Sajjan Kumar Vs C.B.I.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2010 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 6374 of 2010)

Sajjan Kumar .... Appellant (s)

Versus

Central Bureau of Investigation .... Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T

P. Sathasivam, J.

1) Application for intervention is allowed.

2) Leave granted.

3) This appeal is directed against the order of the High

Court of Delhi at New Delhi dated 19.07.2010 whereby the

learned single Judge confirmed the order dated

15.05.2010 passed by the District Judge-VII/NE-cum-

Additional Sessions Judge, Karkardooma Courts, Delhi in

S.C. No. 26/10, RC SII 2005 S0024. By the said order,

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the Additional Sessions Judge has ordered the framing of

charges against the appellant for offences punishable

under Section 120B read with Sections 153A, 295, 302,

395, 427, 436, 339 and 505 of the Indian Penal Code

(hereinafter referred to as “IPC”) and for the offence under

Section 109 read with Sections 147, 148, 149, 153A, 295,

302, 395, 427, 435, 339 and 505 IPC, besides framing of a

separate charge for offence punishable under Section

153A IPC and rejected the application for discharge filed

by the appellant.

4) Brief Facts:-

(a) The present case arises out of 1984 anti-Sikh Riot

cases in which thousands of Sikhs were killed. Delhi

Police has made this case a part of FIR No. 416 of 1984

registered at Police Station Delhi Cantt. In this FIR, 24

complaints were investigated pertaining to more than 60

deaths in the area. As many as 5 charge-sheets were filed

by Delhi Police relating to 5 deaths which resulted in

acquittals. One supplementary charge-sheet about

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robbery, rioting etc. was also filed which also ended in

acquittal. The investigation pertaining to the death of

family members of Smt. Jagdish Kaur PW-1, was reopened

by the anti-Riot Cell of Delhi Police in the year 2002 and

after investigation, a Closure Report was filed in the Court

on 15/22.12.2005.

(b) After filing of the Closure Report in the present case,

on 31.07.2008, a Status Report was filed by the Delhi

Police before the Metropolitan Magistrate, Patiala House

Court, New Delhi. Pursuant to the recommendation of

Justice Nanavati Commission, the Government of India

entrusted the investigation to the Central Bureau of

Investigation (hereinafter referred to as “CBI”) on

24.10.2005. On receipt of the said communication, the

respondent-CBI registered a formal FIR on 22.11.2005.

The Closure Report was filed by Delhi Police on

15.12.2005/22.12.2005, when a case had already been

registered by the CBI on 22.11.2005 and the documents

had already been transferred to the respondent-CBI.

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(c) After fresh investigation, CBI filed charge-sheet

bearing No. 1/2010 in the present case on 13.01.2010.

After committal, charges were framed on 15.05.2010. At

the same time, the appellant has also filed a petition for

discharge raising various grounds in support of his claim.

Since he was not successful before the Special Court, he

filed a revision before the High Court and by the impugned

order dated 19.07.2010, after finding no merit in the case

of the appellant, the High Court dismissed his criminal

revision and directed the Trial Court for early completion

of the trial since the same is pending from 1984.

5) Heard Mr. U.U. Lalit, learned senior counsel for the

appellant, Mr. H.P. Rawal, learned Additional Solicitor

General for the respondent-CBI and Mr. Dushyant Dave,

learned senior counsel for the intervenor.

6) Submissions:

(a) After taking us through the charge-sheet dated

13.01.2010, statements of PW-1, PW-2 and PW-10, order

dated 15.05.2010 framing charges by the District Judge,

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Karkardooma Courts, Delhi and the impugned order of the

High Court dated 19.07.2010, Mr. Lalit, learned senior

counsel for the appellant submitted that i) the statement

of Jagdish Kaur is highly doubtful and later she made an

improvement, hence the same cannot be relied upon to

frame charge against the appellant; ii) reliance on the

evidence of Jagsher Singh PW-2, who gave a statement

after a gap of 25 years cannot be accepted; iii) the

statement of Nirprit Kaur PW-10 is also not acceptable

since the same was also made after a gap of 25 years of

the occurrence; iv) other witnesses who were examined in

support of the prosecution specifically admitted that they

did not see the appellant at the time of alleged commission

of offence; v) inasmuch as the charge has been framed

after 25 years of occurrence, proceeding against the

appellant, at this juncture, is violative of his constitutional

right under Article 21; vi) after filing of the closure report

by the Delhi Police, by following the procedure, the

present action of the CBI conducting further re-

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investigation and filing charge-sheet based on fresh and

improved materials is impermissible in law; vii) follow-up

action based on the recommendation of Justice Nanavati

Commission is also impermissible at this juncture; viii)

many remarks/observations made by the High Court are

uncalled for and based on conjectures and surmises and

also without there being any material on record. If those

observations are not deleted from the order of the High

Court, it would amount to directing the trial Judge to

convict the appellant without proper proof and evidence.

