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PETITIONER: SALEM ERODE ELECTRICITY DISTRIBUTION  COMPANY LTD.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SALEM  ERODE ELECTRICITY DISTRIBUTION  CO.  LTD.   EMPLOYEES

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 03/11/1965

BENCH: GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. (CJ) BENCH: GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. (CJ) WANCHOO, K.N. HIDAYATULLAH, M. RAMASWAMI, V.

CITATION:  1966 AIR  808            1966 SCR  (2) 498  CITATOR INFO :  D          1968 SC 585  (16,20)  APL        1970 SC 512  (7,10)  R          1972 SC1201  (7,9,10)  F          1972 SC1626  (8)  R          1972 SC2326  (14)  R          1973 SC2650  (6)  R          1984 SC 505  (23)  F          1985 SC 504  (4)

ACT: Industrial   Employment   (Standing   Orders)   Act,   1946- Application  for  amendment  of  certified  Standing  Order- Proposed amendments applying different rules to existing and new   employees-Whether   fair   and   reasonable   -Whether certifying officer has power In law to refuse amendment.

HEADNOTE: The  appellant  company, which carried on  the  business  of buying  bulk  electrical  energy  and  distributing  it   to consumers,   made  an  application  under   the   Industrial Employment  (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, to  the  Certifying Officer,  Madras, for an amendment of two of  its  certified Standing-Orders  relating  to holidays and  leave.   It  was claimed by the appellant that the urgent need for  increased production  and  for increased supply of  electrical  energy could  be  met  if the existing rules embodied  in  the  two standing  orders were suitably amended; the amendments  pro- posed  sought  to  introduce  different  rules  relating  to holidays and leave for employees who were appointed before a specified date and those who joined service after that date. The  proposed amendments were resisted by  the  respondents’ union  on the ground, inter alia, that they would  introduce discrimination  between  one  se of  employees  and  another resulting   in  industrial  unrest  and   disharmony.    The Certifying  Officer upheld the respondents I plea and  nega- tived the amendments.  An appeal to the appellate  authority against this decision was dismissed. it  was  contended  on  behalf of  the  appellant  that  the proposed  amendments were fair and reasonable and  that  the Certifying-Officer and, the appellate authority had erred in

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law in not certifying the Standing Orders as proposed to  be amended. HELD  :  (i)  The  Certifying  Officer  and  the   appellate authority  committed no error of law in refusing to  certify the modified Standing Orders. [510 E] The  Act provides a self contained code and  the  Certifying Officer is given the power to consider questions of fairness and  reasonableness as well as other questions indicated  by s. 4(a) and (b).  An appeal is provided against the decision of the Certifying Officer and in case a dispute arises as to the interpretation or the application of the Standing Order, a  remedy is provided In s. 13A.  A Tight is given  both  to the  employer  and  the  workman  to  move  the  appropriate authorities  for  modification  of  the  existing   Standing Orders. [505 G-H] (ii) It  is clear from the provisions of the  Act  requiring industrial  establishments  to have  their  Standing  Orders certified that matters specified in the Schedule to the  Act should  be covered by uniform Standing Orders applicable  to all workmen employed in an industrial establishment. [505 B]  499 Rai  Bahadur  Diwan Badri Das V.  The  Industrial  Tribunal, Punjab;[1963] 3 S.C.R. 930; Associated Cement Staff Union v. Associated Cement Co.,& Ors. (1964) 1 L.L.J. 12; Guest  Keen Williams Private Ltd. v. F. I. Sterling and others: [1960] 1 S.C.R. 348; referred to.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: C.A. No. 305 of 1964. Appeal by Special Leave from the order dated the 9th  April, 1963 of the Labour Court, Coimbatore, in C.S.O. Appeal No. 1 of 1962. M.   C. Setalvad, and Naunit Lai, for the appellant. M.   K. Ramamurthi, R. K. Garg, D. P. Singh and S. C. Agar- wala, for the respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Gajendragadkar, C.J. The appellant, Salem Erode  Electricity Distribution  Co.,  Ltd.,  is a licensee  under  the  Indian Electricity  Act, 1910, and its business consists in  buying electrical  energy in bulk from the State Electricity  Board of Madras and selling it to consumers in Salem and Erode and certain  rural  districts in the State of Madras.   For  the purpose  of carrying on this business, the appellant has  an industrial establishment at Salem. In  or about 1940, when the number of the  appellant’s  con- sumers  was about 3,000, and that of its workmen ’about  45, the  appellant  framed certain terms and conditions  of  its workmen’s  employment.   Amongst these were  included  terms about  leave  and  holidays.   Later,  when  the  Industrial Employment  (Standing  Orders) Act, 1946 (No.  20  of  1946) (hereinafter   called  ’the  Act’)  came  into  force,   the provisions   as  to  leave  and  holidays  which  had   been introduced  by the appellant in the terms and conditions  of the  employment  of  its  workmen,  were  embodied  in   the appellant’s  Standing Orders which were certified under  the relevant  provisions of the Act in or about 1947.  The  said terms read thus :-               "Standing Order 5(b)               The  number of holidays to be granted  to  the               workmen  and the days which shall be  observed               as  holidays  by the  Establishment  shall  be               regulated  in  accordance with  the  Factories               Act, 1948 or other relevant law for time being

