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PETITIONER: SARDARI LAL

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: UNION OF INDIA & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT21/01/1971

BENCH: GROVER, A.N. BENCH: GROVER, A.N. SHAH, J.C. (CJ) MITTER, G.K. HEGDE, K.S. RAY, A.N.

CITATION:  1971 AIR 1547            1971 SCR  (3) 461  1970 SCC  (1) 411  CITATOR INFO :  O          1974 SC2192  (152)  O          1977 SC 451  (6)  RF         1982 SC 149  (709)  O          1984 SC 684  (55)  E          1985 SC1416  (49,58)  RF         1987 SC2106  (6)

ACT: Constitution   of  India,  1950,  Art.  311(2)(c)-Power   to dispense  with inquiry under Article cannot be delegated  to the Joint Secretary under (Government of India Allocation of Business)   Rules,  1961  made  under  Art.  77(3)  of   the Constitution-Article  77(2) does not prevent the court  from examining validity of order passed by Joint Secretary  under s. 311(2) (c)  in the name of the President.

HEADNOTE:  The appellant and 17 others were dismissed from Delhi Police  Force.  The order in the case of the appellant recited  that  he  was  unfit  to be retained in Civil  Service.   It  also  recited  that the President was satisfied under Art.  311(2)  (c) of the Constitution that in the interest of the security  of  the State it was not expedient to hold an inquiry.   The  order  was made by the Joint Secretary to the Government  of  India,  Ministry of Home Affairs under authority granted  to  him  by  the Government of India  (Allocation  of  Business)  Rules,  1961 made under Art. 77(3) of the Constitution.   It  was argued on behalf of the appellants that authority  could  not  be  exercised on behalf of the President by  the  Joint  Secretary.   The  High Court rejected this  contention.   In  appeal by certificate,  HELD : On the principles enunciated by this Court in earlier  decisions  the functions in cl. (c) of the proviso  to  Art.  311(2)  cannot be delegated by the President to anyone  else  in the case of a civil servant of the Union.  In other words  he  has to be satisfied personally that in the  interest  of  the  security  of the State it is not expedient to  hold  an  inquiry prescribed by cl. (2).     In  the first  place  the  general consensus in the decisions of this Court has   been

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that  executive function of the nature entrusted by  certain  articles, such as Arts. 309, 352, 356, 360 and in particular  those  articles in which the President has to  be  satisfied  himself  about the existence of certain ’facts or  state  of  affairs cannot be delegated by him to anyone else.  Secondly  even with regard to cl. (c) of the proviso there is specific  observation  in  Jayantilal’s case that the  powers  of  the  President under that provision cannot be delegated.  Thirdly  the dichotomy which has been specifically introduced between  the  authority  mentioned  in  cl.  (b)  and  the  President  mentioned  in  cl.  (c) of the  proviso  cannot  be  without  significance.  The Constitution makers apparently felt  that  a matter in which the interest of the security of the  State  has  to be considered should receive personal  attention  of  the President or the Head of the State and he should himself  be  satisfied that an inquiry under the substantive part  di  cl. (2), Art. 31 1 was not expedient for the reasons  stated  in  cl.  (c)  of the proviso in the  case  of  a  particular  servant. [467 D-G]  The  order  impugned  in  the  present  case  was  therefore  illegal,  ultra  vires,  and  void.   If  the  functions  or  functions  exercisable  under cl. (c) of the  proviso  under  consideration could not be delegated or allocated to  anyone  else by the President, Art. 77(2) could not stand in the way  of the Court in the matter of examining the validity of  the  order. [467 H468 B]  Moti  Ram  Deka  etc. v. General  Manager,  N.E.F.  Railway,  Maligaon,   Pandu,  [1964]  5  S.C.R.  683,  731,  732   and  Javantilal Amrit Lal Shodhan  462