(b) On the other hand, Mr. H.P. Rawal, learned

Additional Solicitor General appearing for the CBI

submitted that in view of categorical statement by the

victims before Justice Nanavati Commission and its

recommendation which was deliberated in the Parliament,

the Government of India took a decision to entrust

further/re-investigation in respect of 1984 anti-Sikh riots

through CBI. According to him, the present action by the

CBI and framing of charges against the appellant and

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others is in consonance with Sections 227 and 228 of the

Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as

“Cr.P.C.”). He also submitted that at the stage of framing

of the charges, the material on record has not to be

examined meticulously; a prima facie finding of sufficient

material showing grave suspicion is enough to frame a

charge. He pointed out that there is nothing illegal with

the order framing charge which was rightly affirmed by the

High Court. He further submitted that the High Court has

not exceeded in making observations and, in any event, it

would not affect the merits of the case.

(c) Mr. Dushyant Dave, learned senior counsel for the

intervenor, while reiterating the stand taken by the

learned Additional Solicitor General supported the order of

the District Judge framing charges as well as the order of

the High Court dismissing the criminal revision filed by

the appellant. He pointed out that it is not a case for

interference under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.

No prejudice would be caused to the appellant and he has

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to face the trial. He further contended that the delay

cannot be a ground for interference.

Relevant Provisions:

7) Before considering the claim of the parties, it is

useful to refer Sections 227 and 228 of the Cr.P.C. which

are reproduced below:

“227. Discharge.- If, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing.

228. Framing of charge- (1) If, after such consideration and hearing as aforesaid, the Judge is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence which-

(a) is not exclusively triable by the Court of Session, he may, frame a charge against the accused and, by order, transfer the case for trial to the Chief Judicial Magistrate or any other Judicial Magistrate of the first class and direct the accused to appear before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, or, as the case may be, the Judicial Magistrate of the first class, on such date as he deems fit, and thereupon such Magistrate shall try the offence in accordance with the procedure for the trial of warrant-cases instituted on a police report;

(b) is exclusively triable by the Court, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused.

(2) Where the Judge frames any charge under clause (b) of sub-section (1), the charge shall be read and

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explained to the accused and the accused shall be asked whether he pleads guilty of the offence charged or claims to be tried.”

It is clear that the Judge concerned has to consider all the

records of the case, the documents placed, hear the

submission of the accused and the prosecution and if

there is “not sufficient ground” (Emphasis supplied) for

proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the

accused by recording reasons. If after such consideration

and hearing, as mentioned in Section 227, if the Judge is

of the opinion that “there is ground for presuming”

(Emphasis supplied) that the accused has committed an

offence, he is free to direct the accused to appear and try

the offence in accordance with the procedure after framing

charge in writing against the accused.

Statements of PW-1, PW-2, PW-8 and PW-10

8) Mr. Lalit, learned senior counsel for the appellant

pointed out that the prosecution, for framing the

impugned charges, heavily relied on the statements of

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Jagdish Kaur, Jagsher Singh and Nirprit Kaur. He also

took us through their statements made at various stages

which are available in the paper-book. It is true that

Jagdish Kaur PW-1, in her statement under Section 161

Cr.P.C. dated 20.01.1985, did not mention the name of

the appellant. Even in the affidavit dated 07.09.1985,

filed before Justice Ranganath Misra Commission she has

not whispered a word about the role of the appellant.

According to him, for the first time i.e. in the year 2000,

after a gap of 15 years an affidavit was filed before Justice

Nanavati Commission, wherein she referred the name of

the appellant and his role along with certain local

Congress workers. According to Mr. Lalit, except the

above statement in the form of an affidavit before Justice

Nanavati Commission, she had not attributed anything

against the appellant in the categorical statements made

on 20.01.1985 as well as on 07.09.1985 before Justice

Ranganath Misra Commission.

