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PETITIONER: SADHU ROY

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL

DATE OF JUDGMENT22/01/1975

BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH

CITATION:  1975 AIR  919            1975 SCR  (3) 291  1975 SCC  (1) 660  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1975 SC1165  (5)

ACT: Maintenance  of  Internal  Security  Act  (26  of  1971)  S. 3.--Preventive  detention after discharge by Criminal  Court for offences which are grounds of detention--When valid.

HEADNOTE: The petitioner was detained under s. 3 of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971.  The grounds of detention  were that twice on the same day he and his associates, armed with dangerous weapons, committed thefts of overhead copper wire, the  first  time in broad day light and then  at  about  mid night.   On  both occasions they were challenged  by  public servants, members of the para police force, attached to  the railway administration but the petitioner and his associates escaped  after attacking the members of the  Railway  Police Force.   The petitioner was arrested in connection with  the two  incidents.   His  name was not in the  F.I.R.  but  was gathered  in the course of investigation.  The police,  how- ever reported that the petitioner being a dangerous  person, witnesses  were afraid to depose against him in  open  court and  so  he  was discharged.  He was,  however,  taken  into custody the same day of discharge pursuant to the  detention order. Allowing the petition challenging the detention. HELD  : 1(a) The discharge or acquittal by a criminal  court is not necessarily a bar to preventive detention on the same facts  for  ’security’ purposes.  But if such  discharge  or acquittal  proceeds  on  the  footing  that  the  charge  is baseless   or  false,  preventive  detention  on  the   same condemned  facts  may be vulnerable on the ground  that  the power  of  detention has been exercised in a  mala  fide  or colorable manner. (b)  The   executive   authority  may  act   on   subjective satisfaction and is immunised from  judicial  dissection  of the   sufficiency  of  the  material.   But  the   executive conclusion  regarding futuristic prejudicial  activities  of the  detenu  and  its nexus with  his  past  conduct  though acceptable is not invulnerable. (c)  The  satisfaction though attenuated  by  ’subjectivity’ must  be real and rational, must flow from an advertence  to

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relevant  factors, and not be a mockery or mechanical  chant of   statutorily   sanctified   phrases.    The   subjective satisfaction must be actual satisfaction.  (d) One test to check upon the colorable nature or mindless mood of the alleged satisfaction of the authority,is to  see if  the articulated ’grounds’ are too groundless  to  induce credence  in  any  reasonable man or  too  frivolous  to  be brushed    aside    as   fictitious   by    a    responsible instrumentality. (e)  If   witnesses  are  frightened  off  by  a   desperate criminal, the court may discharge for deficient evidence but on  being  convinced (on police or  other  materials  coming within   his  ken)  that  witnesses  had  been   scared   of testifying,  the  District Magistrate may still  invoke  his preventive power to protect society. (f)  But  if  on  a rational or fair  consideration  of  the police  version  or probative circumstances he  should  have rejected  it the routinisation of the satisfaction,  couched in  correct  diction.  cannot  carry  conviction  about  its reality  and  on a charge of mala fides or misuse  of  power being made, the court can examine the circumstances. [297 D- 298 C] (2)  Merely to allege that witnesses were panicked away from testifying  to truth cannot be swallowed gullibly  when  the witnesses  are members of the Railway Protection  Force  and the offenses against public property were of grave character. [299 B-C] 292 (3)In  a case like the present, where the  circumstances  Of the non-prosecution strongly militate against the reality of the   petitioner’s  involvement  in  the   occurrence,   the subjective  satisfaction of the District Magistrate must  be spoken  to  by  him.  While the detainer’s on  oath  is  not always  insisted on as the price for sustaining  the  order, subjective  satisfaction,  being a mental fact or  state  is best established by the author’s affidavit and not that of a stranger  in the secretariat familiar with the papers.   But in the present case, the District Magistrate’s affidavit  is not  available and the reason given for his not  filing  his affidavit is not convincing.  If the District Magistrate had sworn  an affidavit that the identity of the  petitioner  as participant  in  the  two incidents was  not  known  to  the Railway Protection Force and that other villagers made  them out as the gang was decamping with the booty, the  detention might  have been upheld.  But there is no such averment  and the  bare  ipse dixit of the Deputy Secretary  in  the  Home Department  that  witnesses  were afraid to  depose  is  too implausible and tenuous to be acceptable even for subjective satisfaction. [298 E-F; 299 A-B, C-E] [Were  a  grievous  crime against  the  community  has  been committed   the  culprit  must  be  subjected   to   condign punishment  so  that the penal law may strike a  stern  blow where it should.  Detention is a softer treatment.  Further, if the is innocent  the process of the law should give him a fair   chance   and   that  should  not   be   scuttled   by indiscriminate  to easy but unreal orders of  detention  un- bound by precise time.]. [300 C-E] Srilal  Shaw v. The State of West Bengal Writ  Petition  No. 453 of 1974. decided on 4-12-74 and Jaganath’s case [1966] 3 S.C.R. 134 and 138, followed. Rameshwar  Shaw [1964] 4 S.C.R. 921 926.   Hoorchand’s  cast A.I.R.  1974  S.C. 2120; Golam Hussain  v.  Commissioner  of Police  [1974]  4  S.C.C.  530, 534 and  Dulal  Roy  v.  The District  Magistrate, Burdwan [1975] 3 S.C.R.  186  referred to.

