and conduct.  On 29 April, 1967 the appellant received a  letter from the Deputy Secretary to the Government addressed to the Registrar,  Punjab and Haryana High Court that the  services of the appellant had been terminated. It appears that a mountain has been made out of a mole hill. The  allegation against the appellant is that he helped  the opponent  of  Prem Sagar.  The case against Prem  Sagar  was heard  on 17 April, 1965.  Judgment was pronounced the  same day.   The  application  for execution  of  the  decree  was entertained on the same day by the appellant. 843 In  the warrant the appellant wrote with his own  hands  the words, "Trees, well, crops and other rights attached to  the land".   This correction was made by the appellant in  order that the warrant might be in conformity with the plaint  and the  decree.   There  is nothing  wrong  in  correcting  the warrant  to make it consistent with the decree.  It  appears that  with regard to the complaint of leaving  office  early and  the complaint of Om Prakash, Agriculture Inspector  the appellant was, in fact punished and a punishment of  warning was inflicted on him.  The appellant claimed protection of Rule 9. Rule 9 makes it incumbent   on  the  authority  that  the  services   of   a probationer  can  be  terminated on  specific  fault  or  on account of unsatisfactory record implying unsuitability.  In the  facts and circumstances of this case it is. clear  that the order of termination of the appellant Samsher Singh was, one  of  punishment.  The authorities were to find  out  the suitability  of  the  appellant.   They  however   concerned themselves  with  matters which were  really  trifle.   The- appellant rightly corrected the records in the case of  Prem

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Sagar.   The appellant did so with his own hand.  The  order of  termination  is in infraction of Rule 9.  The  order  of termination is therefore set aside. The appellant Shamsher Singh is now employed in the Ministry of  law.   No useful purpose will be served  by  asking  for reconsideration  as  to  the suitability  of  the  appellant Samsher  Singh for confirmation.  If the authorities had  at the  proper  time been a little more  careful  and  cautious perhaps  the appellant might not have left  the  subordinate Judicial Service and sought employment elsewhere. For the foregoing reasons we hold that the President as well as the Governor acts on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers  in  executive action and is not required  by  the Constitution to act personally without the aid and advice of the  Council of Ministers or against the aid and  advice  of the  Council  of  Ministers.  Where  the  Governor  has  any discretion  the  Governor  acts on his  own  judgment.   The Governor  exercises  his  discretion  in  harmony  with  his Council of Ministers.  The appointment as well as removal of the  members  of  the Subordinate  Judicial  Service  is  an executive action of the Governor to be exercised on the  aid and  advice of the Council of Ministers in  accordance  with the  provisions  of  the  Constitution.   Appointments   and removals  of  persons  are made by  the  President  and  the Governor as the constitutional head’ of the executive on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers.  That is why any action by any servant of the Union or the State in regard to appointment dismissal is brought against the Union or the Jr State and not against the President or the Governor. The orders of termination of the services of the  appellants are  set  aside.   The appellant  Ishwar  Chand  Agarwal  is declared  to  be  a  member  of  the  Punjab  Civil  Service (Judicial Branch).  The appellant Samsher Singh succeeds  in so far as the order of termination is set aside.  In view of the  fact  that  Samsher Singh is already  employed  in  the Ministry of Law no relief excepting salary or other monetary benefits  which  accrued to him upto the  time  he  obtained employment in the Ministry of Law is given. The State of Punjab will pay costs to the appellants. 844 KRISHNA  IYER,  J-These two appeals, by a  couple  of  small judicial  officers  whose probation has been  terminated  by orders  of  concerned  Ministers  in  conformity  With   the recommendations   of   the  High   Court,   have   projected constitutional  issues  whose  profound  import  and   broad impact,   if  accepted,  may  shake  up  or  re-shape   the. parliamentary  corner-stone of our nation.  Great  deference and complete concurrence would have otherwise left us merely to say me agree’, to what has fallen from the learned  Chief Justice  just  now, but when basic principles  are  assailed with  textual support, academic backing and judicial  dicta, speech, not silence, is our option. Putting aside for the noncesome subsidiary, though  salient, questions  argued  before us, we may focus on a  problem  of great  moment  which  has been canvassed at  length  by  the learned  counsel for the parties.  It is this problem  which has  necessitated  the hearing of this case by  a  Bench  of seven  Judges.  The question is : does our  legal  political system approximate to the Westminster-style Cabinet  Govern- ment  or contemplate the President and Governor, unlike  the British  Crown,  being  real repositories  of  and  actually exercising   power  in  its   comprehensive   constitutional signification?   Phrased metaphorically, is the  Rashtrapati Bhavan  or Raj Bhavan-an Indian Buckingham Palace or a  half way  house between it and the White House?  This issue  lays

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bare the basics. This Court has a solemn duty, as a high sentinel  authorized by Art. 141, to declare what our law of the Constitution is, how  our suprema lex has designed a project of  power.   The major  instrumentalities  must work in comity  and  avoid  a collision  course,  ensuring  the  ultimate  authority   and continuous  control of We, the People of India’ through  the House  of  elected members.  In essaying this task  we  must keep  away  from  ideological slants  and  imaginary  appre- hensions  and should not import  personal  predilections-but inform ourselves of the grand design of our Constitution and the great models inspiring it. May be, our founding fathers were not political prophets who could foresee glaring abuses or perverted developments.   In a passage which is classic, Mill told the lovers of liberty               "Of  what  avail is the most  broadly  popular               representative system, if the electors do  not               care to choose the best member of  parliament,               but choose him who will spend most money to be               elected  ? How can a  representative  assembly               work  for good, if its members can be  bought,               or   if  their  excitability  of   temperament               uncorrected  by public discipline  or  private               self  control,  makes them incapable  of  calm               deliberation,   and  they  resort  to   manual               violence  on the floor of the House, or  shoot               at one another with rifles ?"(1)               We are not unmindful of the agitational  siege               of parliamentary institutions and of the anti-               parliamentary  build-up  under  way  and   the               rashes  of frustration showing up against  the               unsavory politics               The President and the Governors in the  Indian               Constitution-by Justice  M.    M.       Ismail               Orient Longman. 845 of  power.  But  the  limited task  assigned  to  us  is  to interpret the Constitution as it is, not to venture  starry- eyed  proposals  for  reform.  Even  so,  our  activism   in interpretation  must  not be bogged  down  by  logomachy  or blinkered  by  legalism, but be aglow  with  the  insightful observations of Marshall, C J. :               "   We  must  never  forget  that  it   is   a               constitution  which  we  are   expounding,   a               constitution intended to endure for ages,  and               consequently  to  be adapted  to  the  various               crises of human affairs.  Nor did they imagine               that it was to be so strictly interpreted that           amendments  and  radical   revisions               would be constantly required   to         keep               Government functioning smoothly." Not  the  terminological  facade  of  euphemisms,  but   the underlying  reality of government by the people, must be our lodestar,  as we search for the true semantics of  terms  of art used in the Great Charter. It is surprising that extreme views have been propounded  by responsible  jurists on the law of our Constitution  in  the strategic sector of the President vis-a-vis his Cabinet  and dangerous portents must  therefore  be  forestalled  by   an authoritative  statement of the constitutional  position  by the apex court. If, in that process, earlier ruling of  this Court  have to be over-ruled, we may not hesitate to do  so. For,  it is truer to our tryst to be ultimately right,  than to  be consistently wrong, where the constitutional  destiny of a developing nation   is  at  stake.  In  the  words   of

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Learned Hand,the judiciary’s proper representative character as a complementary organ of the social will’ cannot       be overlooked.  A skeletal projection of the facts on the forensic  screen, sufficient     to  follow  the  problems  raised  in   these appeals,  may  now  be made. Two  fresher,,;  in  the  State judiciary, the appellants, were undergoing their  prescribed probation. Before the full term set by the rules had   run out,  the  High Court discovered unsavory conduct  in  these officers  and, as controlling authority, considered the need to terminate their  services  on grounds  of  unsuitability. The  ups and downs of the follow-up action vary in  the  two cases.  In one, during the President’s rule,  the  Governor, instead of acting     on the High Court’s advice  indicated that  the  charges  were  vague  and  a  fresh  enquiry   be held.Thereupon,  the High Court requested   the Director  of Vigilance, to  make some investigations which were  actually carried  out  by  his  subordinate,  the  Superintendent  of Police. The Administrative Full Court, however held, on  the materials  available, but without a formal  or  full-blooded enquiry, that on the proved charges the officer’s  probation deserved  to  be terminated for unsuitability. By  then  the Council  of  Ministers  had  come  into  being  and,  on   a consideration of the High Court’s report, the Chief Minister acted on it and ended the probation of the officer, although the  Governor’s  personal satisfaction about this  step  was neither sought nor secured. Also, by that time, the  maximum probation  period of three years, under the relevant  rules, had  expired and a permanent vacancy had  also  arisen.(This bears  on another argument about the import of  the  service Rules.)  In  the other case also, the High  Court  held  the officer unfit 846 to be confirmed without any elaborate enquiry and this  view was accepted by the Chief Minister without reference to  the Governor. The  orders terminating probation have been challenged on  a few grounds.  Primarily, the power of appointment being with the  Governor  (or  the President, in the  case  of  Central Services)  the  removal must be by him alone,  the  argument runs.   Wherever  the Constitution vests a function  in  the Governor  or President, as such. it has to be discharged  by him,  applying  his mind to the materials.  He  can  neither surrender  to his ministers, nor delegate to  his  officers, what the Constitution has enjoined shall-be executed by  him personally.   Admittedly, in the present case, the  ultimate order  was made, without reference to the Governor,  by  the Chief-Minister who virtually accepted the recommendation  of the  High  Court.   The learned  Attorney  General  and  the Additional  Solicitor General, have refuted the whole  basis of this argument.  We have, in the President and Governor, a replicate   of  a  constitutional  monarch  and  a   Cabinet answerable   to  Parliament,  substantially  embodying   the conventions  of  the  British  Constitution-not  a  turn-key project imported from Britain, but an. edifice made in India with  the  know-how of British Constitutionalism.   If  this theory  be sound, Government is carried on by the  Ministers according  to the rules of allocation of business  and,  the Governor,  no  more  than the Queen, need  know  or  approve orders  issued  in his name.  The core  of  the  Westminster system  is that the Queen resigns, but the  Ministers  rule, except in a few special, though blurred, areas, one of which certainly  is  not the appointment and  dismissal  of  civil servants.   The second major contention of Shri Sanghi,  for the  appellant, is that the High Court and Government  have,

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in  substance, dismissed the probationers and, in doing  so, violated  the  constitutional mandate of Art.  311  and  the canons  of  natural justice.  Even on the footing  that  the impugned orders are innocuous terminations of probation, the rules which embody procedural fairness have been flouted the consequence  being  invalidation.   In  the  course  of  the submissions,  some criticism was leveled at the  High  Court requesting  the  Director  of  Vigilance  police  officer-to investigate  into the veracity of charges  against  judicial officers.   Thirdly,  has  the  High  Court  the  last  word regarding  termination  of service  of  judicial  personnel, Government being a formal agency to implement it?  This  was challenged at the bar, although we do not finally deal  with it,  for  the reasons to be mentioned later.   Other  lesser illegalities  were relied on, but they have been dealt  with in the judgment of the learned Chief justice, with which  we wholly  agree.  We confine ourselves to the  dual  principal pleas  whose  impact will far exceed  the  nullification  of orders  by  Ministers removing  judicial  probationers  from service and deserve careful study. The  first broad proposition of the appellants is  that  the presidentand   the  Governor-are  not  just   constitutional cousins  of the British Queen, but real wielders  of  power, bestowed on them expressly by the terms of the text,  almost next  of  kin to their American  counterparts  with  similar designations.    The  issue  is  so  fundamental  that   its resolution  is necessary to know not only who can declare  a probationer’s fitness but who can declare a war in  national defence or proclaim 847 a breakdown of the State constitutional machinery or  assent to a bill passed by Parliament.  For, if under Art. 311  the President  must  be personally satisfied for  certain  small steps,  he must surely be individually  convinced  regarding the  far more momentous spectrum of functions he  is  called upon  to  discharge under a big bunch of  other  provisions. And  this  reasoning  regarding  disposal  of  gubernatorial business  or.  discharge of official  responsibilities  will equally apply to Governors. A sort of constitutional mini-crisis has been sparked off by the  decision  in Sardarilal’s Case(1)  which  regarded  the President’s  personal satisfaction for dispensing,  with  an enquiry,  for reasons of security of the State under  clause (c)of  the  proviso to Art. 311(2) of the  Constitution,  as necessary  and  non-delegable.  We will  presently  project, with   reference   to   the   Articles,   the   rainbow   of administrative,   quasi-judicial   and   legislative   tasks specifically directed by the Constitution to be performed by the Head of the State in contradistinction to his Council of Ministers,  if the appellant’s proposition were sound,  thus bringing   dyarchy  by  a  side  wind,  as  it   were,   and emasculating the plenary authority of Parliament to whom the President   is   not  but  the  Council  of   Ministers   is responsible.    The  peril  to  the  Westminster  model   of government is self-evident and serious if vital business  of government  is to be transacted de facto and de jury by  the head of the State, and the Ministers, who are responsible to the  House consisting of the elected representative  of  the people,   arc  to  be  relegated  to  carrying  on  of   the administration  only, subject to the  over-riding  presence, pleasure and powers of their uncrown republican King.- This  dilemma  of democracy, created by a spreadout  of  the rationale of Sardarilal(1), can be resolved only by a  study in depth of the political perspective and philosophy and  of the conspectus of provisions, as well as an understanding of