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9) He also pointed out that even after submission of

Justice Nanavati Commission’s report and entrusting the

investigation to CBI, she made a statement before the CBI

officers at the initial stage by mentioning “that the mob

was being led by Congress leaders”. Only in later part of

her statement, she mentioned that “she learnt that Sajjan

Kumar, the Member of Parliament was conducting

meeting in the area”. She confirmed the statement in the

form of an affidavit dated 07.09.1985 filed before Justice

Ranganath Misra Commission as well as her deposition

with regard to the appellant before Justice Nanavati

Commission on 08.01.2002. No doubt, in the last part of

her statement, it was stated that in the year 1984-85, the

atmosphere was totally against the Sikh community and

under pressure she did not mention the name of Sajjan

Kumar. She also informed that she could not mention his

name for the safety of her children.

10) The other witness Jagsher Singh, first cousin of

Jagdish Kaur, in his statement recorded by the CBI on

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07.11.2007 i.e. after a gap of 23 years, mentioned the

name of the appellant and his threat to Sikhs as well as to

Hindus who had given shelter to Sikhs. According to Mr.

Lalit, this witness mentioned the name of the appellant for

the first time before the CBI nearly after 23 years of the

incident which, according to him, cannot be relied upon.

11) The other witness relied on by the prosecution in

support of framing of charges is Nirprit Kaur PW-10. It is

pointed out that she also made certain statements to the

CBI after a gap of 23 years and she did not mention the

name of the appellant except stating that one Balwan

Khokhar who is alleged to be a nephew of Sajjan Kumar,

came to her house for discussing employment for her

nephew as driver.

12) The other statement relied on by the prosecution in

support of framing of charges against the appellant is that

of Om Prakash PW-8. He narrated that during the

relevant time he had given shelter to a number of women

and children of Sikh community including Jagdish Kaur

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PW-1. Mr. Lalit pointed out that in his statement, he did

not even utter a word about the appellant but at the end

of his statement on being asked, stated that he knew Shri

Sajjan Kumar, Member of Parliament. However, he

further stated that he did not see him in that mob or even

in their area during the said period. In the last sentence,

he expressed that he had heard from the people in general

that Sajjan Kumar was also involved in the 1984 riots.

13) By pointing out the earlier statement of Jagdish Kaur

PW-1, recorded by the CBI, her affidavit before Justice

Nanavati Commission and the statement of Jagsher Singh

PW-2, Nirpreet Kaur PW-10 and Om Prakash PW-8 before

the CBI, Mr. Lalit submitted that there was no assertion

by anyone about the specific role of the appellant except

the bald statement and that too after 23 years. In such

circumstances, according to him, the materials relied on

by the prosecution are not sufficient to frame charges.

According to him, mere suspicion is not sufficient for

which he relied on the judgments of this Court in Union

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of India vs. Prafulla Kumar Samal and Another,

(1979) 3 SCC 4 and Dilawar Balu Kurane vs. State of

Maharashtra, (2002) 2 SCC 135.

14) In Prafulla Kumar Samal (supra), the scope of

Section 227 of the Cr.P.C. was considered. After adverting

to various decisions, this Court has enumerated the

following principles:

“(1) That the Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under Section 227 of the Code has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out. (2) Where the materials placed before the Court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained the Court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial. (3) The test to determine a prima facie case would naturally depend upon the facts of each case and it is difficult to lay down a rule of universal application. By and large however if two views are equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced before him while giving rise to some suspicion but not grave suspicion against the accused, he will be fully within his right to discharge the accused. (4) That in exercising his jurisdiction under Section 227 of the Code the Judge which under the present Code is a senior and experienced court cannot act merely as a Post Office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution, but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the Court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on. This however does not mean that the Judge should make a roving enquiry into the pros and

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cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial.”

15) In Dilawar Balu Kurane (supra), the principles

enunciated in Prafulla Kumar Samal (supra) have been

reiterated and it was held:

“12. Now the next question is whether a prima facie case has been made out against the appellant. In exercising powers under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the settled position of law is that the Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under the said section has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out; where the materials placed before the court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained the court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial; by and large if two views are equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced before him while giving rise to some suspicion but not grave suspicion against the accused, he will be fully justified to discharge the accused, and in exercising jurisdiction under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Judge cannot act merely as a post office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution, but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the court but should not make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial (see Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal).