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             in  force  and  the custom  or  usage  of  the               Establishment,   viz.,  holidays   under   the               Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and  festival               holidays  peculiar to this locality which  are               being given.               5 0 0               Standing Order 10(a) :               Leave will be given in accordance with the law               and  existing  practice  provided  the   leave               facilities  now available to the  workers  are               not curtailed in any manner". The proceedings which have, given rise to the present appeal by special leave between the appellant and the  respondents, its  employees,  began  with the application  made  by  -the appellant  on the 6th October, 1960, before  the  Certifying Officer, Madras, for the amendment of the certified Standing Orders to which we have just referred.  By its  application, the  management of the appellant wanted the said  Orders  to read thus               "Standing Order 5(b) :               For all workmen who have joined service  prior               to   ....   holidays  under   the   Negotiable               Instruments  Act, 1881, and festival  holidays               of one day per year which day may be chosen by               the  workmen shall be given.  For all  workmen               who  have joined on and after  holidays  under               the Madras Industrial Establishments (National               and  Festival  holidays) Act,  1958  shall  be               given."               "Standing Order 10(a)               Leave  will be given to all employees who  are               appointed  on  and after ....  iii  accordance               with  the provisions of the Madras  Shops  and               Establishment  Act,  1947  or  any   statutory               modification thereof (irrespective of  whether               this  Act  applies or not to any  category  of               employee  or employees).   Provided,  however,               that for all employees who have been confirmed               prior  to the above said date, viz  the  leave               facilities now available are not curtailed  in               any manner". It  is  relevant to mention the background  of  the  present application.   The appellant believed that the  urgent  need for  increased  production  and  for  increased  supply   of electrical  energy  could  be  met  if  the  existing  rules embodied  in  Standing Orders 5(b) and 10(a)  were  suitably modified; and so, the appellant wanted to make the change in the said two Standing Orders on the lines indicated by it in its application to the Certifying Officer.  It appears  that these  Rules  were introduced by the appellant  on  the  1st October, 1960, and were embodied in the contracts of service of  new  entrants who joined the appellant’s  employment  as from  that date.  In fact, they were agreed to by  such  new entrants.  501 In  order to regularise the steps taken by the appellant  by revising  the relevant Rules in respect of the new  entrants to   its   employment,  the  appellant  made   the   present application. The  change proposed to be made by the appellant in the  two Standing Orders in question was resisted by the respondents’ Union.   It was urged by the respondents that  the  proposed change  was unfair and unreasonable, and it was also  argued that  it would introduce discrimination between one  set  of employees  and another working under the same employer,  and

