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PETITIONER: SHAIK ABDUL AZEEZ

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF KARNATAKA

DATE OF JUDGMENT28/03/1977

BENCH: GOSWAMI, P.K. BENCH: GOSWAMI, P.K. CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. SHINGAL, P.N.

CITATION:  1977 AIR 1485            1977 SCR  (3) 393  1977 SCC  (2) 485  CITATOR INFO :  R          1978 SC1675  (114,223)

ACT:             Penal  Code (Act 45 of 1860), 1860,  section  303--Death         Sentence  for murder by life convict--Whether a person  sen-         tenced  to imprisonment for life and later released  by  the         Government  by  remission of sentence u/s. 401 of  the  .Cr.         P.C.,  ,1898 (1973 Code, s. 432) continues to  "being  under         sentence of imprisonment for life" for the purpose of s. 303         I. P.C.--Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, sec. 401 (1973 Code,         section 432)---Scope of.

HEADNOTE:             Section  303 I.P.C. lays down that "whoever being  under         sentence  of imprisonment for life  commits murder shall  be         punished  with  death".  The appellant, for the  offence  of         murder committed on December 3, 1959, had been convicted  on         July  26,  1961, by the High Court of Mysore  under  s.  302         I.P.C.  and sentenced to imprisonment for life in appeal  by         the  State against his acquittal. .The State Government,  in         exercise  of its power under s. 402 Cr.  P.C.  conditionally         remitted his sentence on February 8, 1972 and he was, there-         fore, conditionally released from jail on February 8,  1972.         The  two  conditions of the remission were that  during  the         unexpired period of his sentence conditionally remitted  (i)         he  will  not commit any offence punishable by  any  law  in         Mysore  and (ii) he will not in any way associate with  per-         sons   known to be of bad character or lead a  dissolute  or         immoral  life.  Even before the expiry of the first year  of         his. release., the appellant got himself involved on January         27, 1973, in another murder charge.  He was convicted  under         s. 302 read with s. 303 I P.C. by the Sessions Judge,  Kolar         on  November  7, 1974 and sentenced to death  under  s.  303         I.P.C.  On an appeal to the High Court which was heard along         with  the reference for confirmation, the sentence of  death         under  s.  302 I. P.C. was confirmed on November  19,  1975.         It  held that s. 303 I.P.C. was applicable. as this  was  In         case  of conditional remission under s. 401 Cr P.C. and  the         second  murder was committed during the  unexpired   portion         of the sentence of imprisonment for life.  This Court  while         granting  the  special leave limited it to the  question  of