14. We have perused the records and we agree with the above views expressed by the High Court. We find that in the alleged trap no police agency was involved; the FIR was lodged after seven days; no incriminating articles were found in the possession of the accused and statements of witnesses were recorded by the police after ten months of the occurrence. We are, therefore, of the opinion that not to speak of grave suspicion against

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the accused, in fact the prosecution has not been able to throw any suspicion. We, therefore, hold that no prima facie case was made against the appellant.”

16) It is clear that at the initial stage, if there is a strong

suspicion which leads the Court to think that there is

ground for presuming that the accused has committed an

offence, then it is not open to the court to say that there is

no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

The presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be

drawn at the initial stage is only for the purpose of

deciding prima facie whether the Court should proceed

with the trial or not. If the evidence which the prosecution

proposes to adduce prove the guilt of the accused even if

fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination

or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show

that the accused committed the offence, then there will be

no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial. A

Magistrate enquiring into a case under Section 209 of the

Cr.P.C. is not to act as a mere Post Office and has to come

to a conclusion whether the case before him is fit for

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commitment of the accused to the Court of Session. He is

entitled to sift and weigh the materials on record, but only

for seeing whether there is sufficient evidence for

commitment, and not whether there is sufficient evidence

for conviction. If there is no prima facie evidence or the

evidence is totally unworthy of credit, it is the duty of the

Magistrate to discharge the accused, on the other hand, if

there is some evidence on which the conviction may

reasonably be based, he must commit the case. It is also

clear that in exercising jurisdiction under Section 227 of

Cr.P.C., the Magistrate should not make a roving enquiry

into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the

evidence as if he was conducting a trial.

17) Exercise of jurisdiction under Sections 227 & 228 of

Cr.P.C.

On consideration of the authorities about the scope of Section

227 and 228 of the Code, the following principles emerge:-

(i) The Judge while considering the question of framing the

charges under Section 227 of the Cr.P.C. has the undoubted

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power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of

finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the

accused has been made out. The test to determine prima facie

case would depend upon the facts of each case.

ii) Where the materials placed before the Court disclose grave

suspicion against the accused which has not been properly

explained, the Court will be fully justified in framing a charge

and proceeding with the trial.

iii) The Court cannot act merely as a Post Office or a

mouthpiece of the prosecution but has to consider the broad

probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the

documents produced before the Court, any basic infirmities

etc. However, at this stage, there cannot be a roving enquiry

into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as

if he was conducting a trial.

iv) If on the basis of the material on record, the Court could

form an opinion that the accused might have committed

offence, it can frame the charge, though for conviction the

conclusion is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt

that the accused has committed the offence.

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v) At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value

of the material on record cannot be gone into but before

framing a charge the Court must apply its judicial mind on the

material placed on record and must be satisfied that the

commission of offence by the accused was possible.

vi) At the stage of Sections 227 and 228, the Court is

required to evaluate the material and documents on record

with a view to find out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at

their face value discloses the existence of all the ingredients

constituting the alleged offence. For this limited purpose, sift

the evidence as it cannot be expected even at that initial stage

to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if

it is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of the

case.

vii) If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to

suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial

Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and at this

stage, he is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or

acquittal.

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18) With the above principles, if we discuss the

statements of PW-1, PW-2, PW-10 as well as of PW-8, it

cannot be presumed that there is no case at all to proceed.

However, we are conscious of the fact that the very same

witnesses did not whisper a word about the involvement of

the appellant at the earliest point of time. It is the

grievance of the appellant that the High Court did not take

into account that the complainant Jagdish Kaur PW-1 had

not named him in her first statement filed by way of an

affidavit dated 07.09.1985 before Justice Ranganath Misra

Commission nor did she named him in her subsequent

statements made before the Delhi Police (Riots Cell) and in

her deposition dated 08.01.2002 before Justice Nanavati

Commission except certain hearsay statement. It is the

stand of Jagdish Kaur PW-1, the prime prosecution

witness, that apart from her statement dated 03.11.1984,

she has not made any statement to Delhi Police at any

stage. However, it is also the claim of the C.B.I. that the

alleged statements of Jagdish Kaur PW-1, dated

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20.01.1985 and 31.12.1992 are doubtful. Likewise,

Nirprit Kaur PW-10, in her statement under Section 161

Cr.P.C., has denied having made any statement before the

Delhi Police. At the stage of framing of charge under

Section 228 of the Cr.P.C. or while considering the

discharge petition filed under Section 227, it is not for the

Magistrate or a Judge concerned to analyse all the

materials including pros and cons, reliability or

acceptability etc. It is at the trial, the Judge concerned

has to appreciate their evidentiary value, credibility or

otherwise of the statement, veracity of various documents

and free to take a decision one way or the other.

