http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 10  

PETITIONER: SABITRI DEI AND OTHERS

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SARAT CHANDRA ROUT AND OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       02/02/1996

BENCH: G.B. PATTANAIK (J) BENCH: G.B. PATTANAIK (J) RAMASWAMY, K.

CITATION:  1996 SCC  (3) 301        JT 1996 (2)     1  1996 SCALE  (1)714

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                       J U D G M E N T PATTANAIK. J.      Leave granted.      This appeal  is directed  against the  Judgment of  the Orissa High  Court dated  19th April, 1993 in Civil Revision No. 403  of 1987  arising out  of  a  petition  filed  under Section 47  of the Code of Civil Procedure in Execution Case No. 110  of 1981.  The judgment  debtor is  the appellant in this Court.  The deceased  Jai Rout  had filed  a  suit  for recovery of possession in the Court of Munsif, Cuttack which was registered  as Title Suit No. 243 of 1953, the same suit was decreed  on 30th March, 1965. The decree became final in as much  as the  appeal against  decree was dismissed on the ground of abatement and the said order of abatement was also sustained in  Civil Revision No. 252 of 1974 by the order of the High Court dated 15th October, 1976. In the meantime the suit property  which is  admittedly an  intermediary  estate stood  vested   with  State   of  Orissa   by  virtue  of  a notification dated  27th April,  1963 under  Section 3(1) of the Orissa  Estate Abolition Act (hereinafter referred to as ’the Act’).  The plaintiff - decree holder deceased Rai Rout levied  execution   by  filing   an  application  which  was registered as  Execution Case  No. 110 of 1981. The Judgment debtor filed  an objection  under Section 47 challenging the executability of the decree in question. The executing court by its  order dated 10th March, 1987 allowed the application under Section  47, C.P.C.  filed by  the judgment debtor and dropped the  execution case on a Indian that the property in question has  been vested  in the State Government and is no longer available  to  be  executed  under  the  decree.  The decree-holder, deceased  Jai Rout  challenged the said order of the  Executing Court  by filing  a   Revision in the High Court. During  the pendency of  said Revision, decree holder having died,  the legal representatives were substituted who are the   respondents in this appeal. The High Court came to

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 10  

the conclusion  that  notwithstanding  the  vesting  of  the estate under  the Act, the question whether the right of the decree holder  had extinguished  is not open to be raised in the  execution   proceeding  because  of  the  principle  of constructive res  judicata. The  High Court also came to the conclusion that  the decree  in question cannot held to be a nullity as  the Civil Court had the jurisdiction in the suit for recovery of possession and section 39 of the Act doesn’t take away  that jurisdiction.  With  these  conclusions  the order of  the Munsif having been set aside and the executing court having  been  directed  to  execute  the  decree,  the judgment debtors are in appeal to this Court.      Mr. P.N.  Misra,  learned  counsel  appearing  for  the appellant contends  that the  suit in  question having  been filed on the basis of the proprietary right of the plaintiff and that  right having  vested in  the State  free from  all encumbrances on  and from  the date  of  notification  under Section 3  of the  Act dated  27th April,  1963, the  decree holder did  not have  any existing right in the property and therefore is  not entitled to execute the decree in question and the  High Court  committed error  in brushing aside this question by  applying the  principle of  res  judicata.  Mr. Misra further  contended the notification under Section 3(1) of   the Act  having been issued on 27th April, 1963 and the property in  question  not  having  been  settled  with  the intermediary under Section 6 of the Act, the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to pass a decree in March, 1965 and thus the decree in   question  is a  nullity. The  principle  of  res judicata will  not be attracted and invalidity of the decree can be  set up whenever it is sought to be enforced or acted upon as  a foundation  for a  right even  at  the  stage  of execution or  in any  collateral  proceeding.  Mr.  Mohanty, learned   counsel appealing for the respondents on the other hand contended  that the  decree in question cannot  be held to be  a nullity  as the  Civil Court  cannot be  said to be having inherent lack of jurisdiction. He also contended that Section 6  of the  Act overrides the other provisions of the Act and  therefore the  deemed  settlement  as  contemplated under Section  6 on  the intermediary  does not  divest  the intermediary of  his right to recover possession and in this view of  the matter  the High  Court was  fully justified in directing execution of the decree in question.      Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on examining the  different provisions  of  the  Orissa  Estate Abolitions  Act,  we  find  sufficient  force  in  both  the contentions raised  by Mr.  Misra, learned  counsel for  the appellant. Two questions really arise for our consideration: 1)   Whether the  decree in  question can  be held  to be  a nullity? 2)   Whether the  plaintiff -  decree holder having lost his right of proprietorship in the property, the Executing Court can refuse to execute the decree?      For  adjudicating  both  these  questions  it  will  be necessary to  examine the  different  spositions  of  Orissa Estate Abolition Act and accordingly the relevant provisions of the  Act are  extracted hereinafter in extenso. Section 3 of the Act state thus:      "(Section - 3) Notification vesting      an estate in the State:      1. The  State Government  may, from      time  to   time  by   notification,      declare that  the estate  specified      in the  notification has  passed to      and become vested in the State free      from all encumbrances.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 10  

