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PETITIONER: SARASWATI SUGAR MILLS

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: HARYANA STATE BOARD AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT22/10/1991

BENCH: RAMASWAMI, V. (J) II BENCH: RAMASWAMI, V. (J) II AHMADI, A.M. (J)

CITATION:  1992 AIR  224            1991 SCR  Supl. (1) 523  1992 SCC  (1) 418        JT 1991 (4)   220  1991 SCALE  (2)913

ACT: Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Cess Act, 1977:     Sections  2(c), 3 and Schedule 1, Entry  15--’Processing of animal or vegetable product industry’--Sugar  manufactur- ing  industry--   Whether  covered  by  Entry  15,  Schedule 1---Sugar Cane---Whether a Vegetable. Interpretation of Statutes:     Construction of words and meaning to be given-- Normally depends on the nature, scope and purpose of statute. Words and Phrases: "Vegetable", "Processing"--Meaning of

HEADNOTE:     Section  3  of the Water (Prevention  of  Pollution  and Control) Cess Act, 1977 provided that water cess was payable by every person carrying on any specified industry and every local  authority, for the purposes of the Water  (Prevention and  Control of Pollution) Act, 1974.  "Specified  industry" was  defined  in the Act meaning any industry  specified  in Schedule 1. There were 15 items under Schedule I,  including "processing of animal or vegetable products industry", under Entry 15.     The question for consideration in the batch of  appeals, writ  petitions  and transferred cases arising  out  of  the notices  issued by the concerned assessing  authorities  de- manding water cess from the sugar manufacturers was  whether sugar manufacturing industry fell under Entry 15 of Schedule I  of the Water (Prevention and Control of  Pollution)  Cess Act, 1977.     Disposing of the appeals, writ petitions and transferred cases, this Court,     HELD: 1. In the context in which the word ’vegetable’ is used  in Entry 15, Schedule I of the Water  (Prevention  and Control  of Pollution) Cess Act, 1977,  ’vegetable  product’ means product of or made of or out of 524 vegetable. ’Vegetables’ as understood in common parlance are not products of manufacture unless it is said that  agricul- ture is an industry for certain purposes and vegetables  are products  of  that industry. In order to bring  an  industry within  any of the entries in Schedule 1 it has to  be  seen what is the end product produced by that industry. Sugarcane

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is not a vegetable though it may be an agricultural product. If the botanic meaning of vegetable as referring to any  and every  kind  of plant life is to be given then some  of  the industries  listed  in Schedule I like  Paper  Industry  and Textile  Industry and even Chemical Industry which are  cov- ered by other entries could also be brought within Entry 15. The  word  ’vegetable’ in the context does not  attract  the botanic meaning. The sugar manufacturing industry does  not, therefore,  come within Entry 15 of Schedule I of  the  Cess Act. Consequently, the manufacture of alcohol from molasses, which is a by product of manufacture of sugar, could not  be considered to be an industry within Entry 15 of Schedule  I. [534 C-E, F]     2.1 The word ’vegetable’ has been defined in many  ways. From  the botanic point of view ’vegetable’ may include  any plant but in common parlance it is understood as referred to edible plants or parts of edible plants. Unless the  botani- cal  meaning  is  given to the word ’vegetable’  it  is  not possible to conclude sugarcane as vegetable. [528 C]     2.2 Pollution Act may be a regulating Act, but Cess  Act is  a  fiscal enactment. Therefore, the Court  has  to  look merely  at  what is clearly said. There is no room  for  any intendment and no room for bringing within the provision  of the Cess Act anything by implication. [533 E,F]     State of West Bengal & Ors. v. Washi Ahmed Etc. AIR 1977 SC  1638; Member-Secretary, Andhra Pradesh State  Board  for Prevention  and Control of Water Pollution v.Andhra  Pradesh Rayons Ltd. and others, [1989] 1 SCC 44, M/s Motipur Zamind- ary Co. (P) Ltd. v. The State of Bihar, [1962] Suppl. 1  SCR 498 and Rajasthan State Electricity Board v. The Cess Appel- late Committee & Anr., JT 1990 4 SC 123, referred to.     World Book, Concise Oxford Dictionary, 3rd Ed. p.  1365, Webster’s  International Dictionary and Encyclopaedia  Brit- tannica, Vol. 23, referred to.     2.3  Construction of words and the meaning to  be  given for  such words shall normally depend on the  nature,  scope and  purpose of the statute in which it is occurring and  to the fitness of the matter to the 525 statute.  The meaning given to the same word occurring in  a social security measure or a regulating enactment may not be apposite  or. appropriate when the same word is  interpreted with  reference to a taxing state. The Cess Act is a  fiscal enactment. [534 B]     3.1.  Processing of vegetable products industry is  nor- mally understood in the sense that it relates to  processing of vegetables, which even after processing retain its  char- acter as vegetable. [530 H,531A]     3.2 Processing as generally understood in marine,  agri- cultural  and food products industries is an action,  opera- tion or method of treatment applying it to something. It  is refining, development, preparation or converting of material especially  that  in a raw state into  marketable  form.  In manufacture  something is brought into existence,  which  is different from that originally existed in the sense that the thing produced is by itself a commercially different commod- ity,  whereas in the case of processing it is not  necessary to produce a commercially different article. [531 C,D]     3.3 Processing essentially effectuates a change in form, cantour,  physical  appearance or  chemical  combination  or otherwise  by  artificial or natural means and in  its  more complicated form involves progressive action in  performing, producing or making something. [533 A,B]     CST v.A.R.Aladin, AIR 1964 Guj. 27. Addl. CIT v. Farruk- habad  Cold  Storage, [1977] 2 ITJ 202; Union  of  India  v.