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the models which influenced the Constitution framers.   What are  the basic fabric, the animating spirit,  and  juridical ideas of our constitutional structure and dynamics ? The law of our Constitution, any student of Indian political history  and  of  comparative  constitutional  systems  will agree,  is  partly eclectic but  primarily  an  Indo-Anglian version   of  the  Westminster  model   with   quasi-federal adaptations,    historical    modifications,    geopolitical mutations andhomespun traditions-basically a blended brew of the  British  parliamentary system, and  the  Government  of India Act, 1935 and near-American, nomenclature-wise and  in some other respects. Not the Potomac, but the Thames, fertilizes the flow of  the Yamuna. if we may adopt a riverine imagery.  In this  thesis we  are fortified by precedents of this Court,  strengthened by  Constituent Assembly proceedings and reinforced  by  the actual  working  of the organs involved for about  a  silver jubilee’ span of time. Historically,  the Indian constitutional aspirations  flowed along the British pattern.  Granville Austin refers, in  his book, to the Motilal Nehru Report and the Tej Bahadur  Sapru Report and K.M. Munshi’s (1)  [1970] 3 S. C. R. 461. 848 Draft Constitution, in support.  Several pages from the many volumes of the Constituent Assembly debates were read at the Bar and the keynote thought in the lengthy deliberations has been given by Granville Austin in these words :               "in  the  rapidly  moving world  of  the  mid-               twentieth century, a new India had to be built               almost overnight.  How was the leadership  for               this  task  to  be  provided?   What  type  of               Executive would be stable, strong,  effective,               and quick, yet withal, democratic ?               The Assembly chose a slightly modified version               of  the British cabinet system.  India was  to               have  a  President, indirectly elected  for  a               term   of   five  years,  who   would   be   a               constitutional head of State in the manner  of               the  monarch in England. As in England,  there               was  to be a council of ministers,  headed  by               the    Prime   Minister    and    collectively               responsible  to Parliament, to aid and  advise               the  head of State.  The President was  to  be               nominal  head  of  the  Executive;  the  Prime               Minister the real head." Nehru,   Patel,   Munshi,  Sir  B.N.   Rao,.    Sir   Alladi Krishnaswamy  Aiyar  and, above all, Dr. Ambedkar,  who  was Chairman of the Drafting Committee, spoke in one voice, with marginal  variations  on  points  immaterial  to  our  major purpose.   What  emerges  from such a study  is  that,  with minimal innovations, a Parliamentary-style  quasi-federalism was  accepted,  rejecting the substance of  a  Presidential- style   executive.   This  welding  of   statesmanship   and scholarship   and   willingness  to  borrow   whatever   was beneficial  resulted in a constitutional college  where  the Westminster  symbols,  backed  by  Indian  experience,  were reverentially  preserved  and  the  pattern  of  ministerial responsibility  was  built  into the  framework  of  federal republicanism.  While the shopping list of Constitutions was large,  our  founders’ selectivity narrowed it down  to  the Constitutions  of  Commonwealth  countries.   Also   British export of Cabinet Government had been made Swadeshi by  past experience.  Ill-assorted excerpts from the speeches of  the activists make for marvelous unanimity on the Cabinet form.

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Prime  Minister Nehru explained the position with  political clarity  when moving the clause relating to the election  of the President:               ’One  thing  we  have to decide  at  the  very               beginning  is  what  should  be  the  kind  of               governmental  structure,  whether  it  is  one               system    where    there    is     ministerial               responsibility   or   whether   it   is    the               Presidential system as prevails in the  United               States  of America; many members  possibly  at               first  sight  might object  to  this  indirect               election  and may prefer an election by  adult               suffrage.   We have given anxious  thought  to               this  matter and we came to the very  definite               conclusion  that  it would not  be  desirable,               first   because  we  want  to  emphasize   the               ministerial character of the government,  that               power  really resided in the Ministry  and  in               the  Legislature and not in the  President  as               such.   At  the same time we did not  want  to               make the President just a mere figurehead like               the French President.  We did not give               849               him  any  real  power but  we  have  made  his               position  one of great authority and  dignity.               You  will notice from this Draft  Constitution               that  he is also to be  Commander-in-Chief  of               the  Defence  Forces  just  as  the   American               President  is.   Now, therefore if we  had  an               election  by adult franchise and yet  did  not               give  him  any real powers,  it  might  become               slightly  anomalous  and there might  be  just               extraordinary  expense of time and energy  and               money without any adequate result."               His opposition to a fixed tenure for Ministers               stemmed from the same ground :               "That raises a very fundamental issue of  what               form   you   are  going  to   give   to   your               Constitution,  the  ministerial  parliamentary               type  or  the American type.  So far  we  have               been  proceeding with the building up  of  the               Constitution in the Ministerial sense and...we               cannot go back upon it."               Shri  K.M.  Muashi  expressed  the  historical               reason for the acceptance of the parliamentary               system.               we must not forget a very important fact  that               during  the  last  one  hundred  years  Indian               public   life  has  largely  drawn  upon   the               traditions of the British constitutional  law.               Most  of  us,  and  during  the  last  several               generations  before us, public men  in  India,               have  looked  up to the British model  as  the               best.   For  the last thirty or  forty  years,               some   kind   of   responsibility   has   been               introduced in the governance of this  country.               our  constitutional  traditions  have   become               Parliamentary   and  we  have  now   all   our               Provinces  functioning  more or  less  on  the               British  model.  As a matter of  fact,  today,               the   Dominion   Government   of   India    is               functioning  as a  full-fledged  Parliamentary               Government."               At  another  stage,  opposing  Prof.    Shah’s               motion   for   adoption   of   the    American

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             Presidency,  he stressed the same note,  in  a               comparative vein :               " We know that the Constitution in America  is               not   working   as   well   as   the   British               Constitution,  for the simple reason that  the               Chief  Executive in the country  is  separated               from    the   legislature.    The    strongest               Government and the most elastic Executive have               been  found  to  be in  England  and  that  is               because  the  executive  powers  vest  in  the               Cabinet  supported by a majority in the  Lower               House  which  has financial powers  under  the               Constitution.  As a result, it is the rule  of               the  majority  in  the  legislature,  for   it               supports  its  leaders in the  Cabinet,  which               advises  the  Head of the State,  namely,  the               King  or  the  President.  The  Kind,  or  the               President  is thus placed above party.  He  is               made  really  the  symbol  of  the   impartial               dignity of the Constitution.               The  power of the Cabinet in England today  is               no  whit less  than the powers enjoyed by  the               President of the United States of America.  By               reason of the fact that the Prime Minister                8 L192SupCI /75               850               and  the  whole  Cabinet are  members  of  the               Legislature,   the   conflict   between    the               authority wielding the executive-power and the               legislature  is  reduced  to  minimum;  really               there is none at all, because, at every moment               of time, the Cabinet subsists only provided it               carries with it the support of the majority in               the Parliament." B.   N. Rau’s preliminary note suggested that the  President be  clothed  with some discretionary powers, but  the  Union Constitution   Committee-early   in   June   1947   "decided unreservedly   in  favour  of  the  parliamentary  type   of government  in  which the President would  have  no  special powers  vested personally in him but would exercise all  his functions, including the dissolution of the lower chamber of Parliament, only on the advice of his Ministers." The  deletion of the earlier proposal for an  Instrument  of Instructions,  has  been mentioned in this context  by  some writers,  but  the  reason for dropping it was  set  out  by Alladi Krishnaswamy Ayyar in the Assembly thus :               "It  was provided in the Constitution...  that               the Council of Ministers would be collectively               responsible to the House of the People.  If  a               President  stood in the way of the Council  of               Ministers discharging that responsibility,  he               would   be   guilty  of   violation   of   the               Constitution and would even be liable for  im-               peachment.    It  was,  therefore,  merely   a               euphemistic  way of saying that the  President               had  to  be  guided  by  the  advice  of   his               Ministers.   The  Council  of  Ministers   was               collectively  responsible to the House of  the               People,  answerable to the House in regard  to               the  budget,  all legislation and  indeed  for               every matter connected with the administration               of  the  country.   There  was  therefore   no               necessity  for  setting out in  detail  in  an               article of the Constitution what the functions               and incidents of responsible government  would

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             be."               On another occasion he reiterated               "the  Union  Constitution Committee  and  this               Assembly  have all adopted what may be  called               the  Cabinet System of Government. "An  infant               democracy    cannot   afford   under    modern               conditions,  to  take the  risk  of  perpetual               cleavage,  feud,  or conflict,  or  threatened               conflict  between  the  Legislature  and   the               executive."               Dr.    Ambedkar’s   comprehensive    statement               introducing the Draft Constitution on November               4, 1948, is scintillating.  He said :               "In the Draft Constitution there is placed  at               the head of the Indian Union a functionary who               is  called  the President of the  Union.   The               title  of this functionary reminds one of  the               Presiden  to  the United States.   But  beyond               identity  of names there is nothing in  common               between  the form of government  prevalent  in               America  and the form of  government  proposed               under the Draft Constitution.  Under the Draft               Constitution  the President occupies the  same               position as the King under the                851               English  Constitution.  He is the head of  the               State  but not the executive.   He  represents               the  nation but does not rule the nation.   He               is the symbol of the nation.  His place in the               administration is that of a ceremonial  device               on a seal by which the nation’s decisions  are               made  known.  Under the American  Constitution               the  President  has under him  Secretaries  in               charge  of  different  Departments.   In  like               manner the President of the Indian Union  will               have   under  him  Ministers  in   charge   of               different departments of administration.  Here               again   there  is  a  fundamental   difference               between the two.  The President of the  United               States  is  not  bound to  accept  any  advice               tendered  to  him by any of  his  Secretaries.               The  President  of the Indian  Union  will  be               generally   bound   by  the  advice   of   his               Ministers.   He  can do  nothing  contrary  to               their  advice nor can he do  anything  without               their  advice.   The President of  the  United               States can dismiss any Secretary at any  time.               The President of the Indian Union has no power               to  do so so long as his Ministers  command  a               majority in Parliament.               You can have a system which can give you  more               stability  but less responsibility or you  can               have   a   system   which   gives   you   more               responsibility   but  less   stability.    The               American  and  the  Swiss  systems  give  more               stability   but  less   responsibility.    The               British  system  on the other band  gives  you               more responsibility but less stability.               In  England,  where the  Parliamentary  system               evails,  the assessment of  responsibility  of               the executive is both daily and periodic.  The               daily assessment is done by members of Parlia-               ment,  through  questions,  resolutions,   no-               confidence  motions, adjournment motions,  and               debates on addresses.  Periodic assessment  is

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             done  by  the electorate at the  time  of  the               election which may take place every five years               or   earlier.    The   daily   assessment   of               responsibility  which is not  available  under               the  American system is, it is felt, far  more               effective than the periodic assessment and far               more  necessary in a country like India.   The               Draft   Constitution   in   recommending   the               Parliamentary   system   of   executive    has               preferred   more   responsibility   to    more               stability." He silenced Mr. Kamath, who asked in the Assembly if refusal to  accept Ministerial advice would amount to  violation  of the  Constitution,  with  the  words :  "There  is  not  the slightest  doubt about it." Austin, in his well known  book, adds:  "Ayyar concurred with Ambedkar that a  President  who did  not heed the advice of his Ministers would in  fact  be thwarting  the  will of Parliament, for which  he  could  be impeached." Sardar  Patel clinched the issue at a joint-session  of  two crucial Committees, in these words :               "Both   these  Committees(Union   Constitution               Committee  and  the  Committee  on-  he  Model               Provincial Constitution) met                852               and they came to the conclusion that it  would               suit the conditions of this country better  to               adopt   the  Parliamentary  system   of   Con-               stitution,  the British. type of  Constitution               with which we are familiar"               During   the   general   discussion   on   the               Constitution,  at  the  concluding  stage,T.T.               Krishnamachari said :   "  It  has been mentioned that  one  of  the               chief defects of this Constitution is that  we               have not anywhere mentioned that the President               is a constitutional head and the future of the               President’s powers is, therefore,  doubtful...               This  is a matter which has been  examined  by               the  Drafting Committee to some  extent.   The               position  of  the President in  a  responsible               government is not the same as the position  of               the    President   under   a    representative               Government like America and that is a  mistake               that a number of people in the House have been               making, when they said that the President will               be an autocrat, and no one appears to  realize               that the President has to act on the advice of               the Prime Minister. So far as the relationship               of   the   President  with  the   Cabinet   is               concerned, I must say that we have, so to say,               completely  copied the system  of  responsible               government  that  is  functioning  in  Britain               today;  we have made no deviation from it  and               the deviations that we have made are only such               as  are necessary because our Constitution  is               federal in structure."               Participating   in   the   same    discussion,               President Rajendra prasad said               "We  have had to reconcile the position of  an               elected President with an elected legislature,               and in doing so, we have adopted more or less,               the  position of the British monarch  for  the               President.   I.Es  position  is  that   of   a               constitutional President.  Then we come to the