    2. The  notification referred to in      sub-section   (1)   shall   contain      particulars of the estate including      the fouzi  number, if  any, and the      name  and   the  address   of   the      Intermediary  as  recorded  in  the      registers   maintained    by    the      Collector,  or   as   far   as   is      otherwise ascertainable  by him and      shall be  published in  the Gazette      and   shall   be   affixed   in   a      conspicuous place  for a  period of      not less than fifteen clear days in      the office of the Collector.      3.   Such  publication   shall   be      conclusive evidence  of the  notice      of declaration  to everybody  whose      interest is affected by it."      Section 3A of the Act state thus:      "(Section-3A)      Vesting       of      Intermediary interest.  (1) Without      prejudice to  the powers  under the      last preceding  section, the  State      Government  may   be   notification      declare   that   the   intermediary      interests of  all Intermediaries or      a    class     or    classes     of      Intermediaries  or   a   class   or      classes of  Intermediaries  in  the      whole or  a part  of the State have      passed to  an become  vested in the      State free from all encumbrances.      (2)  The notification  referred  to      in   sub-Section   (1)   shall   be      published in  the  Gazette  and  on      such    publication     shall    be      conclusive evidence  of the  notice      of  the  declaration  to  everybody      whose interest is affected thereby.      Section 6 of the Act state thus:      "(Section-6)     Homesteads      of      Intermediaries    and     buildings      together with  lands on  which such      buildings stand  in the  possession      of  Intermediaries   and  used   as      goals, factories  or  mills  to  be      retained  by  them  on  payment  of      rent:-      (l) With  effect from  the date  of      vesting, all  homesteads  comprised      in  estate   and   being   in   the      possession of  an  Intermediary  on      the date  of such vesting, and such      buildings  or  structures  together      with the lands on which they stand.      other  than   any  buildings   used      primarily as  offices or kutcheries      or rest  houses for estate servants      on duty  as were  in the possession      of   an    lntermediary   at    the      commencement of  this Act  and used      as goals  (other  than  goals  used      primarily  for   storing  rent   in      kind), factories  or mills  for the      purpose of  trade,  manufacture  or

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 10  

    commerce,  or   used  for   storing      grains   or   keeping   cattle   or      implements  for   the  purpose   of      agriculture  and   constructed   or      established  and   used   for   the      aforesaid purposes  before the  1st      day  of   January,   1946,   shall,      notwithstanding anything  contained      in  this   Act,  be  deemed  to  be      settled  by  the  State  Government      with such Intermediary and will all      the   share-holders    owning   the      estate, who  shall be  entitled  to      retain possession of such homestead      and of  such building or structures      together with  the lands  on  which      they stand,  as tenants  under  the      State  Government  subject  to  the      payment of  such fair and equitable      ground-rent as may be determined by      the  Collector  in  the  prescribed      manner:           Provided   that    where   the      Intermediaries  have  come  to  any      settlement     among     themselves      regarding   the    occupation    of      buildings and  file a  statement to      the effect  before  the  Collector,      the buildings  shall be  deemed  to      have   been    settled   with   the      Intermediaries  according  to  that      settlement;           Provided     further      that      homesteads in  actual possession of      the Intermediary  shall be  settled      with  him  free  of  groundrent  in      those areas  where no groundrent is      charged under  the existing  law on      homestead lands.      2. ( ... ....... .... )      3.     Notwithstanding     anything      contained in  sub-section(1), where      an   Intermediary   constructed   a      building or structure in his estate      after the  1st day of January, 1946      and used  it on the date of vesting      for the  purposes mentioned in sub-      section(l), he  may be  entitled to      retain possession  of such building      or structure together with the land      on which  it  stands  as  a  tenant      under the  State Government subject      to the  payment of  ground-rent  as      provided in sub-section (1) only if      the Collector, after an enquiry, is      satisfied that it is constructed or      used for  a bona  fide purpose  and      not  with  a  view  to  defeat  the      provisions of  Section  5  of  this      Act."      Section 8A of the Act state thus:      "(Section-8A)  Filing   of   claims      under  sections  6,  7  and  8  and      dispute relating thereto:-      (1) The Intermediary shall file his

