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PETITIONER: SETH NAND LAL & ANR.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF HARYANA & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT09/05/1980

BENCH: TULZAPURKAR, V.D. BENCH: TULZAPURKAR, V.D. CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. ((CJ) BHAGWATI, P.N. KRISHNAIYER, V.R. SEN, A.P. (J)

CITATION:  1980 AIR 2097            1980 SCR  (3)1181  CITATOR INFO :  F          1983 SC1073  (19)  R          1989 SC1737  (5)  RF         1992 SC2279  (35)

ACT:      Haryana Ceiling  on Land  Holdings Act,  ’1972 (Haryana Act  26   of  1972)-Constitutional   validity  of-Artificial definition of  family unit-Sections  4(1), 4(3),  7,  8,  9, 11(1)  and   (2),  whether   violate  Article   14  of   the Constitution.

HEADNOTE:      The Haryana  Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (Act 26 of 1972)  received the assent of the President on 22-12-1972 and was  published in  the  official  Gazette  on  23-12-72. Section 2  contained and  even now  contains  the  requisite declaration that  it was  enacted for  giving effect  to the policy  of   the  State   towards  securing  the  principles specified  in  clauses  (b)  and  (c)  of  Art.  39  of  the Constitution. The  Act was included in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution on 7-9-1974 and, thereby, it came under the protective umbrella of Art. 31B of the Constitution.      In Saroj Kumari’s case A.I.R. 1975 Punjab & Haryana 353 relying on an earlier decision of that Court in such Singh’s case A.I.R.  1974 P  & 162, the Punjab & Haryana High Court, being unaware  of the  inclusion of  Act 26  of 1972  in the Ninth Schedule  struck down certain provisions of the Act on the  ground   that  these  provisions  violated  the  rights guaranteed by  Part m  of the  constitution. The  Full Bench decision in  Sucha Singh’s case A.I.R. 1974 Punjab & Haryana 162 was  reversed by the Supreme Court in Sucha Singh’s case A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 915, taking the view that the provisions of Punjab Land  Reforms Act  are saved by both Articles 31A and 31B of the Constitution.      However, after the decision in Saroj Kumari’s case, Act 26 of  1972 and  the Rule  framed under  s. 31, thereof were amended extensively;  the Act  was first  amended by Haryana Act 17  of 1976 which Amending Act was also put in the Ninth Schedule; the  Act was  further amended by Haryana Acts Nos. 40 and  47 of  1976, 14 of 1977 and 18 of 1978, but the last

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four Amending Acts were not put in the Ninth Schedule.      After the  Principal Act  was amended as above, several writ petitions  were Sled in the Punjab & Haryana High Court challenging the  vires of some of the provisions of the Act. The Division  Bench dismissed  all the  writ  petitions  and upheld the  validity of  all the  provisions except  6.  20A which barred the appearance of any legal practitioner before any  officer   of  authority   other  than   the   Financial Commissioner in  proceedings under  the Act.  The Court took the view that such a provision was repugnant to s. 14 of the Indian Bar  Councils Act  (which had  continued in  force in view   of s.  30 of  the Advocates  Act 1961 not having come into force), and therefore ultra Vires and invalid.      In their  appeals by  special leave the appellants have challenged some  of the provisions of the Act on the grounds substantially different  from those  that were  urged before the High  Court. Besides  their appeals,  a large  number of writ 1182 petitions and  also special  leave petitions have been filed raising  almost   identical  grounds  of  challenge  to  the provisions of the Principal Act (26 of 1972) as amended from time to time.      Dismissing the appeals and the petitions, the Court ^      HELD: 1.  The amendments  effected in the Principal Act by Amending  Act 17  of 1976  will  receive  the  protective umbrella of Art. 31B but not the amendments effected by Acts Nos. 40  & 47  of 1976, 14 of 1977 and 18 of 1978. Moreover, though the  Principal Act as amended by Act 17 of 1976, will be under  the protective  umbrella of  Art. 31B, the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Rules, 1973 as originally framed or even after amendments, being subordinate legislation and not specified  in  the  Ninth  Schedule  may  not  receive  such protection.      Prag Ice and Oil Mills & Anr. v. Union of India, [1978] 3 S.C.R. 293, applied.      2. The Principal Act (Act 26 of 1972) together with all the amendments  made therein  which essentially is meant for imposition  of   ceiling  on   agricultural   holdings   and acquisition and distribution of the surplus area to landless and weaker  sections of  the society  is  in  substance  and reality  an  enactment  dealing  with  agrarian  reform  and squarely falls  within Art.  31A of  the Constitution and as such will  enjoy the  immunity from the attack on the ground of  inconsistency   with  or   abridgments  of  any  of  the Fundamental Rights  guaranteed by Arts. 14, 19 and 31. [1192 H, 1193 A-C]      Sankari Prasad  Singh Deo  v. Union  of India etc. etc. [1952] 3  S.C.R. 89 Keshavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, [1973] Suppl.  S.C.R. 1,  State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh, [1952] 3 S.C.R. 252 followed.      3. A  reading of ss. 4(1), 4(3), 7, 8, 9 and 11 (1) and (2) makes two or three aspects very clear, namely, (i) there is no  doubt that  for the purpose of the Act the concept of family has  been defined  in an artificial manner as meaning husband, wife  and their  minor children  and  exclusive  of major sons  and unmarried daughters, (ii) Under s. 4(1) "the primary unit of family" is confined to five members, namely, husband, wife  and their  minor  children  upto  three  with reference to which permissible area has been prescribed, but under s.  4(2) the  permissible area  is said to increase by one-fifth of  the permissible  area of  the primary unit for each additional  member of the family, such as the fourth or fifth minor  child etc.  but subject  to the  maximum  limit

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prescribed in  the proviso,  namely.  the  permissible  area shall not  exceed twice  the permissible area of the primary unit of  the family  and (iii)  in  respect  of  each  unit, namely,  each   adult  son   living  with  his  parents  the permissible  area  will  be  further  increased  up  to  the permissible area  of the  primary unit  of  a  family  under s.4(3), provided that where the adult son also owns any land the same  shall be  taken into  account for  calculating the permissible area. In other words, in cases where the primary units of  family owns  or holds land [say 54 acres under cl. (l)(c) of s. 41 and an adult son living with the family also owns or  holds similar land of his own (say acre.,) then the permissible area  for the  family will  be 108  acres  after clubbing the two holdings under s. 4(3) and there will be no question of  any augmentation  of area for the family but in cases where  the separate  unit (adult son) owns or holds no land of  his own  but is  living with the family the primary unit’s holding  gets augmented  up to  two units, that is to say, the family will be entitle to  retain 108 acres and the balance will be surplus simply because the 1183 adult  son   is  living   with  the   family;  but  no  such augmentation will occur if h unmarried daughter or daughters are living  with the  family or  if the adult son is  living away separately from the family. [1195 C-H, 1196 A]      4. It  is true that provisions pertaining to artificial definition of family and the adoption of double standard for fixation of ceiling contained in the instant Act are similar to those  which obtained  in the  Kerala Agrarian  Relations Act, 1961  and the  Madras Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on  land)   Act,  1961,   but  even   so,  there   are   two distinguishing features  which would  make the  ratio  R  of these two decisions dealing with those Acts reported in 1962 Sup. 2  SCR 829  and 1964  (7) SCR  82 inapplicable  to  the instant case. In the first place, in both these decisions it was an  admitted position that the concerned enactments were not  governed   by  or  protected  under  Art.  31A  of  the Constitution and  it was  in the  absence of such protection that the attack to the material provisions of the enactments on the  ground of  violation of  Art. 14  was entertained by this Court.  At page  833 of  the Report  in the first case, there is a categorical statement made to the effect that the concerned  Act,  so  far  as  it  affected  the  petitioners therein, was not protected under Art. 31A and it was open to assail it  as violative  of the  rights conferred on them by Articles 14,  19 and  31 of  the Constitution.  Similarly at page 84  of the  Report in  the  second  case,  there  is  a Statement to  the similar effect that the Madras Act was not protected under  Art. 31A  of the Constitution and it was in that background  that the  Court considered the attack based on Art. 14 on the two main provisions of the Act relating to ceiling area  under s.  5 and  compensation under s. 50 read with Schedule  III of the Act. In the instant case it cannot be disputed  that Principal  Act (26  of  1972)  as  amended subsequently is  a  piece  of  agrarian  reform  legislation squarely falling  with Art.  31A of  the  Constitution  and, therefore, the  Act, and  the concerned  provisions would be immune from  attack based  on Articles  14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution. Secondly, in both these decisions, no material by way  of justification  was put before the Court on behalf of the  State for the adoption of the double standard in the matter of  fixing  the  ceiling  read  with  the  artificial definition of  the family  which resulted  in discriminatory results and  this has  been specifically  mentioned  by  the Court in  both the  judgments, while  in the instant case on