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JUDGMENT: ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition No. 429 of 1974.  Under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India. Shiv Pujan Singh, for the petitioner. G. S. Chatterjee, for the respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KRISHNA  IYER,  J.-Shri  S. P. Singh,  appearing  as  amicus curiae  has urged a few points in support of his  submission that  the petitioner detenu, very poor and not  fallen  into criminal  company,  is entitled to be set  free,  the  order being illegal. The obnoxious acts, with futuristic import, relating to  the detention,  have been set out in the grounds annexed to  the order  and  are  repeated in the  affidavit  of  the  Deputy Secretary,  Home  (Special) Department, Government  of  West Bengal,  based on the records available in the  Secretariat. The District Magistrate of Purulia, nearly three long  years ago, passed the order of detention against the petitioner on February 2, 1972 on receipt of materials regarding the  pre- judicial activities of the detenu and on being  subjectively satisfied  of  the need for the detention under s.3  of  the Maintenance  of  internal Security Act, 1971 (Act  of  1971) (her r called the MISA, for short). 293 The  two  criminal  adventuress  of  the  petitioner   which persuaded the District Magistrate to prognosticate about his prejudicial   activities  were  allegedly  indulged  in   on September  3,  1971.  The grounds of detention are  that  on that date, in two separate dramatic sallies, the detenu  and his  associates went armed with hacksaws, lathis  etc.,  and what not, committed theft of overhead copper catenary  wires and  certain  other  items from a place  between  Anaka  and Bagalia railway stations.  On the first occasion, which  was during  broad daylight, the miscreants were  challenged  ’by the  R. S. Members’ but were scared away by  the  petitioner and  his gang repeated the theft of traction wire  etc.,  at stone  throw.   On the second occasion, which was  at  about mid-night about the same spot ’When resisted by the duty RPF Rakshaks with the help Of villagers, ballasts were pelted at them by the violent in uders who made good their escape with the  gains of robbery. on these two frightful episodes,  the detaining  authority came to the requisite conclusion  about danger to the community, which is recited in the order. The  question is whether, in the facts and circumstances  of the case, the order can be impugned as colorable or exercise of  power based on illusory or extraneous circumstances  and therefore  void.  An examination of the surrounding  set  of facts,  serving as backdrop or basis, becomes  necessary  to appreciate the argument that the subjective satisfaction  of the authority did not stem from any real application of  his mind  but as a ritualistic recital in a routine manner.   It is admitted in paragraph 6 of the counter affidavit that the two  incidents  were  investigated as GRPS Case  No.  1  and No  .2. The petitioner was arrested in connection  with  the said  cases on September 9. 1971 and the police submitted  a final  report  in  both the cases on  January  6,  1972  and February  9,  1972 respectively, ’not because there  was  no evidence  against  the petitioner but  because  the  detenu- petitioner  being a dangerous person, witnesses were  afraid to  depose against him in open Court’.  It may be  mentioned here  that  the petitioners name was not in the FIR  but  is alleged  to  have  been  gathered  in  the,  course  of  the

