14 November 1995
Supreme Court
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S.S. DARSHAN Vs STATE OF KARNATAKA

Bench: VERMA,JAGDISH SARAN (J)
Case number: C.A. No.-010305-010305 / 1995
Diary number: 11239 / 1995
Advocates: Vs J. S. WAD


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PETITIONER: S.S.DARSHAN

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF KARNATAKA & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT14/11/1995

BENCH: VERMA, JAGDISH SARAN (J) BENCH: VERMA, JAGDISH SARAN (J) VENKATASWAMI K. (J)

CITATION:  1996 AIR  671            1996 SCC  (7) 302  JT 1995 (8)   229        1995 SCALE  (6)426

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                           JUDGMENT J.S. VERMA. J.      Leave granted.      These appeals by special leave are against dismissal of two writ  petitions by a common order dated 14th July, 1995, passed by  a Division  Bench of the High Court of Karnataka. The challenge  made in  these  writ  petitions  was  to  the validity of  the notification  dated 16/7/1994, issued under Section 4(1)  read with  section 17  of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894  (for short  ’the Act’) and the notification dated 22/8/1994  issued  under  Section  6  thereof  by  State  of Karnataka for  acquisition of 11 acres 36 gunthas of land in Pattandur Agrahara  Village,  Whitefield,  Bangalore  Taluk, Bangalore,  belonging  to  the  appellants.  The  appellants contended that  these notifications  are invalid  apart from the fact  that the  user of  the acquired  land by  them  is beneficial to  the society and not merely of private gain to the appellants. The several grounds on which validity of the acquisition was  challenged have  been rejected  by the High Court. The  nature of  use  of  the  acquired  land  by  the appellants does  not require any further reference since the validity of the acquisition does not depend on it.      Shri Shanti Bhushan, learned counsel for the appellant, contended primarily  that the  acquisition is  for a private limited company  and not  for a  public  purpose  under  the provisions of  the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, on account of which the special powers in case of urgency in Section 17 of the Act  could not  be invoked and, therefore, the provision of Section  5A requiring the hearing of objections cannot be dispensed with.  On this  basis, it  was contended  that the notification in  exercise of  the power  under Section 17(4) and the  subsequent declaration  made under Section 6 of the Act is  invalid.  In  support  of  this  submission  learned counsel for  the appellant  referred  to  certain  documents which admittedly  indicate the  purpose of  the acquisition.

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The construction  made of  these documents  by  Shri  Shanti Bhushan is  that the  acquisition is  not for  the Karnataka Industrial Areas  Development Board  (for short ’the Board’) but for  the private  limited company  known as  Information Technology Park  (Pvt.) Ltd.,  in which  the Board  has  20% equity shares.  In reply,  the learned  Additional Solicitor General and  Shri Ashok Desai contended that the acquisition is  for   the  public   purpose  of   establishment   of   a technological park  of undoubted  national importance, which is a joint venture project, involving three collaborators of which the  Government of Karnataka is one acting through the karnataka  Industrial   Areas  Development   Board.  Learned Additional Solicitor  General submitted that these documents read as  a whole,  indicated the nature of joint venture and the kind  of project  for which  this acquisition  has  been made, which  makes it  clear that  it is  not merely for the purpose of  a company  unrelated  to  the  specified  public purpose. The  documents with  reference to  which this point has to be determined are relied on by both sides.      Admittedly, a  large tract  of land  contiguous to  the area acquired by the impugned notifications had already been acquired by  the said  Board under  the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development  Act, 1966  (for short  ’karnataka  Act’), which also  provides for  acquisition of land for the Board. That area  was found  to be  inadequate for  the project  on account of  which the  contiguous  disputed  area  has  been acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The fact that the larger  area acquired earlier for the Board is meant for the said  project of  setting up the technology park has not been disputed.  It is  also not  disputed that  the  present acquisition under  the Land  Acquisition Act  is to meet the need due  to the  inadequacy of the earlier acquisition made by the Board. In fact a separate argument of learned counsel for  the   appellant,  adverted   to  later,   is  that  the acquisition of  the present  area should  also be  made only under  the  Karnataka  Act  of  1966  instead  of  the  Land Acquisition  Act  since  the  Karnataka  Act  gives  greater opportunity  to  the  owners  of  the  land  to  resist  the acquisition. This  background of  the present acquisition is also significant  to determine  the purpose  of the  present acquisition.      A letter  dated  July  5,  1994  (Annexure-G)  by  Tata Industries to  the Government of Karnataka is on the subject of  ‘Requirement  of  additional  land  for  setting  up  of Bangalore Information  Technology Park’  as a  joint venture project  between   Tata  Industries   Limited,   Information Technology Park Investment Pvt. Ltd. (ITPI), a Consortium of Singapore  Companies   (CSC)  and  Government  of  Karnataka through  Karnataka   Industrial  Areas   Development   Board (KIADB). The  letter emphasizes  on the  need  of  speed  in taking all  steps for  the setting  up on  an  International Scale of  the Information  Technology Park. It then mentions the further need of the adjoining land of about 12 acres for the project  by the  Government for  the Board  which can be used for the Information Technology Park along with the land already earmarked  for the  purpose. The  next  document  is letter dated 7th July, 1994 (Annexure-H) by the Board to the Government of  Karnataka making  the request for acquisition of 11  acres and 36 gunthas of land in question for the said project. It  is the joint venture project for setting up the Technology Park  for which  request was  made to  invoke the emergency provision  in Section  17 of  the Land Acquisition Act because  of the  urgent  need.  The  notification  dated 16/7/1994 (Annexure-I)  under Section 4(1) and Section 17 of the  Land  Acquisition  Act,  1894  was  then  published  on

