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PETITIONER: SATYA NARAYAN ATHYA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: HIGH COURT OF M.P. & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT24/11/1995

BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. HANSARIA B.L. (J)

CITATION:  1996 AIR  750            1996 SCC  (1) 560  1995 SCALE  (7)138

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                          O R D E R      Delay condoned.      The petitioner  was appointed  on probation  as a Civil Judge by  proceedings dated  July 13, 1979. On completion of six months  period, he was put on probation with effect from February 16,  1980. Though  two years period had expired, no order  of  confirmation  was  issued  and  he  continued  on probation. In  view of  the non-satisfactory  nature of  the service, the  Full  Court  decided  that  he  could  not  be confirmed. Accordingly, orders were issued on August 5, 1983 discharging him  from  service  under  Rule  52(a)  of  M.P. Government  Service   (Temporary,  Quasi-permanent  Service) Rules, 1960.  When the petitioner filed writ petition in the High Court,  he was  unsuccessful in  Letters Patent Appeal, though he  succeeded before  learned single Judge. Thus this petition for  special leave has been filed against the order of the  Division Bench  passed on February 3, 1993 in L.P.A. No.122/85.      The question,  therefore, is whether the petitioner has to be  deemed to have been confirmed after his completion of two years  of probation.  Rule 24(1)  of the  M.P.  Judicial Service  (Classification,   Recruitment  and   Condition  of Services) Rules,  1955, (for  short ’the  Rules’),  provides thus :      "Every candidate  appointed to the cadre      shall undergo  training for  a period of      six months  before he  is  appointed  on      probation for  a period  of  two  years,      which  period  may  be  extended  for  a      further period  not exceeding two years.      The probationers  may,  at  the  end  of      period of  their probation, be confirmed      subject    to    their    fitness    for      confirmation and  to having  passed,  by      the   higher    standard,    all    such

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    departmental  examination   as  may   be      prescribed." A  reading   thereof  would   clearly  indicate  that  every candidate appointed  to the  cadre  shall  undergo  training initially for  a period of six months before he is appointed on probation for a period of two years. On his completion of two years probation, it may be open to the High Court either to confirm  or extend  the probation.  At  the  end  of  the probation period,  if he  is not  confirmed on  being  found unfit, it may be extended for a further period not exceeding two years.  It is  seen that  though there  is no  order  of extension, it  must be  deemed  that  he  was  continued  on probation for an extended period of two years. On completion of two  years,  he  must  not  be  deemed  to  be  confirmed automatically. There  is no order of confirmation. Until the order is passed, he must be deemed to continue on probation.      It is  contended on  his behalf  by the learned counsel for the  petitioner that  since the  later record  was found satisfactory as  per the  norms laid down by the High Court, the finding that his performance was not satisfactory is not correct. Therefore,  his discharge  from service  is clearly arbitrary. We  find no force in the contention. The Division Bench held  that during  the relevant period his performance was  not  satisfactory  and  that  subsequent  good  or  bad performance of  the petitioner  became meaningless.  We find that the  approach adopted  by the High Court cannot be said to be  unjustified. Even  the strong  reliance placed by the learned counsel  for the  petitioner on  the report  of  the learned District  Judge indicates that he needed improvement in disposal  of the  cases which  would show  that the  Full Court of  the High  Court considered  his performance as not satisfactory.      Under these circumstances, the High Court was justified in discharging the petitioner from service during the period of his probation. It is not necessary that there should be a charge and an enquiry on his conduct since the petitioner is only on  probation and  during the  period of  probation, it would be  open to  the High  Court to consider whether he is suitable for  confirmation  or  should  be  discharged  from service.      It is  thus not  a fit case warranting our interference under  Article  136  of  the  Constitution.  The  S.L.P.  is accordingly dismissed.