REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICITION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.2758 OF 2004

Sadaram Suryanarayana & Anr. …Appellants

Versus

Kalla Surya Kantham & Anr. …Respondents

J U D G M E N T

T.S. THAKUR, J.

1. This appeal by special leave is directed against an order  

dated 4th March, 2003 passed by the High Court of Andhra  

Pradesh  whereby  Civil  Appeal  No.1530  of  1998 has  been  

allowed,  the  judgment  and  order  passed  by  the  IInd  

Additional Senior Civil Judge, Vishakapatnam in O.S. No.32

of 1991 set aside and the suit for possession filed by the  

plaintiff-respondent decreed with mesne profits @ Rs.800/-  

p.m. from the date of the suit till the date of delivery of its  

judgment.  The facts giving rise to the filing of the suit may  

be summarised as under:

2. The  appellants  are  the  sons  of  late  Smt.  Sadaram  

Appalanarasamma while the respondents are her daughter  

and son-in-law. The property in dispute consisting of four  

eastern portions (two on the ground floor and two on the  

first  floor)  bearing  door  Nos.44-23-35/7,  44-23-35/6,  44-

23-35/1  and  44-23-35  situated  at  Railway  New  Colony,  

Visakhapatnam  was  originally  owned  by  late  Smt.  Kalla  

Jaggayyamma, who passed away on 5th July, 1981 leaving  

behind  four  sons  besides  two  daughters  named:  Smt.  

Sadaram  Appalanarasamma  and  Smt.  Sadaram  

Ramanamma.  It  is  not  in  dispute  that  in  terms of  a  Will  

dated 4th September, 1976 executed by the deceased Smt.  

Kalla  Jaggayyamma the  property  mentioned  at  item 2  in  

para  6  of  the  Will  was  bequeathed  in  favour  of  her  two  

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daughters mentioned above with a stipulation that the same  

shall after their death devolve upon their female offsprings.  

Smt. Sadaram Appalanarasamma mother of the first plaintiff  

and defendants 1 to 6 (Sadaram Suryanarayana, Sadaram  

Eswararao, Sadaram Devanand, Sadaram Ramana, Sadaram  

Satyanarayana and Sadaram Ramu) died intestate on 11th  

January, 1990.  The case of the plaintiffs is that defendants  

1 to 6 i.e. sons of late Appalanarasamma took possession of  

suit property comprising item no.2 of the Will executed by  

Smt. Kalla Jaggayyamma which had devolved upon plaintiff  

no.1  in  her  capacity  as  the  daughter  of  late  

Appalanarasamma and the stipulation contained in the Will  

executed  by  Smt.  Kalla  Jaggayyamma.  The  plaintiffs  

respondents,  therefore,  filed  OS  No.32/91  in  which  they  

sought a decree for declaration of title over the suit property  

and  for  recovery  of  possession  thereof  apart  from  other  

reliefs.

3. The  defendants  appellants  in  the  present  appeal  

contested the suit, inter alia, taking the plea that late Smt.  

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Sadaram Appalanarasamma had acquired  absolute  title  in  

the property under the Will executed in her favour and that  

in  terms  of  a  Will  dated  5th January,  1981  she  had  

bequeathed the property in question to the defendant which  

they were entitled to retain in possession as owners thereof.  

4. On the pleadings of the parties the Trial Court framed  

four  issues,  allowed  the  parties  to  adduce  evidence  in  

support of their respective cases, but eventually dismissed  

the suit. The Trial Court held that the execution of the Will  

by  Smt.  Kalla  Jaggayyamma  had  been  proved  and  that  

according  to  the  said  Will  the  property  would  devolve  

absolutely  upon  the  legatee  Smt.  Sadaram  

Appalanarasamma.  The  plaintiffs’  claim  to  the  property  

based on the stipulation that upon the death of  Sadaram  

Appalanarasamma  the  property  would  devolve  upon  her  

female  offsprings  was  thus  negatived.  Aggrieved,  the  

plaintiffs appealed to the High Court of Andhra Pradesh who  

has by the judgment impugned before us, reversed the view  

taken by the Trial Court and decreed the suit.  In doing so  

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the  High  Court  followed  the  decisions  of  this  Court  in  

Kaivelikkal  Ambunhi  (Dead)  By  Lrs.  and  Ors.  v.  H.  