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 10  

    claim in  the prescribed manner for      settlement of  fair  and  equitable      rent  in   respect  of   lands  and      buildings which  are deemed  to  be      settled with him under Section 6 or      Section  7   before  the  Collector      within six  months from the date of      vesting.      2. Any  person  who  is  discharged      from  the  conditions  of  personal      service under  sub-section  (3)  of      Section 3 may file his claim in the      prescribed   manner    before   the      Collector within  six  months  from      the date  of vesting for settlement      of the  lands held  under the terms      and conditions of such service:           Provided  that  the  Collector      shall, as  soon as may be after any      such claim under sub-section (l) or      sub-section  (2)   is  filed,  give      public notice  thereof by  beat  of      drum in  the  appropriate  locality      and  by  placards  posted  at  such      conspicuous places as he deems fit,      inviting  objections  from  persons      interested;           Provided   further   that   in      respect  of   estates  which   have      vested  in   the  State  Government      prior to  the date  of commencement      of the  Orissa Estates    Abolition      (Second  Amendment),   Act,   1957,      (Orissa Act  3 of 1958), the claims      mentioned in  sub-sections (1)  and      (2)   shall  be  filed  before  the      Collector within  a period  of  six      months from the  said date;           Provided also  that the  State      Government may  further extend  the      period  specified   in   the   last      preceding proviso   up to a maximum      period  of   one   year   for   any      sufficient cause  in  any  case  or      class of cases;           Provided also  that the claims      on behalf  of  an  Intermediary  in      respect of  any  estate  which  has      vested in  the State  Government or      after the  18th day of  March, 1974      but before the date of commencement      of  the  Orissa  Estates  Abolition      (Amendment) Act,  1974  may,  where      such  claim   relates  to  a  trust      estate,   be   filed   before   the      Collector within  a period  of  six      months    from    the    date    of      commencement of the said Act;           Provided also  that such claim      as   aforesaid which has been filed      after the  18th day  of  September,      1974  and   before    the  date  of      commencement of the said Act shall,      for all  purpose, be  treated as  a      claim filed  within the  period  of

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 10  

    limitations.      3. On  the failure  of  filing  the      claims within  the period specified      under this  section the  provisions      of clause  (h) of  section 5 shall,      notwithstanding  anything   to  the      contrary in  Sections 6,  7 and  8,      apply as if the right to possession      of    the  lands  or  buildings  or      structures, as the case may be, had      vested in  the State  Government by      the operation  of  this  Act    and      thereupon the  right  to  make  any      such claim as aforesaid shall stand      extinguished:           Provided   that    when   such      failure is  due to  the pendency of      proceedings in  a Court  of Law  in      which   the    validity   of    any      notification under section 3 or 3-A      is   in      dispute,   the   State      Government may  by order  specially      made in  that  behalf,  extend  the      period for filing of the claim.      4. Any  person disputing  the claim      as to  the extent  or possession of      such   lands    or   buildings   or      structures, as the case may be, may      file  an   objection   before   the      Collector within  three months from      the of the public notice under sub-      section (2)  of such  claim and the      Collector  shall,   prior  to   the      determination   af    rent    under      Sections 6.  7   a 8,  enquire into      the matter in the manner prescribed      and pass  such order  as  he  deems      just and proper.      5.   Without   prejudice   to   the      provisions     contained  in   sub-      section (4), where a respect of any      estate is  made by the Intermediary      on the  ground that  it is  estate,      the Collector shall, whether or not      any objection  is filed  under  the      said sub-section  make a  reference      to the  Tribunal constituted  under      Section 8-D for determining whether      the estate is a trust estate or not      and  shall  act  according  to  the      orders passed by the said Tribunal.           Provided that  in the  case of      any  estate   referred  to  in  the      proviso to  Clause (oo)  of Section      2,  no   Such  reference  shall  be      necessary.      Section 39 of the Act state thus:      "(Section - 39) Bar to jurisdiction      of Civil Courts in certain matters:      No suit  shall be  brought  in  any      Civil Court in respect of any entry      in or  omission from a Compensation      Assessment Roll  or in  respect  of      any order  passed under Chapters II      to  VI  or  concerning  any  matter