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       applicability of s. 303 I.P.C. and the sentence.             Allowing the appeal parly and modifying the sentence  of         death to that of life imprisonment, the Court,            HELD:  (1) An accused cannot be under a sentence  of  im-         prisonment for life at the time of commission of the  second         murder  unless he is actually undergoing such a sentence  or         there is legally extant judicially a final sentence which he         is  bound  to serve without the requirement  of  a  separate         order to breathe life into the sentence which was  otherwise         dead on account of remission  under s. 401 Cr. P.C. [398  H,         399-A]            (2) The earlier sentence of imprisonment for life  became         final  and  inexor able so far as the judicial  process  was         concerned.   It is only when  such a sentence is  "operative         and executable that s. 303 I.P.C. a attracted. [395-C]             Dilip Kumar Sharma & Ors. State of Madhya Pradesh [1976]         (2) SCR 289, referred to.             (3) Section 303 I.P.C. is applicable only to an  accused         who  on  the date of ,commission of the  second  offence  of         murder had earlier committed a murder for which his  convic-         tion and sentence of imprisonment for life were beyond judi-         cial controversy and operative.  [399-A]             (4)  Unlike in the case of s. 75. LP.C., s.  303  I.P.C.         does  not contemplate a mere enhanced punishment for a  con-         vict  with  a  past criminal history for  the  same  offence         Section 303 I.P.C. creates a most aggregated form of offence         when,  committed by a person under sentence of  imprisonment         for life to be punished only with death, the maximum penalty         under the law.  The true effect         394         of  s. 303, I.P.C. is that if the accused was continuing  to         be under the sentence of imprisonment for life on the day of         the  second  murder the court cannot come to his  rescue  by         exercising discretionary clemency in favour of the  alterna-         tive   sentence.  The only sentence the court has power  and         is obliged to impose and no other is the sentence of  death.         [399 B-C]          (5)  A  person must be actually and irrevocably  the  lifer         beyond  the  pale  of judicial controversy at  the  time  of         commission   controversy of the second offence of murder  to         be vitiated with a penalty of death under s. 303 I.P.C.   If         the  sentence of a convict had already been remitted at  the         time  of commission of the second murder, he would cease  to         be an actual lifer to come within the lethal clamp of s. 303         I.P.C. [399-C]             (6)  For the purpose of s. 303 I.P.C. there, can  be  no         warrant  for introducing a legal fiction of being deemed  to         be  under  a  sentence of imprisonment for  .life.   In  the         instant  case  the appellant is not  liable  for  conviction         under s. 303 I.P.C. [399-D]          Sohan  Singh v. State [1965] (1) ILR 181 Punjab 201,  over-         ruled.          (7) Section 401(3) makes it clear that for the purpose.  of         s.  303 I.P.C., it does not make any difference whether  the         remission  under s. 401 Cr. P.C. is with or  without  condi-         tions. [396-F]          Po  Kun v. King AIR 1939 Rangoon 124; Sogan Singh v.  State         [1965]  ILR 181 Punjab 201; Gulam Mohammad Wali Mohammad  v.         Emperor AIR 1943 Sind 114 and Sarat Chandra Rabha & Ors.  v.         Kagendranath & Ors. [1961](2) SCR 133, referred to.            (8) Section 401(3) leaves it to the option of the Govern-         ment  to  take the penal action and there  is  no  automatic         return of the  prisoner to the jail on breach of any  condi-         tion of the remission.  It will certainly  be  open  to  the         Government in a particular case to cancel the remission  but

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       it may not.  The Government is not under a legal  obligation         to  cancel  the remission.  It is only when  the  Government         chooses to pass an order of cancellation of the remission of         sentence  that  the convict is arrested and is  required  to         serve  the  unexpired portion of the sentence.   During  the         interval  the accused who is released cannot be said to  be,         under  a sentence of imprisonment for life while. he. is  in         enjoyment  of  the freedom on account  of  remission.   That         period is not even  reckoned under s. 401 Cr.  P.C. for  the         purpose of  calculation of the  sentence to be served in the         eventuality. [397 B-C, E]

JUDGMENT:             CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No 592/         1976.             (Appeal  by Special Leave from the Judgment  and   Order         dated 19.11.1975 of the Karnataka High Court in Crl. A.  No.         551 of 1974. and Reference Case No. 56/74)                R.B. Datar, for the appellant                Narayan Nettar and R.C. Kaushik, for the respondent.                The Judgement of the Court was delivered by             GOSWAMI,  J. The short question in this. appeal by  spe-         cial leave is whether a person sentenced to imprisonment for         life  and later released by the Government by  remission  of         the  sentence  under section 401, Criminal  Procedure  Code,         1898, continues to "being under sentence of imprisonment for         life" fort the purpose of section. 303, Indian Penal Code.             The  appellant  had earlier been convicted on  July  26,         1961, by the High Court of Mysore under section 302 IPC  and         sentenced  to.  imprisonment for life in an  appeal  by  the         State against his acquittal.         395             The  earlier murder was on December 3, 1959.  The  State         Government  in exercise of its power under section  401  Cr.         P.C.  conditionally  remitted his sentence  on  Feburary  8,         1972. Thus he was conditionally released from jail on  Febu-         rary  8, 1972.  Tragically enough, on January 27, 1973,  the         appellant got himself involved in the present murder  charge         even before the expiry of the first year of his release.  He         was convicted under section 302 and  section 303  IPC by the         Sessions Judge, Kolar, on November 7, 1974 and sentenced  to         death  under  section  303 IPC.  On an appeal  to  the  High         Court by the appellant which was heard along with the refer-         ence for confirmation, .the sentence of death under  section         303  IPC  was confirmed on November 19,  1976.   Hence  this         appeal  by   special leave  limited to the question  of  ap-         plicability of section 303 IPC and the sentence.            The  earlier  sentence of imprisonment for  life   became         final  and  inexorable so far as the  judicial  process  was         concerned.   It is only when such a sentence  is  "operative         and  executable"  that section 303 IPC  is  attracted.  (See         Dilip Kumar Sharrna & Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1).             The  remission  of the sentence in this case is  by  the         State of Karnataka in exercise of its statutory power  under         section  401 Cr. P.C. .The power has been exercised, in  the         instant  case,  laying  down certain  conditions  which  the         convict had accepted.  The two conditions were that,  during         the unexpired period of his sentence conditionally remitted,         (1 ) he will not commit any offence punishable by any law in         Mysore  and (2 ) he will not in any way associate with  per-         sons  known to. be of bad character or lead a  dissolute  or         evil life.         The  portion of the remitted sentence, in this  case, was  a