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investigation.   However,  be was discharged  from  the  two cases  on  February 9, 1972 but was taken into  custody  the same  day pursuant to the detention order.   Thereafter  the prescribed formalities were followed and there is no quarrel about non-compliance in this statutory sequence. The  crucial submission that deserves close study  turns  on the  colorable  nature or mindless manner  of  the  impugned order.   What  are the facts germane to this issue?   It  is seen  that  the  petitioner’s  name  is  not  in  the  first information statements.  Had a court occasion to adjudge the guilt  of  an  accused person  charged  with  serious  crime committed  in the presence of quasi-police officers and  his name is not seen in the earliest report, to the police, that would   have  received  adverse  notice  unless   explained. Likewise,  the  circumstance that the final  report  to  the Court terminated the criminal proceedings may, unless  other reasons  are given, militate against the implication of  the petitioner since s. 169 Cr.P.C. refers to two situations one of   which   at  least  nullifies  possible   inference   of incrimination i.e., that 294 there  is no ’reasonable ground of suspicion to justify  the forwarding of the accused to a magistrate’.  It behoves  the detaining  authority to tell this Court how he  reached  his mental  result  in  the face of a ’release  report’  by  the police.   For, the legal label that the satisfaction of  the executive authority about potential prejudicial activity  is ’subjective’ does not mean that it can be irrational to  the point  of  unreality.   Subjective  satisfaction  is  actual satisfaction,  nevertheless.  The objective standards  which courts  apply  may not be applied, the  subject  being  more sensitive;  but a sham satisfaction is no  satisfaction  and will  fail  in court when challenged under Art.  32  of  the Constitution.   If  material factors are slurred  over,  the formula  of  ’subjective, satisfaction’ cannot  salvage  the deprivatory  order.  Statutory immunology hardly saves  such invalidity.   After  all, the  jurisprudence  of  ’detention without trial is not the vanishing point of judicial review. The  area and depth of the probe, of course, is  conditioned by  the particular law, its purpose and language.   But  our freedoms  axe  not wholly free unless the judiciary  have  a minimal  look  at their executive deprivation,  even  though under exceptional situations. We  may  here refer to what a bench of five Judges  of  this Court observed in the vintage ruling Rameshwar Shaw(1) :               "It is however necessary to emphasise in  this               connection that though the satisfaction of the               detaining  authority contemplated by S. 3  (1)               (a) is the subjective satisfaction of the said               authority,  cases may arise where  the  detenu               may challenge the validity of his detention on               the ground of mala fides and in support of the               said  plea  urge that along with  other  which               show, mala fides, the Court may also  consider               his  grievance that the grounds served on  him               cannot  possibly  or  rationally  support  the               conclusion drawn against him by the  detaining               authority.   It  is only  in  this  incidental               manner  and  in  ’  support  of  the  plea  of               malafides   that  this  question  can   become               justiciable;  otherwise the reasonableness  or               propriety    of    the    said    satisfaction               contemplated  by  S.  3  (1)  (a)  cannot   be               questioned before the Courts." Back  to the facts.  Of course, the mere  circumstance  that

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the aim of the petitioner was gathered in the course of  the investigation is neither here nor there and cannot help  him in  the  tall contention that for that reason the  order  of detention   is   a   make-believe.    The   conspectus    of circumstances  placed before the authority and his  rational response, having regard to the duty to immobilise  dangerous delinquents from molesting the community-these are pertinent factors   to   decode  the  responsible   reality   of   the satisfaction,  although  not the plenary  rightness  of  the detention order. There  are  a  few  vital facts which  loom  large  in  this context.   One  is that  court discharged the  accused,  the reason alleged in the counter being that [1964] 4 S.C.R. 921, 926. 295               "The  police submitted final report  in  those               cases  on 6-1-72 and 9-2-72  respectively  not               because   there  was  no  facts   which   show               malafides,  the  Court may also  consider  his               evidence  against the petitioner  but  because               the detenu petitioner being a dangerous person               witnesses were afraid to depose against him in               open court." What  is  the impact of a discharge of the  accused  by  the criminal  court based on police reports on the  validity  of the  detention  order against the same person based  on  the same  charge  in  the  context of a  contention  of  a  non- application of the authority’s mind ? The two  jurisdictions are  different, the two jurisprudential principles  diverge, the  objects  of  enquiry and nature of  mental  search  and satisfaction  in the two processes vary.  The argument  that detention  without  trial,  for  long  spells  as  in   this instance,  is  undemocratic has its  limitations  in  modern times  when criminal individuals hold the community to  ran- som,  although vigilant check of executive abuse  becomes  a paramount  judicial necessity.  We, as judges and  citizens, must  remember  that, in law as in life, the dogmas  of  the quiet  past  are not adequate to the demands of  the  stormy present  and  the  philosophy  and  strategy  of  preventive detention  has come to stay.  We may merely observe that  we are  not legally impressed with counsel’s  persistent  point that  solely  or  mainly because  the  petitioner  has  been discharged  in the two criminal cases he is entitled  to  be enlarged from preventive captivity. Even so, it does not follow that the extreme view propounded by  the  counsel for the State that the termination  of  the proceedings  in a criminal case on identical facts is of  no consequence  is  sound.   In this connection,  we  may  draw attention to a few decisions of this Court cited at the bar. Chandrachud J., speaking for the Court, recently observed in Srilal  Shaw v. The State of West Bengal(1), dealing with  a situation somewhat like the one in this case, thus):               "This  strikes us as a typical case  in  which               for  no  apparent reason a  person  who  could               easily  be prosecuted under the punitive  laws               is  being preventively detained.  The  Railway               Property  (Unlawful  Possession)  Act,  29  of               1966,  confers  extensive powers to  bring  to               book   persons  who  are  found  in   unlawful               possession  of  railway property.   The  first               offence is punishable with a sentence of  five               years  and  in  the  absence  of  special  and               adequate  reasons  to  be  mentioned  in   the               judgment  the imprisonment shall not  be  less               than one year.  When a person is arrested  for