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that would naturally cause industrial unrest and disharmony. The  Certifying  Officer  upheld the  pleas  raised  by  the respondents  and he accordingly directed that  the  proposed amendments should be negatived. The  appellant  then preferred an appeal  against  the  said order  before  the appellate authority.   Both  the  parties urged similar contentions before the appellate authority and the  said  authority  agreed  with the  view  taken  by  the Certifying Officer and dismissed the appeal preferred by the appellant.  It is against this order that the appellant  has come to this Court by special leave. On behalf of the appellant, Mr. Setalvad has urged that  the change which the appellant wants to make in the two relevant orders  is, on the merits, fair and reasonable; and he  adds that the appellant wanted to prove its bona fides by  making the  changed  Standing  Orders  applicable  to  the   future entrants  and not extending them to its employees  who  were already  in  its  employment and who  are  governed  by  the existing  Standing Orders.  According to Mr.  Setalvad,  the Certifying Officer and the appellate authority have erred in law  in  not  certifying  the  changed  Standing  Orders  as proposed by the appellant. In  dealing with this point, it is necessary to examine  the broad features of the Act and consider its main purpose  and object.  The Act was passed in 1946 and its main object  was to  require  the employers in industrial  establishments  to which  the  Act applied, to define formally  the  terms  and conditions of employment in their respective establishments. In  imposing  this  obligation on  the  employers,  the  Act intended  that  the  terms  and  conditions  of   industrial employment should be well-defined and should be known to the employees  before they accepted the employment.  As we  will presently  point out, one of the objects of the Act  was  to introduce  uniformity of terms and conditions of  employment in  respect  of workmen belonging to the same  category  and discharging  the  same or similar work under  an  industrial establishment.  Before the Act was passed, employees in many industrial  establishments were governed by oral  terms  and conditions of service which CI/66-2 502 were  not uniform and which had been entered into on  an  ad hoc  basis.  The Act now requires that terms and  conditions of  employment  in  relation to  matters  specified  in  the Schedule  must be included in the Standing Orders  and  they must  be certified.  It would at once be clear that  by  the operation  of  the Act, all industrial  establishments  will have  to frame terms and conditions of service in regard  to all  the  matters  specified  in  the  Schedule,  and   that naturally would introduce an element of uniformity  inasmuch as industrial employment in all establishments to which  the Act applied would, after the Act was passed, be governed  by terms and conditions of service in respect of matters  which are  common to all of them.  That, in brief, is  the  object which the Act intends to achieve. Let us now see the scheme of the Act.  "Standing Orders" are defined by s. 2(g) as meaning rules relating to matters  set out in the Schedule; these matters are 11 in number, and the last  one  of them refers to any other matter which  may  be prescribed   "Prescribed"   according  to  s.   2(f)   means prescribed by rules made by the appropriate Government under this  Act;  and  so,  Standing Orders  mean  rules  made  in relation to the matters enumerated in clauses 1 to 10 in the Schedule as well as any other matter which may in future  be added  by  means  of rules to be  made  by  the  appropriate

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Government.   This  gives a general idea about  the  matters which are intended to be covered by the Standing Orders. Section 3 of the Act requires the submission of draft Stand- ing  Orders by the employer within six months from the  date on  which  the  Act  becomes  applicable  to  an  industrial establishment.  A statutory obligation has been imposed upon the  employer  to take necessary action as  required  by  S. 3(1).  Section 4 requires that the Standing Orders must deal with  every  matter  set  out  in  the  Schedule  which   is applicable  to the industrial establishment, and must be  in conformity with the provisions of the Act.  Section 5  deals with  the  proceedings  for certification  of  the  standing orders  by the Certifying Officer.  Section 6  provides  for appeals against the orders passed by the Certifying  Officer Section  7  prescribes  the  date  on  which  the  certified standing  orders  will come into operation.   Section  10(2) provides  for  the  modification  of  the  standing  orders. Section  13A  provides  for  the  machinery  to  deal   with questions  in relation to the application or  interpretation of  the standing orders certified under the Act; and  s.  15 confers  powers on the appropriate Government to make  rules to carry out the purposes of the Act.  5 0 3 When the Act was originally passed, the powers of the Certi- fying  Officer as well as those of the  appellate  authority were  limited  to consider the question as  to  whether  the standing   orders  submitted  for  certification   were   in accordance  with  the Act or not.  By an amendment  made  in 1956,  jurisdiction  has been conferred  on  the  Certifying Officer  as  well as the appellate authority  to  adjudicate upon the fairness or reasonableness of the provisions of the Standing Orders submitted for certification.  That means the jurisdiction  of  the  appropriate  authorities  functioning under the Act has now been widened and they are required  to consider  whether the Standing Orders submitted to them  for their  approval  are fair or reasonable.  Parties  can  make their   contentions   in   respect  of   the   fairness   or reasonableness  of  the proposed Standing  Orders,  and  the appropriate  authorities  will  adjudicate  upon  the   said contentions.  That is one change made in 1956. The other change made in the original provisions of the  Act which  is  relevant  for our purpose is  in  regard  to  the provisions  contained  in  S.  10(2).   Under  the  original provision  of  S. 10(2), it was only the  employer  who  was authorised to make an application to the Certifying  Officer to have the Standing Orders modified.  By the amendment made in  1956,  even workmen are now entitled to  apply  for  the modification  of  the Standing Orders.  The result  of  this amendment  is  that  if workmen are  dissatisfied  with  the operation of the existing Standing Orders, they can move for their modification by applying to the Certifying Officer  in that  behalf.   Before  this amendment was  made,  the  only course  open  to  the  workmen to  adopt  for  securing  any modification in the existing Standing Orders was to raise an industrial  dispute and move the appropriate  government  to refer   the  said  dispute  to  the  adjudication   of   the appropriate Industrial Tribunal.  Both these amendments have been introduced by Act No. 36 of 1956. Now, the question which we have to decide is : is it permis- ible  for  an industrial establishment to have two  sets  of Standing Orders to govern the relevant terms and  conditions of its employees ? Mr. Setalvad argues that if the change is intended  to  be made in the existing  Standing  Orders,  it should be permissible and indeed legitimate for an  employer to  seek for the change on .he ground that the  said  change

