REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.  2543     OF 2009 [Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 23441 of 2007]

Seth Ramdayal Jat …Appellant

Versus

Laxmi Prasad …Respondent

J U D G M E N T  

S.B. SINHA, J :

1. Leave granted.

2. What would be the period of limitation for institution of a suit  for

recovery of ‘pledged ornaments’ is the question involved herein.   

3. It arises in the following factual matrix:

On or about 26.06.1998, the respondent filed a civil suit against the

appellant for recovery of certain items of jewellery allegedly pledged with

him on 2.12.1987 for the purpose of obtaining loan of a sum of Rs. 7000/-.

 On the premise that the appellant had violated the provisions of the

Madhya  Pradesh  Money  Lenders  Act,  1934  in  relation  to  the

aforementioned grant of loan, a criminal proceeding was initiated against

him, which was marked as Case No. 511 of 1997.  In the said criminal case,

he admitted his guilt.  A fine of Rs. 150/- was imposed on him.  The charge

was read over to him, which reads as under:

“The  charge  on  you  is  that  before  date  29.3.97 complainant  Laxmi  Prasad  was  paid  borrowed money  to  you  but  even  after  that  you  were demanding  interest  at  5%.   Your  this  act  is criminal  offence  under  section  3,  4  of  Money Lenders  Act.   Therefore,  show cause  as  to  why you should not be held guilty of the said offence.”

4. Respondent  thereafter,  as  noticed  hereinbefore,  filed  the

aforementioned Civil Suit before the XIVth Civil Judge, Class II, Jabalpur

being civil suit No. 4-A/1998 for recovery of the pledged jewellery.  The

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said suit was decreed directing the appellant to return the said jewellery or

in the alternative a decree for a sum of Rs. 20,000/-.   

5. Aggrieved  by and dissatisfied  therewith  the  appellant  preferred  an

appeal  thereagainst.   The said  appeal  was allowed by the learned XVIth

Additional District Judge, Jabalpur, holding:

(i) The judgment of the criminal court rendered on the basis of the

purported  admission  of  guilt  made  by  the  appellant  was  not

admissible in evidence.

(ii) An admission of the guilt on the basis of a wrong legal advice is

not binding on the appellant.   

(iii) The suit was barred in terms of Article 70 of the Limitation Act.

6. The  second  appeal  preferred  by  the  respondent  herein  has  been

allowed by the High Court by reason of the impugned judgment.

The  High  Court  formulated  the  following  substantial  questions  of

law:

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“1. Whether the suit filed by the appellant was barred by limitation while the suit was filed within 3 years from the date of demand and refusal by the respondent? 2. Whether the admission of guilt  in criminal case  in  respect  of  some  transaction  made  by respondent is admissible in the present case to the extent of fact that  there was transaction between the parties?”

By reason of the impugned judgment, the High Court opined that the

suit had been filed within the prescribed period of limitation having been

brought  within  a  period  of  three  years  from the  date  of  refusal  of  the

demand to  return  the  pledged  ornaments.   The  question  No.  2  was  also

determined in favour of the respondent holding that admission of guilt in a

criminal case would be admissible in evidence being relevant to the fact in

issue.

7. Mr.  Anurag  Sharma,  learned  counsel  appearing  on  behalf  of  the

appellant would urge:

(i) The alleged pledge of jewellery having admittedly been made in

the year 1987 and the suit filed on 26.06.1998, the same must be

held to be barred by limitation.

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(ii) No document of pledge having been produced, service of notice

by itself cannot give rise to a cause of action for filing a suit for

recovery of the pledged ornaments.

8. Mr.  Rohit  Arya, learned senior  counsel  appearing on behalf  of  the

respondent, on the other hand, would contend:

(i) in  view of Article  70 of  the  Limitation  Act,  1963,  the  suit  has

rightly  been  found to  have been instituted  within  the  period  of

limitation.   

(ii) Having regard to  the  provisions  contained in  Section  43 of  the

Indian  Evidence  Act,  the  judgment  of  the  criminal  court  was

admissible in evidence.

(iii) In terms of Section 58 of the Indian Evidence Act, things admitted

need not be proved.  The suit filed by the respondent has rightly

been decreed.   