Ganesh  Bhandary (1995)  5  SCC  444,  Ramachandra  

Shenoy and Anr. v. Mrs. Hilda Brite & Ors. 1964 (2) SCR  

722  and  the  decision  of  Privy  Council  in  Sasiman  

Chowdhurain and Ors.  v.  Shib Narain Chowdhury and  

Ors. AIR 1922 PC 63 and Pearey Lal v. Rameshwar Das  

(1963)  Supp  2  SCR,  in  preference  to  those  delivered  in  

Mauleshwar Mani and Ors. v. Jagdish Prasad and Ors.  

(2002)  2  SCC  468,  Ramkishore  Lal  v.  Kamal  Narain  

(1963) Supp 2 SCR 417,  Radha Sundar Dutta v.  Mohd.  

Jahadur Rahim and Ors. 1959 SCR 1309 and (Kunwar)  

Rameshwar  Bakhsh  Singh  and  Ors. v.  (Thakurain)  

Balraj Kuar and Ors. AIR 1935 PC 187.

5. The English rendition of Para 6 of the Will executed by  

Smt. Kalla Jaggayyamma is as under:

“6) 2nd item  Tiled  house  situated  in  New  colony  out  of  which  Eastern  wing  2  rooms  shall devolves to my 2nd daughter Chandaram  Appalanarasamma and  the  Western  wing  2  

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rooms shall devolve upon my elder daughter  Chandram Ramanamma with absolute rights  of  Sale,  Gift,  Mortgage  etc.,  and  this  will  come  into  force  after  my  demise.  After  demise  of  my  daughters  the  retained  and  remaining property shall  devolve upon their  female children only.”

6. It is evident from a plain reading of the above that the  

testatrix  had  bequeathed  in  absolute  terms  the  property  

mentioned in clause (6) (supra) in favour of her daughters  

Chandaram Appalanarasamma and Chandaram Ramanamma  

with  absolute  rights  of  sale,  gift,  mortgage  etc.  That  the  

bequest was in absolute terms was made abundantly clear  

by  the  use  of  the  words  “absolute  rights  of  sale,  gift,  

mortgage etc.” appearing in clause (6) above. To that extent  

there is no difficulty. What led to a forensic debate at the  

bar was the latter part of bequest under which the Testatrix  

has attempted to regulate the devolution of the property in  

question after the demise of  her daughters.  The Testatrix  

has  desired  that  after  the  demise  of  her  daughters  the  

property vested in them would devolve upon their  female  

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heirs only. The question is whether the Testatrix Smt. Kalla  

Jaggayyamma, had made two bequests one that vests the  

property absolutely in favour of her daughters and the other  

that purports to vest the very same property in their female  

offsprings. If so whether the two bequests can be reconciled  

and if they cannot be, which one ought to prevail.

7. Before we address these questions we may briefly refer  

to  the  decisions  noted above especially  because the High  

Court  seems to have seen a conflict  in  the  legal  position  

settled by those decisions.   

8. In  (Kunwar)  Rameshwar  Bakhsh  Singh’s  case  

(supra) the Privy Council held that where an absolute estate  

is created by a Will in favour of the devisee, other clauses in  

the Will which are repugnant to such absolute estate cannot  

cut down the estate; but must be held to be invalid.  The  

following passage summed up the law on the subject:

“Where  an  absolute  estate  is  created  by  a  Will in favour of the devisee, the clauses in  the Will which are repugnant to such absolute  

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estate cannot cut down the estate; but they  must be held to be invalid.”