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behalf of  the State  of Haryana  ample  material  has  been produced before  the Court  justifying the  adoption of  the artificial definition  of family and the double standard for fixing the  ceiling negativing  the violation  of  Art.  14. [1197 C-H, 1198 A]      The materials  produced before  the Court make it clear that the  State had  applied its  mind  seriously  to  these questions: whether  family  should  be  adopted  as  a  unit instead of  an  individual  for  applying  ceiling  on  land holdings, what  should  be  the  size  of  the  family,  why artificial definition  of the  family should  be adopted and why adoption  of double standard-one for the primary unit of the family  and another  in respect  of a separate unit when living with  the family was felt necessary, what type of and in what cases clubbing should be prescribed G etc. All these questions were  considered having  regard to  the social and economic realities  of our  rural life  and with  a view  to nullifying  the   transfers  effected  in  favour  of  close relations for  the purpose of avoiding the impact of ceiling legislation. [1198 D-H, 1199 A]      Karimbil Kunhikoman  v. State of Kerala, [1962] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 829;  A. P.  Krishnasami Naidu  v.  State  of  Madras [1964] 7 S.C.R. 82; explained and distinguished      5. An enactment particularly the enactment dealing with agrarian reform  which has been put on the Statute Book with the avowed purpose of bringing 1184 about equality or rather reducing the inequality between the haves and have-nots cannot be struck down as being violative of Art.  14 of the Constitution simply because it has failed to make  a provision for what was regarded as an exceptional case or a rare contingency. The material furnished on behalf of the State Government by way of justification for adopting an artificial  definition of  family and double standard for fixing ceiling  is sufficient  to repel  the attack on these provisions under Art. 14. [1199 E-G]      Adopting "family"  as a unit as against "an individual" was considered  necessary as that would reduce the scope for evasion  of  law  by  effecting  mala  fide  partitions  and transfers since such transactions are usually made in favour of family  members, that  normally in rural agricultural set up in  our country  the family is the operative unit and all the lands  of  a  family  constitute  a  single  operational holding and  that therefore ceiling should be related to the capacity   of a  family to  cultivate the  lands personally. [1198 G-H, 1199 A]      In fact,  a provision  like s. 4(3) which makes for the augmentation of  the permissible  area for a family when the adult sons  do not  on or  hold lands  of their  own but are living with  the family has one virtue, that it ensures such augmentation in  the case of every family irrespective of by what personal  law it  is governed  and no discrimination is made between  major sons  governed by  different systems  of personal laws. So far as an adult son living separately from the family  is  concerned,  he  is  rightly  regarded  as  a separate unit  who will  have to file a separate declaration in respect of his holding under s. 9 of the Act and since he is living  separately and  would  not  be  contributing  his capacity  to  the  family  to  cultivate  the  family  lands personally there  is no  justification  for  increasing  the permissible area of the primary unit of the family. The case of an  unmarried  daughter  or  daughters  living  with  the family, was probably considered to be a rare case and it was presumed  that  daughters  would  become  members  of  their husband’s units,  and that  is why no separate provision was

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made for  giving additional  land for  every unmarried major daughter living  with the  family. [1199 A-E, 1199 G-H, 1200 A]      6. There is no question of any discrimination resulting to the  wife from  the right of selection being given to the husband under  s. 9(4)  (c) of  the Act. In the first place, the selection  of permissible  area which  is desired  to be retained will  ordinarily be  guided by the consideration of retaining the  best quality  land with  the family, be it of the husband  or of  the wife  or even of the minor children, and not  by the  consideration as  to whose  land should  be sacrificed. But, apart from this aspect of the matter, it is precisely to  meet such  situation that  s. 11(2)  has  been enacted  which   provides  that  the  land  as  retained  as permissible area  of the  family and the separate unit shall be owned  or held  by the  members of  the family  and  also separate unit  in the same proportion in which they owned or held land  before the  selection of the permissible area. In other words  if out of sheer cussedness, the husband were to select  his   land  which   he  desires  to  retain  as  the permissible area  and gives away his wife’s land as surplus, he will  do so  at his peril, for in the land so retained as permissible area  he and  his wife shall have a share in the same proportion  in which  they owned  or held  their  lands before the selection of the permissible area. [1200 D, E-H]      7. Section  8 of the Act is not violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution.  Under sub-s.  (3) it  is provided that if any person  transfers any  land after  the appointed  day in contravention of  sub-s. (1),  the land as transferred shall be 1185 deemed to be owned or held by that person in calculating the permissible area  and his  surplus area  over and  above the permissible  area   will  be  determined  ’by  ignoring  the transfer and  in case  the area  left with  him  after  such transfer is  equal to  the surplus  area as  calculated, the entire area  left with him shall be deemed to be the surplus area meaning  thereby the  same  shall  vest  in  the  State Government. Here again, if the husband’s behaviour is guided by self-interest,  as it  would normally  be,  he  would  be indulging in  the type  of activity complained of at his own peril for  he would  not only  be putting  his own land into jeopardy of  litigation but  also lose the wife’s land which will become surplus and vest in the State Government. [120 A-D]      8. It  is s.  7 of  the Act  which imposes a ceiling on agricultural land  by providing  that  no  person  shall  be entitled to  hold, whether  as a landowner or as a tenant or as a  mortgagee with possession or partly in one capacity or partly in  other, within  the State of Haryana exceeding the permissible area  on or after the appointed day (24-1-1971). "Permissible area"  under s.  3(1) means  the extent of land specified as  such in s. 4. For the purpose of determination of permissible area s. (4) divide land into three categories and prescribes  the permissible  area in  respect of each of the said categories A, & C. For evaluation of the lands held by a  person for  determining his  permissible area  one  is required to  turn to  the Rules  made in  that behalf  being Rules 5(1)  and 5(2) of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Rules 1973,  for s.  4(4) only says that evaluation is to be made in  the ’manner  prescribed which  must mean the manner prescribed by  Rules. Fixation  of the extent of permissible area has been actually done by s.4(1) itself inasmuch as the said  provision   apart  from   dividing  land   into  three categories prescribes  and fixes  the extent  of permissible

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area in  respect of each of the three categories, the extent being mentioned  against each  and it is merely the basis of evaluation to  be made  for determining the permissible area that is  left for being prescribed by Rules. [1202 A-C, G-H, 1204 D-E]      9. It  is fairly  clear that  the three categories into which s.4  (1) divides land for determination of permissible area are  mutually exclusive and ordinarily if a land-holder is able  to establish  that the land hold by him exclusively falls within  one or the other category his permissible area would ger straightaway determined by the extent specified in the section  against each  category and  it is  only when  a land-holder has  lands of  more than  one category  that his permissible area shall have to be determined on the basis of evaluation to be made in the prescribed manner under s. 4(4) read with  Rules S(1)  and 5(2).  This is  made clear by the opening words  of Rule  5(1), namely,  "the land  held by  a person shall  be evaluated by converting various categories. Prescribed manner  is to be found in both the Rules, namely, Rules 5(1)  and 5(2) and not merely in one or the other, but it is clear that the two Rule deal with different topics and operate in different fields; whereas Rule 5(1) indicates the inter relation  between  different  categories  of  land  by prescribing the  equating formula,  Rule 5(2)  provides  for mathematical formula  for arriving at the correct figures of different categories  of lands  by reference  to  irrigation intensity ratio  specified against  each of  the  Government canals or  tubewells mentioned  in the  Schedule as  also in case of  land irrigated  by private  tubewells  and  pumping sets. It  is  not  correct  to  say  that  while  furnishing illustrations under  Rule 5(2).  Rule 5(1) has been ignored; in fact,  the first  illustration given  under Rule 5(2) (a) while  applying   the  mathematical   formula   takes   into consideration the  inter-relation mentioned in Rule 5(1) and there is  no question  of Rule  5(2)(a) in  its  application doing reverse 1186 of  what   Rule  5(1)  lays  down.  Further,  if  the  first illustration given  below Rule 5(2)(a) is carefully analysed it will  be clear  there is  nothing like Rule 5(2)(a) going beyond s.  4(1) of  the Act  and there  is  no  question  of reducing the permissible area of a person from 21.8 hectares to only  13.88 hectares.  In that illustration certain basic facts are assumed to exist, namely, the person is holding 25 hectares of  land commanded  for irrigation  by a  perennial canal the irrigation intensity ratio where of is 57 % and on these facts the illustration works out his permissible area. First by  applying the  mathematical formula  given in  Rule S(2)(a) the  extent of ’A category land’ is computed at 7.12 hectares. (Incidentally  the very  fact that  25 hectares of land commanded  for irrigation  by a  perennial canal having the irrigation  intensity  ratio  of  57%  can  comprise  ’A category land’  upto 7.12  hectares negatives the contention that to have ’A category land’ the canal must have intensity ratio of  200% per  annum or  to have  ’B category land’ the canal must  have intensity  ratio of  100% per annum or that any land’  irrigated by  a canal  having less  than 100% per annum intensity  ratio must  be categorised  as ’Cl category land’). Therefore,  after  deducting  7.12  hectares  as  ’A category  land’  out  of  25  hectares,  the  balance  17.88 hectares is said to be ‘category land’. Then by applying the equating formula  in Rule  5(1) his  entire  holding  of  25 hectares is  converted into national ’C category land’ (7.12 X 3 would give 21.36 to which 17.88 is added) which comes to 39.24. But  in reality he holds only 25 hectares. Therefore,