JUDGMENT:  CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 576 of 1969.  Appeal  from the judgment and order dated December 11,  1968  of the Delhi High Court in Civil Writ No. 1440 of 1967.  A.   S.  R.  Chari,  S.  K. Mehta, K. L.  Mehta  and  K.  R.  Nagaraja, for the petitioner.  S.   T. Desai and R. N. Sachthey, for respondents Nos. 2,  3  and  S.   P. Nayar, for respondents Nos. 1, 4 and 5.  S.   K. Mehta and K. L. Mehta, for the intervener.  The Judgment of the Court was delivered by  Grover,  J. This is an appeal by certificate from  a  common  judgment  of the Delhi High Court which disposed of a  batch  of  14  petitions under Art. 226 of the  Constitution.   The  question  involved  is  of importance  and  relates  to  the  exercise  of powers expressly conferred on the President  by  clause   (c)   of  the  proviso  to  Art.  311(2)   of   the  Constitution.  On  14th April, 1967, the appellant and 17 other members  of  the  Delhi  Police Force were dismissed from  service.   The  order dismissing the appellant is reproduced below                     ORDER  "Whereas, you Shri Sardari Lal, Sub-Inspector, Delhi  Police  No.  331/D,  Police Station Kamla Market,  Delhi  hold  your  office during the pleasure of thePresident, and  Whereas the President    is satisfied that you are unfit  to  be retained in the public serviceand ought to be dismissed  from service, and  Whereas the President is further satisfied under  sub-clause  (c)  of  proviso  to  clause (2) of  article  31  1  of  the  Constitution  that  in the interest of the security  of  the  State it is not expedient to hold an inquiry,

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Now, therefore, the President is pleased to dismiss you from  service with immediate effect.  By order and in the name  of the President of India             Sd/-    (B. Venkataraman)  Joint Secretary to the Government of  India in the Ministry of Home Affairs."  463  It was common ground before the High Court and has not  been  disputed  before  us that the President had no  occasion  to  deal  .with the case of the appellant himself and the  order  was  made  by  Shri Venkataraman,  Joint  Secretary  to  the  Government of India in the Ministry of Home Affairs.  It was  claimed  by him that he was competent to make the  order  by  virtue   of  the  authority  which  he  derived  under   the  Government  of  India (Allocation of Business)  Rules,  1961  made under Art. 77(3) of the Constitution.  Before the  High  Court,  the  controversy was confined to  the  narrow  point  whether  the  function  which  is to  be  performed  by  the  President  under  clause (c) of the proviso to  Art.  311(2)  could  be performed by the authority to whom  such  function  had  been  allocated under the aforesaid  Rules.   The  High  Court  negatived  the  contention raised on  behalf  of  the  appellant that such a function could not have been delegated  by  the  President to any other authority.  The  High  Court  also  relied on the provisions of Art. 77(2) which  provides  for  the  authentication of orders made in the name  of  the  President.  Under  Art. 53(1) the Executive power of the Union shall  be  vested in the President and shall be exercised by him either  directly   or  through  officers  subordinate  to   him   in  accordance with the Constitution.  Art. 77(1) lays down that  all  executive  action of the Government of India  shall  be  expressed to be taken in the name of the President.   Clause  (3) of that Article enables the President to make rules  for  the  more  convenient  transaction of the  business  of  the  Government  of India.  Chapter I of Part XIV contains  inter  alia  the  three main provision relating  to  the  Services.  Articles  309,  310  and 311 may be set out  to  the  extent  necessary.  " 309.  Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, Acts  of the appropriate Legislature may regulate the recruitment,  and  conditions of service of persons appointed,  to  public  services  and  posts in connection with the affairs  of  the  Union or of any State :  "Provided  that it shall be competent for the  President  or  such  person  as he may direct in the case of  services  and  posts  in connection with the affairs of the Union, and  for  the  Governor of a State or such person as he may direct  in  the  case  of  services and posts  in  connection  with  the  affairs   of  the  State,  to  make  rules  regulating   the  recruitment  and  the  conditions  of  service,  of  persons  appointed,  to  such services and posts until  provision  in  that  behalf is made by or under an Act of  the  appropriate  Legislature under this article, and any rules so made  shall  have effect subject to the provisions of any such Act."  464   "310.  (1)  Except  as  expressly  provided  by  this  Con-  stitution, every person who is a member of a defence service  or  of  a  civil  service, of the Union or of an  all  India        service  or  holds any  posit  connected  with        defence  or  any civil post under  the  Union,        holds  office  during  the  pleasure  of   the        President, and every person who is a member of