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             Ministers.   They are, of course,  responsible               to  the Legislature and tender advice  to  the               President  who  is bound to act  according  to               that  advice.  Although there are no  specific               provisions,   so  far  as  I  know,   in   the               Constitution  itself making it binding on  the               President   to  accept  the  advice   of   his               Ministers,  it  is hoped that  the  convention               under which in England the King acts always on               the   advice   of  his   Ministers   will   be               established  in  this  country  also  and  the               President.  not  so  much on  account  of  the               written  word-in  the Constitution, but  as  a               result  of this very healthy convention,  will               become  a  constitutional  President  in   all               matters." These  solemn  words were uttered by the  President  of  the Constituent Assembly at the great moment when the motion  or final  adoption of the Constitution was put to the  vote  of the Chamber. The most powerful dramatization of the Constitutional  issue is  found in a debating episode in the Constituent  Assembly when  Dr.  Rajendra Prasad had pointed  exchanges  with  Dr. Ambedkar.  We may reproduce those telling pages here :               "Mr.   President : There is another  amendment               which has been moved by Sardar Hukum Singh  in               which he says that the               853               President  may  promulgate  ordinances   after               consultation with his Council of Ministers.               The   Honourable Dr. B.R. Ambedkar : I am very               grateful  to you for reminding me about  this.               The   point   is  that   that   amendment   is               unnecessary  because the President  could  not               act  and will not act except on the advice  of               the Ministers.               Mt-.  President  : Where is the  provision  in               the   Draft  Constitution  which   binds   the               President to act in accordance with the advice               of the Ministers?               Dr.   Ambedkar  :  I am sure that there  is  a               provision  and  the provision  is  that  there               shall  be  a Council of Ministers to  aid  and               advise  the President in the exercise  of  his               functions.               Mr.   President  :  Since we are  having  this               written   Constitution,  we  must  have   that               clearly put somewhere.               Dr.   Ambedkar : Though I cannot point it  out               just  now, I am sure there is a provision.   I               think there is a provision that the  President               will  be  bound to accept the  advice  of  the               Ministers.  In fact, he cannot act without the               advice of his Ministers.               Some Honourable Members : Article 61(1).               Mr.   president  : It only lays down the  duty               of the Ministers, but it does not lay down the               duty  of  the President to act  in  accordance               with  the advice given by the  Ministers.   It               does not lay down that the President is  bound               to  accept  the advice.  Is  there  any  other               provision in the Constitution?  We will not be               able even to impeach him, because he will  not               be acting in violation of the Constitution, if               there is no provision.

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             Dr.   Ambedkar : May I draw your attention  to               Article  61, which deals with the exercise  of               the President’s functions? lie cannot exercise               any  of his functions, unless he has  got  the               advice, in the exercise of his functions’.  It               is  not  merely to aid and  advise’.   In  the               exercise of his function,’ those are the  most               important words.               Mr.   president  :  I have my doubts  if  this               word  could bind the President. it  only  lays               down  that there shall be a Council of  Minis-               ters  with the Prime Minister at the  Head  to               aid  and advise the President in the  exercise               of  his functions.  It does not say  that  the               President will be bound to accept that advice.               Dr.   Ambedkar  :  If he does not  accept  the               advice of the existing Ministry, he shall have               to find some other body of Ministers to advise               him.    He   Will  never  be   able   to   act               independently of the Ministers.               Mr.  President : Is there any real  difficulty               in providing somewhere that the President will               be bound by the advice of the Ministers?               Dr.   Ambedkar : We are doing that.  If I  may               say so, there is a provision in the Instrument               of Instructions.               854               Mr.  President : I have considered that also.               Dr.   Ambedkar  : Paragraph 3 reads :  In  all               matters  within  the scope  of  the  executive               power of the Union, the President hall, in the               exercise of the powers conferred upon him,  be               guided  by  the advice of his  Ministers,  We-               propose to make some amendment to that.               Mr.   President : You want to change that?  As               it is, it lays down that the President will be               guided by the Ministers in the exercise of the               executive  powers of the Union and not in  its               legislative power.               Dr.   Ambedkar  :  Article 61  follows  almost               literally various other constitutions and  the               Presidents  have always understood  that  that               language  means  that  they  must  accept  the               advice.   If there is any difficulty, it  will               certainly be remedied by suitable amendment.               The Ambedkar approach, unequivocally accepted,               was               "It is the Prime Minister’s business, with the               support of the Ministers, to rule the  country               and  the  President may be permitted  now  and               then  to aid and advise the Council of  Minis-               ters.   Therefore,  we  should  look  at   the               substance  and  not at  the  mere  phraseology               which is the result of conventions." If  the  inner  voice’ of the founding fathers  may  be  any guide,  it  is  proved  beyond  reasonable  doubt  that  the President and, a fortiori, the Governor, enjoy nothing  more and  nothing less than the status. of a constitutional  head in  a Cabinet-type governments few exceptions  and  marginal reservations apart. We must however notice that a strong current of  high-placcd scholarship has expressed itself in the opposite  direction. For instance, Mr. K.M. Munshi, the author, has gone back  on his thesis as framer.  He writes in The President under  the Indian  Constitution’ that the President is  an  independent

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organ  of  the  State  representing  the  whole  Union   and exercising independent powers’ and reads cur Constitution as a composite one in which the Parliamentary form of executive and  a  President with power and  authority  are  combined’. Why?   To prevent a parliamentary government  from  becoming parliamentary   anarchy.’  Indeed,  he  has   regarded   the importation  of  English  inventions  as  tantamount  to  an amendment of the Constitution’.  The election of  President, his  oath of office, his specific powers and his  obligation to prevent Cabinet dictatorship, have been marshaled by this respected  statesman.   He  has climaxed  his  reasoning  by taking  the  view that aid and advice’ in Art.  74,  do  not imply  that the advice must be accepted in all cases.   Shri K.  Santhanam,  another cider statesman,  also  shares  this view.   Even  Dr. Rajendra Prasad is reported  to  have  had second thoughts on the denudation of Presidential powers (p. 141, The Constitution of India-How it has been framed-Pratap Kumar Ghosh).  This interpretative volte fsce may be due  to disillusionment; for, Shri Munshi has plainly stated :               "During  the framing of the  Constitution,  we               all dreamt that               we  would  make  a  success  of  parliamentary               democracy and               855               the  British  Cabinet  system.   It  must   be               confessed that this experiment has failed.  If               I had to make a choice again, I would vote for               the Presidential form of Government, so  that,               whenever  the  politicians fail  the  country,               there  is  at least one strong  organ  of  the               State capable of tiding over the crisis." In  the field of legal interpretation, is wish to be  father to the thought? Similarly, Mr. Justice P.B. Mukherjea and Mr. Justice Ismail have  argued that the Rashtrapati is more than  the  British Crown, that he reigns and rules and is not a faint  presence like a full moon at mid-day, but queen of the Constitutional sky.  We will briefly examine the arguments which have  been set  forth  to  substantiate  the  thesis  that  while   the initiative  to deal with all matters of policy will be  with the Cabinet and the Prime Minister, the final decision shall be  such that the President can give his assent with  honour and  self respect’ [quoted from p. 98 of (1) supra].   After bewailing  how when unconcealed opportunism reigns  supreme, when principles are thrown to the winds in favour of  office and  power,  when  ideologies are given the  go-by  for  the temporary  advantage of gaining and gathering votes  on  the basis  of  catchy  slogans,  when  self-interest  and  petty considerations  prevail over national interest and  when  an object of immediate gain gets ascendancy over the  permanent and  paramount object of bringing into existence  a  healthy and  contented society assured of the basic requirements  of life,  there  can  be no guarantee  against  perversion  and subversion of any Constitution howsoever perfectly it  might have  been  drawn up’, the learned jurist-judge  states  his sequitur :               "In view of all these aspects. my view is that               the Constitution has not imposed on obligation               either on the President or on the Governors to               act  in  accordance  with the  advice  of  the               Council of Ministers in ill matters and  under               all circumstances and they have got a  certain               amount of discretion in the matter of preserv-               ing, protecting and defending the Constitution               and  devoting  themselves to the  service  and

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             well-being of the people of India,  overriding               the  temporary advantages sought to be  gained               by any particular party in power for the  time               being."               Shri P.B. Mukherjea, in his Chimanlal Setalvad               Lectures, has propounded the thesis that-               "These constitutional features and  provisions               are   not   mere  pious   wishes   devoid   of               constitutional  and legal substance,  but  are               specific  tenets of the  Indian  Constitution.               Their  wisdom  lies  in  the  fact  that   the               President  is a Constitutional  and  effective               check on Cabinet dictatorship, flowing out  of               the   overwhelming   strength  of   a   single               political   party   without   any    effective               opposition.               *     *    *      *      *       *       *               "It  is  submitted on this analysis  that  the               Indian   Executive   is  authorized   by   the               Constitution to be strong and effective.   But               by  wrong action and wrong  interpretation  of               the  constitutional  provisions  it  has  been               reduced to a degree of ineffectiveness               856               which unless corrected is going to create  not               only   Constitutional  problems   but   extra-               Constitutional  problems  which  might   spell               disaster for the country." Which means that the President and Governor actually  govern and the Council of Ministers live up to their name by merely tendering advice in a take it or leave it’ spirit.  It is at once,  difficult and dangerous to enshrine  the  personality cult  in  a Republican Constitution and  emasculate  Cabinet Government into a cabal of counselors.  It is easier for one person  dressed  in omnipotent authority and  answerable  to none  to misuse power or for a collective body,  exposed  to opposition frequently and diversely and obligated to command the  confidence of a Parliament of elected  representatives? Is  it  not straining at a gnat and  swallowing  the  camel? Those who are critical of popular Government being perverted by   party  rais-rule  may  argue  for  a  change   in   the Constitution  if  they  have a case,  but  cannot  miss  the meaning  of  the  organic law as it is,  enacted  wisely  or foolishly,  but with eyes open, on the basic fabric  of  the Westminster  model.  Nor can constitutional construction  be deflected from its natural role of gathering the intendment, by an elitist touch reminiscent of imperial argument against Indian   aspiration   for  Poorna  Swaraj.    Here   is   an introductory passage by Shri Ismail on the subject :               "Certainly  it  cannot be said that,  in  this               connection,  there  is  either  similarity  or               identity between England and India.  In India,               with  its vast illiteracy and  ignorance,  the               traditions   of  the   British   Parliamentary               democracy  will  take a long time  to  acquire               effective   acceptance  or  find  useful   and               beneficial adoption.  The history of India has               been   characterized   only   by    benevolent               monarchical   traditions   and  not   by   any               completely  popular  democratic  institutions.               The  temperament  and emotions of  the  Indian               people  have been attuned only to such  insti-               tutions  and  they  will  have  to   gradually               acclimatize  themselves to a total  democratic               tradition,"

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This  attitude may give insight into why the  conclusion  he has drawn has been reached. it  is  argued  that the President’s action  is  beyond  the scrutiny of the Court to know if it is based on  Ministerial advice.   Even so, the fact that Courts cannot enquire  into whether  any and, if so, what advice has been given  by  his Ministers  to  the  Constitutional head does  not  mean  the latter can act as he fancies.  A thing is lawfully done  not because a Court can examine it but because it is  sanctioned by the law.  Many are the ways, e.g. impeachment, censure by Parliament,  massive protest-in which law is  recognised  by social organs.  Rights are enforced not by Courts alone  and remedies are not the source of right. The argument about the oath of office of President to defend the    Constitution    is   sometimes   put    forward    by antiministerialist   advocates.    Yes,   he   defends   the Constitution not by denying its spiritual essence of Cabinet responsibility-indeed he subverts it that way-but by 857 accepting   as   his  Constitutional   function   what   his responsible’  ministers  have  decided.  Can  a  Judge’,  in fulfillment  of the oath of his office, ignore  all  binding precedents  and  decide according to the ad hoc  dictate  so this uninformed conscience?  Tribhovandas’Case(1)answers the point  in the negative.  If every functionary who takes  the oath  by  the Constitution interprets it  according  to  his lights,  this solemn document would be the source  of  chaos and  collusion and the first casualty would be the  rule  of law.  Such mischief cannot merit juristic acceptance. Seervai   and   other  jurists  take  the  view   that   our Constitution had adopted the English system of parliamentary executive;  that  the  President  and  the  Governors   were constitutional   heads  of  the  executive  and  that   real executive power was vested in the Council of Ministers’ (2). Alexandrovicz has brought out the same point :               "The provisions of Chapter I of Part V of  the               Constitution relating to the executive  convey               prima facie the impression that the  President               of  India, the Head of the State, is also  the               real  head of the Executive, and the  Ministry               is only there to aid and to advise him in  the               exercise of his functions.  However, a careful               reading  of the Constituent  Assembly  debates               and the examination of Constitutional practice               in  the  post-independence years  show  beyond               doubt that the position is exactly the reverse               and  that  the  President  is  by   convention               reduced   to  a  more  figurehead  while   the               Ministry is the real Executive."                *         *         *         *         *               "Within the definite adoption of parliamentary               Government the vesting clause in Article 53(1)               remained to a great extent meaningless as real               executive  power  was in  the  Ministry.   The               President remained therefore divested of  such               executive power by those conventions which are               generally   at  the  basis  of   parliamentary               Government." Sir  B.N.  Rao, who, after considerable  study,  established that  the parliamentary system of Government in India,  with periodic elections, parliamentary control of Ministers and a constitutional monarch at the head, was part of our cultural heritage  from  the days of Manu and Kautilya, has  met  the familiar  arguments urged to invest powers in the  President as  against  the  Council  of  Ministers.   In  an   article