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       period of four years and four months after the appellant had         undergone  over   years of his sentence including  a  little         over  five years’ remission earned by him in jail.   In  the         normal  course,  in absence of the order of  remission,  the         appellant would have been released from jail on June 1976.         Shortly stated, was the appellant under sentence of  impris-         onment  for  life on the date of occurrence  of  the  second         murder  on  January 27, 1973 ?  If he was continuing  to  be         under the sentence of imprisonment for life on that day  the         court cannot come to his rescue by exercising  discretionary         clemency  in favour of the  alternative sentence.  Then  the         only sentence the court has power and is obliged to  impose,         and  no other, is the sentence of death.  That is  the  true         effect of section 303 IPC.  The fact that the accused is  of         the  age  of 73 years will be of no consequence once  he  is         found  guilty  under  section 303 IPC.  The  court  will  be         helpless in such an event.              The Sessions Judge as well as the High Court held  that         section 303 IPC was applicable as this was a case of  condi-         tional  remission under section 401 Cr. P.C. and the  second         murder  was  committed during the unexpired portion  of  the         sentence of imprisonment for life.         (1) [1976] 2 S.C.R. 289.         396             It is the correctness of the above view of the law  that         falls  for  consideration  before us.   That  view  receives         support from the following decisions cited at the bar.             The first decision is from the Rangoon High Court in  Po         Kun v. The King(1).  It was held in that case that--                             "if  the sentence of transportation  for                       life  passed   on  a person  is  conditionally                       remitted  by the  Government  under s.  403  ?                       Criminal  P.C., and the person  is   released,                       such person must still be deemed to be  under,                       sentence  of transportation for life in  spite                       of  the  fact that he is  not  actually  under                       sentence or in a penal settlement".          0             The next decision is from the Punjab High Court in Sohan         Singh v. The State(2).  It was held in that case that--                             "it is not  essential for the   applica-                       tion  of the  section (303 IPC) that a  person                       should be actually undergoing the sentence  of                       imprisonment for life when he commits murder".                       X           X              X        X                             "   ......  the effect of a  conditional                       order  of remission is not to altogether  wipe                       out  or  efface the remitted  portion  of  the                       sentence,  but  to. keep it in  abeyance.   As                       soon  as there is breach of the conditions  of                       the remission, the remission can be  cancelled                       and  the  prisoner  committed  to  custody  to                       undergo the unexpired portion of the sentence.                       In  the circumstances. the accused  should  be                       deemed  to be under sentence  of  imprisonment                       for  life  when the  present  occurrence  took                       place".             Our attention was drawn to a decision Of the Sind  Court         in Ghularn Muhammad Wali Muhammad v. Emperor(3) which was  a         case  of unconditional remission of the sentence under  sec-         tion  401 Cr. P.C. It was held in that decision  that  since         the Provincial Government had ’remitted the sentence without         condition under section 401 Cr. P.C. the accused  committing         the  second  murder after the remission would no  longer  be         said  to  be "under a sentence of transportation  for  life,