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by applying  the rule  of three  his permissible  area in ’C category land’  would be  13.88 hectares  and the balance of 11.12 hectares  is declared  to  be  surplus.  There  is  no reduction of  ’C category  land’ from 21.8 hectares to 13.88 hectares, for if out of 25 hectares 21.8 hectares were to be allowed to  the landholder  as ’C’ category land by invoking s. 4(1)  or only  Rule 5(1)  that will  be ignoring the fact that out  of his total holding an area to the extent of 7.12 hectares  has  the  potential  of  ’A’  category  land  and, therefore, giving  him 21.8  hectares as  ’C’ category  land would be  clearly -  wrong.  Therefore,  Rule  5(2)  of  the Haryana Ceiling  on Land  Holding Rules 1973 is valid. [1204 H, 1205 A-H, 1206 A-D]      10. The amount payable for such surplus land that vests in the  State Government  is to  be calculated  at the rates shown in the Table given below s. 16(1) and it is clear that the rates  are based  on the  actual quality of the soil and its yield  and the same cannot be said to be illusory. [1206 D-E]      11. The  right of appeal is a creature of a statute and there is  no reason  why the  legislature while granting the right cannot  impose conditions  for the  exercise  of  such right so  long as  the conditions  are not  so onerous as to amount to  unreasonable  restrictions  rendering  the  right almost illusory. [1207 F]      Neither the  amended s.  18(7) is onerous in nature nor do that  sub-section and  sub-section (8)  of s.  18 put any fetter on  the right  of appeal and revision provided for in s. 18(1) and (2) as originally enacted in 1972. In the first place, the  object of imposing the condition is obviously to prevent  frivolous   appeals  revision   that   impede   the implementation  of  the  ceiling  policy:  secondly,  having regard to  sub-ss. (5)  and (9)  it is  clear that  the cash deposit or  bank guarantee is not by way of any exaction but in the  nature of securing mesne profits from the person who is ultimately  found to  be in  unlawful possession  or  the land; thirdly, the deposit or the guarantee is so-related to the land  holdings tax  (30 times  the tax) which. varies in the State 1187 Of Haryana  around a  paltry amount  of  Rs.  8/-  per  acre annually;  fourthly,    the  deposit  to  be  made  or  bank guarantee to  be furnished  is confined to the land holdings tax payable  in respect  of the disputed area i.e., the area or part   thereof  which is declared a surplus after leaving the permissible  area to the appellant or petitioner. Having referred to  these aspects,  particularly the meagre rate of the annual land tax payable, the fetter imposed on the right of appeal/revision,  even in  the absence  of  ;1  provision conferring discretion  the appellate/revisional authority to relax or  waive the  condition cannot be regarded as onerous or unreasonable. [1207 G-H, 1208 A-D]      Anant Mills  Ltd. v.  State of Gujarat A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1234 applied.      12. Section  8 (3)  of the  Act does  not  violate  the second proviso  of s.  31A. The  Act including  -  the  said provision having  been included  in the  Ninth Schedule will receive the protection of Art. 31B. [1208 D-E]

JUDGMENT:                 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION                 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1361 OF 1977      Appeal by  Special Leave  from the  Judgment and  order

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dated the  17-3-1977 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court at Chandigarh in Writ Petition No. 4766 of 1976                             AND      CIVIL APPEALS  Nos. 2785-86,  2935-38,  2893,  2823-25, 2235, 1348,  1362 - 74, 1525- 27, 2022-23, 2144, 2234, 2707, 2710, 2831,  2723-24, 2423-  26,  2805-09/77,  976,  843-44, 1263, 56-67,  1010-1014, 1076,  1898-1901, 1902  - 16, 2043- 47, 2064,  1674 -76,  120 -27, 1079,  291, 318-19, 132, 546, 547, 671,  941- 45, 946, 949, 1650, 1876, 1878 - 1895, 1813, 1829, 176-77, 139, 276, 576, 581 - 83, 1645- 48, 1554, 992 - 998, 1789-1803, 1831 - 33, 2071- 74, 2162, 2216, 2233, 2234, 2294, 2436-39 of 1978 & 2725 of 1977.                             WITH      S.L.P. (Civil)  No. 3498-99,  4270, 4419,  4420,  4455, 4735, 5205, 5238/77, 63, 64, 65, 99, 352-353, 442, 443, 454, 455, 608,  635, 622,  623, 778-79,  1819, 1303,  1312, 1414, 1404, 1573, 1576- 79, 1715, 1842, 1849-50, 1959, 2370, 2013- 14, 2414, 2462, 2491-92, 3102-03, 3225-26, 3569, 3413, 3476, 1423, 4072, 3519, 3521, 3541- 44, 3715, 3746, 3819, 3857-58, 3891-96, 4052,  4539, 4500  - 11,  *4655- 67, 4617, 4815-17, 4818, 4830,  4831 - 34, 4836-37, 4849, 4864 -76, 4966, 4972, *4973- 81,  4983A -  5002, 5004  - 7,  5030, 4850-51,  4863, 5008- 22, 5024, 5025, 5049, 5126- 29, 5174 - 84, 5272, 5211, 5250 - 57, 5271, 5290 - 93, 5340- 46, 5385, 5402 -08, 5413 - 15, 5454,  5460 -  72, 5516-19, 5628, 5625, 5634 - 36, 5637- 44, 5646-47,  5786-87, 5788- 90, 5869 - 72, 5873, 5907 - 24, 5939-40, 5970  - 74,  *5975- 84, 6002, 6120, 6126- 33, 6158- 62, 6208, 6209, 6240, 6216-18, 6246-47, 6361-62, 6395, 6421, 6449 -  53, 6582,  6645- 49,  6677 - 78, 6654, 6656, 6669/78 and 200-214  & 215/80  ( *4662/78, 4974/78 and 5975- 5977/78 Withdrawn) 1188                             WITH      WRIT PETITION NOS. 4306, 4312, 4377 & 4507 of 78.      M.N. Phadke,  Nishat  Singh,  B.P.  Maheshwari,  Suresh Sethi, V.M.  Tarkunde, Naunitlal  and Naurang Singh, for the appellant/ petitioners  in Civil  Appeals 2785-86,  2935-38, 2234-35, 2707-10,  2831 2805-9/77, 120-22, 318-19, 671, 176, 276, 2071-84/78,  171,  ’’216178,  SLPS.  91-93/78  3541-44, 5126-29, 6216-18, 6421, 5308/78 and WP 4377, CA 2893/77.,      R.K  Mohan   and  Mrs.   Geetanjali   Mohan   for   the appellants/petitioners in CAs. 2823-25, 1525-27, 2022-23/77, 2069-70/78, 1813/78, 2144, 2423-26/77, 1263, 56-67, 1010-14, 1898-1901, 1902-16, 2064-68, 1392, 291, 546-47, 941-45, 946- 49, 139,  576, 1789-1803  1828, 2436-39/78,  SLPs. 442, 443, 454, 608,  635, 778,  779, 1819,  1401, 1414, 1573, 1576-79, 1849-50, 2013-14,  2414, 2462,  3102-3, 3225-26, 3369, 3746, 5272, 3819,  3857-58, 3891-96, 4052, 4500-11, 4655-67 4983A- 5002, 5174-84,  5460-72, 5907-24, 5970-74, 6126-33, 6645-49, 6677-78/78 4270, 4455, 4735, 5205 & 5238/77 & 5030/78.      V.M. Tarkunde,  O.P. Malhotra,  P.R. Mridul, H.K. Puri, for the  appellant in CAs. 1348, 1362-74/77 & petitioners in SLPs. 4539 and 562/78      N.C. Sikri  for the  appellants in  CAs.  2723-24177  & 2725/77.      Lakshmi Arvind  for the appellants in CAs. 976, 1076178 & petitioners in SLPs. 622, 623, 1715/78 and WP No. 4312.      S.K. Mehta  for the  appellants in CAs. 843-44, 546/78& petitioners in  SLPs. 4815-17, 5008-22, 5024, 5025, 5290-93, 5340-46, 5869-72 3 of 1978, 4419-20/77.      S.M. Ashri S.S. Sharma for the appellants in CAs. 2043- 47, 1831-34/78  & petitioners  in SLPs.  4617,  4830,  5454, 5628, 6246-47/78 & 4863178.      R.S. Mittal  and A.  Minocha for the appellants in CAs. 1674-76, 1554/78 & petitioners in SLPs. 5873/78, 5646-47/78.