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 10  

    which is  or has  already been  the      subject of  any application made or      proceedings taken  under  the  said      Chapters."      Coming to  the first  question, it  is apparent that on issuance of  a notification  under Section  3(1) of the Act, the estate  vests free  from all  encumbrances in  the State Government. The pre-existing rights shall cease to exist and new rights  have been  created under  the Act.  By virtue of section 6  the Homesteads  of Intermediaries  and  buildings together  with   lands  on  which  buildings  stand  in  the possession of Intermediaries and used as goals, factories or mills to be retained by them on payment of rent. But the pre conditions in  a deemed  settlement for  fixation of rent as contemplated under  Section 6  must be  satisfied namely the land must be in use as goals, factories or mills. Under sub- section (3)  of section  8A if  no claim is filed within the specified period  then the  right to  possess  the  land  or building or  structure, as  the case may be, stand vested in the State  Government by  operation of the Act and thereupon the right  to make  any such claim by the Intermediary stand extinguished.  It  is  admitted  by  the  parties  that  the Intermediary had  not filed  any claim within the stipulated period and  infact no  settlement of  rent had been mad with the Intermediary under Section 6. Such a settlement couldn’t have been  made as  admittedly the defendant judgment debtor is in  possession of  the land.  This being the position, on and from  the ate  of issuance of notification under Section 3(1) of  the Act  that is 27th April,, 1963, the Civil Court looses jurisdiction  in respect  of the disputed property by operation of  Section 39  of the  Act and  consequently  the decree passed  on 30th of the March, 1965 must be held to be a nullity.  Once a  decree is  held to  be  a  nullity,  the principle  of   constructive  res   judicata  will  have  no application and  its invalidity can be set up whenever it is sought to be enforced or is acted upon as a foundation for a right even  at the  stage of  execution or in any collateral proceeding. This  question no longer remains res integra and has been  so held  in the  case of  Sushil Kumar  Mehta  vs. Gobind Ram Bohra reported in (1990) 1 S.C.C. P. 193 to which one of  us (brother Ramaswamy, J.) was a member. It has been held in the aforesaid case:      "Thus  it   is  settled   law  that      normally a decree passed by a court      of  competent  jurisdiction,  after      adjudication  on   merits  of   the      rights of  the parties, operates as      res judicata  in a  subsequent suit      or  proceedings   and   binds   the      parties  or  and  persons  claiming      right, title  or interest  from the      parties.  Its  validity  should  be      assailed  only   in  an  appeal  or      revision as  the case  may  be.  In      subsequent proceedings its validity      cannot  be   questioned.  A  decree      passed   by    a   court    without      jurisdiction   over   the   subject      matter or  on other  grounds  which      goes to the root of its exercise or      jurisdiction,    lacks     inherent      jurisdiction. It  is  a  coram  non      judice. A  decree passed  by such a      court is  a nullity and is non est.      Its  invalidity   can  be   set  up

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 10  

    whenever  it   is  sought   to   be      enforced or  is  acted  upon  as  a      foundation for a right, even at the      stage of execution or in collateral      proceedings.    the    defect    of      jurisdiction   strikes    at    the      authority of  the court  to pass  a      decree which  cannot  be  cured  by      consent or  waiver of the party. If      the  court   has  jurisdiction  but      there is  defect  in  its  exercise      which does  nor go  to the  root of      its authority, such a defect in its      exercise which  does not  go to the      root of  its authority, such defect      like pecuniary or territorial could      be waived  by the party. They could      be corrected  by way of appropriate      plea  at   its  inception   or   in      appellate  or   revisional  forums,      provided law  permits. The doctrine      of res  judicata under  Section  11      CPC is founded on public policy. An      issue  of  fact  or  law  or  mixed      question of  fact and suit or might      and ought  to  be  raised  claiming      under them  and was  adjudicated or      allowed uncontested  becomes  final      and binds  the parties  or  persons      claiming  under   them.  Thus   the      decision of  a may  operate as  res      judicata in  subsequent proceedings      between the  same parties and those      claiming  under   them.   But   the      question    relating     to     the      interpretation   of    a    statute      touching  the   jurisdiction  of  a      court     unrelating     to     the      jurisdiction of  a court  unrelated      to questions  of  fact  or  as  res      judicata even  between the  parties      reason is  obvious; a pure question      of law unrelated to facts which are      the basis  or to  be  a  matter  in      issue.   The   principle   of   res      judicata is  a facet  of  procedure      but not  of  substantive  law.  The      decision on an issue of law founded      on fact  in issue  would operate as      res judicata.  But when the law has      since  the  earlier  decision  been      altered by  a com  patent authority      or  when   the   earlier   decision      declares a  transaction to be valid      despite prohibition  by law it does      not operate  as res judicata.  Thus      a question  of  jurisdiction  of  a      court or  of a   E  procedure or  a      pure question  of law  unrelated to      the right  of the  parties  founded      purefy on  question of  fact in the      previous suit,  is not res judicata      in the  subsequent suit. A question      relating  to    jurisdiction  of  a      court   or   interpretation      of