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             an offence punishable under that Act, officers               of the Railway Protection Force have the power               to  investigate into the alleged  offence  and               the  statements  recorded by them  during  the               course  of  investigation do not  attract  the               provisions of section 162, Criminal  Procedure               Code.  (See  Criminal Appeal No. 156  of  1972               decided on 23-8-1974).  If the facts stated in               the ground are true, this was an easy case  to               take to a successful termination.  We find  it               impossible  of  accept  that  the  prosecution               could not be proceeded with as the witnesses               (1)   Writ  Petition No. 453 of 1974,  decided               on 4-12-74.                296               were  afraid to depose, in the public  against               the  petitioner. The Sub-inspector  of  Police               who  made  the  Panchnavna,  we  hope,   could               certainly  not  be afraid of  giving  evidence               against  the  petitioner.   He  had  made   the               Panchnama   of  seizure  openly  and  to   the               knowledge of the petitioner.  Besides, if  the               petitioner’s statement was recorded during the               course of investigation under the Act of 1966,               that  itself  could  be  relied  upon  by  the               prosecution  in order to establish the  charge               that the petitioner was in unlawful possession               of Rail-, way property." (emphasis ours)               Again,   in  Noorchand’s  case(1)  Gupta   J.,               delivering judgment for Court, held:               "We do not think it can be said that the  fact               that  the petitioner was discharged  from  the               criminal  cases is entirely irrelevant and  of               no  significance; it is a  circumstance  which               the  detaining  authority  cannot   altogether               disregard.   In the case of Bhut Nath Mate  v.               State  of West Bengal (AIR 1974 SC  806)  this               Court observed:               ".  detention power cannot be quietly used  to               subvert,   supplant  or  to   substitute   the               punitive  law of the Penal Code.   The  immune               expedient  of throwing into a prison cell  one               whom  the  ordinary law would  take  care  of,               merely because it is irksome to undertake  the               inconvenience  of  proving guilt in  court  is               unfair abuse."               If  as  the petitioner has  asserted,  he  was               discharged  because  t ’here was  no  material               against  him  and not because  witnesses  were               afraid  to  give evidence against  him,  there               would be apparently no rational basis for  the               subjective   satisfaction  of  the   detaining               authority.  It is for the detaining  authority               to  say that in spite of the discharge he  was               satisfied,  on some valid material, about  the               petitioner’s  complicity in the criminal  acts               which  constitute the basis of  the  detention               order.   But, as stated already, the  District               Magistrate Malda, who passed the order in this               case, has not affirmed the affidavit that  has               been filed on behalf of the State." There  was  reference at the bar to the ruling  reported  as Golam  Husvain v. Commissioner of Police(2) where the  Court clarified  that there was no bar to a detention order  being made after the order of discharge by the criminal court, but