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Delhi  Cloth  and  General Mills, AIR 1963 SC  79  and  Corn Products  Refining Co. v. Federal Trade  Commission,  CCA.7. 144 F.2d 211, referred to.

JUDGMENT:     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4289 of F 1991 etc. etc.     From  the  Judgment  and Order dated  25.8.1989  of  the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Civil Writ Petition No.  2635 of 1989.    Soli  J.  Sorabjee,  Krishnamurthy  lyer,  Bishamber  Lal Khanna,  H.K.  Puri, Ms. Geetanjali Mohan, Ms.  A.K.  Verma, P.R. Ramasesh, MahabirSingh, R. Mohan and Ayyam Perumal  for the appearing parties. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by V.  RAMASWAMI, J. Leave granted in all Special  Leave  Peti- tions. 526     In this batch of civil appeals, writ petition and trans- ferred  case, a common question of law arises as to  whether the  industries which manufacture sugar from sugar cane  are covered  by Entry 15 of Schedule I to the Water  (Prevention and  Control of Pollution Cess Act, 1977 (Central Act 36  of 1977) (hereinafter called the ’Cess Act’).     Originally  the Water (Prevention and Control of  Pollu- tion Act), 1974 (hereinafter called the Act) was enacted  by the Parliament under Article 252 of the Constitution with  a view  to control the pollution of rivers and  streams  which has  assumed considerable importance and urgency  in  recent years as a result of increasing industrialisation and urban- isation. The Act is intended to ensure that the domestic and industrial  affluence are not allowed to be discharged  into water coarses without adequate treatment. This Act is now in force in almost all States and in all Union Territories. The Act provides for the constitution of a Central Board by  the Central Government and State Boards by the State Governments concerned for the prevention and control of water pollution. There  are also certain provisions relating to  constitution of joint boards the details of which need not detain us. The Act  sets  out in detail the functions and powers  of  these Boards.  Chapter VI of the Act requires the Central  Govern- ment  and  the  State Governments to provide  funds  to  the Central  Board and the State Boards respectively for  imple- menting  the provisions of the Act. The Cess Act 36 of  1977 provides  for  levy  of cess on water  consumed  by  persons carrying on certain industries and by the local  authorities with  a view to augment the resources of the  Central  Board and  the  State Boards constituted for  the  prevention  and control of water pollution. Section 3 of the Cess Act  which may  be  termed as the charging section states  that  "there shall be levied and collected a cess for the purposes of the Water  (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act,  1974  and utilisation thereunder". The cess is payable by every person carrying on any specified industry and every local authority and  is  calculated on the basis of water consumed  by  such person or local authority as the case may be for any of  the purposes specified in column I of Schedule II to the Act, at such  rate not exceeding the rates specified in  the  corre- sponding  Entry in column II thereof as the Central  Govern- ment  may by notification in the Official Gazette from  time to time, specify. "Specified industry" is defined in the Act as  meaning any industry specified in Schedule I. There  are 15 entries in Schedule I and they read as follows:

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             SCHEDULE I                                (See Section 2(c))                1. Ferrous metallurgical industry.                      527                  2. Non-ferrous metallurgical industry.                  3. Mining industry.                  4. Ore processing industry.                  5. Petroleum industry.                  6. Petro-chemical industry.                  7. Chemical industry.                  8. Ceramic industry.                  9. Cement industry.                  10. Textile industry.                  11. Paper industry.                  12. Fertilizer industry.                13.  Coal (including coke) industry.               14.  Power  (thermal  and  diesel)  generating               industry. ’                  15.  Processing  of  animal  or   vegetable               products industry.     The  concerned  assessing authorities have  in  all  the cases  under  consideration issued notices  demanding  water cess  from the sugar manufacturers on the ground  that  this industry falls under item 15 "processing of animal or  vege- table products industry". The Punjab and Haryana High  Court and  the Allahabad High Court have taken the view  that  the sugar manufacturing industries would come within Entry 15 as "processing vegetable products industry". On the other  hand the  Andhra  Pradesh High Court and Patna  High  Court  have taken the view that sugar manufacturing industries would not come  within Entry 15 of the ist Schedule. A  writ  petition which  was filed in the High Court of Karnataka,  Bangalore, by  one  of  the sugar mills in  Karnataka  raising  similar question has been withdrawn to this Court in transfer  peti- tion  No.  276  of 1984 to be dealt with  along  with  other appeals  raising identical question. Similarly another  writ petition has been withdrawn from the Allahabad High Court in Transfer  Petition  No. 277 of 1984 to be dealt  with  along with this group of cases. The object of the Act is to control the water pollution  and to ensure 528 that  industrial affluents are not allowed to be  discharged into the water coarses without adequate treatment. The  Cess Act  is not an enactment to regulate and  control  pollution but  a  fiscal measure to raise revenue for  augmenting  the resources  of  the Pollution Control Boards.  The  levy  and collection  of cess provided under the Cess Act is on  water consumed by persons carrying on the industries specified  in the  Schedule. The Cess is levied on the person carrying  on the  specified industry. The question is whether  industries manufacturing sugar is covered by Entry 15 that is "process- ing of vegetable product industry".     From  the botanic point of view ’vegetable’ may  include any plant but in common parlance it is understood as  refer- ring  to edible plants or parts of edible plants.  The  word ’vegetable’ has been defined in many ways. In the World Book it is defined as follows:               "In  the  usual sense, the word  vegetable  is               applied to those plants whose leaves,  stalks,               roots  or  tubers are used for food,  such  as               lettuce, asparagus, cabbage, beet and  turnip.               It  also includes several plants whose  fruits               are  the  edible  portions,  as  peas,  beans,               melons and tomatoes."

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             In  the Concise Oxford Dictionary, 3rd Ed.  p.               1365, it is defined as:               "Plant, esp. herbaceous plant, used for  culi-               nary  purposes  or for  feeding  cattle,  e.g.               cabbage, potato, turnip bean."               Again  in Webster’s International  Dictionary,               vegetable is defined as:               "A  plant used or cultivated for food for  man               or  domestic animals, as the cabbage,  turnip,               potato, bean, dandelion, etc., also the edible               part  of such a plant, as prepared for  market               or the table. Vegetables and fruits are  some-               times  loosely distinguished by the used  need               of cooking the former or the use of man, while               the latter may be eaten raw; but the  distinc-               tion  often fails, as in the case of  quinces,               barberries,  and  other fruits,  and  lettuce,               celery,  and  other  vegetable.  Tomatoes   if               cooked  are  vegetables,  if  eaten  raw   are               fruit."               In  the  Encyclopaedie  Britannica,  vol.  23,               ’vegetable’ is defined as:               "A general term used as an adjective in refer-               ring  to  any  kind of  plant  life  or  plant               product, viz. ’vegetable matter’. More common-               ly  and specifically, in common language,  the               word is used               529                as  a  noun in referring to  those  generally               herbaceous plants or any parts of such  plants               as  are eaten by man. The edible’ portions  of               many plants considered aS vegetables are in  a               botanical  sense, fruits. The common  distinc-               tion  between fruits and vegetables  is  often               indefinite  and confusing, since it  is  based               generally  on how the plant or plant  part  is               used rather than on what it     This Court in State of West Bengal & Ors. v. Washi Ahmed etc., AIR 1977 SC 1638 with reference to the meaning of  the word  ’vegetable’  in Item (6) of Schedule I to  the  Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941 held:               "That  the  word ’vegetable’ in  Item  (6)  of               Schedule  I  to the Act must be  construed  as               understood  in common parlance and it must  be               given  its popular sense meaning  ’that  sense               which  people  conversant  with  the  subject-               matter with which the statute is dealing would               attribute to it’ and so construed, it  denotes               those classes of vegetables which are grown in               a kitchen garden or in a farm and are used for               the table."     The  interpretation of one of the entries in Schedule  I to  the Cess Act came up for consideration in  Member-Secre- tary, Andhra Pradesh State Board for Prevention and  Control of Water Pollution v. Andhra Pradesh Rayons Ltd. and others, [1989] 1 SCC 44. The question for consideration was  whether manufacturing of rayon grade pulp a base material for  manu- facturing of synthetics or manmade fabrics is an industry as mentioned in Schedule I to the Cess Act. It was held: .lm13             "Whether a particular industry is an industry as             covered  in Schedule I of the Act, it has to  be             judged  normally by what that industry  produces             mainly. Every industry carries out  multifarious             activities  to  reach its goal  through  various