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would be reasonable and fair,, provided the existing  rights of  employees  already employed are ,lot  affected  by  such change.    Prima   facie,  this  argument  appears   to   be attractive;  but  if we examine the scheme of  the  relevant Provisions of the Act in the light of the matters  specified in  the  schedule in respect of which  Standing  Orders  are required to be 504 made, it appears that two sets of Standing Orders cannot  be made under the Act. Let us first examine the matters specified in the  Schedule. They are specified under cls. ( 1 ) to ( 11 ). The first  is in  regard to classification of workmen.  The second  is  in relation to the manner of intimating to workmen periods  and hours of work, holidays, pay-days and wage rates.  The third has reference to shift working; the fourth to attendance and late coming.  Clause (5) relates to conditions of, procedure in  applying for, and the authority which may  grant,  leave and  holidays.   Clause (6) deals with  the  requirement  to enter  premises by certain gates, and liability  to  search. Clause  (7) is concerned with the closing and  reopening  of sections  of  the industrial  establishment,  and  temporary stoppages  of  work and the rights and  liabilities  of  the employer  and workmen arising therefrom.  Clause  (8)  deals with  the termination of employment, and the notice  thereof to be given by employer and workmen.  Clause (9) covers  the subject of suspension or dismissal for misconduct, and  acts or  omissions  which  constitute  misconduct.   Clause  (10) relates  to  means  of redress for  workmen  against  unfair treatment  or  wrongful  exactions by the  employer  or  his agents  or  servants.  Clause (11) is the  residuary  clause which refers to any other matter which may be prescribed. One  has  merely to examine these clauses one by one  to  be satisfied  that  there is no scope for having  two  separate Standing  Orders  in respect to any one of them.   Take  the case of classification of workmen.  It is inconceivable that there can be two separate Standing Orders in respect of this matter.   What we have said about classification is  equally true  about each one of the other said clauses; and so,  the conclusion appears to be irresistible that the object of the Act is to certify Standing Orders in respect of the  matters covered by the Schedule; and having regard to these matters, Standing  Orders  so certified would be  uniform  and  would apply  to  all  workmen  alike  who  are  employed  in   any industrial establishment. Prior to the enactment of the Act, industrial establishments used to employ workmen on different terms and conditions  of service and they used to enter into separate agreements with employees  on  an ad hoc basis.  It was precisely  with  the object of avoiding this anomalous position that the Act  has been  passed,  and an obligation has been imposed  upon  the industrial  establishments  to have  their  Standing  Orders certified by the appropriate authorities.  Therefore, we  do not think Mr. Setalvad is right in  505 contending that it is open to an industrial establishment to have  two sets of Standing Orders certified in  relation  to leave  and  holidays  provided that  the  modified  Standing Orders  apply to future entrants and the  existing  Standing Orders  apply to entrants who are already in the  employment of the establishment. On principle, it seems expedient and desirable that  matters specified  in the Schedule to the Act should be  covered  by uniform  Standing Orders applicable to all workmen  employed in  an  industrial establishment.  It is  not  difficult  to