Investigation by the C.B.I.

19) Learned Additional Solicitor General has brought to

our notice the letter dated 24.10.2005 from Mr. K.P.

Singh, Special Secretary (H) to Mr. U.S. Mishra, Director,

Central Bureau of Investigation, North Block, New Delhi.

A perusal of the said letter shows that in reply to the

discussion held in the Lok Sabha on 10.08.2005 and the

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Rajya Sabha on 11.08.2005 on the report of Justice

Nanavati Commission of Inquiry into 1984 anti-Sikh riots,

the Prime Minister and the Home Minister had given an

assurance that wherever the Commission has named any

specific individuals as needing further examination or re-

opening of case the Government will take all possible

steps to do so within the ambit of law. The letter further

shows that based on the assurance on the floor of the

Parliament, the Government examined the report of

Justice Nanavati Commission, its recommendations

regarding investigation/re-investigation of the cases

against (a) Shri Dharam Das Shastri, (b) Shri Jagdish

Tytler, and (c) Shri Sajjan Kumar. The letter further

shows that the Government had decided that the work of

conducting further investigation/re-investigation against

the abovementioned persons as per the recommendations

of Justice Nanavati Commission should be entrusted to

the CBI. Pursuant to the said decision, Home Department

forwarded the relevant records connected with the cases

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against the abovementioned persons. It also shows those

additional records/information required in connection

with investigation are to be obtained from the Delhi Police.

The materials placed by the CBI show that Justice

Nanavati Commission submitted its report on 09.02.2005,

its recommendations were discussed by the Lok Sabha on

10.08.2005 and the Rajya Sabha on 11.08.2005,

Government of India asked CBI to inquire those

recommendations on 24.10.2005 and the F.I.R. No. 416 of

1984 dated 04.11.1984 of Police Station, Delhi Cantt was

re-registered by the CBI as case RC-24(S)/2005-

SCU.I/CBI/SCR.I/New Delhi. Pursuant to the same, on

22.11.2005, investigation was taken up and it revealed

that the accused persons committed offences punishable

under Section 109 read with Sections 147, 148, 149,

153A, 295, 302, 396, 427, 436, 449, 505 and 201 IPC and

accordingly filed the charge-sheet. It is relevant to note

that no one including the appellant has not challenged

appointment of CBI to inquire into the recommendations

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made by Justice Nanavati Commission.

Status Report by Delhi Police

20) Mr. Lalit heavily relied on the status report of the

Delhi Police and consequential order of the Magistrate. By

pointing out the same, he contended that the CBI is not

justified in re-opening the case merely on the basis of

observations made by Justice Nanavati Commission. The

following conclusion in the status report dated 31.07.2008

filed by the Delhi Police was pressed into service.

“From the investigation and verification made so far

it was revealed that:-

(a) There is no eye-witness to support the

version of the complaint of Smt. Jagdish Kaur.

(b) The complaints and affidavits made by Smt.

Jagdish Kaur are having huge contradictions.

(i) In her first statement recorded by local

police during the investigation, she did not

name any person specifically and also

stated that she could not identify any one

among the mob.

(ii) She even did not name Shri Sajjan Kumar

in her statement recorded by the I.O. of the

Spl. Riot Cell after a gap of seven years.

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(iii) She suspected the involvement of one

Congress Leader Balwan Khokhar in these

riots but she had not seen him personally.

She was told by one Om Prakash who was

colleague of her husband, about the killing

of her husband and son.

(iv) In the statement recorded on 22.01.1993

under Section 161 Cr.P.C. during the

course of further investigation, the witness

Om Prakash stated that he had seen

nothing about the riots. Jagdish Kaur

stayed at his house from 01.11.1984 to

03.11.1984 but she did not mention the

name of any person who was indulged in

the killing of her husband and son.”