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emphasized the need to scan the ,order to prevent  executive abuse in the following words:               "Of  course,  we can visualise  extreme  cases               where  a Court has held a criminal case to  be               false  and  a detaining  authority  with  that               judicial  pronouncement  before  him  may  not               reasonably   claim  to  be   satisfied   about               prospective  prejudicial activities  based  on               what a Court has found to be baseless."                (1) A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 2120.                (2) [1974]4 S.C.C. 530.                297 Maybe,    we  may as well refer to the,  vintage  ruling  in Jagannath’s care(1) where Wanchoo J., (as he thn was)  spoke for a unanimous Court :               order  of  detention should show that  it  had               acted  with all due care and caution and  with               the  sense of responsibility necessary when  a               citizen is deprived his liberty without trial.               We  have  therefore  to  see  whether  in  the               present case the authority concerned has acted               in this manner or not.  If it has not so acted               and  if it appears that it did not  apply  its               mind  properly  before  making  the  order  of               detention  the order in question would not  be               an  order  under  die  Rules  and  the  person               detained would be entitled to release." The precedential backdrop help crystallize the jurisprudence of,  preventive detention, an odd but  inevitable  juridical phenomenon,  in a suicide manner and to the extent  relevant to the case.  Although. the circumstances of each case  will ultimately  demarcate the callous, or colorable exercise  of power  from  the  activist  or  alert  application  of   the executive’s  mind in making the impugned order, some  clear. guidelines, though overlapping, help application of the law:               (1)   The discharge or acquittal by a criminal               court  is not necessarily a bar to  preventive               detention  on the same  facts  for  ’security’               purposes.  But if such discharge or  acquittal               proceeds  on  the footing that the  charge  is               false or baseless, preventive detention on the               same condemned facts may be vulnerable on  the               ground that the power under the MISA has  been               exercised in a malafide or colorable manner.                (2)  The  executive  may  act  on  subjective               satisfaction  and is immunised  from  judicial               dissection of the sufficiency of the material.               (3)   The  satisfaction, though attenuated  by               ’subjectivity’ must be real and rational,  not               random   divination,   must   flow   from   an               advertence to relevant factors, not be a  mock               recital  or  mechanical chant  of  statutorily               sanctified phrases.               (4)   The   executive   conclusion   regarding               futuristic   prejudicial  activities  of   the               detenu and its nexus with his past conduct  is               acceptable  but not invulnerable.   The  court               can lift the verbal veil to discover the  true               face.               (5)   One test to check upon the  recolourable               nature   or  mindless  mood  of  the   alleged               satisfaction of the authority is to see if the               articulate  ’grounds’  are too  groundless  to               induce  credence in any reasonable man  or  to               frivolous to be brushed aside as fictitious by

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                           a               (1) [1966] 3 S.C.R. 134,138.               298               responsible  instrumentality.  The court  must               see  through mere sleights of mind  played  by               the detaining authority.  ’               (6)   More   concretaly,  if   witnesses   are               frightened  off by a desperate  criminal,  the               court may discharge for deficient evidence but               on   being  convinced  (on  police  or   other               materials   coming   within  his   ken)   that               witnesses  had been scared of testifying,  the               District  Magistrate  may  still  invoke   his               preventive power to protect society.               (7)   But   if   on   a   rational   or   fair               consideration   of  the  police   version   or               probative  circumstances  he would  or  should               necessarily    have    rejected    it,     the               routinisation of the satisfaction, couched  in               correct diction, cannot carry conviction about               its reality or fidelity, as against factitious               terminological  conformity.         And  on  a               charge  of malafides or misuse of power  being               made,  the court can go behind the facade  and               reach at the factum.               So  viewed,  how does  the  petitioner’s  case               stand? The  petitioner’s  identity and involvement  must,  in  some manner,   brought  home,  sufficient  for   the   subjective satisfaction  of  a responsible officer not merely  for  his hunch or intuition.  Let us assume in favour of the  officer that such material was present before him when he passed the order  of detention.  This should be revealed to  the  court hearing the habeas corpus motion, in a proper return in  the shape  of an affidavit.  While we agree that the  detainer’s own  oath  is  not  always insisted  on  as  the  price  for sustaining  the  order,  subjective  satisfaction,  being  a mental  fact  or state is best established by  the  author’s affidavit,  not a stranger in the Secretariat familiar  with papers,   but  the  mind  of  the  man  who   realised   the imperativeness  of the detention.  This is not  a  formality when  the  subject-matter is personal liberty and  the  more ’subjective’ the executive’s operation the more sensitive is procedural  insistence.   Here  the  District   Magistrate’s affidavit is unavailable. Another  obstacle in the way of the State, which has  to  be surmounted,  consists  in the circumstances  that  both  the criminal  occurrences took place in the presence  of  public servants, members of the para-police forces attached to  the railway  administration.  Indeed, the case is that  some  of these  officials  were terrorized and over-awed  before  the stolen articles were removed.  Naturally, one would expect a serious crime like railway property being removed by show of violence  being the subject-matter of the  prosecution.   In the present case. the District Magistrate does not swear  an affidavit  himself  and  what is stated is that  he  is  now posted  in  Sikkim  and  is  not  ’presently  available  for affirming the affidavit’.  In a case where a personal expla- nation  is  necessary, Sikkim is not too distant and  so  we have  to  see Whether the District Magistrate  has,  in  the instant case, to show why, 299 when the cases were discharged by the trying magistrate,  he thought there was enough material for preventive  detention. True, the Home Department official, informed by the records,