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imagine  how the application of two sets of Standing  Orders in respect of the said matters is bound to lead to confusion in   the   working   of   the   establishment   and    cause dissatisfaction  amongst the employees.  If Mr. Setalvad  is right in contending that the Standing Orders in relation  to these matters can be changed from time to time, it may  lead to  the  anomalous result that in course of 10 or  15  years there  may  come  into existence 3 or 4  different  sets  of Standing  Orders  applicable to the employees  in  the  same industrial  establishment, the application of  the  Standing Orders  depending  -upon  the  date  of  employment  of  the respective  employees.  That, we think, is not  intended  by the provisions of the Act. Once  the Standing Orders are made, it is not unlikely  that disputes may arise between the employer and the employees in regard to their application or their interpretation, and the Act  has  specifically  made a provision  for  dealing  with problems  of  this  kind.  As  we  have  already  indicated, section  13A provides that if any question arises as to  the application or interpretation of a Standing Order  certified under  the  Act,  an employer or a  workman  may  refer  the question  to any one of the Labour Courts indicated  by  the section,  and the said Labour Court shall, after giving  the parties  an opportunity of being heard, decide the  question and such decision be final and binding on the parties. The  result, therefore, appears to be that in regard to  the certification of the Standing Orders, the Act provides for a self-contained  Code.  The Certifying Officer is  given  the power  to consider questions of fairness and  reasonableness as well as the other questions indicated by s. 4(a) and (b). An appeal is provided against the decision of the Certifying Officer   and   in  case  a  dispute  arises   as   to   the interpretation  or the application of the Standing Order,  a remedy  is provided by s. 13A.  Besides, as we have  already pointed  out, a right is given both to the employer and  the workmen to move the appropriate authorities for modification of  the  existing Standing Orders.  That is why  we  do  not think  that  Mr. Setalvad is right in  contending  that  the Certifying 506 Officer  as well as the appellate authority erred in law  in refusing  to certify the modified Standing Orders  submitted by the appellant for certification. It  may  be  that  even in  regard  to  matters  covered  by certified  Standing  Orders, industrial disputes  may  arise between the. employer and his employees, and a question  may then  fall  to be considered whether such  disputes  can  be referred  to  the Industrial Tribunal for  its  adjudication under  section  10(1) of the Industrial  Disputes  Act.   In other  words, where an industrial dispute arises in  respect of  such  matters,  it  may  become  necessary  to  consider whether,  notwithstanding the self-contained  provisions  of the  Act,  it  would not still be open  to  the  appropriate Government  to  refer such a dispute for  adjudication.   We wish  to  make  it clear that our decision  in  the  present appeal  has  no relation to that question.  In  the  present appeal,  the  only point which we are  deciding  is  whether under  the scheme of the Act, it is permissible to  the  em- ployer to require the appropriate authorities under the  Act to  certify two different sets of Standing Orders in  regard to any of the matters covered by the Schedule. It now remains to consider the three decisions to which  Mr. Setalvad  has invited our attention.  In Rai  Bahadur  Diwan Badri Das v. The Industrial Tribunal, Punjab(1), this  Court had  to  consider the question as to  whether  the  Tribunal