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18/7/1994 which begins as under :-           "The lands  shown  in  the  annexed      index are required for a public purpose,      that  is,   to   establish   information      technological  park   through  Karnataka      Industrial Areas Development Board".      The above  extract mentions  the purpose of acquisition as a  public purpose  to establish Information Technological Park through  Karnataka Industrial  Areas Development Board. The specific  mention of  the purpose of acquisition in this notification  is   undoubtedly   the   public   purpose   of establishing the  Information Technological Park through the Board. Learned  counsel for  the appellants  rightly did not dispute  that   the  acquisition   for  the   Board  is  not acquisition for the company to attract this argument. If the acquisition is for the Board then the other argument is that it should  be made  under  the  Karnataka  Industrial  Areas Development Act,  1966 and  not the  Central Act.  The other argument would be considered later.      The documents, so far, do indicate that the acquisition is for  the public  purpose of  setting up  the  Information Technological Park  through the Board. However, reference is made to  the written  statement (Annexure-F) in a suit filed by the  appellant-S.S.Darshan against  the State  Government and Board in which it is mentioned that the land acquired by the Board  is being  transferred in favour of M/s. Bangalore Information  Technology  Park,  a  Private  Limited  Company incorporated under  the Companies Act with the participation of  Tata   Group  of   Companies,  a   group  of   companies incorporated in  Singapore  and  Board  for  developing  the Information Technology  Park with  an investment  of several hundred crores  of rupees,  which  would  earn  considerable foreign exchange  and provide  jobs to  18,000 engineers. On this basis,  learned counsel  urged that the transfer of the acquired land  would be  made in favour of a private limited company which  shows that  the acquisition  is not  for  the public purpose  but for  a Private Limited Company. Reliance was also  placed on the lease agreement (Annexure-Q) between the Board and the Information Technology Park (Pvt.) Limited (the lessee)  under which  the Board  has agreed to lease to the Company the land acquired earlier for a term of 11 years which ultimately would be converted into a sale in favour of the Company.  It was  urged, and  is not  disputed,  that  a similar lease-cum-sale  agreement would  be executed  by the Board in  favour of the Company in respect of the additional land being  acquired under  the impugned notifications. Shri Shanti Bhushan  contended that  reading all  these documents together, it is clear that the acquisition is ultimately for the Private  Company  as  evident  from  the  lease-cum-sale agreement  between   the  Board  and  the  Company.  It  was submitted that  the form  in which the agreement has already been executed  in respect  of the  land earlier acquired for the same  project bears  striking similarity  to the form of sale prescribed in the regulations governing the disposal of lands by  the Board  under Section  14(a) of  the  Karnataka Industrial Areas  Development Act,  1966. No  doubt all  the documents have  to be read together to determine the purpose of the present acquisition.      We  have   already  indicated  with  reference  to  the notification issued  under Sections  4(1) and 17 of the Land Acquisition Act that the purpose of acquiring land mentioned therein is  the public  purpose of setting up the Technology Park through  the Board.  The two  letters (Annexures G & H) which led to the issuance of the notification, also indicate the  same.  The  affidavit  of  M.N.  Vidyashankar-Executive