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published in 1957, captioned To what extent is the President under, the Indian Constitution required, in the discharge of his functions, to act upon the advice of his Ministers’,  he has   dealt  with  the  relevant  Article  and   the   usual considerations  put  forward  to  reject  the  theory  of  a symbolic presidency.  We quote :               It  was well understood during the framing  of               the  Indian  Constitution that  the  President               must act on Ministerial advice.               (a)  In justifying the provision  relating  to               the mode of election of the President-indirect               election by the elected members               (1)   [1968] S.C.R. 455, 465.               (2)   Constitutional   Law  of  India-H.    M.               Seervai-1968 reprint Vol. II p. 774.               858               of Parliament and of the State Assemblies  all               over India instead of direct election based on               adult   suffrage   (now   art.   54   of   the               Constitution)-the Prime Minister said :               "If  we  had the  President  elected  on-adult               franchise  and  did  not  give  him  any  real               powers, it might become a little anomalous."               In other words, the intention was to emphasize               that real power was vested by the constitution               in the Ministry and not in the President.               (b)   It will be remembered that the draft  of               the Indian Constitution originally contained a               schedule of instructions to the President  and               an article one of whose clauses provided that,               in  the  exercise of his functions  under  the               constitution,  he must be generally guided  by               these   instructions.    These    instructions               provided  inter  alia  that  he  must  act  on               ministerial advice.  The relevant  instruction               ran : "In all matters within the scope of  the               executive  power of the Union,  the  President               shall in the exercise of the powers  conferred               upon  him  be  guided by  the  advice  of  his               ministers".   Ultimately, the instructions  as               well   as   the   clause   were   omitted   as               unnecessary.  A number of members objected  to               the omission because they thought that it  was               not  all at clear how far the  conventions  of               the  British  Constitution  would  be  binding               under  the  Indian Constitution, But  the  Law               Minister was emphatic that they would be. That               the  convention  about acting  on  ministerial               advice  ought  to be the same in India  as  in               England  no one appears to have doubted :  the               only   doubt  voiced  was  whether  this   was               sufficiently clear in the Indian Constitution.               The Constituent Assembly, on the. assurance of               the Law Minister that the point admitted of no               doubt,  agreed  to omit the schedule  and  the               clause. (Constituent Assembly Debates,  Volume               10, 1949, pp. 268-271).               (1).  It  is clear from article 74(1) that  it               is the function of the Council of Ministers to               advise  the  President over the whole  of  the               Central   field.   Nothing  is  left  to   his               discretion or excepted from that field by this               article.   By  way of contrast, see  Art.  163               which  is  the  corresponding  provision   for               Governors and which expressly excepts  certain

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             matters in which the Governor is, by or  under               the  constitution,  required to act  it,.  his               discretion.  There is no such exception in the               case of the President.               Moreover,  art.  75(3) makes  the  Council  of               Ministers  responsible  to the  House  of  the               People.   If, therefore, the  President  acted               contrary to advice, the ministers would either               resign or, since the advice tendered reflected               the  view  of the House of  the  People,  they               would be thrown. out of office by the House of               the people.  For the same reasons, no one else               would then be able to form a government.   The               President  would, therefore, be  compelled  to               dissolve the House.  Apart from the  technical               difficulty of carrying out the man details. of               a general election in such               859               a  situation  the  President  might  have   to               dismiss the Ministry and install a  caretaker’               government to co-operate with him; bordering a               general   election-the  consequences  of   the               election  might  be  most  serious.   If   the               electorate  should return the same  government               to  power, the President might be  accused  of               having  sided with the Opposition  and  thrown               the country into the turmoil and expense of  a               general election in a vain attempt to get  rid               of   a  ministry  that  had  the  support   of               Parliament and the People.  This would gravely               impair the position of the: President.               III. If we hold that in a conflict between the               Ministry  and the President,  the  President’s               voice  should  prevail in  the  last,  resort,               either generally or even in a particular class               of cases,, this would mean the elimination  to               that  extent  of the authority of  a  Ministry               which  is continuously subject to  control  or               criticism  by  the  House of  the  People,  in               favour of the authority of a President who  is               not  so  subject.  It would thus result  in  a               reduction   of  the  sphere   of   responsible               government’.  So important a subtraction  must               be justified by some express provisions in our               constitution.               IV.   -If the President, in a particular  case               where  his own views differ from those of  his               Ministers, ultimately accepts their advice  in               defence to a well-understood convention,  then               even  if the act should result in a breach  of               some    fundamental   right’   or    directive               principle’ enunciated in the constitution, the               responsibility  will be that of the  ministers               and not of the President.,               The  considerations  mentioned  above  in  the               second group, of arguments seem to be decisive               in favour of the proposition that, in the last               resort, the President should accept the advice               of his ministers as in England...," Does   this   reduce  the  President,   under   the   Indian Constitution, to a, figurehead?  Far from it.  Like the King in England, he will still have the right to be consulted, to encourage  an( to Warn’.  Acting on ministerial advice  does not necessarily mean immediate acceptance of the  Ministry’s first thoughts.  The President can state all his  objections

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to  any proposed course of action and ask his  Ministers  in Council, if necessary, to reconsider the matter.  It is only in  the last resort that he must accept their final  advice. It has been observed that the influence of the Crown-and  of the House of Lords as well-in England’ has grown with  every curtailment  of its legal powers by convention. or  statute. A  similar result is likely to follow in India too; for,  as has  been  well said, "the voice of reason is  more  readily heard  when. it can persuade but no longer coerce", One  can conceive of no better future for the President of India than that he should be more and more like the Monarch in England, "eschewing  legal  power,  standing  outside  the  clash  of parties  and  gaining in moral  authority."  These.words  of constitutional wisdom come from one who played a key role in shaping  the framework of the Republic and had no  political affiliations. 860 Text  book writers have taught law students and  lawyers  in the   same  strain.  indeed,  a  national  disposition   for parliamentary  democracy  has taken shape  among  the  post- Independence  generation of students in  school  parliaments and university replicas.  Almost all political parties have, at  least at State level, been in and out of office  on  the basic   assumption  of  Cabinet  Government.   While   these pervasive  social  factors  are  not  germane  to  statutory construction,  they are not impertinent to an  understanding by a whole people of what they gave to themselves, Sirlvor  Jennings(1) has acknowledged that the President  in the  Union,  or the Governor or Rajpramukh in  a  State,  is essentially  a  constitutional monarch.   The  machinery  of government  is essentially British and the whole  collection of  British constitutional conventions has  apparently  been incorporated  as conventions.’ The text, the  author  notes, vests  vast  powers in the President but past  history  must provide the modus vivendi.  In an article entitled Crown and Commonwealth in Asia’ he, however, wrote :               "Dr.   Rajendra  Prasad  seems  to  have  been               following   British  conventions   with   some               fidelity;   but  there  is  nothing   in   the               Constitution   which  requires  him   or   his               successors to do so, and one of them may  well               say that he is not bound by the constitutional               practices  followed in a foreign monarchy  and               that he proposes to carry out the law and  law               alone." We  have extensively excerpted from various sources not  for adopting  quotational jurisprudence’ but to  establish  that the only correct construction can be that in  constitutional law  the  functions’ of the President and Governor  and  the business’  of Government belong to the Ministers and not  to the  head  of State, that aid and advice’ of  ministers  are terms  of art which, in law mean, in the Cabinet context  of our  constitutional  scheme,  that the aider  acts  and  the adviser decides in his own authority and not subject to  the power  of  President  to accept or  reject  such  action  or decision,  except, in the case of Governors, to the  limited extent  that  Art. 163 permits and  his  discretion,  remote controlled by the Centre, has play.               When  Dr.  Prasad,  as  President  of   India,               hesitated  to  sign the ]Hindu  Code  Bill  in               September  1951  and wrote to  Prime  Minister               Nehru  whether  he  could  not  exercise   his               judgment, the latter did not mince words :               The   whole   conception   of   constitutional               government  is  against any  exercise  by  the

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             President of any such authority.               The first Attorney General of India, whom both               the  first  President  and  the  first   Prime               Minister consulted on the question,  counseled               thus               "I  went into the matter most carefully and  I               reached the conclusion that the President  was               under our Constitution which had borrowed  the               British   Parliamentary  form  of   Government               making the cabinet collectively responsible to               the Parliament               (1)   Some   Characteristics  of  the   Indian               Constitution, p. 2.               861               (The   House   of  the  People)   a   strictly               constitution   head.  Having  regard  to   the               meaning  of the expression aid and advise’  in               British  Constitutional  law and  practice  it               meant  that the President was bound to act  in               accordance with the aid and advice tendered to               him  by the Council of Ministers.  I  referred               to  a number of authorities in support  of  my               view.   I  stated that once  this  theory  was               accepted it would govern I presidential action               except, perhaps, a few situations in which the               Council  of Ministers would not be capable  of               advising him by reason, for example, of it not               existing  when the President was  supposed  to               discharge a particular executive function," Shri  Setalvad  further  narrates  two  incidents  when  the President  Dr.  Rajendra  Prasad asked his  opinion  on  two matters.   The  President wanted to know  whether  he  could prevent the Hindu Code Bill from becoming law.  The Attorney General  advised  him that the President was  bound  to  act accordance   the  advice  of  his  Ministers.   On   another occasion,  the  President  wanted to know  whether,  as  the Supreme Commander of Forces, he can send for individual army officers to elicit information about the defence forces.  In this  case  also,  Shri Setalvad gave his  answer  in  "firm negative".   Sir Alladi, whose views were also  elicited  by President  Prasad on the same sensitive issues,  struck  the same note thus :               "In  not  stating in detail the  incidents  of               responsible  government, our Constitution  has               followed  the  example  of  most  of  Dominion               Constitutions  excepting that of Ireland.   In               the ease of Ireland, as is well known,  having               regard  to the circumstances under  which  the               Irish  Constitution  came into  existence,  an               attempt  has been made to state in detail  the               incident of the Cabinet Government."               "The  one point which the President misses  in               the note is that though the executive power is               technically  vested in the President, just  as               the  same is vested in the Crown  in  England,               under Article 74 of the Constitution a Council               of  Ministers with the Prime Minister  as  the               head  has to aid and advise the  President  in               the exercise of his functions.  Article 74  is               all-pervasive  in its character and  does  not               make any distinction between one kind of  fun-               ction  and  another.   It  applies  to   every               function  and power vested in  the  President,               whether it relates to addressing the House  or               returning   a  Bill  for  reconsideration   or

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             assenting or withholding assent to the Bill.               it  will be constitutionally improper for  the               President  not  to seek to be  guided  by  the               advice  of his Ministers in exercising any  of               the functions legally or technically vested in               the President.  The expression aid and advise’               in  Article  74 cannot be construed so  as  to               enable  the President to act independently  or               against  the  advice  of  the  Cabinet."  "The               President  also  misses in his Note  the  main               point underlying Article Ill dealing with  the               power  to remit a Bill   for  reconsideration.               Here again, the President                862               is not intended to be a revisions or appellate               authority over the Cabinet.  A bill might have               been introduced either by a private member  or               a  member  of the Cabinet.  It may  be  rushed               through in the Parliament.  The Cabinet  might               notice  an obvious slipped error after  it-had               passed  the Houses.  This power vested in  the               President is as much intended to be  exercised               on  the  advice of the Cabinet  as  any  other               power."               "Through  the  discussion in  the  Constituent               Assembly,  the matter was put beyond doubt  by               Dr.  Amebdkar and such of us as took a  fairly               leading  part in the debates that every  power               conferred on the President has to be exercised               by   him  according  to  the  advice  of   the               Ministers.  Otherwise, he might be even guilty               of    violating   the    Constitution,    vide               Constituent  Assembly  Dbates, Vol.  7,  pages               935, 998, 1158 and Vol. 9, p. 150 etc." We   are  citing  these  opinions  not  as   argumentum   ad verecundium, although the authors are legal celebrities, but because   every   fresh   ex  posure   of   this   sensitive constitutional issue found meaning fulresponse which  molded the  shape and stabilized the course of  the  constitutional process  early in its history, Barring- murmurs in  seminars and  mild  ,queries from high quarters  the  constitution-in action  has  been  well set on this  theory  of  responsible Government. In Felix Frankfurter’s phrase, this is the gloss which  life ha-, written’ on our constitutional clauses, and the  Court, true  to  its  function,must try to reflect  that  gloss  by balancing in it sruling the origin, formulation, and  growth of  a  constitutional  structure  denying  judicial  aid  to undermining the democratic substance of Cabinet  Government. A coup can be constitutionally envisioned by an  erroneously literal  interpretation of the living words of  the  Organic Law.  Prof.  Allen Glendhill, we must warn ourselves, wrote               "Let  us  assume  that a  President  has  been               elected  who  has successfully  concealed  his               ambition to establish an authoritarian  system               of Government.  One-fourth of the members of a               House  of  parliament, suddenly aware  of  the               danger, give notice of a motion to impeach the               President.   Before the fourteen days  with,in               which it can be moved, the President dissolves               Parliament, a new House must be elected but it               need  not meet for six months.   He  dismisses               the  Ministers and appoints others of his  own               choice, who for six months need not be Members               of  Parliament and during that period  he  can