It is seen from the report that taking note of lot of

contradictions in the statement of Jagdish Kaur PW-1

before the Commissions and before different investigating

officers and after getting legal opinion from the Public

Prosecutor, closure report was prepared and filed before

the Metropolitan Magistrate, Patiala House Courts, New

Delhi on 31.07.2008. It is further seen that before

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accepting the closure report, the Magistrate issued

summons to the complainant i.e, Smt. Jagdish Kaur

number of times and the same were duly served upon her

by the officers of the Special Riot Cell but she did not

appear before the Court. In view of the same, the

Magistrate, on going through the report and after hearing

the submissions and after noting that the matter under

consideration is being further investigated by the CBI and

the investigation is still pending and after finding that no

definite opinion can be given in respect of the closure

report, without passing any order closed the matter giving

liberty to the prosecution to move appropriate motion as

and when required.

21) Mr. Lalit, learned senior counsel, by placing copy of

the final report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. by Delhi Police

as well as endorsement therein including the date on

which the said report was filed before the Court,

submitted that the action taken by Delhi Police cannot be

faulted with. In other words, according to him, till the

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entrustment of further investigation by the CBI, Delhi

Police was free to proceed further and there is no error in

the action taken by the Delhi Police. In view of the order

dated 31.07.2008 of the Magistrate, declining to give

definite opinion on the closure report since the same was

under further investigation by CBI, we are of the view that

no further probe/enquiry on this aspect is required.

Delay

22) Learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant

further submitted that because of the long delay, the

continuation of the prosecution and framing of charges

merely on the basis of certain statements made after a gap

of 23 years cannot be accepted and according to him, it

would go against the protection provided under Article 21

of the Constitution. Mr. Lalit heavily relied on para 20 of

the decision of this Court in Vakil Prasad Singh vs.

State of Bihar, (2009) 3 SCC 355 which reads as under:

“20. For the sake of brevity, we do not propose to reproduce all the said propositions and it would suffice

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to note the gist thereof. These are: (A.R. Antulay case, SCC pp. 270-73, para 86) (i) fair, just and reasonable procedure implicit in Article 21 of the Constitution creates a right in the accused to be tried speedily; (ii) right to speedy trial flowing from Article 21 encompasses all the stages, namely, the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, revision and retrial; (iii) in every case, where the speedy trial is alleged to have been infringed, the first question to be put and answered is — who is responsible for the delay?; (iv) while determining whether undue delay has occurred (resulting in violation of right to speedy trial) one must have regard to all the attendant circumstances, including nature of offence, number of accused and witnesses, the workload of the court concerned, prevailing local conditions and so on—what is called, the systemic delays; (v) each and every delay does not necessarily prejudice the accused. Some delays may indeed work to his advantage. However, inordinately long delay may be taken as presumptive proof of prejudice. In this context, the fact of incarceration of the accused will also be a relevant fact. The prosecution should not be allowed to become a persecution. But when does the prosecution become persecution, again depends upon the facts of a given case; (vi) ultimately, the court has to balance and weigh several relevant factors—‘balancing test’ or ‘balancing process’—and determine in each case whether the right to speedy trial has been denied; (vii) ordinarily speaking, where the court comes to a conclusion that right to speedy trial of an accused has been infringed the charges or the conviction, as the case may be, shall be quashed. But this is not the only course open and having regard to the nature of offence and other circumstances when the court feels that quashing of proceedings cannot be in the interest of justice, it is open to the court to make appropriate orders, including fixing the period for completion of trial; (viii) it is neither advisable nor feasible to prescribe any outer time-limit for conclusion of all criminal proceedings. In every case of complaint of denial of right to speedy trial, it is primarily for the prosecution to

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justify and explain the delay. At the same time, it is the duty of the court to weigh all the circumstances of a given case before pronouncing upon the complaint; (ix) an objection based on denial of right to speedy trial and for relief on that account, should first be addressed to the High Court. Even if the High Court entertains such a plea, ordinarily it should not stay the proceedings, except in a case of grave and exceptional nature. Such proceedings in the High Court must, however, be disposed of on a priority basis.”

After adverting to various decisions including Abdul

Rehman Antulay and Ors. vs. R.S. Nayak & Anr., this

Court further held:

“24. It is, therefore, well settled that the right to speedy trial in all criminal persecutions (sic prosecutions) is an inalienable right under Article 21 of the Constitution. This right is applicable not only to the actual proceedings in court but also includes within its sweep the preceding police investigations as well. The right to speedy trial extends equally to all criminal prosecutions and is not confined to any particular category of cases. In every case, where the right to speedy trial is alleged to have been infringed, the court has to perform the balancing act upon taking into consideration all the attendant circumstances, enumerated above, and determine in each case whether the right to speedy trial has been denied in a given case. 25. Where the court comes to the conclusion that the right to speedy trial of an accused has been infringed, the charges or the conviction, as the case may be, may be quashed unless the court feels that having regard to the nature of offence and other relevant circumstances, quashing of proceedings may not be in the interest of justice. In such a situation, it is open to the court to make an appropriate order as it may deem just and equitable including fixation of time-frame for conclusion of trial.”