9. In Radha Sundar Dutta’s case (supra), this Court was  

dealing with a situation where there was a conflict between  

two clauses appearing in the Will. This Court ruled in favour  

of the earlier clause, holding that the later clause would give  

way to the former. This Court said:

“……….where there is a conflict between the  earlier clause and the later clauses and it is  not possible to give effect to all of them, then  the  rule  of  construction  is  well  established  that it is the earlier clause that must override  the later clauses and not vice versa”.

10. The issue came up for consideration once again before  

a Constitution Bench of this Court in Ramkishore Lal’s case  

(supra).  In that case too the Court was concerned with the  

approach to be adopted in a matter where a conflict arises  

between what is said in one part of the testament vis-à-vis  

what  is  stated  in  another  part  of  the  same  document  

especially when in the earlier part the bequest is absolute  

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but the latter part of the document gives a contrary direction  

about the very same property. This Court held that in  the  

event of such a conflict the absolute title conferred  upon the  

legatee by the earlier clauses appearing in the Will cannot be  

diluted  or  taken  away   and  shall  prevail  over  directions  

contained in the latter part of the disposition. The following  

passage from the decision is instructive:

“The golden rule of construction, it has been  said,  is  to  ascertain  the  intention  of  the  parties to the instrument after considering all  the words,  in their  ordinary,  natural  sense.  To ascertain this intention the Court has to  consider  the  relevant  portion  of  the  document as a whole and also to take into  account  the circumstances  under  which the  particular  words  were used.  Very  often the  status and the training of the parties using  the  words  have  to  be  taken  into  consideration. It has to be borne in mind that  very many words are used in more than one  sense  and  that  sense  differs  in  different  circumstances.  Again,  even  where  a  particular  word  has,  to  a  trained  conveyancer, a clear and definite significance  and one can be sure about the sense in which  such conveyancer would use it, it may not be  reasonable and proper to give the same strict  interpretation of the word when used by one  who  is  not  so  equally  skilled  in  the  art  of  conveyancing.  Sometimes it  happens in the  

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case of documents as regards disposition of  properties, whether they are testamentary or  non-testamentary instruments,  that there is  a clear conflict between what is said in one  part  of  the  document  and  in  another.  A  familiar instance of this is where in an earlier  part of the document some property is given  absolutely to one person but later on, other  directions about the same property are given  which conflict with and take away from the  absolute  title  given  in  the  earlier  portion.  What is to be done where this happens? It is  well settled that in case of such a conflict the  earlier  disposition  of  absolute  title  should  prevail and the later directions of disposition  should  be  disregarded  as  unsuccessful  attempts  to  restrict  the  title  already  given.  (See  Sahebzada  Mohd.  Kamgar  Shah  v.  Jagdish Chandra  Deo Dhabal  Deo (1960)  3  SCR  604.  It  is  clear,  however,  that  an  attempt should always be made to read the  two parts of the documents harmoniously, if  possible. It is only when this is not possible,  e.g.,  where  an  absolute  title  is  given  is  in  clear and unambiguous terms and the later  provisions trench on the same, that the later  provisions have to be held to be void.”

11. To  the  same  effect  is  the  decision  of  this  Court  in  

Mauleshwar Mani’s case (supra) where the question once  

again  was  whether  an  absolute  interest  created  in  the  

property by the Testatrix in the earlier part of the Will can  

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be taken away or  rendered ineffective  by the subsequent  

bequest which is repugnant to the first bequest. Answering  

the question in the negative, this Court held that once the  

testator has given an absolute right and interest in his entire  

property  to  a  devisee  it  is  not  open  to  him  to  further  

bequeath the very same property in favour of the second set  

of persons.  The following passage from the decision in this  

regard is apposite:

“In view of the aforesaid principles that once  the testator has given an absolute right and  interest in his entire property to a devisee it  is  not  open  to  the  testator  to  further  bequeath the same property in favour of the  second  set  of  persons  in  the  same  will,  a  testator cannot create successive legatees in  his  will.  The  object  behind  is  that  once  an  absolute right is  vested in the first  devisee  the  testator  cannot  change  the  line  of  succession  of  the  first  devisee.  Where  a  testator  having  conferred  an  absolute  right  on anyone, the subsequent bequest for the  same  property  in  favour  of  other  persons  would  be  repugnant  to  the  first  bequest  in  the will and has to be held invalid.  xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx We are, therefore, of the view that once the  testator  has  given  an  absolute  estate  in  favour of the first devisee it is not open to  him  to  further  bequeath  the  very  same  

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property  in  favour  of  the  second  set  of  persons.”