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             legislate  by  Ordinance.   He  can  issue   a               proclamation  of Emergency, legislate  on  any               subject and deprive the States of their shares               in  the proceeds of distributable  taxes.   He               can  issue directions to States calculated  to               provoke  disobedience  and  then  suspend  the               States’Constitutions.   He can use  the  armed               forces in support of the civil power.  He  can               promulgate preventive detention Ordinances and               imprison his opponents."               Again, that learned jurist has commented               "The Constitution vests the executive power of               the  Union in the President and provides  that               all executive action shall               863               be  taken in his name.  The President is  also               given  many powers, shortly to  be  discussed,               but  the  last fourteen years have  shown  the               world that India is a parliamentary  democracy               in which Ministers decide policy and carry  on               Government, but the Constitution does not  say               in  as many words that the President must  act               on  ministerial advice; what it says  is  that               there  shall be a Council of Ministers to  aid               and advice the President; no court may inquire               into the question whether any, and if so what,               advice  was tendered to the  President.   What               the Constitution contemplates is that normally               the  government  shall  be  carried  on  by  a               committee  of  Ministers  selected  from   the               elected representatives of the people, but  it               recognizes  that  circumstances may  arise  in               which  that  system may break down, so  it  is               discrable that there should be some  authority               empowered  to continue the government and  set               about  restoring parliamentary  government  as               soon as possible.  It is for this reason  that               the  Constitution legally vests the  executive               power in the President." We  cannot  allow a confusion of vision’ to creep  into  cur constitutional  interpretation because political  scientists notice  grave shortcomings in the electoral process,  social workers  complain of corrupt misuse of power by  parties  in officer the ordinary people find legislators indifferent and ineffective.   After all, any social scientist  will.  agree that  in  a  rapidly changing  and  inter-acting  world  the technology  of  Government  by  the  people  has  to  be   a continuous process of readjustment and fresh experiment.  As Judges,  we  only  essay a  creative  understanding  of  the constitutional   complex,  not  a  programme  for   possible innovations. Since a constitution is a declaration of articles of  faith, not a compilation of laws, a prior pronouncement must be put out  of  the  way  if it  has  breached  our  constitutional philosophy  or  amputated the amplitude of  cardinal  creeds expressed in its vital words.  Therefore, we have to examine what  this Court has held in the past, from  the  functional angle, on the President (or Governor) vis a vis his Council. of Ministers, on the administrative power of the High  Court over  the State Judicature and on the processual rights,  if any  of  a  probationer  before  his  precarious  tenure  is terminated. The number of decisions of this Court and of the High Courts on  the above points is legion and the legal  gossamer  webs sometimes  woven  by  them are so fine  that  one  sometimes

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wonders  whether  profusion  of precedents  beyond  a  point become  counter-productive  in  the  understanding  of   the Constitution meant to govern and therefore to be within  the ken of the common man.  We will focus largely on the leading decisions, the rest of the skein of case-law wound round the principal constitutional propositions deserving but  passing reference. The  overwhelming weight of judicial authority is in  favour of  the  Cabinet system of government as  inscribed  in  the Constitution.   Mukherjea,  C. J., in Rai  Sahib  Ram  Jawya Kapur v. State of Punjab(1) observed: (1)  [1955] 2 SCR 225.  864               "Our  Constitution,  though  federal  in   its               structure,   is   modelled  on   the   British               Parliamentary  system where the  executive  is               deemed to have the primary responsibility  for               the formulation of governmental policy and its               transmission  into  law though  the  condition               precedent    to   the   exercise    of    this               responsibility is its retaining the confidence               of the legislative branch of the State.                *         *         *         *               In India, as in England, the executive has  to               act subject to the control of the legislature;               but  in what way is this Control exercised  by               the legislature ? Under article 53 (1) of  our               Constitution, the executive power of the Union               is  vested in the President but under  article               75 there is to be a Council of Ministers  with               the  Prime  Minister at the head  to  aid  and               advise  the President in the exercise  of  his               functions.  The President has thus been made a               formal or constitutional head of the executive               and  the real executive powers are  vested  in               the  Ministers  or  the  Cabinet.   The   same               provisions obtain in regard to the  Government               of States; the Governor or the Rajpramukh,  as               the case may be, occupies the position of  the               head  of the executive in the state but it  is               virtually  the  Council of Ministers  in  each               state   that   carries   on   the    executive               Government.    In  the  Indian   Constitution,               therefore,   we  have  the  same   system   of               parliamentary executive as in England and  the               Council of Ministers consisting, as it does of               the  members  of  the  legislatures  like  the               British  Cabinet."  a hyphen  which  joins,  a               buckle  which fastens the legislative part  of               the State to the executive part".  The Cabinet               enjoying,  as  it  does,  a  majority  in  the               legislature concentrates in itself the virtual               control  of  both  legislative  and  executive               functions  and as the  Ministers  constituting               the   Cabinet   are   presumably   agreed   on               fundamentals  and  act  on  the  principle  of               collective responsibility, the most  important               questions  of  policy are  all  formulated  by               them." In  Bejoy Lakshmi Cotton Mills Ltd. v. State of West  Bengal (1) a’ Constitution Bench of this Court expressly ruled that "the  Governor’s personal satisfaction was not necessary  in this case as this is not an item of business with respect to which  the  Governor  is,  by  or  under  the  Constitution, required  to act in his discretion.  Although the  executive

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Government of a State is vested in the Governor, actually it is  carried  on by Ministers and, in this  particular  case, under  rr.  4 and 5 of the Rules of  business,  referred  to above the business of Government is to be transacted in  the various departments specified in the First Schedule thereof" (emphasis supplied). In Sanjeevi Naidu v. State of Madras (2) the question  arose whether in a case where a central statute, namely the  Motor Vehicles Act, vested certain powers in the State Government, which  by  definition in the General Clauses Act  means  the Governor, the order passed by the (1)  [1967] 2 S.C.R. 406. (2)  [1970] 3 S.C.R. 505. 865 Minister to whom the relevant business had been allocated by the  rules of business was valid.  Hegde, J.,  speaking  for himself and his five colleagues, observed:               Under   our  Constitution,  the  Governor   is               essentially   a   constitutional   head;   the               administration of Slate is run by the  Council               of  Ministers.   But  in the  very  nature  of               things,  it is impossible for the  Council  of               Ministers  to deal with each and every  matter               that comes before the Government.  In order to               obviate  that difficulty the Constitution  has               authorized the Governor under sub-Art. (3)  of               Art 166 to make rules for the more  convenient               transaction  of business of the government  of               the  State and for the allocation amongst  its               Ministers,  the  business of  the  Government.               All matters excepting those in which  Governor               is  required to act in his discretion have  to               be  allocated  to  one or  the  other  of  the               Ministers on the advice of the Chief Minister.               Apart  from  allocating  business  among   the               Ministers, the Governor can also make rules on               the  advice  of his Council of  Ministers  for               more  convenient transaction of business.   He               cannot  only  allocate  the  various  subjects               amongst  the Ministers but may go further  and               designate  a particular official to  discharge               any particular function But this again he  can               do  only  on  the advice of’  the  Council  of               Ministers. The  Cabinet  is responsible to the  legislature  for  every action taken in any of the Ministries.  That is the  essence of  joint responsibility.  That does not mean that each  and every decision must be taken by the Cabinet.  The  political responsibility  of  the Council of Ministers  does  not  and cannot   predicate  the  personal  responsibility   of   the Ministers  to  discharge  all or  any  of  the  governmental functions.  Similarly an individual Minister is  responsible to  the legislature for every action taken or omitted to  be taken   in  his  ministry.   This  again  is   a   political responsibility and not personal responsibility." Again a Bench consisting of eleven Judges of this Court,  in the  well-known Bank Nationalization case ( R. C. Cooper  v. Union  of  India  (1) pronounced on  the  character  of  our constitution in these decisive words:               "Under  the Constitution, the President  being               the  Constitutional  head,  normally  acts  in               allmatters  including the promulgation  at  an               ordinance  on  the advice of  his  Council  of               Ministers.   Whether  in  a  given  case   the               President may decline to be guided by the  ad-

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             vice  of his council of Ministers is a  matter               which  need  nit detain us. The  ordinance  is               promulgated  in the name of the President  and               in a constitutional sense on his satisfaction;               it  is in truth promulgated on the  advice  of               his   Council  of  Ministers  and   on   their               satisfaction." (1) [1970] 3 SCR 570. 9 Ll92SupCI/75 866 In  a  recent  decision U. N. Rao  v.  Indira  Gandhi.  (1). Sikri,   C.J.,  speaking  for  a  unanimous   court,   after reiterating that we are interpreting a Constitution and  not an  Act  of Parliament, a constitution which  establishes  a parliamentary system of Government with a Cabinet’,  thought it  proper to keep in mind the conventions prevalent at  the time the Constitution was framed. A  curious  facet of the cabinet system arose in  that  case viz,  whether the President could constitutionally  continue his  Council of Ministers to govern the country  instead  of holding  the  reins in his own hands after  the  Parliament, responsibility to which is the credential of the Cabinet  to rule  in  the name of the people, had been  dissolved.   The conspectus  of clauses bearing on the President’s  election, oath   of   office,   legal  capacity  to   carry   on   the administration  directly were all considered, and Sikri,  C. J., declared the law thus:               "The  Constituent Assembly did not choose  the               Presidential system of Government.  If we were               to  give  effect  to this  contention  of  the               appellant  we  would  be  changing  the  whole               concept of the Executive.  It would mean  that               the  President need not have a Prime  Minister               and  Ministers  to  aid  and  advise  in   the               exercise of his functions.  As there would  be               no  council  of  Ministers’  nobody  would  be               responsible to the House of the People.   With               the  aid of advisers he would be able to  rule               the  country  at least till  he  is  impeached               under Article 61."                *         *              *              *               The  appellant urges that the House of  People               having  been dissolved this clause  cannot  be               complied  with.  According to him  it  follows               from the provisions of this Clause that it was               contemplated  that on the dissolution  of  the               House  of  People the Prime Minister  and  the               other ministers must resign or be dismissed by               the President and the President must carry  on               the Government as best as he can with the  aid               of  the  Services.  As we  have  shown  above,               Article 74(1) is mandatory and, therefore, the               President  cannot exercise power  without  the               aid  and advice of the Council  of  Ministers.               We  must  then  harmonize  the  provisions  of               Article 75 (3) with Article 74 (1) and Article               75(2).   Article 75 (3) brings into  existence               what is usually called Responsible Government.               In  other words the Council of Ministers  must               enjoy  the confidence of the House of  People.               While  the House of People is-  not  dissolved               under  Article  82(2) (b) Article 75  (3)  has               full operation.  But when it is dissolved  the               Council  of Ministers cannot  naturally  enjoy               the confidence of the House of People.  Nobody