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       that sentence having in effect been served".             We are, however, clearly of opinion that for the purpose         of  section 303 IPC it does not make any difference  whether         the  remission  under section 401 Cr. P.C. with  or  without         conditions.   This: is clear from a perusal  of  sub-section         (3) of section 401 Cr. P.C. which, reads as follows :--                             401  (3)  "If any condition on  which  a                       sentence has been suspended or remitted, is in                       the opinion of the appropriate Government, not                       fulfilled,  the  appropriate  Government   may                       cancel the suspension or remission and  there-                       upon the person                       (1) A.I.R. 1939 Rangoon 124.                       (2) [1965] I.L.R. 18 (1) Punjab 201.                       (3) A.I.R. 1943 Sind 114.                       397                       in whose favour the sentence has been suspend-                       ed or remitted, may, if at large, be  arrested                       by  any  police officer  without  warrant  and                       remanded  to undergo the unexpired portion  of                       the sentence".          0             It  is manifest from the above provision that on  breach         of any condition of the remission there is not an  automatic         revival of the sentence.  It will certainly be open to.  the         Government in a particular case to cancel the remission  but         it may not.  The Government is not under a legal  obligation         to  cancel the remission.  It is only when  the   Government         chooses to pass an order of cancellation of the remission of         sentence  that  the convict is arrested and is  required  to         serve  the  unexpired portion of the sentence.   During  the         interregnum.  the accused who is released cannot be-said  to         be  under a sentence of imprisonment for life.  While he  is         in  enjoyment of the freedom on account of  remission,  that         period  is not even reckoned under section 401 Cr. P.C.  for         the purpose of calculation of the sentence to. be served  in         the eventuallty.             Take  the  present case.  Suppose during  the  unexpired         period  of this sentence, which would had normally ended  on         January 9, 1976, the accused made breach of the first condi-         tion  of the remission giving a slap to a person an  offence         punishable  under   section   358 IPC. Clearly  there  is  a         breach of one of the conditions laid down, namely, that  "he         will  not  commit  any  offence punishable  by  any  law  in         Mysore". Can it be conceived that in such a case the Govern-         ment will immediately cancel the remission and remand him to         serve  the remaining period of his sentence of  imprisonment         for  life ? That is why section 401 (3) Cr.  P.C.  advisedly         leaves it to the option of the Government to take the  penal         action  and there is no automatic return of the prisoner  to         the jail.             Counsel for the State of Karnataka relies upon the above         decisions and also upon the decision of this Court in  Sarat         Chandra  Rabha  and  Others   v.   Khagendranath  Nath   and         Others(1).   In  Sarat Chandra Rabha case (supra) the  ques-         tion  of remission under section 401  Cr. P.C. came  up  for         consideration  in the context of a  disqualification  clause         under section 7(b) of the Representation of the People  Act,         1951.   In  that case the appellant’s nomination  paper  was         rejected by the Returning Officer for incurring  disqualifi-         cation  under  section  7(b) of the  Representation  of  the         People Act.  According to section 7(b) of the Act, a  person         shall  be  disqualified for being chosen  as   a  member  of         either House of Parliament or of the Legislative Assembly or         Legislative  Council  of a State if he is convicted   by   a