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against whose award an appeal had been brought to this Court by the appellant Rai Bahadur Diwan Badri Das was in error in refusing  to allow the appellant’s prayer that he should  be permitted  to introduce a new rule in respect of leave  with wages applicable to the entrants in his employment after the 1st  of July, 1956.  It appears that on the said  date,  the appellant  made  a rule that every workman  employed  on  or before  that  date would be entitled to 30 days  leave  with wages after working for 11 months and workmen employed after that  date would be entitled to earned leave  in  accordance with  the provisions of S. 79 of the Indian  Factories  Act. This rule led to an industrial dispute which was referred to the Industrial Tribunal, and the Tribunal held that all  the workmen  were entitled to 30 days earned leave as under  the existing rule and that the rule made by the appellant on the 1st  of  July, 1956 cannot be enforced.  It was  this  award which was challenged by the appellant before this Court, and the challenge was based on the broad and general ground that the employer had full freedom of contract to make a rule for the  employment  of his employees and  that  the  Industrial Tribunal is not entitled to (1)  [1963] 3 S.CR. 930.  507 interfere with his freedom of contract.  It appears that the change which the employer sought to make by the new rule did not involve any appreciable financial burden, and it was not the case of the appellant that the existing rule caused  any hardship  to  him.  The appellant, however, wanted  to  urge before this Court the theoretical ground that in a matter of employment,  an industrial employer is entitled to make  his own  conditions  with  his  employees  and  that  industrial adjudication  should  not  interfere  with  his  freedom  of contract  in that behalf.  Indeed, as the majority  judgment shows,  the appellant was a good employer and  was  treating his  employees  in  a very  liberal  manner.   He,  however, brought the dispute before this Court in order to assert the general principle which was raised for the decision of  this Court.   That is the background of the majority decision  in Rai Bahadur Diwan Badri Das’s(1). case. Dealing with the broad point raised by the learned Solicitor General on behalf of the appellant in that case, this  Court held   that  several  decisions  pronounced  by   industrial adjudication  had  now established the  principle  that  the doctrine of absolute freedom of contract had to yield to the higher claims for social justice.  Even so, this Court  took the precaution of making it clear that the general  question about the employer’s right to manage his own affairs in  the best  way  he chooses, cannot be answered  in  the  abstract without  reference to the facts and circumstances in  regard to which the question is raised, and it was pointed out that in  industrial matters of this kind, there are no  absolutes and no formula can be evolved which would invariably give an answer to different problems which may be posed in different cases on different facts. Having  thus  dealt  with the general point  raised  by  the learned   Solicitor-General  in  Rai  Bahadur  Diwan   Badri Das’s(1) case, the majority decision considered the facts in that  particular  case and held that the  Tribunal  was  not shown to have been in error when it held that in the  matter of earned leave there should be uniformity of conditions  of service  governing all the employees in the service  of  the appellant.   It  was in that connection that  reference  was made  to the fact that in regard to all the other terms  and conditions   of  service,  there  was  uniformity   in   the appellant’s  establishment  itself; and so, it  was  thought

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that the Tribunal might have been justified in  discouraging a departure from the said uniformity in respect of one item, viz.,  earned  leave.   It would thus  be  clear  that  this decision does not lay down any general (1)  [1963] 3 S.C.R 930. 508 principle  at  all.   In fact,  this  decision  emphatically brings  out  the  point  that  in  dealing  with  industrial disputes,  industrial adjudication should always resist  the temptation of laying down any broad, general or  unqualified propositions.  Therefore, we do not think that the  decision of this Court in the case of R. B. Diwan Badri Das(1) is  of much  assistance.  In that case, the Court was dealing  with an  award  pronounced  by  an  Industrial  Tribunal  in   an industrial dispute; and the narrow question which the  Court decided was that the Industrial Tribunal was not in error in not upholding the rule made by the employer on the 1st July, 1956.  In the present case, we are dealing with  proceedings arising  under  the Act and that means  that  considerations which govern the present proceedings are not necessarily the same  as  those  which  would  govern  the  decision  of  an industrial  dispute brought before the  Industrial  Tribunal for its adjudication under the Industrial Disputes Act. The  next  decision to which Mr. Setalvad has  referred  was pronounced  by this Court in the case of  Associated  Cement Staff  Union  and Another v. Associated Cement  Company  and Others(1).  During the course of the hearing of this appeal, some  arguments were urged before us on the  question  about the  relation  between  terms  and  conditions  of   service governing working hours, leave, and the like, and the  wages paid  to the employees.  Mr. Ramamurti who appeared for  the respondents conceded that the terms and conditions in regard to  leave or working hours can be changed; but he  contended that  the increase in the working hours or the reduction  of earned  leave  should  not be  permitted  to  be  introduced without   taking  into  account  the  question   about   the consequent increase in the wage structure itself; and it was with  a  view to combat this contention  that  Mr.  Setalvad referred us to the decision in the Associated Cement Co.(1). In  that case, the question of holidays, working  hours  and wages  were all referred to the Industrial Tribunal for  its decision.   The matter which arose for the decision of  this Court  in  the appeals which were brought to this  Court  in that  case,  was, inter alia, in regard  to  holidays.   The Tribunal had allowed 21 holidays, whereas this Court reduced the  number  to  16.  Dealing with the  question  about  the normal  working  hours,  this Court observed  that  "once  a conclusion  about the normal working hours is reached  after considering the optimum working hours on a consideration  of all  the  relevant factors, industrial  adjudication  cannot hesitate to give effect to its conclusion merely because the workmen would have been entitled (1) [1963] 3 S.C.R 348. (2) [1964] 1 L.L.J. 12.  509 to  more  wages at overtime rates if the hours of  work  had been  fixed  at  less".   Mr.  Setalvad  relies  upon   this observation.  But we think it would be unreasonable to  read this  observation  in isolation, because in  the  very  next sentence,  this  Court  has added that it is  true  that  in fixing  the proper wage-scale, the question of workload  and the  matter  of working hours cannot be left wholly  out  of consideration,  though it further observed that  many  other factors  including  the need of the workmen,  the  financial resources of the employer, the rates of wages prevailing  in