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    M.B. Lal for the appellants in CA. 1079/78.      B.P. Maheshwari and S. Grewal for the appellants in CA. 132/78 &  petitioners. in SLPs. 63-65, 99, 352, 353, 455/78, 208-14180, 209-245/80.      Sarva Mitter  for the  appellants in  CAs. 1650,  1878- 89/78, 1890-95/78,  and petitioners  in SLPs. 4831-34, 4836, 4837, 4864,  76, 4966,  5250-57, 5402-8,  5634-44,  5646-47, 5975-5984, 6158-62, 6449-6453, 6654/78, 5271/78. 1189      S.K Sabharwal  for the  appellants in  CAs. 1876, 1645- 48/78  and  petitioners  in  SLPs.  3519,  4972,  5004-5007, 6120/78 and WP. 4507/78.      S.C. Patel  for the  appellants in  CAs. 581-83/78, and petitioners  in SLPs.(C). 1842/78, 3521, 4849, 4850-51/78.      Manoj Kumar for the appellants in CAs. 992-98/78,      S.K Dhingra  for  the  appellants  in  CAs.2162/78  and petitioners in SLPs. 4973-81, 6361-62, 6395, 5413-5415/78.      D. Goburdhan  for the  appellants in CAs. 2233, 2234/78 and petitioners in SLPs. 5309-10/78.      Ramesh Chand for the appellants in CA. 2294/78.      I.S. Ratta,  Vimal Dave  and  Miss  K.  Mehta  for  the petitioners in  WP. 4306/77 and SLPs. 3498-99/77.      R. Bana  for the  petitioners  in  SLPs.1303/78,  2370, 3413, 3476, 6002, 1423, 4072/78 & 1312/78.      Harbans Singh  for the  petitioners in  SLPs.  1959/78,      5939-40/78.      Rameshwar Nath for the petitioners in SLP. 3715/78.      R.C. Kohli for the petitioners in SLP. 5049/78.      S.R. Srivastava for the petitioners in SLP. 5211/78.      S.K. Bagga for the petitioners in SLP. 5385/78.      J.D. Jain  for the  petitioners in SLPs. 5516-19, 5786- 90, 6208, 6656, 6669/78, 4818, 6239-40/78.      K.K Tienugopal,  B. Datta, M.N. Shroff, Hemantika Wahi, Anup Sachthey, Miss A. Subhashini, for appearing respondent.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      TULZAPURKAR,  J.   These  appeals,  by  special  leave, directed against  the Full  Bench decision  of the  Punjab & Haryana  High  Court  in  Jas  want  Kaur’s  case,  seek  to challenge the  vires of  some of  the  pro  visions  of  the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act 1972 (26 of - 1972) and according to  the appellants  some  of  the  provisions  are pivotal and  run through  the whole  Act and, therefore, the entire Act  is liable to be struck down.      The Act  (26  of  1972)  received  the  assent  of  the President on  22-12-1972 and  was published  in the official Gazette on  23-12-1972. Section  2 contained  and  even  now contains the requisite declaration 1190 that it  was enacted  for giving effect to the policy of the State towards  securing the principles specified in cls. (b) and (c) of Art. 39 of the Constitution. The Act was included in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution on 7-9-1974 (vide: Item 72), and, thereby it came under the protective umbrella of Act.  31-B of  the Constitution;  however, on 9-9-1974 in Saroj Kumari’s(1)  case a  Division Bench  of the  Punjab  & Haryana  High   Court,  being  apparently  unaware  of  such inclusion, struck  down certain provisions of the Act on the ground that  those provisions violated the rights guaranteed by Part  III of  the Constitution.  The Division  Bench also held that  the provisions were not saved by Art. 31-A of the constitution as  those provision  which  mainly  related  to ’Family Unit’,  could not  be said  to be  in furtherance of Art. 39(b)  and (c)  of the Constitution. In so holding, the Division Bench relied on a Full Bench decision of that Court in Sucha Singh’s case where similar provisions of the Punjab

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Land Reforms  Act (Act 10 of 1973) had been struck down. The Full Bench  decision in Sucha Singh’s case (supra) has since been reversed by this Court in Civil Appeal No. 1040 of 1976 (reported in AIR 1977 SC 915). This Court has taken the view that the  provisions of Punjab Land Reforms Act are saved by both Arts. 31-A and 31-B of the Constitution. The foundation on  which  the  decision  in  Saroj  Kumari’s  case  (supra) striking down  certain provisions  of the Haryana Act (26 of 1972) rested has thus disappeared ,      However, after  the decision  in  Saroj  Kumari’s  case (supra) the  Act (26  of 1972) and the Rules framed under s. 31 thereof  were amended  extensively;  the  Act  was  first amended by  Haryana Act  17 of  1976 which  Amending Act was also put in the Ninth Schedule (vide: Item No. 137), the Act was further  amended by Haryana Acts Nos. 40 and 47 of 1976, 14 of  1977 and  18 of 1978, but the last four Amending Acts have not  been put  in the Ninth Schedule. It is, therefore, clear that  the amendments  effected in the Principal Act by Amending Act 17 of 1976 will receive the protective umbrella of Art.  31 but not the amendments effected by the last four Acts. Moreover,  though the  Principal Act as amended by Act 17 of 1976 will be under the protective umbrella of Art. 31- B, the  Haryana Ceiling  on Land  Holdings  Rules,  1973  as originally  framed   or   even   after   amendments,   being subordinate legislation  and  not  specified  in  the  Ninth Schedule may  not receive  such protection (Vide: Prag Ice & oil Mills(3) case). 1191      After the  Principal Act  (26 of  1972) was  amended as above,   several Will petitions were filed in the High Court of Punjab  & Haryana  challenging the  vires of  some of the provisions of  the Act.  Since the  Principal Act as well as the Amending  Act 17 of 1976 had been pul in Ninth Schedule, the challenge  was based on the ground that those provisions were vague  uncertain, ambiguous  and mutually  inconsistent and, therefore,  should be struck down and neither Art. 31-A nor  Art.   31-B  of   the  Constitution   could  save  such provisions. The  High Court  rejected the  plea, and  in our view rightly,  on the  ground that  a statute  enacted lay a Legislature falling  within its  competence  which  did  not offend any  Fundamental Rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution  and   which  did   not  contravene  any  other provision of  the Constitution  could not  be declared ultra vires either  on the  ground that its provisions were vague, or uncertain  or ambiguous  or  mutually  inconsistent.  The Court pointed  out that  unlike the  American  Constitution, there was  no ‘due  process’ clause in our constitution and, therefore, Indian Courts could not declare a statute invalid on the  ground that it contained vague, uncertain, ambiguous or mutually  inconsistent provisions,  and that  it was  the duty and  function of  the Indian Court, in relation to each forensic situation,  to examine the language of the law, the context in  which it  was made, to discover the intention of the Legislature  and  to  the  interpret  the  law  to  make effective and not to frustrate the legislative intent and in that behalf it could always call in aid well known canons of interpretation and  even where  the provisions  of a statute appeared to be mutual inconsistent there were. several well- known rules of interpretation to guide the Court in giving a proper meaning  to the provisions of a statute, such as, the rule of harmonious construction, the rule that special shall prevail over  the general  etc. After  negativing  the  main plea, the  Court went on to examine the concerned provisions which were  said to  be  vague  or  uncertain  and  mutually inconsistent  and   came  to  the  conclusion  that  certain

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expressions which  were said  to be  vague were not so vague but had  definite import and connotation and that apparently inconsistent provisions  were not  irreconcilable and all of them fitted  well into  the general  scheme of  the Act. The only provision in respect of which relief was granted by the Court was  s. 20A  which barred  the appearance of any legal practitioner before  any officer of authority other than the Financial Commissioner in proceedings under the Act, and the Court took  the view  that such a provision was repugnant to s. 14 of the Indian Bar Councils Act (which had continued in force in  view s.  30 of  the Advocates  Act not having come into force)  and, therefore,  invalid. Subject to holding s. 20A of  the Act to be ultra vires  and, therefore, issuing a direction to the State not to enforce 1192 the said  provision  and  subject  to  giving  some  further directions in the matter of filling declarations etc. before the authorities  under the  Act, the Court dismissed all the writ  petitions.   In  these  appeals  the  appellants  have challenged   some of  the provisions  of the  Act on grounds substantially different  form those  that were  urged before the High Court.      Besides these  Civil Appeals,  a large  number of  writ petitions as  also petitions  for special  leave  have  been filed listed before us where in almost identical points have been raised  challenging the provisions of the Principal Act (26 of  19720 as  amended from  time to  time and those also will stand disposed of by this judgment.      It is true that since the Principal Act (26 of 1972) as also the  first Amending Act 17 of 1976 have been put in the Ninth Schedule,  counsel for  the appellants have challenged the constitutional  validity of  Art.31-B  as  also  of  the Constitution (34th Amendment) Act 1976 whereby the Principal Act as  well as the first Amending Act were put in the Ninth Schedule  on   the  ground   that  Art.   31-B   and   these Constitutional Amendments  violated the  basic structure  or features of  the Constitution. Similarly since the Principal Act contains  the requisite  declaration under  s.2  thereof that the  enactment is  for the  purpose of giving effect to the directive  principles enshrined  in Art.  39(b) and (c), counsel  for   the  appellants   have  also  challenged  the constitutional validity  of Art.  31-C as being violative of the basic  features of the Constitution. However, apart from these aspects,  it cannot be gainsaid that the Principal Act (26 of  1972) as  amended form  time to  time, if  it  falls within Art.  31-A of  the Constitution, would be immune from the  attack   on  the   ground  of   inconsistency  with  or abridgement of  any of  the Fundamental Rights guaranteed by Arts. 14, 19 and 31. The constitutional validity of Art. 31- A has  all along  been upheld  by this  court  since  Sankar Prasad’s case  and its  validity was  not put  in  issue  in Keshavananda Bharati’s  case but the constitutional validity of Art.  31C was sought to be canvassed by reference to Art. 31A. Moreover,  consequent upon the introduction of Art. 31A in the  Constitution in  1951 this  Court has  repelled  the challenged to  land reform  laws as violative of fundamental rights conferred  by Arts. 14, 19 or 31 in State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh.  In our  view, it  is manifestly clear that the Principal Act (26 of 1972) together with. 1193 all the  amendments made  therein which essentially is meant for imposition  of  ceiling  on  agricultural  holdings  and acquisition and distribution of the surplus area to landless and weaker  sections of  the society  is  in  substance  and reality  an  enactment  dealing  with  agrarian  reform  and