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           multifarious   methods.  Whether  a   particular             industry  falls  within the realm  of  taxation,             must  be judged by the predominant  purpose  and             process  and not by any ancillary or  incidental             process  carried on by a particular industry  in             running its business."             This Court also observed:             "It  has to be borne in mind that this Act  with             which  we are concerned is an Act  imposing  li-             ability  for cess. The Act is fiscal in  nature.             The  Act must, therefore, be strictly  construed             in order to find out whether a liability is fas-             tened on a particular             530             industry. The subject is not to be taxed without             clear  words  for that purpose,  and  also  that             every  Act of Parliament must be read  according             to  its natural construction of words.  See  the             observations In Re. Nicklethwait, 1985 (11)  Ex.             452, 456. Also see the observations in Tenant v.             Smith  1892 AC 150 and Lord Halsbury’s  observa-             tions at page 154. See also the observations  of             Lord Simonds in St. Aubyn v. A.G. 1951 (2)  All.             ER, 473, 485. Justice Rowlatt of England said  a             long  time ago, that in a taxing Act one has  to             look merely at what is clearly said. There is no             room  for  any intendment. There  is  no  equity             about a tax. There is no presumption as to  tax.             Nothing  is  to  be read in, nothing  is  to  be             implied. One has to look fairly at the  language             used. See the observations in Cape Brandy Syndi-             cate v. IRC, [1921] 1 KB 64, 71. This Court  has             also reiterated the same view in Gursahai Saigal             v.  CIT, [1963] 3 SCR 892, CIT v. Mr.  P.  Firm,             Muar, [1965] 1 SCR 815 Controller of Estate duty             v. Kantilal Trikamlal, [1976] 4 SCC 643.             The question as to what is covered must be found             out  from the language according to its  natural             meaning fairly and squarely read. See the obser-             vations  in IRC v. Duke of Westminster,  ([1963]             AC 1, 24) and of this Court in A.V. Fernandez v.             State of Kerala [1957] SCR 837. Justice  Krishna             Iyer  of this Court in Martand Dairy &  Fawn  v.             Union  of  India [1975] 4 SCC 313  has  observed             that taxing consideration may stem from adminis-             trative experience and other factors of life and             not artistic visualisation or neat logic and  so             the  literal, though pedestrain,  interpretation             must prevail."      This Court considered the question as to whether sugar- cane is green vegetable with reference to an exemption given under  Sales Tax Enactment in the decision in  M/s.  Motipur Zamindary Co. (P) Ltd. v. The State of Bihar [1962] Supp.  1 SCR 498. This Court quoted with the approval a passage  from the judgment of the Nagput High Court in Madhya Pradesh  Pan Merchants  Association v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1956  (7) S.T.C. 99) wherein it was held "the word vegetable in taxing statutes  is to be understood as in common parlance that  is denoting  class of vegetables which are grown in  a  kitchen garden  or  in a farm and are used for the  table".  It  was further  held that sugarcane is normally considered to be  a grass specie and it would not fail within the definition  of words green vegetable.      The  use  of the word processing  is  also  significant. Processing of