9. Before adverting to the rival contentions of the parties raised before

us, we may notice that the purported pledge of jewellery was made by the

respondent herein for taking a loan of Rs. 7,000/- on 2.12.1987.  Appellant

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indisputably is a money lender.  A criminal case for charging excess interest

was  instituted  against  him on  29.03.1997.   On  or  about  29.11.1997,  he

pleaded guilty by reason whereof a fine of Rs. 150/- was imposed on him.   

Respondent thereafter served a notice upon the appellant asking him

to return the pledged jewellery.  As neither the said noticed was replied to

nor the jewellery was returned, he filed the suit on 26.06.1998.   

10. The cause of  action  for  filing  the suit  was  stated  in  para  3  of  the

plaint, which reads as under:

“3. The plaintiff through counsel sent registered notice  dated  12.5.98  and  demanded  the  pledged jewels.   Still  the  defendant  has  not  returned  the jewels of the plaintiff.  Therefore, this suit is being preferred.   The  aforesaid  notice  sent  by  the counsel  of  the  plaintiff  was  received  by  the defendant on 14.5.98.”

11. Respondent examined himself as a witness in the suit.  He stated that

the appellant being his cousin brother, no document was executed.  He also

testified that in the criminal case, appellant having admitted his crime and

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pledge of jewellery with him, a fine of Rs. 150/- was imposed and on in

default thereof, imprisonment of five days was ordered.

12. Indisputably,  the  judgment  in  the  criminal  case  was  marked  as  an

exhibit.  Appellant also in his deposition stated as under:

“…This is correct that plaintiff filed a complaint against me before police and case was registered. This is also correct  that I confessed upon advise from my advocate.  This is correct that fine of Rs. 150/-  was  imposed  on me in  that  case.   This  is correct that I do the money lending.”

He admitted that even one Chandra Kumar had borrowed money from

him.   

It  was  furthermore  admitted  by  him  that  he  received  the  notice

(Exhibit P1) from the plaintiff but he had not replied thereto.

13. Indisputably, the law relating to the admissibility of a judgment in a

criminal  proceedings  vis-à-vis  the  civil  proceedings  and  vice-versa  is

governed by the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act.

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14. Section 43 of the Indian Evidence Act reads, thus:

“43. Judgments,  etc.,  other than those mentioned in  Sections  40,  41  and  42,  when  relevant  - Judgments,  orders  or  decrees  other  then  those mentioned in Sections 40, 41 and 42 are irrelevant, unless  the  existence  of  such  judgment,  order  or decree, is a fact in issue, or is relevant,  under some other provision of this Act.”

In terms of the aforementioned provision, the judgment in a criminal

case shall be admissible provided it is a relevant fact in issue.   

Its admissibility otherwise is limited.   

It was so held in  Anil Behari Ghosh v.  Smt. Latika Bala Dassi and

others [AIR 1955 SC 566] in the following terms:

“The learned counsel for the contesting respondent suggested that it had not been found by the lower appellate  court  as  a  fact  upon  the  evidence adduced in this case, that  Girish was the nearest agnate of the testator or that Charu had murdered his adoptive father, though these matters had been assumed as facts. The courts below have referred to  good  and  reliable  evidence  in  support  of  the

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finding that Girish was the nearest reversioner to the estate of the testator. If the will is a valid and genuine  will,  there  is  intestacy in  respect  of  the interest  created in favour of Charu if he was the murderer  of  the  testator.  On  this  question  the courts  below  have  assumed  on  the  basis  of  the judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the High Court in the sessions trial that Charu was the murderer.  Though that  judgment is  relevant  only to show that there was such a trial resulting in the conviction and sentence of Charu to transportation for life,  it  is  not evidence of the fact  that Charu was the murderer. That question has to be decided on evidence.”