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      a civil service of, a State or holds any civil        post  under  a State holds office  during  the        pleasure of the Governor of the State.  (2).............................."  "31  1. (1) No person who is a member of a civil service  of  the  Union or an all-India service or a civil service  of  a  State or holds a civil post under the Union or a State shall  be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to  that  by which he was appointed.  (2)  No  such  person  as aforesaid shall  be  dismissed  or  removed or reduced in rank except after an inquiry in  which  he  has been informed of the charge against him and given  a  reasonable  opportunity of being heard in respect  of  those  charges  and  where it is proposed, after such  inquiry,  to  impose  on him any such penalty, until he has been  given  a  reasonable  opportunity  of  making  representation  on  the  penalty  proposed.  but only on the basis  of  the  evidence  adduced during such inquiry  (a)  where  a person is dismissed or removed or  reduced  in  rank  on  the  ground  of  conduct  which  has  led  to  his  conviction on a criminal charge; or  "(b)  where the authority empowered to dismiss or ,remove  a  person  or to reduce him in rank is satisfied that for  some  reason,  to be recorded by that authority in writing, it  is  not reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry;  or  (c)  where the President  or the Governor, as the  case  may        be,  is satisfied that in the interest of  the        security  of the State it is not expedient  to        hold such inquiry.  (3)  If,  in  respect  of any such person  as  aforesaid,  a  question arises whether it is reasonably practicable to hold  such  inquiry as is referred to in clause (2), the  decision  thereon of the authority empowered to dismiss or remove such  person or to reduce him in rank shall be final."  465  These  Articles have come up for consideration  before  this  Court  in  several  cases and  in  connection  with  diverse  points’  The view that has been taken with regard  to  their  true  content, scope and inter connection and the nature  of  the  power exercisable under them is that while Art. 3  1  0  provides for the tenure at the pleasure of the President  or  the  Governor,  Art.  309 enables  the  Legislature  or  the  Executive  as  the case may be to make any law  or  rule  in  regard inter alia to conditions of service without impinging  upon  the  overriding power recognised under Art.  310  read  with  Art. 3 1 1. The power to dismiss a public  servant  at  pleasure is outside the scope of Articles 53 and 154 of  the  Constitution and cannot be delegated by the President or the  Governor,  to a subordinate officer and can be exercised  by  him  only  in the manner prescribed,  by  the  Constitution.  This, however, does not mean that a law cannot be made under  Art. 309 or a rule cannot be framed under the proviso to the  said  Article  prescribing the procedure by  whcih  and  the  authority  by whom the said pleasure can be exercised.  Moti  Ram Deka etc. v. General Manager, N.E.F. Railways, Maligaon,  Pandu,  _etc.(1) Art. 311 contains the main  safeguards  for  civil  servants  in the matter of dismissal  or  removal  or  reduction in rank-while the procedure provided in clause (2)  must  be  followed  before  the  dismissal  or  removal   or  reduction  in rank of a civil servant can be ordered,  there  are certain exceptions which have been made where it is  not  necessary to comply with the requirements of the substantive  part  of  clause  (2) of Art.  311.   These  exceptions  are  contained  in  the  three clauses-(a), (b) and  (c)  of  the  proviso to clause (2).

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As in the cases mentioned in the proviso, the procedure laid  down  in  clause  (2) has not to be followed  and  the  only  protection  which is conferred on a civil servant cannot  be  availed  of  by  him, we must look  at  them  carefully.   A  dichotomy  has been introduced in clause (b) and,  (c)  with  regard  to  the authority or the functionary who has  to  be  satisfied about the matters stated therein.  In clause  (b),  it  is only the authority empowered to dismiss or  remove  a  person or to reduce him in rank who has to be satisfied that  it  is  not  reasonably  practicable  to  hold  the  inquiry  provided  by clause (2) and his decision in terms of  clause  (3) of the Article shall be final.  But in clause (c) it is.  the President or the Governor alone, as the case may be, who  has to be satisfied that in the interest of the security  of  the State it is not expedient to hold such inquiry.  Now the argument on behalf of the appellant has proceeded on  these  lines.  Art. 53(1) vests the Executive power  of  the  Union in the President but Art. 77 deals only with executive  action of  (1) [1964] 5 S.C.R. 683 at pp. 731 & 732).  466  the  Government of India.  There are several Articles  under  which  the President is required to be satisfied  before  an  action is taken.  Clause (c) of the proviso to clause (2) of  Art.  311 is one, of Such provisions.  The  other  provision  which also deals with the question of satisfaction about the  security of India being threatened etc. is the one contained  in  Art.  352 which relates to  Proclamation  of  emergency.  Art.  356 says that if the President on receipt of a  report  from the Governor of a State or otherwise, is satisfied that  a situation has arisen in which the government of the  State  cannot  be carried on in accordance with the provisions;  of  the Constitution, he may make a Proclamation as provided  in  the Article.  Art. 360 which contains provisions relating to  financial  emergency  also  employs  the  language  "if  the  President  is satisfied that a situation has arisen  whereby  the financial stability or credit of India or of any part of  the   territory   thereof  is  threatened,  he  may   by   a  Proclamation  make  a  declaration  to  that  effect."   The  enumeration of the aforesaid Articles is merely illustrative  and not exhaustive.  In such cases, it is the President  who  has to be personally satisfied on the material placed before  him  about  the various matters on which action  has  to  be  taken.  Such functions may pertain to the executive power of  the Union which is vested in him under Art. 53(1) but  these  cannot fall within Art. 77(1) which is confined to executive  action of the Government of India.  Apart from the  Articles  mentioned above, there are several other Articles which  may  also be considered in this connection.  It would be  han  v. F. N. Rana and Others(2).  "The  power  to  promulgate Ordinances under  Art.  123;  to  suspend  the  ’provisions  of Arts. 268  to  279  during  an  emergency;   to  declare  failure  of   the   Constitutional  machinery  in States under Art. 356; to declare a  financial  emergency  under  Art.  360; to  make  rules  regarding  the  recruitment  and conditions of service of persons  appointed  to posts and services in connection with the affairs of  the  Union  under Art. 309-to enumerate a few out of the  various  powers-are  not  powers of the Union Government;  these  are  powers  vested in the President by the Constitution and  are  incapable of being delegated or entrusted to any other  body  or  authority  under Art. 258(1).  The plea  that  the  very  nature  of  these  powers is such that  they  could  not  be  intended to be entrusted under Art. 258(1) to the, State  or  officer of the State, and, therefore, that clause must  have