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531 vegetable  products industry are normally understood in  the sense they relate processing of vegetables which even  after processing retain its character as vegetable.     Processing: Section 3(1), Marine Product Export Develop- ment  Authority Act, 1972 defines processing in relation  to marine  products,  as  including the  preservation  of  such products  as  canning, freezing, drying,  salting,  smoking, peeling or filleting or any other method of processing which the authority made by notification in the Gazette of  India, specified  in this behalf. Section 2(g) of the  Agricultural and  Processed  Food Products Export  Development  Authority Act,  1985  defines  processing  in  relation  to  scheduled products  as including the process of preservation  of  such products  such as canning, freezing, drying, salting,  smok- ing, peeling or rilleting and any other methods of  process- ing which the authority made by notification in the official Gazette specified in this behalf. Thus processing as  gener- ally  understood in marine, agricultural and  food  products industries  is an action, operation or method  of  treatment applying  it  to  something. It  is  refining,  development, preparation  or converting of material especially that in  a raw  state into marketable form. It would be interesting  to note  that this Act contains a Schedule of the  agricultural or processed food products" which are to be governed by  the Act which reads as follows:               THE SCHEDULE                        (See Section 2(i))                1. Fruits, vegetables and their products.                  2. Meat and meat products.                  3. Poultry and poultry products.                  4. Dairy products.                  5.   Confectionary,  biscuits  and   bakery               products.                  6. Honey, jaggery and sugar products.                  7.  Cocoa and its products,  chocolates  of               all kinds.                  8. Alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages.                  9. Cereal products.               532               10.  Cashewnuts, groundnuts, peanuts and  wal-               nuts.               11. Pickles, chutneys and papads.               12. Guar Gum.               13.  Floriculture and  floriculture  products.               14. Herbal and medicinal plants.     In  CST v.A.R.Alladin, AIR 1964 Guj. 27  the  expression "who  processes any goods" in the Bombay Sales Tax was  held to  refer to the subjecting of any goods to a  treatment  or process. In Addl. CIT v. Farrukhabad Cold Storage, 1977  (2) ITJ  202 held that processing of goods means that the  goods must  be adopted for a particular use. The variety  of  acts performed  in  respect  of goods or their  subjection  to  a process  need not be such as may lead to the  production  of any new article. The act of subjecting ’ goods to a particu- lar temperature for a long period of time as in cold storage amounts  to processing of goods. On the other hand  manufac- ture is a transformation of an article which is commercially different  from the one which is converted. The  essence  of manufacture  is the change of one object to another for  the purpose of making it marketable. In Union of India v.  Delhi Cloth  and General Mills, AIR 1963 SC 79 this Court  pointed out:               "The  word  ’manufacture’ used as  a  verb  is               generally understood to mean as bringing  into