12. In  Pearey  Lal’s case (supra),  this  Court  held  that  

while interpreting a Will the Court must take the document  

as a whole with a view to harmonizing apparently conflicting  

stipulations.  This  Court  recognized  the  following  guiding  

principles in the matter of interpretation of Wills:

“(i) the intention of the testator by reading  the  will  as  a  whole  and  if  possible,  such  construction  as  would  give  to  every  expression  some  effect  rather  than  that  which  could  render  any  of  the  expression  inoperative  must  be  accepted;  (ii)  another  rule  is  that  the words occurring more than  once in a will shall be presumed to be used  always in the same sense unless a contrary  intention appears from the will; (iii) all parts  of  a will  should be construed in relation to  each  other;  (iv)  the  court  will  look  at  the  circumstances  under  which  the  testator  makes  his  will,  such  as  the  state  of  his  property,  of  his  family  and  the  like;  (v)  where apparently conflicting dispositions can  be  reconciled  by  giving  full  effect  to  every  word  used  in  a  document,  such  a  construction should be accepted instead of a  construction which would have the effect of  cutting down the clear meaning of the words  

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used by the testator; (vi) where one of the  two  reasonable  construction  would  lead  to  intestacy, that should be discarded in favour  of a construction which does not create any  such hiatus.”

13. In  Ramachandra  Shenoy’s case  (supra) this  Court  

was dealing with a case where the Testatrix had made a Will  

in favour of her daughter and a gift over in favour of her  

(daughter’s) male children.  The relevant portion of the Will  

was translated in English to the following effect:

“All  these  (properties)  shall  after  me  be  enjoyed  by  my  elder  daughter  Severina  Sabina  and  after  her  lifetime  by  her  male  children  too  as  permanent  and  absolute  hukdars.”

The  question  was  whether  the  Testatrix  had  made  an  

absolute  bequest  to  the  daughter  or  created  only  a  life  

interest  followed by an absolute  bequest  in  favour  of  the  

grandsons  of  the  Testatrix.  This  Court  held  on  an  

interpretation  of  the  bequest  that  what  was  created  in  

favour of the daughter was only a life estate and that the  

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intention of the Testatrix was to make an absolute bequest  

in  favour  of  her  grandsons  through  her  daughter.  The  

following  passage  from  the  decision  is  in  this  regard  

apposite:

“It  was  common  ground  that  under  clause 3(c)  the testatrix  intended to confer  an absolute  and permanent  interest  on the  male children of her daughter, though if the  contentions  urged  by  the  appellants  were  accepted the legacy in their favour would be  void  because there  could  legally  be no gift  over after an absolute interest  in favour of  their  mother.  This  is  on  the  principle  that  where property is given to A absolutely, then  whatever remains of A's death must pass to  his heirs or under his will and any attempt to  sever the incidents from the absolute interest  by  prescribing  a  different  destination  must  fail  as  being  repugnant  to  the  interest  created.  But  the  initial  question  for  consideration  is  whether  on  a  proper  construction of the will an absolute interest in  favour  Severina  is  established.  It  is  one of  the cardinal principles of construction of wills  that to the extent that it  is legally possible  effect  should  be  given  to  every  disposition  contained in the will unless the law prevents  effect  being given to it.  Of course,  if  there  are  two  repugnant  provisions  conferring  successive  interests,  if  the  first  interest  created  is  valid  the  subsequent  interest  cannot take effect but a Court of construction  