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             has  said that the Council of  Ministers  does               not  enjoy  the  confidence of  the  House  of               People  when it is prorogued.  In the  context               therefore, this clause must be read as meaning               that Article 75(3) only applies when the House               of   People  does  not  stand   dissolved   or               prorogued.   We  are not  concerned  with  the               cases where dissolution of the House of People               takes   place  under  Article  83(2)  on   the               expiration   of  the  period  of  five   years               prescribed   therein,   for   Parliament   has               provided for that contingency in S. 14 of  the               Representation of the People Act, 1951.               (1)   [1971] Supp.  S.C.R. 46.                867               On  our interpretation other articles  of  the               Constitution  also  have full play,  i.e.  Art               77(3)   which   contemplates   allocation   of               business  among  Ministers,  and  Articles  78               which  prescribes  certain  duties  of   Prime               Minister."(emphasis supplied)               The  Constitutional right of the  Ministry  to               continue  in office after the  dissolution  of               the  State Assembly was highlighted in  K.  N.               Rajagopal  v. M. Karunanidhi. (1) This  Court,               adopting  the  ratio in Indira  Gandhi’s  case               (supra) repelled the challengeable’ the U.  K.               Practice.               The analysis which appeals to us, in the light               of this Court’s rulings, accords with the view               expressed  by Mr. Keith in his Preface to  The               King and the Imperial Crown’ :               "It is a conviction of the public in the self-               governing  Dominions  of the  Crown  that  the               Governor-General in matters official serves no               more  distinguished  purpose  than-that  of  a               rubber stamp’.               As for the semantic gap between the verbal and               the  real, even in England, as  William  Paley               has explained :               "there  exists a wide difference  between  the               actual state of the government and the theory.               When we contemplate the  theory of the British               government;  we  see the king  vested  with  a               power of rejecting laws.  Yet when we turn our               attention from the legal extent to the  actual               exercise of royal authority in England we  see               these  formidable prerogatives  dwindled  into               more ceremonies; and in their stead a sure and               commanding    influence    of    which     the               constitution, it seems, is totally ignorant." In  Blackstone’s commentaries on the Laws of  England,  said Dicey,   students   might   read   that   the   Constitution concentrated  all executive power in the hands of the  King. The   language   of   this   passage’,   he   remarked,   is impressive......  It has but one fault : the  statements  it contains are the direct opposite of the truth".’ The President in India is not at all a glorified cipher.  He represents the majesty of the State, is at the apex,  though only  symbolically,  and  has rapport with  the  people  and parties, being above politics.  His vigilant presence  makes for good government if only he uses, what Bagehot  described as,  the  right  to be consulted, to  warn  and  encourage’. Indeed,  Art. 78 wisely used, keeps the President  in  close touch  with  the  Prime  Minister  on  matters  of  national

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importance  and policy significance, and there is  no  doubt that the imprint of his personality may chasten and  correct the  political government, although the actual  exercise  of the  functions entrusted to him by law is in effect  and  in law  carried  on by his duly appointed  mentors.  i.e.,  the Prime Minister and his colleagues.  In short, the President, like   the  King,  has  not  merely  been   constitutionally romanticized  but  actually  vested  with  a  pervasive  and persuasive  role.  Political theorists are quite  conversant with  the  dynamic role of the Crown which keeps  away  from politics and power (1)  AIR 1971 SC 1551.  868 and yet influences both.  While he plays such a role, he  is not  a rival centre of power in any sense and must abide  by and act on the advice tendered by his Ministers except in  a narrow territory which is sometimes slippery. Of course, there is some qualitative difference between  the position  of  the President and the Governor.   The  former, under  Art. 74 has no discretionary powers; the  latter  too has  none, save in the tiny strips covered by  Art.  163(2), 371 A (1)b & (d) 371 A (2)(b) and (f), VI Schedule para 9(2) (and  VI Schedule para 18(3) _ until omitted  recently  with effect  from 21-1-1972).  These discretionary  powers  exist only  where expressly spelt out and even these are not  left to the sweet will of the Governor but are  remote-controlled by the Union Ministry which is answerable to Parliament  for those  actions.   Again,  a  minimal  area  centering  round reports  to  be dispatched under Art. 356 may  not,  in  the nature  of things, be amenable to ministerial  advice.   The practice   of  sending  periodical  reports  to  the   Union Government is a pre-constitutional one and it is doubtful if a  Governor  could or should report behind the back  of  his Ministers.    For  a  Centrally   appointed   constitutional functionary to keep a dossier on his Ministers or to  report against  them  or  to take up  public  stances  critical  of Government policy settled by the cabinet or to interfere  in the administration directly-these are unconstitutional  faux pas  and  run counter to parliamentary system.  In  all  his constitutional functions’ it is the Ministers who act;  only in the narrow area specifically marked out for discretionary exercise by the Constitution, he is untrammeled by the State Ministers’  acts  and advice.  Of course,  a  limited  free- wheeling is available regarding choice of Chief Minister and dismissal  of  the  Ministry, as  in  the  English  practice adapted to Indian conditions. Shri Sanghi, counsel for the appellant, adopted an ingenious argument to get round the holdings of this Court that  India has accepted the Cabinet form of Government, by urging  that while the Ministers exercise powers by virtue of  allocation of business of Government under Art. 77(3) and have, on  the strength  of  Art. 74, the authority to  discharge  all  the functions  of  the head of State, still wherever  the  Cons- titution  has  expressly vested powers in the  President  by Governor, they belong to him alone and cannot be handled  on his  behalf  by  Ministers  under  the  relevant  Rules   of Business.   He  concedes that we cannot  read  the  Articles literally  in the context of a Parliamentary  Executive  but insists  on  an exception in the  category  just  mentioned. Inspiration for this argument comes from Sardarilal (2)  and a  few other Cases which do lead countenance to this  rather extravagant  claim  of  personal  power  for  President  and Governor.    How   ambitious   and   subversive   such    an interpretation   can  be  to  Parliamentary  (and   popular) authority  unfolds itself when we survey the wide  range  of

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vital powers so enunciated in the Constitution. The  argument  of  the counsel for  the  appellant  is  that wherever  the President is invested with power-and the  same holds good for the Governor-he is sovereign in his own right and has to exercise the functions  personally and the orders of a proxy, even a Minister, cannot do duty for the exercise of Presidential power.  There is logic in arguing  869 that  if, under Art. 31 1, the President or  Governor  means President  or  Governor  personally.  under  other   similar Articles  the  rules  of business making  over  exercise  of functions  to  Ministers  and  officers  cannot  be   valid. Indeed,  a  whole  host  of  such  Articles  exist  in   the Constitution, most of them very vital for the daily  running of the administration and embracing executive, emergency and legislative powers either of a routine or momentous  nature. The  power to grant pardon or to remit sentence (Art.  161), the  power  to  make appointments  including  of  the  Chief Minister  (Art  164), the Advocate General (Art.  165),  the District  Judges  (Art.  233), the  Members  of  the  Public Service   Commission  (Art.  316)  are  of  this   category. Likewise, the power to prorogue either House of  Legislature or to dissolve the Legislative Assembly (Art. 174) the right to address or send messages to the Houses of the Legislature (Art. 175 and Art.16), the power to assent to Bills or with- hold   such   assent   (Art.  200),  the   power   to   make recommendations for demands of grants (Art.203(3)), and  the duty to cause to be laid every year the annual budget  (Art. 202), the power to promulgate ordinances during recesses  of the  Legislature (Art. 213) also belong to this  species  of power.   Again,  the  obligation to make  available  to  the Election Commission the requisite staff for discharging  the functions  conferred by Art. 324(1) on the Commission  (Art. 324 (6)), the power to nominate a member of the Anglo-Indian Community to the Assembly in certain situations (Art.  333), the  power to authorize the use of Hindi in the  proceedings in  the  High Court (Art. 348(2)), are illustrative  of  the functions of the Governor qua Governor. Similarly, the President is entrusted with powers and duties covering  a wide range by the Articles of the  Constitution. Indeed, he is the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (Art 53(2)),  appoints Judges of the Supreme Court and  the  High Courts and determines the latter’s age when dispute  arises, has power to refer questions for the Advisory opinion of the Supreme   Court.(Art  143)  and  has  power  to  hold   that Government  of a State cannot be carried in accordance  with the  Constitution  (Art.  356).   The  Auditor-General,  the Attorney  General,  the  Governors and the  entire  army  of public  servants  hold  office during the  pleasure  of  the President.   Bills  cannot  become law, even  if  passed  by Parliament,   without   the   assent   of   the   President. Recognizing and derecognising rulers of former native States of   India  is  a  power  vested  in  the  President.    The extraordinary   powers   of   legislation   by   Ordinances, dispensing  with  enquiries against public  servants  before dismissal,  declaration  of  emergency  and  imposition   of President’s  rule  by  proclamation upon  States.  are  vast powers of profound significance.  Indeed, even the power  of summoning  and  proroguing and dissolving the House  of  the People and returning Bills passed by the Parliament  belongs to  him.  If only we expand the ratio of Sardarilal (2)  and Jayantilal (12) to every function which the various Articles of the Constitution confer on the President or the Governor, Parliamentary  democracy  will become a  dope  and  national elections  a numerical exercise in expensive  futility.   We

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will  be  compelled  to hold that  there  are  two  parallel authorities exercising powers of governance of the  country, as in the dyarchy days, except that Whitehall is substituted by  Rashtrapati  Bhavan and Raj Bhawan.   The  Cabinet  will shrink   at  Union  and  State  levels  in   political   and administrative authority and,, 870 having  solemn  regard  to  the  gamut  of  his  powers  and responsibilities, the Head of State will be a  reincarnation of Her Majesty’s Secretary of State for India, untroubled by even  the British Parliament-a little taller in  power  than the    American   President,   Such   a    distortion,    by interpretation, it appears to us, would virtually amount  to a subversion of the structure, substance and vitality of our Republic,  particularly when we remember that Governors  are but  appointed  functionaries and the President  himself  is elected  on  a limited indirect basis.  As we  have  already indicated  the  overwhelming catena of authorities  of  this Court  have  established over the decades that  the  cabinet form.-of  Government and the Parliamentary system have  been adopted  in India and the contrary concept must be  rejected as   incredibly   allergic   to   our   political    genius, constitutional creed and culture. The  contention  of the appellant, however, has  been  built upon  Sardari Lal v. Union of India.(2) There the Court  had to  consider the exercise of powers expressly  conferred  on the President by cl. (c) of the proviso to.  Art. 311(2)  of the  Constitution’. it was common ground in that  case  that the  President had no occasion to deal with the case of  the appellant  himself and the order was made by  a  subordinate official of the Government of India.  The dispute was as  to whether the function of dispensing with enquiry in the  name of  the  security of the State had to be  performed  by  the President  personally,under cl. (10) of the proviso to  Art. 311  (2), of could be one of the functions  allocable  under the  Allocation of Business Rules.  Of course, the  relevant text of Art. 311 speaks of the President being satisfied and the Court came to the conclusion that what was intended  was not Ministerial but Presidential satisfaction.  Grover,  J., speaking for a unanimous Court, observed.               "On the principles which have been  enunciated               by  this Court, the function in clause (c)  of               the proviso to Art. 311(2) cannot be delegated               by  the President to any one else in the  case               of  a  civil servant of the Union.   In  other               words  he has to be satisfied personally  that               in the interest of the security of the  State,               it  is  not  expedient  to  hold  the  inquiry               prescribed by clause (2).  In the first place,               the general consensus has been that  executive               functions  of  the  nature  entrusted  by  the               Articles,  some of which have  been  mentioned               before  and  in particular those  Articles  in               which  the  President  has  to  be   satisfied               himself about the existence of certain fact or               state of affairs cannot be delegated by him to               any  one else.  Secondly even with  regard  to               clause(c) of the proviso, there is a               specific observation in the passage  extracted               above  from the case of Jayantilal  Amrit  Lal               Shodhan that the powers of the President under               that provision cannot be delegated.   Thirdly,               the  dichotomy  which has.  been  specifically               introduced between the authority mentioned  in               clause  (b)  and the  President  mentioned  in

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             clause  (c) of the proviso cannot  be  without               significance,    The    Constitution    makers               apparently felt that a matter in which the in-               terest of the security of the State has to  be               considered   should   receive   the   personal               attention of the President or the head of  the               State and he should be himself satisfied  that               an inquiry under the                871               substantive part of clause (2) of Art. 311 was               not expedient for the reasons stated in clause               (c)  of the proviso in the case of  particular               servant". Some   observations  in  the  ruling  relied  upon,   namely Jayantilal Amritlal Shodhan v. F N. Rama (1) apparently seem to support the conclusion reached in Sardarilal,(Supra)  but it  must  be remembered that the actual case turned  on  the constitutionality  of  the  President  delegating  executive powers  conferred  on him by Art. 258 to a government  of  a State.   In  that  case  a  distinction  was  made   between functions  with which the Union Government is  invested  and those vested in the President.  The Court took the view that Art.258 (1) did not permit the President to part with powers and functions with which he is, by express provisions of the Constitution   qua  President,  invested.   The   particular observations relied upon in Sardarilal may well be extracted here:               "The power to promulgate Ordinances under Art.               123; to suspend the provisions of Arts. 268 to               279 during an emergency; to declare failure of               the  Constitutional machinery in States  under               Art.  356;  to declare a  financial  emergency               under  Art.  360 to make rules  regarding  the               recruitment  and  conditions  of  service   of               persons  appointed  to posts and  services  in               connection with the affairs of the Union under               Art. 309-to enumerate a few out of the various               powers-are not powers of the Union Government;               these  are powers vested in the  President  by               the  Constitution and are incapable  of  being               delegated  or entrusted to any other  body  or               authority  under Art. 258 (1).  The plea  that               the  very nature of these powers is such  that               they  could  not be intended to  be  entrusted               under Art. 258 (1) to the State or officer  of               the  State, and, therefore, that  clause  must               have  a  limited  content,  proceeds  upon  an               obvious  fallacy.  Those powers cannot be  de-               legated under Art. 258(1) because they are not               the  powers  of the Union and not  because  of               their  special  character.  There  is  a  vast               array  of  other  powers  exercisable  by  the               President-to mention only a few appointment of               judges;   Art.  124  &  217,  appointment   of               Committees  of  Official Languages  Act,  Art.               344, appointment of Commissions to investigate               conditions  of  backward  classes;  Art.  340,               appointment  of Special Officer for  Scheduled               Castes  and Tribes; Art. 338, exercise of  his               pleasure  to  terminate employment;  Art.  310               declaration that in the interest of the  secu-               rity of the State it is not expedient to  give               a  public  servant sought to be  dismissed  an               opportunity contemplated by Art. 311 (2)-these               are executive powers of the President and  may