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Considering the factual position therein, namely, alleged

demand of a sum of Rs.1,000/- as illegal gratification for

release of payment for the civil work executed by a

contractor, a charge was laid against Assistant Engineer

in the Bihar State Electricity Board and taking note of

considerable length of delay and insufficient materials,

based on the above principles, ultimately the Court after

finding that further continuance of criminal proceedings

pending against the appellant therein is unwarranted and

quashed the same. Though the principles enunciated in

the said decision have to be adhered to, considering the

factual position being an extraordinary one, the ultimate

decision quashing the criminal proceedings cannot be

applied straightaway.

23) In P. Vijayan vs. State of Kerala and Another,

(2010) 2 SCC 398, this Court while considering scope of

Section 227 of Crl.P.C. upheld the order dismissing the

petition filed for discharge and permitted the prosecution

to proceed further even after 28 years. In that case, from

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1970 till 1998, there was no allegation that the encounter

was a fake and only in the year 1998 reports appeared in

various newspapers in Kerala that the killing of Varghese

in the year 1970 was in a fake encounter and that senior

police officers were involved in the said fake encounter.

Pursuant to the said news reports, several writ petitions

were filed by various individuals and organisations before

the High Court of Kerala with a prayer that the

investigation may be transferred to the Central Bureau of

Investigation (CBI). In the said writ petition, Constable

Ramachandran Nair filed a counter affidavit dated

11.01.1999 in which he made a confession that he had

shot Naxalite Varghese on the instruction of the then

Deputy Superintendent of Police (DSP), Lakshmana. He

also stated that the appellant was present when the

incident occurred. By order dated 27.01.1999, learned

Single Judge of the High Court of Kerala passed an order

directing CBI to register an FIR on the facts disclosed in

the counter affidavit filed by Constable Ramachandran

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Nair. Accordingly, CBI registered an FIR on 3-3-1999 in

which Constable Ramachandran Nair was named as

Accused 1, Mr Lakshmana was named as Accused 2 and

Mr. P. Vijayan, the appellant, was named as Accused 3 for

an offence under Section 302 IPC read with Section 34

IPC. After investigation, CBI filed a charge-sheet before the

Special Judge (CBI), Ernakulam on 11.12.2002 wherein

all the abovementioned persons were named as A-1 to A-3

respectively for an offence under Sections 302 and 34 IPC.

The appellant - P. Vijayan filed a petition under Section

227 of the Code on 17.05.2007 for discharge on various

grounds including on the ground of delay. The trial Judge,

by order dated 08.06.2007, dismissed the said petition

and passed an order for framing charge for offences under

Sections 302 and 34 IPC. Aggrieved by the aforesaid

order, the appellant – Vijayan filed Criminal Revision

Petition No. 2455 of 2007 before the High Court of Kerala.

By an order dated 04.07.2007, learned Single Judge of the

High Court dismissed his criminal revision petition. The

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said order was challenged by Mr. P. Vijayan before this

Court. Taking note of all the ingredients in Section 227 of

the Criminal Procedure Code and the materials placed by

the prosecution and the reasons assigned by the trial

Judge for dismissing the discharge petition filed under

Section 227, this Court confirmed the order of the trial

Judge as well as the order of the High Court. Though,

there was a considerable lapse of time from the alleged

occurrence and the further investigation by CBI inasmuch

as adequate material was shown, the Court permitted the

prosecution to proceed further.

24) Though delay is also a relevant factor and every

accused is entitled to speedy justice in view of Article 21 of

the Constitution, ultimately it depends upon various

factors/reasons and materials placed by the prosecution.

Though Mr. Lalit heavily relied on paragraph 20 of the

decision of this Court in Vakil Prasad Singh’s case

(supra), the learned Additional Solicitor General, by

drawing our attention to the subsequent paragraphs i.e.,

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21, 23, 24, 27 and 29 pointed out that the principles

enunciated in A.R.Antulay’s case (supra) are only

illustrative and merely because of long delay the case of

the prosecution cannot be closed.