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will  proceed to the farthest  extent to avoid  repugnancy, so that effect could be given as  far  as  possible  to  every  testamentary  intention contained in the will. It is for this  reason that  where  there  is  a  bequest  to  A  even  though  it  be  in  terms  apparently  absolute followed by a gift of the same to B  absolutely "on" or "after" or "at" A's death, A  is prima facie held to take a life interest and  B  an  interest  in  remainder,  the  apparently  absolute  interest  of  A  being  cut  down  to  accommodate the interest created in favour  of  B.  In  the  present  case  if,  as  has  to  be  admitted,  the testatrix  did  intend to confer  an absolute interest in the male children of  Severina the question is whether effect can  or  cannot  be given  to it.  If  the  interest  of  Severina were held to be absolute no doubt  effect  could  not  be  given  to  the  said  intention. But if  there are words in the will  which  on  a  reasonable  construction  would  denote that the interest of Severina was not  intended to be absolute  but  was limited to  her life only, it would be proper for the Court  to adopt such a construction, for that would  give effect to every testamentary disposition  contained in the will. It is in that context that  the  words  'after  her  lifetime'  occurring  in  clause 3(c) assume crucial importance. These  words  do  indicate  that  the  persons  designated by the words that follow were to  take an interest after her, i.e., in succession  and not jointly with her. And unless therefore  the words referring to the interest conferred  on the male children were held to be words  of  limitation  merely,  i.e.,  as  denoting  the  quality of the interest Severina herself was to  take  and  not  words  of  purchase,  the  only  

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reasonable  construction  possible  of  the  clause  would  be  to  hold  that  the  interest  created in favour of Severina was merely a  life  interest  and  that  the  remainder  in  absolute  was  conferred  on  her  male  children.”

14. In  Kaivelikkal  Ambunhi’s case  (supra),  the  Court  

applied  the  maximum  “cum  duo  inter  se  pugnantia  

reperiuntur in testamento ultimum ratum est” which means  

that  in  a  will  if  there  are  two  provisions  the  latter  shall  

prevail over the earlier.

15. Time  now  to  refer  to  the  provisions  of  Indian  

Succession  Act  1925,  Chapter  VI  whereof  deals  with  

construction of Wills. Some of the principles of interpretation  

of Wills that are statutorily recognized in Chapter VI need  

special  notice.  For instance,  Section 84 provides that  if  a  

clause is susceptible of two meanings, according to one of  

which it has some effect and according to the other it can  

have none, the former shall be preferred. So also, Section  

85  provides  that  no  part  of  a  Will  shall  be  rejected  as  

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destitute  of  meaning  if  it  is  possible  to  put  a  reasonable  

construction on the same. Section 86 provides that if  the  

same word occurs in different parts of the same Will, they  

shall be taken to have been used everywhere in the same  

sense unless a contrary intention appears. Section 87 makes  

it  clear that the intention of the Testator shall  not be set  

aside merely because it cannot take effect to the full extent,  

and that effect is to be given to it as far as possible.  Section  

88 provides that if there are two clauses of gift in a Will,  

which are irreconcilable, so that they cannot possibly stand  

together, the last shall prevail.   

16. It is evident from a careful  reading of the provisions  

referred to above that while interpreting a Will, the Courts  

would as far as possible place an interpretation that would  

avoid any part of a testament becoming redundant. So also  

the Courts will interpret a Will to give effect to the intention  

of the Testator as far as the same is possible. Having said  

so, we must hasten to add that the decisions rendered by  

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Courts touching interpretation of the Wills are seldom helpful  

except  to  the  extent  the  same  recognize  or  lay  down  a  

proposition of law of general application. That is so because  

each  document  has  to  be  interpreted  in  the  peculiar  

circumstances  in  which  the  same has  been executed  and  

keeping  in  view  the  language  employed  by  the  Testator.  

That  indeed  is  the  requirement  of  Section  82  of  the  

Succession Act also inasmuch it  provides that meaning of  

any  clause  in  a  Will  must  be  collected  from  the  entire  

instrument and all parts shall be construed with reference to  

each other.   

