SCINDIA EMPLOYEES UNION Vs STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS.

09 May 1996
Supreme Court
Download

SCINDIA EMPLOYEES UNION Vs STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS.

1

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 3  

PETITIONER: SCINDIA EMPLOYEES  UNION

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       09/05/1996

BENCH: K. RAMASWAMY, FAIZAN UDDIN, G.B. PATTANAIK

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                          O R D E R      We  have  heard  Ms.  India  Jaisingh,  learned  senior counsel for  the petitioner. Notification under Section 4(1) of the  Land Acquisition  Act, 1984  (1 of 1984) (for short, the ‘Act’) was published on May 17, 1988 acquiring land over which the  workshop was situated for public purpose, namely, for the  expansion of  dockyard  for  defence  purpose.  The petitioner  had   challenged  the   validity  of   the  said notification and  the declaration  published under Section 6 on May  25, 1989 on diverse grounds. Subsequently, the award came to be passed on January 15, 1991 and the same also came to  be   challenged  by   the  petitioner-Union.   The  main controversy raised  by the  petitioner is that they are  the ’persons interested’  within the  meaning of Section 3(d) of the Act  and in  conducting enquiry  under Section 5(A), the Land Acquisition Officer had not given any notice under sub- section (2) of Section 5A. Issuance of notice and hearing of it is mandatory and the failure to comply with the mandatory requirement vitiates the declaration published under Section 6 of the Act. We find no force in the contention.      The only  scope of  the enquiry  under  Section  5A  is whether the  land sought  to be  acquired is  needed  for  a public  purpose  or  is  an  arable  land.    Besides  these questions, the  inter se  claim  of  the  employer  and  the workmen of  payment of wages and extent thereof are alien to the enquiry.  sub-section (3)  of Section 5A makes the scope beyond pale  of doubt.  If the interested person is entitled to  compensation   or  by  implication  bound  by  award  of compensation or excess compensation is an interested person. Therefore,  the  petitioners  cannot  claim  to  be  persons interested for the purpose of an enquiry under Section 5A.      Obvious, therefore, the petitioners have contended that the acquisition  is not  for a  public purpose; it is a mala fide acquisition  and a  vague public purpose of defence and so acquisition  is not  valid in  law. Precedents  have been copiously cited  in the  High  Court  in  that  behalf.  The learned single  Judge and  the  Division  Bench  elaborately considered  them  and  held  that  acquisition  for  defence purpose is  a public  purpose. Rodrigue  case to  Tamil Nadu Housing Board  case settled  the  controversy  holding  that

2

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 3  

acquisition for  housing development is not a vague purpose. Expansion of  dockyard  for  defence  purpose  is  a  public purpose. Publication  of declaration under Section 6 accords conclusiveness to  public purpose. It is for the appropriate Government to  take a  decision whether a particular land is needed for  a public  purpose or  not and  the Court  cannot substitute its  opinion on the public purpose to that of the appropriate Government.  We wholly agree with the view taken by  the  High  Court  in  that  behalf.  As  regards  person interested  this  Court  dealt  with  the  controversy  from Himalayan Tiles to Neively Lignites Corporation case and the Constitution Bench  decision, per  majority. The petitioner, therefore, is not a person interested. Notice and hearing of it under Section 5A(2) is not mandatory.      It is next contended that since the management has gone before  the  appropriate  Government  under  the  Industrial Dispute Act  for closure  of the workshop and the Government had refused  to give such permission, in the absence of such a permission,  the acquisition  cannot  be  proceeded  with. While the Industrial Disputes Act permits the workshop to be continued in operation, the Act deprives the workmen of that right and, therefore, the petitioner is entitled to be heard in that  behalf. We  find  that  the  contention  is  wholly misconceived and the petitioner has chartered out a mistaken course of  action. It  is true  that as a consequence of the acquisition of  land, the  workshop was likely to be closed. The material  circumstance to  be considered  is whether the State is  entitled  to  acquire  the  land  over  which  the workshop stands.  They very object of compulsory acquisition is in  exercise of  the power  of the  eminent domain by the State against  the wishes  of willingness  of the  owner  or person interested  in the  land. Therefore,  so long  as the public purpose subsists the exercise of the power of eminent domain cannot  be  questioned.  Publication  of  declaration under Section 6 is conclusive evidence of public purpose. In view of  the finding  that it  is a question of expansion of dockyard for  defence purpose,  it is  a public purpose. The Government have  exercised the  power of  eminent domain and had got  published notification  under Section  4(1).  After conducting the enquiry Section 5A, declaration under Section 6 was  published which  is  conclusive  evidence  of  public purpose.  The   question  of   their  disabilities   due  to acquisition is  collateral to  the enquiry under Section 5A. Therefore, there  was no  need to  give notice under Section 5A(2) nor to hear the petitioners.      It is  next contended that the petitioners are entitled to the  salary and  arrears are  getting mounted  up. If the proper compensation  is not  determined and  the payment  be made, they  would stand  to lose.  We find  no force  in the contention. The compensation is required to be determined as provided under  Section 23(1) of the Act. It is the function of  the   Land  Acquisition   Officer   to   determine   the compensation. If the person is aggrieved of the compensation so determined, procedure of reference under Section 18 and a further appeal  under  Section  54  of  the  Act  have  been provided for and the aggrieved persons is only to pursue the remedies provided under the Act.      It    is     then    contended     that    since    the petitioner/employees already  had the  order for recovery of the arrears  from  the  owner  of  the  property,  they  are interested persons  and  that,  therefore,  they  should  be heard. It  is seen that an ward has already been made by the Land Acquisition  Officer under  Section 11. If the owner or the person  interested refused  to receive the compensation, the procedure  as contemplated  under Section  31 of the Act

3

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 3  

required  to   be  followed.   We  are   informed  that  the petitioners have approached the Land Acquisition Officer for being impleaded  as a  party interested  for compensation in the  award  enquiry  under  Section  11  which  request  was rejected. If  that be so, appropriate remedy is elsewhere or to have  the compensation attached and to recover as arrears of revenues.  But in  an enquiry  under Section  5A  such  a question does not arise.      It  is   then  contended   that  on   account  of   the acquisition, the  petitioners have lost their jobs and since the Government of India is acquiring the property for public purpose, the  Government have to a corresponding public duty to rehabilitate  the workmen  in  any  appropriate  industry particularly in  Mazgaon Docks  Ltd. which  also is a public undertaking. They  require to be rehabilitated therein. That question is  not germane  for the  disposal of this case. It may be  open to  the petitioners  to pursue  the appropriate remedy, if available.      The special leave petition is dismissed accordingly.