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             not be delegated or entrusted to another  body               or  officer  because they do not  fall  within               Art. 258". The Court there was not concerned with the question  whether the   President   must  exercise  these   executive   powers personally  or  they can be exercised by a  Minister  or  an officer on his behalf according to the allocation made under the Rules of Business. (1)  [1964] 5 S.C.R. 294, 307 & 308. 872 Before jettisoning wholesale the theory of absolute power of Presidency   we   must  deal  with  two  Articles   of   the Constitution,  one relating to the determination of the  age of High Court Judges [Art 217 (3)] and the other relating to the  Election  Commission (Art 361) which have come  up  for judicial  consideration.   Counsel  for  the  appellant  has relied  on passages from these cases which hark back,  in  a way,  to the, theory of individual judgment of the  Head  of State. In  J. P.  Mitter v. Chief Justice, Calcutta (1) this  Court had  to consider the decision of the Government of India  on the  age of a Judge of the Calcutta High Court and, in  that context, had to ascertain the true scope and effect of  Art. 217   (3)  which  clothes  the  President   with   exclusive jurisdiction  to determine the age of a Judge  finally.   In that  case  the Ministry of Home Affairs  went  through  the exercise  prescribed  in  Art.  217  (3).   "The  then  Home Minister  wrote to the Chief Minister, West Bengal, that  he had consulted the Chief Justice of India, and he agreed with the advice given to him by the Chief Justice, and so he  had decided  that the date of birth of the appellant was  it  is this  decision which was, in due course communicated to  the appellant."  When  the  said decision was  attacked  as  one reached  by the Home Minister only and not by the  President personally, the Court observed:               "The  alternative  stand which  the  appellant               took  was that the Executive was not  entitled               to   determine  his  age;  and  it   must   be               remembered  that this stand was  taken  before               Art. 217 (3) was inserted in the Constitution;               the  appellant  was undoubtedly  justified  in               contending   that   the  Executive   was   not               competent to determine the question about  his               age because that is a matter which would  have               to  be tried normally,in judicial  proceedings               instituted  before  High Courts  of  competent               jurisdiction.  There is considerable force  in               the  plea  which  the appellant  took  at  the               initial stages of this controversy that if the               Executive is allowed to determine the age of a               sitting  Judge  of a High  Court,  that  would               seriously  affect  the  independence  of   the               Judiciary itself." Based  on this reasoning, the Court quashed the  order,  the ratio  of the case being that the President  himself  should decide the age of the Judge, uninfluenced by the  Executive, i.e. by the Minister in charge of the portfolio dealing with Justice. This  decision  was reiterated in Union of  India  v.  Jyoti Prakash  Mitter. (2) Although an argument was made that  the President  was guided in that case by the Minister  of  Home Affairs  and by the Prime Minister, it was repelled  by  the Court which, on the facts, found the decision to be that  of the  President himself and not of the Prime Minister or  the Home Minister.

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In  the  light  of the scheme of the  Constitution  we  have already   referred  to  it  is  doubtful  whether  such   an interpretation  as  to  the  personal  satisfaction  of  the President is correct.  We are of the view that (1)  [1965] 2 S.C.R. 53, 68. (2)  [1971] 3 S.C.R. 483. 873 the  President  means,  for  all  practical  purposes,   the Minister or the Council of Ministers as the case may be, and his  opinion, satisfaction or decision  is  constitutionally secured   when  his  Ministers  arrive  at.  such   opinion, satisfaction  or  decision.  The independence of  the  Judi- ciary, which is a cardinal principle of the Constitution and has  been relied on to justify the deviation, is guarded  by the  relevant  Article making consultation  with  the  Chief Justice  of  India  obligatory.  In  all  conceivable  cases consultation with that highest dignitary of Indian-. justice will  and should be accepted by the Government of India  and the  Court will have an opportunity to examine if any  other extraneous,  circumstances have entered into the verdict  of the  Minister, if he departs from the counsel given  by  the Chief Justice of India.  In practice the last word in such a sensitive subject must belong to the Chief Justice of India, the  rejection of his advice being ordinarily  regarded  as, prompted by oblique considerations vitiating the order.   In this  view  it is immaterial whether the  President  or  the Prime Minister or the Minister for Justice formally  decides the issue., In  Brundaban  Nayak  V,  Election  Commission  (1)  another Sensitive  situation  relating  to  the  functions  of   the President (Art. 103) and the Governor (Art. 192) arose.   It is   a   sacred  principle  of  our  democracy,   like   the independence  of  the  Judiciary,  that  decisions  on   the disqualifications   of  Members  of  Assemblies  should   be unbiased.   While formally the power to decide a dispute  in this  behalf  is vested in the President  and  the  Governor under Arts 103 and 192 respectively, it would be a  travesty of impartiality if such decision were to be made on the  aid and advice of a Ministry which is essentially chosen from  a party  or  combination  of parties.   How  can  a  political activist with party loyalty in our pluralistic society judge a  cause  in  which he has  deep,  concern.   Therefore  the Constitution  has  made  the Election  Commission  the  real arbiter  in the dispute, it being assumed that the  Election Commission  is free and fearless and unobliged to the  party in   power.   The  constitutional  mechanism  is  that   the President   (Govern,,   shall   refer   the   question    of disqualification of a member for the opinion of the Election Commission and shall act according to such opinion’, so that whether the right to decide is formally in the President  or is  to be exercised by the aid and advice of his  Ministers, it  is immaterial, since the actual adjudication has  always to  be  made  by the Election  Commission  which  binds  the Government and the President merely appends his signature to the  order  in  regard  to  such  decision.  in  this  view, Brundaban(2)  deals  with a special situation and  does  not affect  the  otherwise universal rule of the Head  of  State being  bound  to  act only in accordance with  the  aid  and advice of his Ministers. Gajendragadkar,  C. J., outlined the scheme relating to  the decision  about  the  disqualification  of  members  of  the Legislature, at p.60, thus::               "The  object  of  this  provision  (Art   192)               clearly  is  to  leave  it  to  the   Election               Commission  to decide the matter,  though  the

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             decision as such would formally be  pronounced               in the               (1)   [1965] 3 S.C.R. 53.               (2)   Constitutional Government in India-by M.               V. Pylee p. 770-1965 Edition--Asia  Publishing               House.               874               name  of  the  Governor.   When  the  Governor               pronounces his decision under Art. 192 (1), he               is  not  required to consult  his  Council  of               Ministers; he is not even required to consider               and  decide the matter himself; he has  merely               to  forward  the  question  to  the   Election               Commission for its opinion, and as soon as the               ;opinion  is received, he shall act  according               to  such  opinion’.  In regard  to  complaints               made  against the election of members  to  the               Legislative  Assembly,  the  jurisdiction   to               decide  such  Complaints  is  left  with   the               Election    Tribunal   under   the    relevant               provisions  of the Act.  That means  that  all               allegations  made challenging the validity  of               the  election of any member, have to be  tried               by  the Election Tribunals constituted by  the               Election Commission.  Similarly,all complaints               in  respect to disqualifications  subsequently               incurred  by  members who  have  been  validly               elected, have, in substance to be tried by the               Election  Commission, though the  decision  in               form has to be pronounced by the Governor." All  these add up to making a Sovereign who can  scotch  the Legislature,  rubberize  the  judiciary  and  overrule   the Cabinet.   One has only to case a glance at  similar  powers relating to the Governor to reach the same conclusion at the State  level,with  the additional fact or that an  ‘area  of discretionary  Power is expressly left to him.  What  is  of grave  import  is  that the Court  has  no  jurisdiction  to inquire  what advice has been given by the Ministers to  the President  or the Governor and thus the  effective  judicial check  on  exercise of power is also under eclipse.   If  we read  these  powers literally as personal’ to  the  Head  of State.  the  conclusion is rather disquieting in  a  country which  has already had a long night of  imperial  subjection and  monarchical  tradition.  Dr.  Ambedkar  expressed  this warning  in  the Constituent Assembly in  words  Which  have contemporary relevance:               "This  caution  is far more necessary  in  the               case  of India than, in the case of any  other               country.  For, in India, Bhakti or what may be               called   the   path  of  devotion   or   hero-               worship,plays.part  in its politics  unequaled               in magnitude by the part it plays in the poli-               tics  of  any  other  country  in  the  world.               Bhakti  in  religion  may be  a  road  to  the               salvation  or  the  soul.   But  in  politics,               Bhakti  or  hero-worship  is a  sure  road  to               degradation and eventual dictatorship. The  omnipotence  of the President and of  the  Governor  at State level is euphemistically inscribed in the pages of our Fundamental  Law  with the obvious intent  that  even  where express conferment of power or functions is written into the Articles,  such business has to redisposed of decisively  by the  Ministry answerable to the Legislature and  through  it vicariously  to the people, thus vindicating  our  democracy instead  of  surrendering it to a single summit  soul  whose

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deification is incompatible with the basis of our  political architecture lest national elections become Dead Sea fruits, legislative  organs  become labels full of  sound  and  fury signifying  nothing  and the Council of Ministers put  in  a quandary  of responsibility to the House of the  People  and submission to the personal decision of the Head of State.  A parliamentary  style  Republic  like  ours  could  not  have conceptualized its self-liquidation by this process. 875 on the contrary, democratic capital-formation to  strengthen the people’ rights can be achieved only through invigoration of the mechanism of Cabinet House Elections. Certainly, the key words of wide import in the fasciculus of Articles   relating  to  the  President  and  Governor   are functions’ (Arts. 74 & 163) and business’ and allocation  of portfolios,   rules   of  business  and  deice   nation   to subordinate officials are but the methodology of working out the  Cabinet process.  Long arguments on the  terminological niceties  of  the  various  provisions,  divorced  from  the essentials  of  parliamentary perspective, will land  us  in Himalayan’ constitutional blunders.  Similarly,  expressions like  is  satisfied’,  opinion’ as he  thinks  fit’,  if  it appears  to’  have to be interpreted by  super-imposing  the invisible  but very real presence of the Ministry  over  the Head of State. Before  we  conclude  on this part of  the  case  we  remind ourselves  that so long as the Constitution shall  endure-no one  can  say  how  long, each  generation  being  almost  a separate  nation this Court must exist with it, deciding  in the peaceful forms of forensic proceeding, the delicate  and dangerous  controversies  inter alia,  between  sub-soverei- gnties and citizens.  And the pronouncements of this  summit tribunal   being  law  under  Art.  141,  it   binds   until reinterpreted differently and competently.  But as Judges we have  solemnly  to  remind ourselves of  the  words  of  the historian of the U. S. Supreme Court, Mr. Charles Warren(1):               "However the Court interpret the provisions of               the Constitution, it is still the Constitution               which is the law and  not the decision of  the               Court." Nor  is Sardarilal(2)of such antiquity and moment  that  are versal  would  upset the sanctity of stare  decision.   Some rulings, even of the highest Court, when running against the current  of  case-and  the clear  stream  of  Constitutional thought, may have to fall into the same class as  restricted railroad ticket, goods for the day and train only, to  adopt the language of Justice Roberts ( Smith v. Alleright, 321 U. S. 649, 665). We declare the law of this branch of our Constitution to  be that the President and Governor, custodians of all executive and other powers under various Articles, shall, by virtue of these  provisions,  exercise  their  formal   constitutional powers only upon and in accordance with the advice of  their Ministers  save in a few well known exceptional  situations. Without  being  dogmatic  or  exhaustive,  these  situations relate to (a) the choice of Prime Minister (Chief  Minister) restricted   thought  his  choice.  is  by   the   paramount consideration that he should command majority in the  House; (b)  the  dismissal  of  a Government  which  has  lost  its majority  in the House but refuses to quit office;  (c)  the dissolution  of the House where an appeal to the country  is necessitous, although in this area the Head of State  should avoid  getting involved in politics and must be -advised  by his  Prime  Minister (Chief Minister) who.  will  eventually take the responsibility for the step.  We do not examine  in