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a limited content, proceeds upon an obvious fallacy.   Those  powers  cannot be delegated under Art. 258(1)  because  they  are not  (2)  1964] 5 S.C.R. 294 at pp. 307 to 308.  the  powers of the Union, and not because of  their  special  character.    There  is  a  vast  array  of   other   powers  exercisable  by  the  President-to mention  only  a  few-ap-  pointment  of  Judges:  Arts.  124  &  217,  appointment  of  Committees of Official Languages Act; Art. 344,  appointment  of   Commissions  to  investigate  conditions  of   backward  classes;  Art.  340,  appointment  of  Special  Officer  for  Scheduled  Castes  and Tribes : Art. 338,  exercise  of  his  pleasure to terminate employment: Art. 310, declaration that  in  the  interest  of the security of the State  it  is  not  expedient to give to a public servant sought to be dismissed  an   opportunity  contemplated  by  Art.  311(2)-these   are  executive  powers of the President and may not be  delegated  or entrusted to another body or officer because they do  not  fall within Art. 258."  It seems to us that there is a good deal of substance in the  argument  raised  on  behalf  of  the  appellant.   On   the  principles  which  have been enunciated by this  Court,  the  function in clause (c) of the proviso to Art. 311(2)  cannot  be delegated by the President to any one else in the case of  a  civil servant of the Union.  In other words he has to  be  satisfied personally that in the interest of the security of  the  State,  it  is  not  expedient  to  hold  the   inquiry  prescribed  by clause (2).  In the first place, the  general  consensus  has been that executive functions of  the  nature  entrusted by the Articles, some of which have been mentioned  before  and  in  particular  those  Articles  in  which  the  President has to be satisfied himself about the existence of  certain fact or state of affairs cannot be delegated by  him  to any one else.  Secondly even with regard to clause (c) of  the proviso, there is a specific. observation in the passage  extracted  above  from  the case  of  Jayantilal  Amrit  Lal  Shodhan  that  the  powers  of  the  President  under   that  provision cannot be delegated.  Thirdly, the dichotomy which  has  been  specifically  introduced  between  the  authority  mentioned  in  clause  (b) and the  President  mentioned  in  clause  (c) of the proviso cannot be  without  significance.  The  Constitution  makers apparently felt that a  matter  in  which  the interest of the security of the State had  to  be  considered  should  receive the personal  attention  of  the  President or the head of the State and he should be  himself  satisfied  that  an inquiry under the  substantive  part  of  clause  (2) of Art. 3 1 1 was not expedient for the  reasons  stated  in  clause  (c)  of the proviso in  the  case  of  a  particular servant.  We  are not impressed with the reasoning of the  High  Court  with reference to Art. 77(2).  If the function or the  power  exercisable   under   clause  (c)  of  the   proviso   under  consideration could not be delegated or allocated to any one  else by the President.  Art.  468  77(2)  will not stand in the way of the Court in the  matter  of examining the validity of the order.  For  all  the above reasons this appeal is allowed  and  the  judgment of the High Court is set aside.  The impugned order  by  which  the appellant was dismissed  from  service  shall  stand quashed on the ground that it was illegal, ultra vires  and void.  The appellant shall be entitled to costs in  this  court and the High Court.  G.C.                                                  Appeal  allowed.

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