In  Perumal v.  Devarajan and others [AIR 1974 Madras 14],  it  was

held:

“2. Even at the outset, I want to state that the view of the lower appellate court that the plaintiff has  not  established  satisfactorily  that  the  first defendant  or  the  second  defendant  or  both  were responsible  for  the  theft  is  perverse  and  clearly against  the evidence and the legal position.  The lower appellate Court refused to rely on Exhibit A- 3 which is a certified copy of the judgment in C.C. No.  1949  of  1965.   It  is  true  that  the  evidence discussed  in  that  judgment  and the  fact  that  the first  defendant  had  confessed  his  guilt  in  his statement is not admissible in evidence in the suit. But it is not correct to state that even the factum that  the  first  and  the  second  defendants  were charged under Sections 454,  and 380, I.P.C. and they were convicted on those charges could not be admitted.  The order of the Criminal Court is, in

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my  opinion,  clearly  admissible  to  prove  the conviction  of  the first  defendant  and the  second defendant  and  that  is  the  only  point  which  the plaintiff had to establish in this case…”

A similar issue is dealt in some details in  Lalmuni Devi and Ors. v.

Jagdish Tiwary and Ors. [AIR 2005 Patna 51] wherein it was held:

“14.  Relying  on  the  judgment  of  the  Supreme Court  in  Anil  Behari  Ghosh v. Smt. Latika Bala Dassi and Ors., (supra), a Division Bench of this Court in its judgment reported in 1968 BLJR 197, Mundrika Kuer v. President, Bihar State Board of Religious  Trusts,  and 8 others,  has laid  down to the same effect. Paragraph 7 of the judgment is set out  hereinbelow  for  the  facility  of  quick reference :- "7. It is true that, if the Board acted capriciously and  arbitrarily  without  any  material  whatsoever and attempts to administer private property, saying that  it  is  a public  religious  trust,  this  Court  may have to interfere in appropriate cases; but it cannot be  said  here  that  there  were  no  prima  facie materials  to  show  that  the  trust  is  a  public religious  trust.  The  acquittal  of  the  petitioner  in the  criminal  case  (Annexure-A)  was  very  much relied upon; but it is well settled that acquittal or conviction  in  a criminal  case has  no evidentiary value in a subsequent civil litigation except for the limited purpose of showing that there was a trial resulting . in acquittal  or conviction,  as  the case may be.  The  findings  of  the  criminal  Court  are inadmissible.”

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15. A  judgment  in  a  criminal  case,  thus,  is  admissible  for  a  limited

purpose.  Relying only on or on the basis thereof, a civil proceeding cannot

be determined,  but  that  would not  mean that  it  is  not  admissible for any

purpose whatsoever.   

16. Mr. Sharma also relies upon a decision of this Court in Shanti Kumar

Panda v. Shakuntala Devi [(2004) 1 SCC 438] to contend that a judgment of

a civil court shall be binding on the criminal court but the converse is not

true.  Therein it was held:

“(3) A decision by a criminal court does not bind the civil court while a decision by the civil court binds the criminal court.  An order passed by the Executive  Magistrate  in  proceedings  under Sections  145/146  of  the  Code  is  an  order  by  a criminal  court  and that  too based on a summary enquiry. The order is entitled to respect and wait before  the  competent  court  at  the  interlocutory stage. At the stage of final adjudication of rights, which would be on the evidence adduced before the court, the order of the Magistrate is only one out of several pieces of evidence.”

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With respect, the ratio laid down therein may not be entirely correct

being in conflict with a Three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in  K.G.

Premshanker vs. Inspector of Police and anr. [(2002) 8 SCC 87].

17. A  civil  proceeding  as  also  a  criminal  proceeding  may  go  on

simultaneously.  No statute puts an embargo in relation thereto.  A decision

in a criminal case is not binding on a civil court.

In M.S. Sheriff & Anr. v. State of Madras & Ors. [AIR 1954 SC 397],

a Constitution Bench of this Court was seized with a question as to whether

a civil suit or a criminal case should be stayed in the event both are pending.

It was opined that the criminal matter should be given precedence.  

In regard to the possibility of conflict in decisions, it was held that the

law envisages such an eventuality when it expressly refrains from making

the decision of one Court binding on the other, or even relevant, except for

certain limited purposes, such as sentence or damages.  It was held that the

only relevant consideration was the likelihood of embarrassment.

If a primacy is given to a criminal proceeding, indisputably, the civil

suit must be determined on its own keeping in view the evidence which has

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been brought on record before it and not in terms of the evidence brought in

the criminal proceeding.   