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detail the constitutional proprieties in these  predicaments except to utter the (1)  The Supreme Court in United States History, III p. 470- 471 (1922). 876 caution  that even here the action must be compelled by  the peril  to  democracy and the appeal to the House or  to  the country  must become blatantly obligatory’ We have no  doubt that  de Smith’s statement (1) regarding royal assent  holds good for the President and Governor in India :               "  Refusal of the royal assent on  the  ground               that  the  monarch strongly disapproved  of  a               bill  or that it was  intensely  controversial               would  nevertheless be unconstitutional.   The               only  circunistances in which the  withholding               of the royal assent might be justifiable would               be  if  the Government itself were  to  advise                             such a courses highly improbable conti ngency-or               possibly  if it was notorious that a bill  had               been   passed   in  disregard   to   mandatory               procedural   requirements;   but   since   the               Government in the later situation would be  of               the  opinion  that  the  deviation  would  not               effect the validity of the measure once it had               been  assented to, prudence would suggest  the               giving of assent." So far as the appeals before us are concerned, the effect is that  there  is no infirmity in the impugned orders  on  the score  that the Governor has not himself pursued the  papers or passed the orders. The  second spinal issue in the ease, as earlier  indicated, bears  Oil fearless justice, another prominent creed of  our Constitution.   The  independence  of  the  Judiciary  is  a fighting faith of our founding document.  Since the days  of Lord Coke, judicial independence from executive control  has been   accomplished   in  England.   The  framers   of   our Constitution,  impressed by this example have fortified  the cherished  value  of  the  rule  of  law  by   incorporating provisions to insulate the judicature.  Justice becomes fair and  free  only if institutional immunity and  autonomy  are guaranteed (of course there are other dimensions to judicial independence  which  are important but  irrelevant  for  the present    discussion).    The   exclusion   of    executive interference  with the Subordinate Judiciary,  i.e.,  grass- roots  justice, can prove a teasing illusion if the  control over them is vested in two masters viz., the High Court  and the Government, the latter being otherwise stronger.   Some- times  a transfer could be more harmful than punishment  and discipline control by the High Court can also be  stultified by an appellate jurisdiction being vested in Government over the High Court’s administrative orders.  This constitutional perspective  informed  the framer of our  Constitution  when they  enacted  the  relevant  Articles,  233  to  237.   Any interpretation  of administrative jurisdiction of  the  High Court  over  its subordinate limbs must be  aglow  with  the thought that separation of the Executive from the  Judiciary is a cardinal principle of our Constitution.  However, we do not pursue this question further since in the-present  case, Government  has  agreed with and acted on the  High  Court’s recommendation’  and, moreover, the methodology of  conflict resolution,  when the view of the High Court is  unpalatable to  the  Executive,  falls to be directly  considered  in  a different set of pending appeals. (1)  Constitutional and Administrative Law-by S.A. de Smith-

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Penguin Books on Foundations of Law. 877 Nevertheless, we must refer to one aspect of the matter.  It is  nice on paper to invest disciplinary authority over  the subordinate  judiciary in the High Court.  But when  charges or  aspersions of corrupt practice or  incompetence  against the  members  of  the lower judiciary  are  brought  to  the Cognizance  of  the  High Court,  there  is  an  operational handicap.   Who  is  to investigate into the  truth  of  the allegations?  Is there a machinery at the exclusive disposal of  the High Court to probe into the primefacie veracity  of such  complaints?   It  is awkward and,  ineffectual  for  a superior  Judge, trained in formal procedures  and  weighing and  not  collecting evidence, to  undertake  the  sub-rosa, informal, extensive and technical job of investigation which demands a different kind of expertise.  At the same time  if the  police  are  permitted to check  upon  complaints,  the successful invasion of judicial independence is  inevitable. No Magistrate may function fearlessly if the prosecuting de- partment  may  also investigate against him.  It  is  indeed regrettable  that  this  sensitive side  of  the  issue  was overlooked  by  the  Punjab High  Court  when  it  requested Government to direct the Vigilance Commissioner to report on a member of the judicature.  The true intendment of judicial independence  is fulfilled not by declining  to  investigate into  delinquencies of judicial personnel nor by holding  an open  enquiry  by  a Judge which is a  poor  substitute  for collection  of  evidence but by creating  an  apparatus  for collecting  intelligence  and presenting evidence  which  is under  the complete control of the High Court.  This  is  no new idea but had been mooted in the 50s at an all-India  Law Minister’s  Conference but at least, now after such  a  long lapse of time, this felt want may be remedied. The  third  contention, argued elaborately  by  both  sides, turns  on the scope and sweep of Art. 311 in the  background of the rules framed under Art. 309 and the pleaser’ doctrine expressed  in  Art.  310.  The  two  probationers,  who  are appellants,  have contended that what purport to  be  simple terminations  of probation on the ground  of  unsuitability’ are really and in substance by way of punishment and falling short  of the rigorous prescriptions of Art. 311  (2),  they are  bad.  Their complaint is that penal  consequences  have been visited on them by the impugned orders and since even a probationer is protected by Art. 311 (2), in such situations the Court must void those orders.  Naturally, the  launching pad of the argument is Dhingra’s Case (supra).  In a  sense, Dhingra  is  the Manga Carta of the  Indian  civil  servant, although  it has spawned diverse judicial trends,  difficult to be disciplined into one single, simple, practical formula applicable  to termination of probation of freshens  and  of the  services of temporary employees.  The  Judicial  search has  turned  the focus on the discovery of  the  element  of punishment  in  the  order passed  by  Government.   If  the proceedings are disciplinary, the rule in Dhingra’s Case (1) is attracted.  But if the termination is innocuous and  does not  stigmatize  the probationer or temporary  servant,  the constitutional  shield  of Art. 311 is  unavailable.   In  a series of cases, the Court has wrestled with the problem  of devising  a principle or rule to determine  this  questions’ where    non-punitive   termination   of    probation    for unsuitability  ends  and  punitive  action  for  delinquency begins.  In Gopi Kishore (2) this Court ruled that where the State (1) A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 36. (2) A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 689.

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878 holds  an enquiry on the basis of Complaints  of  misconduct against  a  probationer or temporary servant,  the  employer must  be presumed to have abandoned his right  to  terminate sine   pliciter   and  to   have   undertaken   disciplinary proceedings bringing in its wake the protective operation of Art  311.  At  first flush, the  distinguishing  mark  would therefore  appear to be the holding of an inquiry  into  the complaints of misconduct Sinha C. J., observed :               "It  is true that, if the Government  came  to               the  conclusion that the respondent was not  a               fit  and proper person to hold a post  in  the               public  service  of the State, it  could  dis-               charge  him without holding any  enquiry  into               his alleged misconduct. Instead of taking that               easy  course,  the Government chose  the  more               difficult one of starting proceedings  against               him  and  of branding him as a  dishonest  and               incompetent  officer.   He had the  right,  in               those  circumstances, to insist upon the  pro-               tection of Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution."               The learned Chief Justice summarized the legal               position thus:               "1.  Appointment to a post on probation  gives               the  person so appointed no right to the  post               and  his services may be  terminated,  without               taking  recourse to the proceedings laid  down               in the relevant rules for dismissing a  public               servant. or removing him from service.               2.    The  termination  of  employment  of   a               person holding a post on probation without any               enquiry  whatsoever cannot be said to  deprive               him off any right to a post and is, therefore,               no punishment.               3.    But  if  instead of terminating  such  a               person’s  service  without  any  enquiry,  the               employer  chooses to hold an enquiry into  his               alleged   misconduct,  or   inefficiency,   or               foursome  similar reason, the  termination  of               servicers  by  way of punishment,  because  it               puts  a  stigma  on his  competence  and  thus               affects his future career.  In such a case, he               is entitled to the protection of Art. 311  (2)               of the Constitution.               4........               5.    But,  if the employer simply  terminates               the services of a probationer without  holding               an enquiry and without giving him a reasonable               chance  of showing cause against  his  removal               from  service, the probationary civil  servant               can  have no cause of action, even though  the               real  motive behind the removal  from  service               may have been that his employer thought him to               be unsuitable for the post he was  temporarily               holding,  on  account of  his  misconduct,  or               inefficiency, or some such cause." The  5th proposition states that the real motive behind  the removal is irrelevant and the holding of an enquiry  leaving an indelible stain as a consequence alone attracts Art.  311 (2)  Ram Narayan Das (1) dealt with a case where  the  rules under  the  proviso  to Art. 309 provided some  sort  of  an enquiry before termination of probation. in such (1)  A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 177. 879 a case, the enquiry test would necessarily break down and so

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the Court had to devise a different test.  Mr. Justice  Shah (as he then was) stated the rule thus :               "The  enquiry against the respondent  was  for               ascertaining   whether  he  was  fit   to   be               confirmed. The third proposition in  (the Gopi               Kishore)  case  refers  to  an  enquiry   into               allegations of misconduct or inefficiency with               a  view,  if they were found  established,  to               imposing  punishment  and not  to  an  enquiry               whether  a  probationer should  be  confirmed.               Therefore,  the fact of holding of an  enquiry               is  not  decisive of the  question.   What  is               decisive  is  whether the order is by  way  of               punishment,  in  the light of the  tests  laid               down in Purshottam lal Dhmgra’s Case." Thus  a  shift was made from the factum of enquiry   to  the object  of  the enquiry.  Madan Gopal (1)  found  the  Court applying the object of enquiry doctrine to a simple order of termination which had been pre     by  a show  cause  notice and enquiry. It was held that if the enquiry was intended to take traumatic action, the innocent phraseology of the order made  no  difference.  Then came Jagdish Mitter  v.Union  of India (2) where Mr. Justice Gajendragadkar (as he then  was) held               "No  doubt  the order purports to  be  one  of               discharge and, as such, can be referred to the               power  of  the  authority  to  terminate   the               temporary appointment with one month’s notice.               But it seems to us that when the order  refers               to  the  fact  that the  appellant  was  found               undesirable to be retained in Government  ser-               vice,  it  expressly  casts a  stigma  on  the               appellant  and in that sense, must be hold  to               be an order of dismissal and not a mere  order               of discharge." Thus  we see how memberanous distinctions have been  evolved between an enquiry merely to ascertain unsuitability and one held to punish the delinquent-to impractical and  uncertain, particularly  when we remember that the machinery  to  apply this delicate test is the administrator, untrained in  legal nuances.   The  impact  on  the  fired’  individual,  be  it termination  of probation or removal from service, is  often the  same.   Referring  to  the anomaly  of  the  object  of inquiry, test, Dr. Tripathi has pointed out (3)               "The object of inquiry’ rule discourages  this               fair  procedure  and the  impulse  of  justice               behind it by insisting that the order  setting               up the inquiry will be judicially  scrutinized               for the purpose of ascertaining the object  of               the inquiry." Again.  could  it  be  that if  you  summarily  pack  off  a probationer, the order is judicially inscrutable and  immune ?  If  you conscientiously seek to  satisfy  yourself  about allegations  by some sort of enquiry you get caught  in  the coils  of law, however harmlessly the order may be  phrased? And, so this sphinx-complex has had to give (1) A I.R. 1963 S.C. 531.     (2) A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 449. (3) Spotlights on     Constitutional  Interpretation-1972-N. M. Tripathi  Pvt.  Ltd., Bombay. 880 way in later cases.  In some cases the rule of guidance  has been  stated  to  be the substance of the  matter’  and  the foundation’  of the order.  When does motive’ trespass  into foundation’?  When do we lift the veil of form to touch  the substance’?   When  the  Course says  so.   Those  Freudian’

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frontiers  obviously  fail in the work-a-day world  and  Dr. Tripathi’s  observations  in this context  are  not  without force.  He says               "As  already explained, in a  situation  where               the order of termination purports to be a mere               order   of  discharge  without   stating   the               stigmatizing   results  of  the   departmental               enquiry  a  search for the  substance  of  the               matter’  will  be  indistinguishable  from   a               search   for  the  motive  (real,   unrevealed               object)  of the order.  Failure to  appreciate               this  relationship between motive  (the  real,               but unrevealed object) and from (the apparent,               or  officially revealed object in the  present               context  has  led to an  unreal  interplay  of               words   and  phrases  wherein   symbols   like               motive’, substance’ form or  direct parade  in               different  combinations without  communicating               precise situations or entities in the world of               facts." The need, in this branch of jurisprudence, is not so much to reach perfect justice but to lay down a plain test which the administrator  and  civil  servant  can  understand  without subtlety  and apply without difficulty.  After all,  between unsuitability’  and  misconduct’ thin  partitions  do  their bounds divide’.  And, over the years, in the rulings of this Court  the  accent has shifted, the canons have  varied  and predictability  has  proved difficult because  the  play  of legal light and shade has been baffling.  The learned  Chief Justice  has  in  his judgment,  tackled  this  problem  and explained  the rule which must govern the  determination  of the  question  as  to  when  termination  of  service  of  a probationer  can be said to amount to discharge  simpliciter and  when  it can be said to amount to punishment so  as  to attract the inhibition of Art.311. We are in agreement  with what the learned, Chief Justice has said in this connection. So far as the present case is concerned, it is clear on  the facts  set out in the judgment of the learned Chief  Justice that  there is breach of the requirements of Rule 7 and  the orders of termination passed against the appellants are,  on that account liable to be quashed and set a side. In  the result, we agree with the conclusion reached by  the learned  Chief Justice and concur in the order  proposed  by him. P.H.P. 881