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squarely falls  within Art.  31A of  the Constitution and as such will enjoy the immunity mentioned above. The challenges made before  us to some specific provisions of the Act will, therefore, assume  different complexion  and will have to be dealt with accordingly.      The principal  attack made  against the  Act is that it enacts an artificial definition of ’family’ in s.3(f), which does not  conform to  any kind of natural families prevalent in the  State like  a Hindu  Undivided Family known to Hindu Law or  any family  under Muslim  Law etc. and that a double standard has been adopted in s. 4 in the matter of providing ceiling which  leads to gross inequalities and as such these provisions are  violative of  Art. 14  of the  Constitution. Counsel  for  the  appellants  urged  that  this  artificial definition of  ’family’ given  in s.  3(f) is required to be read with  two other  definitions, namely, the definition of ’permissible area’  given in  s.3(1) and  the definition  of ’separate unit’  given in  s. 3(q)  and read in that fashion the artificial  definition of  family alongwith  s.4,  which prescribes permissible  area by adopting double standard for fixing ceiling  in the  case of ’primary unit of family’ and ’separate  unit’   produces   discriminatory   results   and according to  him since  the definition of family is pivotal and occurs  in major  provisions of the Act such as sections 4(1), 4(3), 7, 8, 9, and 11(1), it will render the whole Act unconstitutional as  being  violative  of  Art.  14  of  the Constitution. He  also urged  that  these  major  provisions through which  the artificial  definition of family runs are not severable  and, therefore, the whole Act will have to be struck down.  In order to appreciate this contention it will be necessary to examine the relevant provisions of the Act.      Section 3(f) defines ’family’ thus:           "3. (f)  ’family’ means  husband, wife  and  their      minor children or any two or more of them.           Explanation I-A  married minor  daughter shall not      be treated as a child."           Explanation II  is not material for the purpose of      the point under consideration.      Section 3(1) defines ’permissible area’ thus:           "3.(1). ’permissible  area’ means  the  extent  of      land specified in section 4 as the permissible area;" 1194      Section 3(q) defines ’separate unit’ thus:           "3(q). ’separate  unit’ means  an adult son living      with his  parents or  either of them and in case of his      death his widow and children, if any.           Explanation: The adult son or in case of his death      his widow  and children  shall be  deemed to  be living      with the parents or either of them unless separated;"      It is  sec.7 which  imposes the ceiling on agricultural landholding and it provides that notwithstanding anything to the  contrary   contained  in  any  law,  custom,  usage  or agreement, no  person shall  be entitled  to hold whether as landowner or  tenant or  as a  mortgagee with  possession or partly in one capacity or partly in another, land within the State of  Haryana exceeding the permissible area on or after the appointed  day (which under s. 3(c) is 24-1-71). Section 3(m) defines  person as  including inter  alia  family.  The Explanation to s. 7 is important which provides for clubbing and says  that where  the person  is a  family including the separate unit,  if any the land owned or held by such person together with  the land  owned or held by the members of the family and the separate unit shall be taken into account for the purposes  of calculating  the permissible area. The next important provision  is s.  4 which  deals with  permissible

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area and sub-ss.(1), (2) and (3) thereof are material to the point at issue and these provisions run thus:           "4(1)  The  permissible  area  in  relation  to  a      landowner or  tenant or  mortgagee with  possession  or      partly in  one capacity or partly in another, or person      or family  consisting of  husband, wife  and upto three      minor children (hereinafter referred to as "the primary      unit of family"), shall be, in-respect of-           (a)  land  under  assured  irrigation  capable  of      growing at  least two  crops  in  a  year  (hereinafter      referred to  as the land under assured irrigation, 7.25      hectares (=18 acres).           (b)  land  under  assured  irrigation  capable  of      growing at least one crop in a year, 10.9 hectares (=27      acres).           (c) land  of all  other types including land under      orchard, 21.8 hectares (=54 acres); 1195           (2) The  permissible area  shall be  increased  by      one-fifth of  the permissible  area of the primary unit      of family for each additional member of family:           Provided  that  the  permissible  area  shall  not      exceed twice  the permissible  area of the primary unit      of family.           (3).  The   permissible  area   shall  be  further      increased up  to the  permissible area  of the  primary      unit of a family for each separate unit:           Provided that  where the  separate unit  also owns      any land,  the same  shall be  taken into  account  for      calculating the permissible area."      On reading  the  aforesaid  provisions,  two  or  three aspects emerge very clearly. In the first place, there is no doubt that for the purposes of the Act the concept of family has been defined in an artificial manner as meaning husband, wife and  their minor  children and  excludes major sons and unmarried daughters.  Secondly, under  s.4(1)  ’the  primary unit  of  family’  is  confined  to  five  members,  namely, husband, wife  and their  minor  children  upto  three  with reference to which permissible area has been prescribed, but under s.4(2),  the permissible  area is  said to increase by one-fifth of  the permissible  area of  the primary unit for each additional  member of the family, such as the fourth or fifth minor  child etc.  but subject  to the  maximum  limit prescribed in  the proviso,  namely,  the  permissible  area shall not  exceed twice  the permissible area of the primary unit of  the family.  Thirdly, in  respect of  each separate unit, namely,  each adult  son living  with his  parents the permissible  area  will  be  further  increased  up  to  the permissible area  of the  primary unit  of  a  family  under s.4(3), provided that where the adult son also owns any land the same  shall be  taken into  account for  calculating the permissible area. In other words, in cases where the primary unit of family owns or holds land (say 54 acres under cl.(1) (c) of  s.4) and  an adult  son living  with the family also owns or  holds similar  land of  his own (say 54 acres) then the permissible  area for the family will be 108 acres after clubbing the  two holdings under s.4(3) and there will be no question of  any augmentation  of area for the family but in cases where  the separate  unit (adult son) owns or holds no land of  his own  but is  living with the family the primary unit’s holding  gets augmented  up to  two units, that is to say, the family will be entitled to retain 108 acres and the balance will  be surplus  simply because  the adult  son  is living with  the family; but no such augmentation will occur if unmarried daughter or daughters are

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1196 living with  the family  or if  the adult son is living away separately from the family.      Mr. Tarkunde  appearing for  the appellants, therefore, contended that  if the  concept of  family  as  artificially defined in s.3(f) is worked out in s.4(1), 4(3) and 7, gross inequalities result  and he  explained the  resulting  gross inequalities by  giving the following illustration: in cases where the  separate units  do not  own or  hold any  land of their own,  the primary unit of family consisting of father, mother and three minor children under s.4(1) will be able to retain with  the family one unit of the permissible area, be it 18  acres or  27 acres  or 54 acres, but by reason of the clubbing that  is provided for in the Explanation to s.7 and reading the  same with  s.4(3) the  primary unit  comprising father, mother  and three  minors and  one major  son living with it  will be  able to  retain two  units (i.e. either 36 acres or  54 acres  or 108  acres); further  a primary  unit consisting of  father, mother and three minors and two major sons living with it will be able to retain three units while the primary  unit consisting  of father,  mother  and  three minors and  three major  sons living with it will be able to retain four  units and  so on  and this is because the major sons who  constitute separate  units happen to live with the family. But  if unmarried  daughter or  daughters are living with the  family the  permissible area for the family is not increased or  allowed to  be augmented  and this  is clearly discriminatory. Similar  discriminatory result occurs if the adult son  is not  living with  family. Such  discriminatory treatment  becomes   possible  because   of  the  artificial definition of  family as  given in  s.3(f) of  the  Act  and because double  standard for fixing the permissible area has been prescribed  and, therefore,  s.4 which  prescribes such double standard  for fixing  the  ceiling  is  violative  of Art.14 of the Constitution.      In support  of his  contention, reliance  was placed by him upon  two decisions of this Court in Karimbil Kunhikoman v. State  of Kerala(1)  and A. P. Krishnasami Naidu v. State of Madras(2).  He pointed  out that  in the  former case the Court was  concerned  with  the  provisions  of  the  Kerala Agrarian Relations Act, 1961 where s.2(12) defined family in an artificial  manner which  did not  conform to  any of the three kinds  of the  families prevalent  in Kerala State and s.58 fixed the ceiling by adopting a double standard and the Court held that s. 58(1) was violative of Art. 14 and as the section was  the basic  of the entire Chapter III, the whole Chapter must  fall with  it. Similarly,  in the second case, the 1197 Court was  dealing with  Madras Land  Reforms  (Fixation  of Ceiling on  Land) Act,  1961 where  the definition of family given in  s.3(14)  was  regarded  as  artificial  and  since s.5(1)(a) adopted  a double standard for fixing the ceiling, the Court  held that  the same  resulted  in  discrimination between persons  equally circumstanced  and, therefore,  the said provision  was violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution and since  it was  the basis of Chapter II the whole Chapter fell with  it. Counsel  urged that  the ratio  of these  two decisions of this Court squarely applied to instant case and since the  said provisions ran through the major sections of Chapter III  of the  act the  whole Chapter was liable to be struck down.      It is  not possible  to accept  the contention  of  Mr. Tarkunde  for  two  reasons.  It  is  true  that  provisions pertaining  to  artificial  definition  of  family  and  the