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other industries in the region, have all to be considered in deciding the wage scale.  It appears that in that case,  the Tribunal itself had held that 21 holidays erred on the  side of  excessive  liberality, and yet it did  not  reduce  that number.   That  is  why this Court  reduced  the  number  of holidays from 21 to 16.  This decision, in our opinion, does show that where industrial adjudication has to deal with  an industrial  dispute in relation to wage  structure,  working hours, and holidays, it must consider the problem comprehen- sively  and  in prescribing the working  hours,  and  making provision  for  holidays  and leave  with  or  without  pay, amongst  other  relevant  factors, the  wages  paid  to  the ’employees  have  no doubt to be taken  into  account.   But these   considerations   do  not  arise   in   the   present proceedings, because what the appropriate authorities  under the  Act  had to consider was whether two sets  of  Standing Orders  should be permitted under the same establishment  or not. The  last  case to which reference must be  made  is  Guest, Keen, William Private Ltd. v. P. J. Sterling and  Others(1). In  that case, the Standing Order had been  certified  under the Act prior to its amendment.  The relevant Standing Order had relation to the age of retirement of the employees under the establishment in question.  When the Standing Order  was certified,  its fairness and reasonableness could  not  have been  examined  by the Certifying Authority.  After  it  was certified, the employer sought to give effect to the age  of retirement  in regard to employees who were already  in  its employment;  and  that gave rise to an  industrial  dispute. The  employees  who were already in the  employment  of  the employer,  contended that prior to the certification of  the Standing  Order,  there  was no, age of  retirement  in  the concern  and  they urged that the certified  Standing  Order could  not affect their right to continue in the  employment so long as they were fit to discharge their duties.  It  was in the contending this dispute that the question arose as to whether   the  certified  Standing  Order  applied  to   the previously existing employees.  The Labour Appel- (1)  [1960] 1 S.C.R. 348. 510 late Tribunal against whose decision the appeal was  brought to this Court by the appellant Guest, Keen, Williams Private Ltd.,  had held that the certified Standing Order could  not apply  to the ,employees who were already in the  employment of the appellant.  This Court affirmed the view expressed by the  Labour Appellate Tribunal that the  certified  Standing Order could not affect the rights of the previous employees; nevertheless,  it was held that the question of  prescribing an  age  of retirement for them could be considered  in  the proceedings   before  the  Court  and  under   the   special circumstances  to  which  reference has  been  made  in  the judgment, it was thought that the age of superannuation  for prior  employees could be reasonably and fairly fixed at  60 years.   This  decision  again is  not  of  any  assistance, because  the  matter came to this Court from  an  industrial dispute   which   was  the  subject,matter   of   industrial adjudication  before the Industrial Tribunal and the  Labour Appellate  Tribunal; and all that this Court did was to  fix an  age of superannuation or workmen who had  been  employed prior  to  the  date of the certification  of  the  relevant Standing Order, at 60, and that course was adopted under the special  and unusual circumstances expressly stated  in  the course of the judgment.  As we have already pointed out, the question  as to whether two sets of Standing Orders  can  be certified  under the provisions of the Act, did not fall  to

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be  considered  in that case.  Therefore, we  are  satisfied that  the  Certifying  Officer  as  well  as  the  appellate authority  committed no error of law in refusing to  certify the  modified Standing Orders submitted by the appellant  in the present proceedings. The result is, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed. 511