The question came up for consideration in K.G. Premshanker (supra),

wherein this Court inter alia held:

“30. What emerges from the aforesaid discussion is — (1) the previous judgment which is final can be relied upon as provided under Sections 40 to 43 of the Evidence Act; (2) in civil suits between the same parties, principle of  res judicata may apply; (3)  in  a criminal  case,  Section  300 CrPC makes provision  that  once  a  person  is  convicted  or acquitted, he may not be tried again for the same offence  if  the  conditions  mentioned  therein  are satisfied;  (4)  if  the  criminal  case  and  the  civil proceedings  are for the same cause,  judgment of the civil court would be relevant if conditions of any of Sections 40 to 43 are satisfied, but it cannot be said that the same would be conclusive except as  provided  in  Section  41.  Section  41  provides which  judgment  would  be  conclusive  proof  of what is stated therein.

31. Further, the judgment, order or decree passed in  a  previous  civil  proceeding,  if  relevant,  as provided  under  Sections  40  and  42  or  other provisions of the Evidence Act then in each case, the court has to decide to what extent it is binding or conclusive with regard to the matter(s) decided therein. Take for illustration, in a case of alleged trespass by  A on  B’s property,  B filed a suit  for declaration  of  its  title  and  to  recover  possession from  A and  suit  is  decreed.  Thereafter,  in  a criminal prosecution by  B against  A for trespass, judgment  passed  between  the  parties  in  civil proceedings would be relevant and the court may

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hold  that  it  conclusively  establishes  the  title  as well as possession of B over the property. In such case,  A may  be  convicted  for  trespass.  The illustration  to  Section  42  which is  quoted  above makes the position clear. Hence, in each and every case,  the  first  question  which  would  require consideration  is  —  whether  judgment,  order  or decree is relevant, if relevant — its effect. It may be relevant for a limited purpose, such as, motive or as a fact in issue. This would depend upon the facts of each case.

It is,  however, significant to notice a decision of this Court in  M/s

Karam Chand Ganga Prasad & Anr. etc. v. Union of India & Ors. [(1970) 3

SCC 694], wherein it was categorically held that the decisions of the civil

court will be binding on the criminal courts but the converse is not true, was

overruled, stating:

“33. Hence, the observation made by this Court in V.M. Shah case that the finding recorded by the criminal  court  stands  superseded  by  the  finding recorded  by  the  civil  court  is  not  correct enunciation  of  law.  Further,  the  general observations  made  in  Karam Chand  case are  in context of the facts of the case stated above. The Court  was  not  required  to  consider  the  earlier decision of the Constitution Bench in M.S. Sheriff case as well as Sections 40 to 43 of the Evidence Act.”

[See also  Syed Askari  Hadi Ali  Augustine Imam and Anr. v.  State

(Delhi Admn.) and Anr. 2009 (3) SCALE 604]

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Another  Constitution  Bench  of  this  Court  had  the  occasion  to

consider the question in Iqbal Singh Marwah & Anr. v. Meenakshi Marwah

& Anr.   [(2005)  4  SCC 370].   Relying  on  M.S.  Sheriff  (supra)  as  also

various other decisions, it was categorically held:

“32. Coming to the last contention that an effort should  be  made  to  avoid  conflict  of  findings between  the  civil  and  criminal  courts,  it  is necessary to point  out  that  the standard of proof required  in  the  two  proceedings  are  entirely different. Civil  cases are decided on the basis of preponderance  of  evidence  while  in  a  criminal case the entire burden lies on the prosecution and proof beyond reasonable doubt has to be given.”

The  question  yet  again  came up  for  consideration  in  P.  Swaroopa

Rani v. M. Hari Narayana @ Hari Babu [AIR 2008 SC 1884], wherein the

law was stated, thus :

“13.  It  is,  however,  well-settled that  in  a given case, civil proceedings and criminal proceedings can proceed simultaneously. Whether civil proceedings or criminal proceedings shall be stayed depends upon the fact and circumstances of each case.”

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18. It is now almost well-settled that, save and except for Section 43 of

the Indian Evidence Act which refers to Sections 40, 41, and 42 thereof, a

judgment of a criminal court shall not be admissible in a civil suit.