25) Mr. Dave, learned senior counsel appearing for the

intervenor has pointed out that in criminal justice “a

crime never dies” for which he relied on the decision of

this Court in Japani Sahoo vs. Chandra Sekhar

Mohanty, (2007) 7 SCC 394. In para-14, C.K. Thakker, J.

speaking for the Bench has observed:

“It is settled law that a criminal offence is considered as a wrong against the State and the society even though it has been committed against an individual. Normally, in serious offences, prosecution is launched by the State and a court of law has no power to throw away prosecution solely on the ground of delay.”

In the case on hand, though delay may be a relevant

ground, in the light of the materials which are available

before the Court through CBI, without testing the same at

the trial, the proceedings cannot be quashed merely on

the ground of delay. As stated earlier, those materials

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have to be tested in the context of prejudice to the accused

only at the trial.

Observations by the High Court

26) Coming to the last submission about the various

observations made by the High Court, Mr. Lalit pointed

out that the observations/reference/conclusion in

paragraphs 64, 65, 69, 70, 72, 73 and 50 are not

warranted. According to him, to arrive such conclusion

the prosecution has not placed relevant material. Even

otherwise, according to him, if the same are allowed to

stand, the trial Judge has no other option but to convict

the appellant which would be against all canons of justice.

He further submitted that even if it is clarified that those

observations are to be confined for the disposal of the

appeal filed against framing of charges and dismissal of

discharge petition and need not be relied on at the time of

the trial, undoubtedly, it would affect the mind of the trial

Judge to take independent conclusion for which he relied

on a judgment of this Court in Common Cause, A

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Registered Society vs. Union of India & Ors. (1999) 6

SCC 667. He pressed into service paragraph 177 which

reads as under:

“177. Mr Gopal Subramaniam contended that the Court has itself taken care to say that CBI in the matter of investigation, would not be influenced by any observation made in the judgment and that it would independently hold the investigation into the offence of criminal breach of trust or any other offence. To this, there is a vehement reply from Mr Parasaran and we think he is right. It is contended by him that this Court having recorded a finding that the petitioner on being appointed as a Minister in the Central Cabinet, held a trust on behalf of the people and further that he cannot be permitted to commit breach of the trust reposed in him by the people and still further that the petitioner had deliberately acted in a wholly arbitrary and unjust manner and that the allotments made by him were wholly mala fide and for extraneous consideration, the direction to CBI not to be influenced by any observations made by this Court in the judgment, is in the nature of palliative. CBI has been directed to register a case against the petitioner in respect of the allegations dealt with and findings reached by this Court in the judgment under review. Once the findings are directed to be treated as part of the first information report, the further direction that CBI shall not be influenced by any observations made by this Court or the findings recorded by it, is a mere lullaby.”

On the other hand, learned Additional Solicitor General

highlighted that these observations by the High Court are

based on the materials placed and, in any event, it would

not affect the interest of the appellant in the ultimate trial.

In view of the apprehension raised by the learned senior

counsel for the appellant, we also verified the relevant

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paragraphs. In the light of the fact that it is for the trial

Judge to evaluate all the materials including the

evidentiary value of the witnesses of the prosecution such

as Jagdish Kaur PW-1, Jagsher Singh PW-2, Nirpit Kaur

PW-10 and Om Prakash PW-8, alleged contradictory

statements, delay and the conduct of the Delhi Police in

filing Status Report and on the basis of further

investigation by the CBI, we clarify that all those

observations of the High Court would not affect the

ultimate analysis and final verdict of the trial Judge.

Conclusion:

27) In the light of the above discussion, we are of the

view that it cannot be concluded that framing of charges

against the appellant by the trial Judge is either bad in

law or abuse of process of law or without any material.

However, we clarify that de hors to those comments,

observations and explanations emanating from the

judgment of the learned single Judge, which we referred

in para 26, the trial Judge is free to analyse, appreciate,

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evaluate and arrive at a proper conclusion based on the

materials being placed by prosecution as well as the

defence. Inasmuch as the trial relates to the incident of

the year 1984, we direct the trial Judge to take sincere

efforts for completion of the case as early as possible for

which the prosecution and accused must render all

assistance. Interim order granted on 13.08.2010 is

vacated. With the above observation and direction, the

appeal is disposed of.

...…………………………………J. (P. SATHASIVAM)

...…………………………………J. (ANIL R. DAVE)

NEW DELHI; SEPTEMBER 20, 2010.

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SAJJAN KUMAR Vs C.B.I.