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 9 of 10  

    provisions of  a statute  cannot be      -  deemed   to  have  been  finally      determined   by      an   erroneous      decision of  a court   - Therefore,      the doctrine  of res judicata  does      not appl-y  to a  case of decree of      nullity. If  the  court  inherently      lacks   jurisdiction consent cannot      confer  jurisdiction. Where certain      statutory    X  ;  ;  rights  in  a      welfare legislation  are   created,      the doctrine of waiver also does  ;      not apply to A case of decree where      the    court    inherently    lacks      jurisdiction."      The ratio  of the  aforesaid case  fully applies to the facts and  circumstances of  the case  in hand.  Mr. Mohanty appearing  for   the  respondents   did  not  challenge  the proposition of  law but  contended that Section 6 of the Act confers a deemed right of settlement with the Intermediaries in respect  of the  disputed  property  and  that  provision overrides the  other provisions  of the  Act  and  therefore Section 39  of the  Act will  have no  application.  We  are unable to  persuade ourselves  to agree  with the submission made by  Mr. Mohanty  as the  said submission  does not take into consideration  the provisions  of  sub-section  (3)  of section 8A. In our considered opinion the estate in question having been  vested by  virtue of notification under Section 3(1) of’  the Act  and no  claim having  been  made  by  the Intermediary for  getting deemed  settlement of  fixation of rent, by operation of sub-section 3 of Section 8A, the right of the   lntermediary stand extinguished and therefore under such circumstances  the Civil  Court had  no jurisdiction of pass the  decree in  the year 1965.  Consequently the decree in question is nullity and the executing court can refuse to execute the  decree. The  High Court was in obvious error in directing execution of the decree.      So far  as the  second question  is concerned, the same also has  been directly answered by a decision of this Court in the  case of Haji Sk. Subhan vs. Madhorao, (1962) Supp. l S.C.R. P.  123. The  identical provisions  of Madhya Pradesh Abolition   of   Proprietary   Rights   (Estates,   .Mahals, Alienated Lands)  Act, 1950  was being  considered  by  this Court. This  Court came  to hold that the proprietary rights in an  estate specified  in the notification passed from the proprietor and  became   vested in  the state  free from all encumbrances and   therefore after issue of the notification under   Section 3  notwithstanding anything contained in any contract, grant  or document  or any  other law for the time being in  force. all  rights, title  and  interest  which  a proprietor possessed on account of his proprietorship of the land  within  the  estate    became  vested  in  the  State. Consequently the  provisions of Madhya Pradesh  Abolition of Proprietary Rights  (Estates, Mahals,  Alienated Lands) Act, 1950 deprived  the proprietor  of his    proprietary  rights including the  right to  recover possession over the land in the suit.  This Court  also further  held that the Executing Court has  a right to refuse to execute the decree upholding that the  decree has  became inexecutable  on account of the change in  law and  its effect. What has been stated by this Court in  relation to  the provision  of the  Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary  Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands)  Act  1950    would  have  full  application  to  the provisions of the Orissa Estate Abolitions Act with which we are concerned  in the  present case.  In this  view  of  the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 10 of 10  

matter the  proprietary rights of the plaintiff Intermediary became vested  in the  State of Orissa.  The plaintiff could not execute the decree for  recovery of possession.      In our  considered opinion  the Executing Court rightly refused to  execute the  decree and  the High  Court was  in error in  setting aside  the said  order  of  the  Executing Court. In the aforesaid premises the order of the High Court passed in  Civil Revision No. 403 of 1987 is set aside. This appeal is allowed. The execution proceeding stands annulled. There will be no order as to costs.