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             existence  a new substance and does  not  mean               ’merely’  to  produce some change  in  a  sub-               stance,  however  minor  in  consequence,  the               change may be."     In  the  same decision the following  passage  from  the Permanent  Edition  of Words and Phrases  from  an  American Judgment was quoted with approval:               "Manufacture implies a change but every change               is not manufacture, and yet every change of an               article is the result of treatment, labour and               manipulation. But something more is  necessary               and  there must be transformation, a  new  and               different  article must emerges having a  dis-               tinctive name, character or use."     The  essential point thus is that in  manufacture  some- thing is brought into existence which is different from that originally  existed in the sense that the thing produced  is by itself a commercially different commodity 533 whereas  in  the case of processing it is not  necessary  to produce a commer-   cially different article.     Processing  essentially  effectuates a change  in  form, contour,  physical  appearance or  chemical  combination  or otherwise  by  artificial or natural means and in  its  more complicated form involves progressive action in  performing, producing  or making something. Vide Com  Products  Refining 60. v. Federal Trade Commission, CCA. 7, 144 F.2d 211.     In the decisions under appeal, the Allahabad High  Court held that sugar mills will come within the meaning of  ’pro- cessing  vegetable  products industry’ in Entry  15  on  the ground that the word ’vegetable’ has been used in opposition to  the expression ’animal’ and that it could not  be  given the  meaning  of  vegetables which are kept  on  the  dining tables for dinner purposes, and it has a wider amplitude. It was further of the view that in interpreting the word  ’veg- etable’  one  has to keep in mind the object for  which  the Cess Act was made. The learned Judges then stated that sugar industry  is one of the main source of causing water  pollu- tion and since the object of the Pollution Act and the  Cess Act  were intended to control water pollution and since  the entries are to be given a wider meaning sugar industry would be covered by the Act.     The Punjab & Haryana High Court also took a similar line of reasoning and said that ’vegetable products’  essentially mean  what  belongs to the plant kingdom as opposed  to  the animal  kingdom. In another words the word  ’vegetable’  has been used in contra-distinction to the word ’animal’. Though the learned Judges were not prepared.to hold that sugar cane is  vegetable, the word ’product’ gives a  definite  colour, meaning  thereby  all that belongs to the  world  of  plants would come within the entry.     We are unable to appredate the reasonings of the learned judges.  Pollution Act may be a regulating Act but Cess  Act is  a fiscal enactment, as is held by this Court  in  Member Secretary,  Andhra  Pradesh State Board for  Prevention  and Control of Water Pollution v. Andhra Pradesh Rayons Ltd. and Others (supra) and Rajasthan State Electricity Board v.  The Cess Appellate Committee & Anr., JT 1990 (4) SC 123.  There- fore  we have to look merely at what is clearly said.  There is  no  room  for any intendment and there is  no  room  for bringing within the provision of the Act anything by  impli- cation.  Unless  we give the botanical meaning to  the  word ’vegetable’  it  is not possible to conclude sugar  cane  as vegetable.     The  Patna  High Court in Civil Writ  Jurisdiction  Case

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Nos.  4413 of 1981 and 2346 of 1983 M/s Champaran Sugar  Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar & 534 Ors.  held that sugar manufacturing industry would not  fall under Entry 15 Of Schedule I. The Andhra Pradesh High  Court also  seems  to be as the same view and it had  dismissed  a Writ Petition without a speaking order.     Construction  of words and the meaning to be  given  for such  words shall normally depend on the nature,  scope  and purpose  of the statute in which it is occurring and to  the fitness  of the matter to the statute. The meaning given  to the  same word occurring in a. social security measure or  a regulating enactment may not be apposite or appropriate when the  same  word is interpreted with reference  to  a  taxing statute. The Cess Act is a fiscal enactment. In the  context in which the word ’vegetable’ is used in Entry 15 ’vegetable product’  means product of or made of or out  of  vegetable. ’Vegetables’  as  understood  in  common  parlance  are  not products of manufacture unless we say that agriculture is an industry for certain purposes and vegetables are products of that  industry. In order to bring an industry within any  of the entires in Schedule I it has to be seen what is the  end product  produced  by  that industry. Sugar cane  is  not  a vegetable  though it may be an agricultural product. If  the botanic  meaning of vegetable as referring to any and  every kind  of plant life is to be given then some of  the  indus- tries  listed in Schedule I like Paper Industry and  Textile Industry  and  even chemical industry which are  covered  by other  entries  could also be brought within Entry  15.  The word  vegetable in the context does not attract the  botanic meaning. The sugar manufacturing industry do not, therefore, come within Entry 15 of Schedule I of the Cess Act.     In  Civil Appeal (arising out of Special Leave  Petition No.  814  of 1990) the appellant is Haryana  Distillery  who purchases molasses which is a by-product of the .manufacture of  sugar and manufactures alcohol. Manufacture of  alchohol was held by the High Court to come within Entry 15 of Sched- ule  I as processing agricultural prOduct industry. We  have held already that the industry manufacturing sugar itself is not an industry within the meaning of Entry 15 and a fortio- ri  the  manufacture of alcohol from molasses could  not  be considered to be an industry within Entry 15 of Schedule I.     In the result we allow Civil Appeals (arising out of SLP Nos. 15828 of 1989, 7496 of 1989, 778, 814, 830, 1286,  1433 of  1990 and SLP No  .............. of 1991  entitled  Upper Doab  Sugar Mills Ltd & Anr. v. Union of India &  Ors.  Writ Petition  No.  77 of 1990, and Transfer CaSe (C) Nos.  6  of 1986 & 91 of 1989 and dismiss Civil Appeals (arising out  of SLP  Nos. 9558-62 of 1988) and the Rule Nisi is  made  abso- lute. N.P.V.                                               Appeals disposed of. 535