19. What,  however,  would  be  admissible  is  the  admission  made  by a

party  in  a  previous  proceeding.   The  admission  of  the  appellant  was

recorded in writing.  While he was deposing in the suit, he was confronted

with the question as to whether he had admitted his guilt and pleaded guilty

of the charges framed.  He did so.  Having, thus, accepted that he had made

an admission in the criminal case, the same was admissible in evidence.  He

could have resiled therefrom or explained away his admission.  He offered

an explanation that he was wrongly advised by the counsel to do so.  The

said explanation was not accepted by the trial court.  It was considered to be

an afterthought.  His admission in the civil proceeding was admissible in

evidence.   

20. Section 58 of the Indian Evidence Act reads as under:

“58 - Facts admitted need not be proved  

No  fact  need  to  be  proved  in  any  proceeding which the parties thereto or their agents agree to admit at the hearing, or which, before the hearing,

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they  agree  to  admit  by  any  writing  under  their hands, or which by any rule of pleading in force at the time they are deemed to have admitted by their pleadings: Provided  that  the  court  may,  in  its  discretion, require the facts admitted to be proved otherwise than by such admission.”

In view of the aforementioned provision, there cannot be any doubt or

dispute  that  a  thing  admitted  need  not  be  proved.   [See  Vice-Chairman,

Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan and Another v.  Girdharilal Yadav (2004) 6

SCC 325, L.K. Verma v. HMT Ltd. and Another (2006) 2 SCC 269, Avtar

Singh  and  Others v.  Gurdial  Singh  and  Others (2006)  12  SCC  552,

Gannmani  Anasuya  and  Others v.  Parvatini  Amarendra  Chowdhary  and

Others (2007) 10 SCC 296]

21. We, therefore,  are  of  the  opinion  that  although  the  judgment  in  a

criminal case was not relevant in evidence for the purpose of proving his

civil liability, his admission in the civil suit was admissible.  The question

as to whether the explanation offered by him should be accepted or not is a

matter which would fall within the realm of appreciation of evidence.  The

Trial  Court  had  accepted  the  same.  The first  appellate  court  refused  to

consider  the effect  thereof in its  proper perspective.   The appellate court

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proceeded on the basis that as the judgment of the criminal court was not

admissible in evidence,  the suit  could not have been decreed on the said

basis.   For the said  purpose,  the admission made by the appellant  in his

deposition as also the effect of charge had not been taken into consideration.

We, therefore, are of the opinion that the High Court cannot be said to

have  committed  any  error  in  interfering  with  the  judgment  of  the  first

appellate court.   

22. So far as the question of the applicability of the period of limitation is

concerned, Article 70 of the Limitation Act would be applicable.  It reads as

under:

“Description of suit Period of limitation

Time from which period begins to run

70. To recover movable property deposited or pawned from a depository or pawnee.

Three years The date of refusal after demand.”

In terms of  the  aforementioned provision,  the  period  of  limitation,

thus, begins to run from the date of refusal after demand.

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23. Appellant  did  not  respond  to  the  notice  issued  by  the  respondent

asking him to return the pledged jewellery.  The date of receipt of such a

notice is 14.05.1998.  The suit having been filed on 26.06.1998, thus, must

be held to have been filed within the prescribed period of limitation.  

24. Having  regard  to  the  fact  that  the  averments  contained  in  the

paragraph 3 of the plaint were not traversed, the same would be deemed to

have been admitted by him in terms of Order VIII, Rule 5 of the Code of

Civil Procedure.

In Gautam Sarup v. Leela Jetly [(2008) 7 SCC 85], this Court held:

 “14. An admission made in a pleading is not to

be treated in the same manner as an admission in a document. An admission made by a party to the lis is admissible against him proprio vigore.”

[See also Ranganayakamma and Another v. K.S. Prakash (D) By LRs

and Others 2008 (9) SCALE 144]

25. For  the  reasons  aforementioned,  there  is  no  merit  in  this  appeal,

which is dismissed accordingly.  However, in the facts and circumstances of

this case, there shall be no order as to costs.

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………………………….J. [S.B. Sinha]

..…………………………J.     [Dr. Mukundakam Sharma]

New Delhi; April 15, 2009

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