17. Coming  then  to  the  facts  of  the  case  at  hand  it  is  

evident  from  a  careful  reading  of  clause  6  of  the  Will  

extracted above that the same makes an unequivocal and  

absolute  bequest  in  favour  of  daughters  of  Testatrix.  The  

use  of  words  like  “absolute  rights  of  sale,  gift,  mortgage  

etc.” employed by the Testatrix make the intention of the  

Testatrix abundantly clear. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs  

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respondents herein also did not have any quarrel with the  

proposition  that  the  Testatrix  had  in  no  uncertain  terms  

made an absolute bequest in favour of her daughters. What  

was argued by him was that the bequest so made could be  

treated as a life estate not because the testament stated so  

but  because  unless  it  is  so  construed  the  second part  of  

clause  6  by  which  the  female  offsprings  of  the  legatees  

would get the property cannot take effect.  It was on that  

premise  contended  that  the  absolute  estate  of  the  Smt.  

Sadaram Appalanarasamma ought to be treated only as a  

life estate. The contention though attractive on first blush,  

does  not  stand  closer  scrutiny.  We  say  so  because  the  

ultimate  purpose  of  interpretation  of  any  document  is  to  

discover and give effect to the true intention of the executor  

in the present case the Testatrix. We are not here dealing  

with a case where the Testatrix has in one part of the Will  

bequeathed the property to ‘A’ while the same property has  

been bequeathed to ‘B’ in another part. Had there been such  

a  conflict,  it  may  have  been  possible  for  the  plaintiff-

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respondent to argue that the latter bequest ought to take  

effect in preference to the former.  We are on the contrary  

dealing with a case where the intention of the Testatrix to  

make  an  absolute  bequest  in  favour  of  her  daughters  is  

unequivocal.  Secondly, the expression “after demise of my  

daughters  the  retained  and  remaining  properties shall  

devolve  on  their  females  children  only”  does  not  stricto  

sensu amount to a bequest contrary to the one made earlier  

in favour of the daughters of the Testatrix. The expression  

extracted above does not detract from the absolute nature  

of  the  bequest  in  favour  of  the  daughters.  All  that  the  

Testatrix intended to achieve by the latter part of clause 6  

was  the  devolution  upon  their  female  offsprings  all  such  

property as remained available in the hands of the legatees  

at the time of their  demise. There would obviously be no  

devolution of any such property upon the female offsprings  

in terms of the said clause if the legatees decided to sell or  

gift  the property bequeathed to them as indeed they had  

every right to do under the terms of the bequest. Seen thus,  

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there is no real conflict between the absolute bequest which  

the first part of clause 6 of the Will makes and the second  

part of the said clause which deals with devolution of what  

and  if  at  all  anything  that  remains  in  the  hands  of  the  

legatees.   The  two  parts  of  clause  6  operate  in  different  

spheres,  namely,  one  vesting  absolute  title  upon  the  

legatees with rights to sell, gift, mortgage etc. and the other  

regulating devolution of what may escape such sale, gift or  

transfer by them. The latter part is redundant by reason of  

the fact that the same was repugnant to the clear intention  

of the Testatrix in making an absolute bequest in favour of  

her  daughters.  It  could  be  redundant  also  because  the  

legatees  exercised  their  rights  of  absolute  ownership  and  

sale thereby leaving nothing that could fall to the lot of the  

next generation females or otherwise. All told the stipulation  

made in the second part  of  clause 6 did not  in the least  

affect  the  legatees  being  the  absolute  owners  of  the  

property bequeathed to them.  The corollary would be that  

upon their demise the estate owned by them would devolve  

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by the ordinary law of succession on their heirs and not in  

terms of the Will executed by the Testatrix.   

18. In  the  result  this  appeal  succeeds  and  is  hereby  

allowed.  The judgment and order passed by the High Court  

is set aside and that passed by the Trial Court restored. No  

costs.

…….………………………J. (MARKANDEY KATJU)

……….……………………J. (T.S. THAKUR)

New Delhi October 22, 2010

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