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adoption  of   double  standards  for  fixation  of  ceiling contained in  the instant  Act are  similar to  those  which obtained in  the Kerala Agrarian Relations Act, 1961 and the Madras Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on land) Act, 1961, but even  so, there  are two  distinguishing features  which would make  the ratio of those two decisions inapplicable to the  instant  case.  In  the  first  place,  in  both  these decisions it  was an  admitted position  that the  concerned enactments were  not governed by or protected under Art.31-A of the  Constitution and  it was  in  the  absence  of  such protection that the attack to the material provisions of the enactments  on   the  ground  of  violation  of  Art.14  was entertained by  this Court. At page 833 of the Report in the first case,  there is  a categorical  statement made  to the effect that  the concerned  Act, so  far as  it affected the petitioners therein, was not protected under Art.31-A and it was open  to assail  it as violative of the rights conferred on them  by Articles  14, 19  and 31  of  the  Constitution. Similarly, at  page 84  of the  Report in  the second  case, there is  a statement  to the similar effect that the Madras Act was not protected under Art 31-A of the Constitution and it was  in that  background that  the Court  considered  the attack based  on Art.  14 on  the two main provisions of the Act, relating  to ceiling  area under  s 5  and compensation under s.50 read with Schedule III of the Act. In the instant case it  cannot be  disputed that  the principal  Act (26 of 1972) as  amended subsequently is a piece of agrarian reform legislation  squarely   falling   with   Art.31-A   of   the Constitution and,  therefore,  the  Act  and  the  concerned provisions would be immune from attack based on Articles 14, 19 and  31 of  the Constitution.  Secondly,  in  both  these decisions, no  material by  way  of  justification  was  put before the  Court on behalf of the State for the adoption of the double standard in the matter of fixing the ceiling read with the  artificial definition of the family which resulted in discriminatory results- 1198 and this  has been  specifically mentioned  by the  Court in both the  judgments, while  in the instant case on behalf of the State  of Haryana,  as we shall indicate presently ample material has  been produced  before the Court justifying the adoption of  the artificial  definition of  family  and  the double  standard  for  fixing  the  ceiling  negativing  the violation of Art. 14. On behalf of the State material in the form extracts from Reports of the Committee on Panel of land Reforms under  Planning Commission, (January 1956), extracts from a  note prepared  in the  Land Reforms  Division of the Planning Commission  (1960), extracts  from Second Five Year Plan, Chapter  9 on  Agrarian Land  Reorganisation, extracts from  the  Report  of  the  Committee  on  Ceiling  on  Land Holdings-Planning Commission  (April  1961),  extracts  from Summary  Record  of  Chief  Ministers’  Conference  on  Land Reforms  (26-27  September,  1970),  extracts  from  Summary Record of  Chief Ministers’  Conference on Land Reform (23rd July, 1972),  and Guidelines  drawn up  on the  basis of the conclusions of  the Chief  Ministers’ Conference  (23rd July 1972), and extracts from Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings by P.S.  Appu   published  by   the  Ministry  of  Agriculture, Government of  India in  1972, has  been placed  before  the Court from  which it  will appear that the State had applied its mind seriously to these questions: whether family should be adopted  as a  unit instead of an individual for applying ceiling on  land holdings,  what should  be the  size of the family, why  artificial definition  of the  family should be adopted and  why adoption  of double  standard-one  for  the

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primary unit  of the  family and  another in  respect  of  a separate  unit   when  living   with  the  family  was  left necessary, what type of and in what cases clubbing should be prescribed etc., and after going through this material we do find that  all these questions were considered having regard to the  social and  economic realities of our rural life and with a  view to  nullifying the transfers effected in favour of close relations for the purpose of avoiding the impact of ceiling legislation.  It has  been pointed  out that a large number  of   alternatives  were   considered,   that   every alternative was  beset with difficulties of some kind or the other  and  no  particular  course  was  free  from  blemish altogether but  for that reason the main objective could not be given  up and  ultimately, on  the basis  of a  consensus reached at  the Chief Ministers’ Conference hold on July 23, 1972 certain  policy decisions  were taken  on  these  vexed questions. It has been pointed out that adopting ’family’ as a unit  as against  ’an individual’ was considered necessary as that  would reduce  the  scope  for  evasion  of  law  by effecting mala  fide partitions  and  transfers  since  such transactions are  usually made  in favour of family members, that normally  in rural  agricultural set  up in our country the family is the operative unit and all the lands of 1199 a family  constitute a  single operational  holding and that therefore ceiling  should be  related to  the capacity  of a family to  cultivate  the  lands  personally.  It  has  been pointed out  that keeping  all these  aspects  in  view  the concept  of  family  was  artificially  defined  and  double standard for  fixing ceiling,  one for  the primary unit and other for  the adult son living with the family was adopted. In fact,  a  provision  like  s.4(3)  which  makes  for  the augmentation of  the permissible  area for a family when the adult sons  do not  own or  hold lands  of their own but are living with  the family has one virtue, that it ensures such augmentation in  the case of every family irrespective of by what personal  law it  is governed  and no discrimination is made between  major sons  governed by  different systems  of personal laws. So far as an adult son living separately from the family  is  concerned,  he  is  rightly  regarded  as  a separate unit  who will  have to file a separate declaration in respect  of his holding under s.9 of the Act and since he is living  separately and  would  not  be  contributing  his capacity  to  the  family  to  cultivate  the  family  lands personally there  is no  justification  for  increasing  the permissible area of the primary unit of the family. The case of an  unmarried  daughter  or  daughters  living  with  the family, counsel pointed out, was probably considered to be a rare case and it was presumed that daughters would in normal course  get  married  and  would  become  members  of  their husbands’ units,  and that is why no separate provisions was made for  giving additional  land for  every unmarried major daughter living with the family. On the materials placed and the  initial   presumption  of   constitutionally,  we  find considerable force  in this  submissions. It  is, therefore, not possible  to strike  down an  enactment particularly the enactment dealing with agrarian reform which has been put on the Statute  Book with  the avowed purpose of bringing about equality or rather reducing the inequality between the haves and the  have not,  as being  violative of  Art. 14  of  the Constitution  simply   because  it  has  failed  to  make  a provision for  what was regarded as an exceptional case or a rare contingency.  In our  view, the  material furnished  on behalf of  the State  Government by way of justification for adopting an  artificial definition  of family  and a  double

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standard for  fixing ceiling  is  sufficient  to  repel  the attack on  these provisions  under Art.  14. However, before parting with  this point  we might  like to observe that the State of Haryana should consider sympathetically the case of unmarried major  daughters living  with the  family and  for that matter  even the  case of  a divorced  daughter who has come back  to the  family by  providing for addition of some more land to the permissible area of the primary unit of the family for  each such  unmarried major  daughter    or  such divorced daughter which again could be subjected 1200 to some  maximum limit  or the  State of  Haryana  may  draw inspiration from a kindred legislation like West Bengal Land Reforms Act  1955 as  amended by  West Bengal (Land Reforms) amendment Act, 1972.      The next  provision  challenged  by  counsel  as  being violative of Art.14 was s.9 which requires every person, who on the  appointed day  or at  any time thereafter holds land exceeding  the  permissible  area,  to  furnish  within  the specified period  to the  prescribed authority a declaration giving the  particulars of  all his  land and  that  of  the separate unit in the prescribed form and manner and starting therein his  selection of  parcels of lands not exceeding in aggregate the  permissible area  which he desires to retain. Under Explanation  I to  that section,  it is  provided that where the person is a member of the family, he shall include in his  declaration particulars of land held by him and also of land, if any, held by other members of the family and the separate unit.  Under sub-s.(4)  (c) such declaration in the case of a family is required to be furnished by the husband, or in  his absence,  by the wife, or in the absence of both, by the  guardian of  minor children. It was urged that since the  husband  has  been  given  the  right  to  furnish  the declaration as  also to  make the  selection  of  the  lands within the  permissible area which he desires to retain, the husband can,  while making  the  selection,  give  away  his wife’s land  as surplus, and this was discriminatory against wife who  might lose her land declared as surplus. We do not find any  substance in  this contention. In the first place, the selection  of permissible  area which  is desired  to be retained will  ordinarily be  guided by the consideration of retaining the  best quality  land with  the family, be it of the husband  or of  the wife  or even of the minor children, and not  by the  consideration as  to whose  land should  be sacrificed. But,  apart from  this aspect of the matter, its preciously to  meet such  situation that  s.11(2)  has  been enacted  which   provides  that  the  land  so  retained  as permissible area  of family  and the  separate unit shall be owned or held by the members of the family and also separate unit in the same proportion in which they owned or held land before the  selection of  the  permissible  area.  In  other words, if  out of  sheer cursedness,  the  husband  were  to select  his   land  which   he  desires  to  retain  as  the permissible area  and gives away his wife’s land as surplus, he will  do so  at his peril, for in the land so retained as permissible area  he and  his wife shall have a share in the same proportion  in which  they owned  or held  their  lands before the  selection of  the permissible area. In our view, therefore,  there  is  no  question  of  any  discrimination resulting to  the wife  from the  right of  selection  being given to the husband under s. 9(4) (c) of the Act. 1201      Similar contention  was  urged  by  Mr.  Tarkunde  with reference to  s. 8  of the Act which prohibits all transfers of land  in excess  of the  permissible area,  except a bona