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has  sworn  that the police report for  non-prosecution  was ’not because there was no offence against the petitioner but because  the  detenu  petitioner being  a  Jangerous  person witnesses were afraid to depose against him in open  court’. Maybe  this is true, but the subjective satisfaction of  the District  Magistrate must be spoken to by him,  particularly in   a  situation  where  the  circumstances  of  the   non- prosecution  strongly  militate against the reality  of  the petitioner’s  involvement  in the  occurrence.   After  all, merely  to  allege that witnesses were  panicked  away  from Testifying  to truth cannot be swallowed gullibly  when  the witnesses  Themselves  are members of a  railway  protection force  and  the offenses against public property  are  of  a grave,  character.   The observations of Chandrachud  J.  in Srilal Shaw, quoted earlier, are in point. In the case of non-officials, maybe they are afraid to  give evidence against dangerous characters for fear of their life but such an excuse or alibi is ordinarily unavailable  where the  witnesses  are  para-police public  servants.   If  the District Magistrate had sworn an affidavit that he  identity of  the  petitioner, as participant in the  crime,  was  not known  of  the  railway  protection  force  and  that  other villagers  made them out is the gang was decamping with  the booty, something may be said for he plea.  There is no  such averment in the counter-affidavit and the pare ipse dixit of the  Deputy Secretary in the Home Department that  witnesses were  afraid to depose is too implausible and tenuous to  be acceptable  even  for subjective satisfaction.   After  all, freedom is not bubble to be blown away by executive whif  or whim.  For, as pointed put by Gajendragadkar J. (as he  then was) in Rameshwar Shaw (supra) it p. 930 :               "At  the  point  of  time  when  an  order  of               detention  is going to be served on a  person,               it  must be patent that the said person  would               act  prejudicially if he is not  detained  and               that is a consideration which would be  absent               when  the authority is dealing with  a  person               already in detention." Had  the statement been of the detaining authority, had  the deponent  furnished some fact which would or could make  any reasonable man believe that the witnesses were likely to shy away  from  the  court for far of the  petitioner,  bad  the affidavit thrown some light on the dark lint behind the non- prosecution in court due to non-disclosure of evidence or to indicate  that the final report of investigation was not  on account  of  the  absence of any  reasonable  suspicion  but because  of  the  deficiency of  evidence  (S.  169  Cr.P.C. contemplates  both types of situations and the copy  of  the report  was  easy  to produce), we  might  have  upheld  the detention.    In  Dulat  Roy  v.  The  District   Magistrate Burdwan(1) this question has been dealt with in some detail. The flaw in the order flows from non-explanation of how  the District   Magistrate   has  made  his  inference   in   the circumstances indicated. (1)  [1975] 3 S.C.R. 186. 300 Without  more,  we  are  inclined  to  the  view  that   the observations  of  Wanchoo J. (as he than was)  in  Jagannath (supra), at p. 138, applies               "This  casualness also shows that the mind  of               the authority concerned was really not applied               to the question of detention of the petitioner               in  the  present case.  In this  view  of  the               matter  we are of opinion that the  petitioner               is  entitled to release as the order by  which

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             he  was detained is no order under  the  Rules               for  it was passed without the application  of               the mind of the authority con In  the present case, on account of the special reasons  set out  above,  who are far from satisfied that  the  detention order  is  not a cloak to avoid the irksome procedure  of  a trial in Court. There  are two social implications of dropping  prosecutions and resorting to substitutive detentions which deserve to be remembered.   Where a grievous crime against  the  community has been committed, the culprit must be subjected to condign punishment  so  that the penal law may strike  a  stem  blow where  it  should.   Detention is a  softer  treatment  than stringent  sentence  and there is no reason why  a  dangeral should  get  away with it by enjoying an unfree  but  unpaid holiday.   Secondly, if the man is innocent, the process  of the law should give him a fair chance and that should not be scuttled by indiscriminate resort to easy but unreal  orders of detention unbound by precise time.  That is a negation of the   correctional  humanism  of  our  system   and   breeds bitterness, alienation and hostility within the cage. We  accordingly  allow  me  writ  petition,  make  the  rule absolute and’ direct that the petitioner set free. V.P.S. Petition allowed. 301