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Member of  the Board (at pages 238 to 243 of the Paper Book) gives the  relevant facts  indicating  the  purpose  of  the acquisition. It describes the nature of joint venture called Information Technology  Park  Pvt.  Ltd.  (respondent  no.5) which is  a joint  venture company promoted by (1) the Board (2) Singapore  Consortium of  five companies  and  (3)  Tata Industries Ltd.,  in which  the share  holding is restricted only to  these three  promoters and the Board has 20% equity shares therein. It says that the present acquisition is made for the  said project  and the involvement of the company is only for  this purpose ensuring the use of the land acquired only  for   this  project,   namely,establishment   of   the Information Technology  Park, Since  the expertise  required for the  establishment of  the Park is being provided by the Singapore Consortium and Tata Industries Ltd.. The affidavit gives the  details of the control by the Board to ensure use of the  entire land  only for  this project  and not for any other purpose.  Proceedings of the meeting of the Board held on 24/1/1994  have  been  annexed  to  the  affidavit.  This mentions clearly  that in the joint venture agreement, it is clearly provided  that the  Board  has  veto  power  in  the matters pertaining  to  policies  and  guidelines  etc.  and provision has  been made  to enable the Board to enforce the policy decisions. It further provides as under :-           "The      proposed      Information      Technology   Park    would   have    the      facilities  like,   power   supply,water      supply,    centrally    airconditioning,      facilities  for   transmission  of  data      through satellite  etc., in  addition to      the     common     facilities,     like,      administrative block, canteen, hospitals      and residential  accommodation  for  the      Executive  Staff.  The  Park  should  be      fully functional  before expiry  of  the      lease period."      The other provisions also indicate that the involvement of the  Company is  only for  carrying  out  the  object  of setting up this project.      We have  no doubt  that the  cumulative effect  of  all these documents  is that  the present acquisition is for the public purpose  of setting  up the  Technology Park  by  the Government of  Karnataka through  the  said  Board  and  the acquisition of  this additional  area  became  necessary  on account of the inadequacy of the land acquired earlier under the Karnataka  Act of  1966, in  view of the urgency and the need to speed up the project. The foundation for the primary submission of  the learned  counsel for  the appellant  does not, therefore, exist.      The  next   contention  of   learned  counsel  for  the appellants is  indeed a  corollary of the primary submission which is  already  rejected.  The  contention  is  that  the acquisition being  for the private company, the provision of the central  Act which  had been  invoked are  inapplicable. This question does not arise in view of the rejection of the primary submission.      The next  contention is  that the acquisition under the Contral Act which is a more stringent provision is violative of Article  14 since it deprives the appellants of the right of the  more liberal  provisions of the Karnataka Act, 1966. In our  opinion, there  is no  merit in  this contention  as well. In view of the urgent need for the acquisition of this land, which cannot be met under the Karnataka Act, resort to the provisions  of the  Central  Act  which  are  applicable cannot  be   faulted.  Moreover,  Chapter  VII  relating  to

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‘Acquisition and  Disposal of Land’ in the Karnataka Act has to be  read in  the light  of Section 27,which says that the provision of  this Chapter  shall apply  to such  areas from such dates  as have  been notified  by the  State Government under  sub-section   (3)  of  Section  1.  Accordingly,  the provision in  Section 28  therein for  Acquisition  of  Land applies only  to areas  notified under  sub-section  (3)  of Section 1.  Admittedly, it  is only  an area of about 1 acre out of  the acquired  area of 11 acres 36 gunthas, which has been so  notified. For  this reason,  this argument does not arise in  respect of  the remaining  area of about 10 acres. Shri G.L.  Sanghi also  appearing for  one of the appellants advanced  the   further  argument  that  the  Karnataka  Act excludes the  applicability of  the Central  Act since  they operate in  the same  field. The  fact of inapplicability of the Karnataka  Act by  virtue of Section 27 therein to about 10 acres  of the  acquired land is significant to repel this argument in  respect of  at least  the major  portion of the acquired land.  Moreover, we  are  not  impressed  with  the argument based  on Article 14 in the facts and circumstances of this case.      The  last   submission  of   learned  counsel  for  the appellant is that the user of the acquired land shown in the master plan being different, there cannot be a conversion of the user except in accordance with the provisions for making the change  in the  land use.  It is not a case of change of user by  the owner of the land but one of acquisition by the State under  the provisions  of the  Land  Acquisition  Act, 1894. This argument also had no merit.      An argument  was also  made alleging  malafides on  the ground of  a dispute raised by the appellant to the right of way claimed  for  use  of  the  earlier  acquired  land  for implementation of  the project, through a portion of the now acquired land.  We have  examined the  facts  on  which  the argument is  based. We  are not satisfied that any ground of malafides is  made out  in the  present  case.  The  present acquisition is shown to be for the public purpose of setting up the  Information Technology  Park and to meet the need of additional land  contiguous to the area acquired earlier for the project by the Board.      Consequently, the appeals are dismissed. No costs.