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fide transfer,  after the  appointed day  and declares  that such transfers  shall not  affect the  right  of  the  State Government to the surplus area to which it could be entitled but for  such transfer. Under sub-s. (3) it is provided that if any  person transfers any land after the appointed day in contravention of  sub-s. (1),  the land so transferred shall be deemed  to be owned or held by that person in calculating the permissible area and his surplus area over and above the permissible area will be determined by ignoring the transfer and in  case the  area left  with him after such transfer is equal to  the surplus  area so  calculated, the  entire area left with him shall be deemed to be the surplus area meaning thereby the  same shall  vest in  the State Government. What was urged by Mr. Tarkunde was that the effect of clubbing of the holdings  of  the  husband  and  wife  on  such  invalid transfer could  be that the husband by transferring his land in contravention  of sub-s.(1)  will deprive the wife of her land which  becomes surplus under sub-s. (3). Here again, if the husband’s  behaviour is  guided by  self-interest, as it would normally  be, he  would be  indulging in  the type  of activity complained  of at  his own  peril for  he would not only be putting his own land into jeopardy of litigation but also lose the wife’s land which will become surplus and vest in the  State Government.  The challenge  to  the  aforesaid provisions under Art. 14 must fail.      Mr. Phadke  counsel for some of the appellants in these appeals  challenged   the  vires   of  some  of  the  Rules, particularly Rule  5(2)  of  the  Haryana  Ceiling  of  Land Holdings Rules 1973 framed under s. 31 of the Act on several grounds.  He  contended  that  effective  ceiling  has  been brought about  by the  Rules and not by Sections of the Act, that Rule  5(2) was a clear instance of excessive delegation of the  essential legislative  function, that Rule 5(2) goes beyond the  scope or ambit of and is, therefore, ultra vires s.4(1), that  it was wrong to think that ’prescribed manner’ was only  to be  found in Rule 5(2) (a) and not in Rule 5(1) and that,  in fact,  in its  working Rule  5(2) (a) does the reverse of  what Rule  5 (1)  lays down,  that  is  to  say, instead of  first converting various categories of land of a person into  ’C’ category  and then permitting him to select an area  equivalent to  21.8 hectares  (=54 acres)  of  such converted ’C’ category land so that his remaining land shall be treated  as surplus  area, Rule  5(2) first  converts all irrigated lands  into ’A’  category  wrongly,  and  then  by subtracting it  from the rest of the land, declares that the remainder shall be ’C’ category land. In order to appreciate these contentions  properly it  will be necessary to examine the provisions  of the  Act and  the  Rules  concerning  the imposition of  ceiling  on  agricultural  holdings  and  the determination of permissible area. 1202      As pointed  out earlier,  it is  s. 7  of the Act which imposes a  ceiling on agricultural land by providing that no person shall  be entitled to hold, whether as a landowner or as a  tenant or  as a mortgagee with possession or partly in one capacity  or partly  in other,  land within the State of Haryana exceeding  the permissible  area  on  or  after  the appointed day  (24.1.1971). "Permissible area" under s. 3(1) means the  extent of land specified as such in s. 4. For the purpose of determination of permissible area s. 4(1) divides land into  three categories  and prescribes  the permissible area in  respect of  each of  the said  categories  and,  as indicated earlier,  it is  7.25  hectares  (=18  acres)  for category under  s. 4(1)(a),  10.9 hectares  (=27 acres)  for category under  s. 4(1)(b)  (styled ’B’ category land’ under

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Rule 2)  and 21.8  hectares (=54  acres) for  category under s.4(1)(c) (styled  ’C category  land’ under Rule 2). Section 4(5) further  sub-divides land  falling under s.4(1)(a) into two classes: (i) land under irrigation from a canal or State tube-well (styled  ’A category land’ under Rule (2) and (ii) land  under  irrigation  from  privately  owned  tube-wells, pumping sets,  etc. (styled ’AA category land’ under Rule 2) and  the   inter  relation  between  these  two  classes  is indicated in s. 4(5) thus:           "4(5) In  determining the permissible area for the      purpose of clause (a) of sub-section (1), five hectares      of land  under irrigation  from privately  owned  tube-      wells, pumping  sets, etc.,  shall  be  equal  to  four      hectares of land under irrigation from canal as defined      in the  Northern India  Canal and  Drainage  Act,  1873      (Central Act  8 of  1873), or  from State  Tube-well as      defined in  the Punjab State Tubewell Act, 1954 (Punjab      Act 21 of 1954)." Section 4(4)  lays down  the manner in which the permissible area shall be determined and it runs thus:           "4(4) The  permissible area shall be determined on      the  basis   of  valuation  to  be  calculated  in  the      prescribed  manner   taking  into   consideration   the      ownership of  the means  of irrigation, their intensity      and such  other factors as may be prescribed subject to      the condition  that the total physical holding does not      exceed 21.8 hectares." In other words, for evaluation of the lands held by a person for determining his permissible area one is required to turn to the  Rules made  in that behalf being Rules 5(1) and 5(2) of the  Haryana Ceiling  on Land  Holdings Rules  1973,  for s.4(4) only  says that  evaluation is  to  be  made  in  the ’manner prescribed’ which must mean the manner prescribed by Rules Rule 5(1) runs thus: 1203           "5.(1)  the   land  held  by  a  person  shall  be      evaluated  by  converting  various  categories  into  C      category land according to the following formula:-      1 unit of    1.25 units of   1.5 unit of    3 units of      A category - AA category  -  B category   - C category      land         land            land           land           Such person  shall be  allowed to  select an  area      equivalent to  21.8 hectares  of  C  category  land  as      permissible  area  and  the  remaining  land  shall  be      treated as surplus area." Rule 5(2) runs thus:           "5.  (2)   Land  irrigated   by   Canal/Government      Tubewells.-In case  the land  is irrigated  by canal or      Government tubewell,-           (a)   where land  is commanded for irrigation by a                perennial canal,  the area of such land shall                be  multiplied  by  half  of  the  irrigation                intensity ratio  specified against each canal                in  Schedule   ’A’  appended  hereafter.  The                figure thus  arrived at  shall be  treated as                ’A’ category  land and  the remaining area of                such land  shall be  treated as  ’C’ category                land:           Provided that  where the whole or part of the land      so commanded  is prescribed  in the  revenue record  as      ’Thur’ or  ’Kallar’, the  area so  described  shall  be      multiplied by  half of  the irrigation  intensity ratio      specified against  such  canal  in  Schedule  ’A’.  The      figure thus arrived at shall be treated as ’B’ category      land and  the remaining  area of  such  land  shall  be

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    treated as ’C’ category land;           (b)   where land  is commanded for irrigation by a                non perennial/restricted perennial canal, the                area of  such land shall be multiplied by the                irrigation intensity  ratio specified against                each canal  in Schedule  ’A’. The figure thus                arrived at  shall be  treated as ’B’ category                land and  the remaining  area  of  such  land                shall be treated as ’C’ category land;           Provided that  the extent of land described in the      revenue record  as ’Thur’ or ’Kallar’ shall be excluded      from the commanded area for the purpose of calculations      and shall be treated as ’C’ category land;           (c)   where land  is commanded for irrigation by a                Government tubewell,  the area  of such  land                shall be 1204                multiplied  by   half   of   the   irrigation                intensity ratio  specified against Government                tubewell in  Schedule ’A’.  The  figure  thus                arrived at  shall be  treated as ’A’ category                land and  the remaining  area  of  such  land                shall be treated as ’C’ category land;           (d)  where irrigation by canal water or Government                tubewell is  supplemented by water drawn from                privately owned  tubewell, pumping  set, well                or other  sources, the  area treated  as ’AA’                category  land   in   accordance   with   the                provisions of  sub-rule (3)  or sub-rule  (4)                shall be  added to  the land determined under                the  aforesaid  clause  (a),  clause  (b)  or                clause  (c),   as  the   case  may  be."  (1.                Substituted by  Notification No. GSR 222/H.A.                26/72/S. 31 Amd. (4)/76 dt. 15-10-76). Counsel  for   the  appellants  at  the  outset  urged  that effective ceiling was made by Rules 5(1) and 5(2) and not by s. 4  of the  Act inasmuch  as the basis of evaluation to be made for  determining the  permissible area was provided for by Rules  and not  by the  Section and since the fixation of the  extent  of  the  permissible  area  was  essentially  a legislative function  it  could  not  be  delegated  to  the executive and this was a clear instance of delegation of the essential legislative  function and  hence the enactment was liable to  be struck  down. It  is impossible to accept this contention for the simple reason that fixation of the extent of permissible area has been actually done by s. 4(1) itself inasmuch as the said provision apart from dividing land into three  categories   prescribes  and   fixes  the  extent  of permissible area in respect of each of the three categories, the extent being mentioned against each and it is merely the basis  of   evaluation  to   be  made  for  determining  the permissible area that is left for being prescribed by Rules. The contention is, therefore, devoid of any substance.      It was  next contended  by him  that Rule  5(2)(a) goes beyond s.  4(1) of the Act inasmuch as by its application it produces the  effect of  reducing the  permissible area of a person from 21.8 hectares (=54 acres) to only 13.88 hectares (=34 acres)  as would be clear from illustration No. 1 given under Rule  5(2) (a)  and as such the Rule is ultra vires s. 4(1). He also urged that ’prescribed manner’ was to be found both in Rule 5(1) and 5(2) but in its working Rule 5(2) does the reverse  of what  Rule 5(1) lays down. In our view these contentions proceed  on a  misconception of  the  functional role of  these Rules  and a  misunderstanding regarding  the correct import  of the  first illustration  given under Rule