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       court  in India of any offence and sentenced to imprisonment         for not less than two years, unless a period of five  years,         or such less period. as the Election Commission may allow in         any  particular case, has elapsed., since his  release.   It         was  admitted in that case that the appellant was  convicted         under   section  4(b)  of the Explosive Substances Act,  (VI         of 1908) and  sentenced to  three years’  rigorous   impris-         onment on  July  10, 1953 and the nomination paper was filed         (1) [1961] 2 S.C.R. 133.         398         in   January 1957  and the  election  was  held in  Feburary         1957  Thus  the period of five years had not  elapsed  since         iris  release  by the, State under section 401 Cr.  P.C.  on         November  14,  1954.    This Court held in  that  case  that         section  401  Cr. P.C., unlike the grant of a  free  pardon,         cannot  wipe out either the conviction or the sentence.  and         affirmed  the order of rejection of the nomination paper  on         the  ground of disqualification incurred under section  7(b)         of the Representation the People Act.               Mr. Nettar for the State emphasises upon the  observa-         tion of this Court in Sarat Chandra Rabha case (supra)  that         there is no wiping out of the conviction and sentence  under         section 401 Cr. P.C. in the present case and, therefore, the         present appellant’s.  conviction  and sentence subsisted  on         the date of the second  murder.               In Sarat Chandra Rabha case (supra), this Court had to         consider  the effect of remission vis-a-vis a  disqualifica-         tion clause under an Act which even provides for removal  of         disqualification  by the Election Commission and  which  was         not  actually  done.  There is a  complete  purging  process         provided  in the Representation of the People Act itself  by         an  efflux of a period of five years from release on  expiry         of  the  sentence.  Conviction and sentence  recorded  by  a         judicial  court cannot be wiped out by  executive  remission         under  section  401 Cr. P.C. in order to set at  naught  the         penitentiary  period provided for in the Act, in absence  of         removal  of the disqualification by the Election  Commission         under the Act.  Those were the considerations which  weighed         with  this Court when it refused to do away with the  effect         of the judicial conviction and sentence merely on the  basis         of  executive  remission.   Even if the  sentence  were  run         through  without remission, the five years,’ period  had  to         elapse for commencement of new electoral life.  The  facturn         of conviction and the sentence is sufficient and it does not         matter whether it has been served out wholly or a portion of         it  has  been remitted.  The person  remains  convicted  and         sentenced  for  the  purpose of the  Representation  of  the         People  Act notwithstanding the remission.  The decision  in         Sarat  Chandra Rabha ’case (supra) does not at  all  support         the submission that even after remission of the sentence the         convict  therein  was under a sentence of  imprisonment.  No         such  Corollary  follows flora the above  decision  of  this         Court.               The observations of this Court in Sarat Chandra  Rabha         case  (supra)  with regard to wiping out of  conviction  and         sentence cannot be pressed too far in a criminal trial where         the provisions of the penal section have to be very strictly         construed  and  in case of ambiguity or possibility  of  two         views  the benefit of construction must be in favour of  the         accused.               To revert, at the end, to the only question with which         we started. Was the appellant under sentence of imprisonment         for  life  during the unexpired period of  his  imprisonment         conditionally remitted under 1 section 401 Cr. P.C.?  We are         clearly  of opinion that an accused cannot be under  a  sen-

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       tence of imprisonment for life at the time of commission  of         the  second murder unless he is actually undergoing  such  a         sentence  or  there  is legally extant  a  judicially  final         sentence         399         which   he  is  bound  to  serve  without   the  requirement         of  a separate order to breathe life into the sentence which         was  otherwise dead on account of  remission  under  section         401  Cr.P.C.  Section 303 IPC is applicable only to  an  ac-         cused  who, on the date of commission of the second  offence         of  murder,  had  earlier committed a murder for  which  his         conviction  and  sentence  of  imprisonment  for  life  were         beyond judicial controversy and were operative.             Unlike  in  the case of section 75, Indian  Penal  Code,         section 303 IPC does not contemplate a mere enhanced punish-         ment for a convict with a past criminal history for the same         offence.  Section 303 IPC creates a most aggravated form  of         offence when committed by a person under sentence of impris-         onment for life to be punished only with death, the  maximum         penalty under the law.  A person must be actually and irrev-         ocably  a lifer beyond the pale of judicial  controversy  at         the time of commission of the second offence of murder to be         visited with the penalty of death under section 303 IPC.  If         the  sentence of a convict had already been remitted at  the         time of commission of the second murder he would cease to be         an  actual lifer to come within the lethal clamp of  section         303 IPC.  For the purpose  of  section 303 IPC there can  be         no  warrant for introducing a legal fiction of being  deemed         to be under a sentence of imprisonment for life.  The  deci-         sion  of the Punjab High Court in Sohan Singh case  (supra);         with  respect, is not correct.  We are also,  with  respect,         unable  to agree with the view of the Rangoon High Court  in         Po Kun case (supra).             We find from the judgement of the trial court as well as         that  of the High Court that if the appellant were not  con-         victed under section 303 IPC, a sentence of death would  not         have been’ imposed on him.  For the reasons set out  earlier         we  are clearly of opinion that the appellant is not  liable         for  conviction  under section 303 IPC and his  sentence  of         death  is, therefore, set aside.  The judgment and order  of         the  High Court are set aside to that extent.   The   appel-         lant,   however, stands convicted under section 302 IPC  and         is sentenced to imprisonment for life.  The appeal is partly         allowed with the above modification of the sentence.         S.R.                             Appeal allowed in part.         11--436SC1/77         400