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5(2)(a).      At the  outset we  may say that it is fairly clear that the three  categories into  which s.4(1)  divides  land  for determination of permissible 1205 area are  mutually exclusive and ordinarily if a land-holder is able  to establish  that the land held by him exclusively falls within  one or the other category his permissible area would get straightaway determined by the extent specified in the section  against each  category and  it is  only when  a land-holder has  lands of  more than  one category  that his permissible area shall have to be determined on the basis of evaluation to be made in the prescribed manner under s. 4(4) read with  Rules 5(1)  and 5(2).  This is  made clear by the opening words  of Rule  5(1), namely,  "the land  held by  a person shall  be evaluated  by converting various categories into ’C’  category land according to the following formula". In other words, Rules 5(1) and 5(2) come into play only when a  land-holder  is  holding  lands  of  various  categories. Further, it  cannot be  disputed that ’prescribed manner’ is to be found in both the Rules, namely, Rules 5 (1) and 5 (2) and not merely in one or the other, but it is clear that the two  Rules   deal  with  different  topics  and  operate  in different fields;  whereas Rule  5(1)  indicates  the  inter relation between different categories of land by prescribing the equating  formula, Rule  5(2) provides  for mathematical formula for  arriving at  the correct  figures of  different categories of  lands by  reference to  irrigation  intensity ratio specified  against each  of the  Government canals  or tubewells mentioned in the Schedule as also in case of lands irrigated by  private tubewells  and pumping  sets but it is not correct to say that while furnishing illustrations under Rule 5(2),  Rule 5(1)  has been  ignored; in fact, the first illustration given  under Rule  5(2)(a) while  applying  the mathematical formula  takes into  consideration  the  inter- relation mentioned  in Rule 5(1) and there is no question of Rule 5(2)(a)  in its  application doing reverse of what Rule 5(1) lays  down. Further,  if the  first illustration  given below Rule  5(2)(a) is  carefully analysed  it will be clear there is  nothing like  Rule 5(2)(a) going beyond s. 4(1) of the Act  as contended  and there  is no question of reducing the permissible  area of a person from 21.8 hectares to only 13.88 hectares  as suggested.  In that  illustration certain basic facts  are assumed  to exist,  namely, the  person  is holding 25  hectares of  land commanded  for irrigation by a perennial canal  the irrigation  intensity ratio  whereof is 57% and  on these  facts  the  illustration  works  out  his permissible area. First by applying the mathematical formula given in  Rule 5(2)(a)  the extent  of ’A  category land’ is computed at  7.12 hectares. (Incidentally the very fact that 25 hectares  of land commanded for irrigation by a perennial canal having  the irrigation  intensity  ratio  of  57%  can comprise ’A  category land’ upto 7.12 hectares negatives the other contention  of counsel for the appellants that to have ’A category  land’ the  canal must  have intensity  ratio of 200% per  annum or  to have ’B category land’ the canal must have intensity  ratio of  100% per  annum or  that any  land irrigated by a canal having 1206 less than 100% per annum intensity ratio must be categorised as ’C  category  land’.)  Therefore,  after  deducting  7.12 hectares as  ’A category  land’  out  of  25  hectares,  the balance 17.88 hectares is said to be ’C category land’. Then by applying  the equating  formula in  Rule 5(1)  his entire holding  of  25  hectares  is  converted  into  notional  ’C

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category land’  (7.12X3 would  give 21.36  to which 17.88 is added) which comes to 39.24. But in reality he holds only 25 hectares. Therefore,  by applying  the  rule  of  three  his permissible  area  in  ’C  category  land’  would  be  13.88 hectares and the balance of 11.12 hectares is declared to be surplus. There  is no  reduction of  ’C category  land’ from 21.8 hectares  to 13.88 hectares as contended, for if out of 25 hectares  21.8 hectares  were to  be allowed to the land- holder as  ’C’ category  land by invoking Sec. 4 (1) or only Rule 5  (1) that  will be  ignoring the fact that out of his total holding an area to the extent of 7.12 hectares has the potential of  ’A’ category  land and,  therefore, giving him 21.8 hectares  as ’C’  category land would be clearly wrong. In our  view, therefore, there is no substance in any of the challenges made  to Rule 5(2) of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Rules, 1973.      Counsel for  the  appellants  feebly  argued  that  the compensation payable  in respect of the surplus land that is acquired or gets vested in the State Government as specified in s.  16 is  illusory. We  find that the amount payable for such surplus  land that  vests in the State Government is to be calculated at the rates shown in the Table given below s. 16(1) and it is clear that the rates are based on the actual quality of  the soil  and its  yield and  the same cannot be said to  be illusory.  In any  case no  materials have  been placed before  us from  which we  could infer that the rates shown in the Table lead to illusory compensation.      The next  provision challenged  as unconstitutional  is the one contained in s. 18(7) imposing a condition of making a deposit  of a  sum equal to 30 times the land holdings tax payable in respect of the disputed area before any appeal or revision is  entertained  by  the  appellate  or  revisional authority-a provision inserted in the Act by Amending Act 40 of 1976. Section 18(1) and (2) provide for an appeal, review and revision  of the  orders of the prescribed authority and the position  was that  prior to  1976 there  was no  fetter placed on  the appellate/revisional  remedy by  the statute. However, by  the amendments  made by  Haryana Act  No. 40 of 1976, sub-ss.  (7) and (8) were added and the newly inserted sub-s. (7)  for the  first time imposed a condition that all appeals under  sub-s. (1)  or sub-s. (2) and revisions under sub-s. (4) would be entertained only on the appellant or the petitioner depositing  with the  appellate or the revisional authority a  sum equal  to 30  times the  land holdings  tax payable in respect of the 1207 disputed surplus area. Under sub-s. (8) it was provided that if the  appellant or the petitioner coming against the order declaring the land surplus failed in his appeal or revision, he shall  be liable to pay for the period he has at any time been in  possession of the land declared surplus to which he was not  entitled under  the law,  a licence fee equal to 30 times the  land holdings  tax recoverable in respect of this area. On  6th June,  1978, the  Act was  further amended  by Amending Act  18 of 1978 whereby the rigour of the condition imposed under  sub-s. (7)  was  reduced  by  permitting  the appellant or  the petitioner to furnish a bank guarantee for the requisite  amount  as  an  alternative  to  making  cash deposit and while retaining sub-s. (8) in its original form, a new  sub-s. (9)  inserted under which it has been provided that  if   the  appeal  or  revision  succeeds,  the  amount deposited or  the bank guarantee furnished shall be refunded or released,  as the  case may  be  but  if  the  appeal  or revision  fails  the  deposit  or  the  guarantee  shall  be adjusted against  the licence  fee recoverable  under sub-s.

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(8). In  the High  Court, two contentions were urged: first, that s.  18(1) and  (2), as originally enacted in 1972, gave an  unrestricted  and  unconditional  right  of  appeal  and revision against  the orders  of the prescribed authority or the appellate authority but by inserting sub-ss. (7) and (8) by Act  40 of  1976, a  fetter was  put on this unrestricted right  which   was  unconstitutional;   secondly,  even  the mellowing down  of the  condition by  Act 18 of 1978 did not have the effect of removing the vice of unconstitutionality, inasmuch as  even the  conditions imposed  under the amended sub-s. (7)  were so  onerous  in  nature  that  they  either virtually took  away the  vested right  of appeal  or in any event rendered  it illusory.  Both  these  contentions  were rejected by the High Court and in our view rightly.      It is  well settled  by several decisions of this Court that the  right of  appeal is  a creature  of a  statute and there is  no reason  why the  legislature while granting the right cannot  impose conditions  for the  exercise  of  such right so  long as  the conditions  are not  so onerous as to amount to  unreasonable  restrictions  rendering  the  right almost illusory  (vide the  latest decision  in Anant  Mills Ltd. v.  State of  Gujarat(1) Counsel  for  the  appellants, however,  urged   that  the  conditions  imposed  should  be regarded  as   unreasonably  onerous   especially  when   no discretion has  been left  with the  appellate or revisional authority to relax or waive the condition or grant exemption in respect  thereof in  fit and proper cases and, therefore, the fetter  imposed must be regarded as unconstitutional and struck down.  It is  not possible  to accept this contention for more  than one reason. In the first place, the object of imposing the  condition is  obviously to  prevent  frivolous appeals and 1208 revision that  impede  the  implementation  of  the  ceiling policy; secondly, having regard to sub-ss. (8) and (9) it is clear that  the cash deposit or bank guarantee is not by way of any  exaction but in the nature of securing mesne profits from the  person who  is ultimately  found to be in unlawful possession  of   the  land;  thirdly,  the  deposit  or  the guarantee is  co-related to  the land holdings tax (30 times the tax)  which, we  are informed,  varies in  the State  of Haryana around a paltry amount of Rs. 8/- per acre annually; fourthly, the  deposit to  be made  or bank  guarantee to be furnished is  confined to  the land  holdings tax payable in respect of  the disputed  area i.e. the area or part thereof which is declared surplus after leaving the permissible area to the  appellant or  petitioner.  Having  regard  to  these aspects, particularly the meagre rate of the annual land tax payable, the fetter imposed on the right of appeal/revision, even in  the absence of a provision conferring discretion on the appellate/revisional  authority to  relax or  waive  the condition, cannot  be regarded  as onerous  or unreasonable. The challenge to s. 18(7) must, therefore, fail.      It may  be stated that relying on Kunjukutty Sahib’s(1) case counsel  for the  appellants also challenged s. 8(3) of the Act on the ground that it violates the second proviso to Art. 31-A.  The Act  including said  provision  having  been included in  the Ninth  Schedule will receive the protection of Art.  31-B and  since the challenge to the constitutional validity of  Art. 31-B  is being separately dealt with it is unnecessary to deal with the contention here.      In the result all the Civil Appeals, Writ Petitions and Petitions for  Special Leave  are dimissed. There will be no order as to costs. S.R.                        Appeals and Petitions dismissed.

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