REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.               OF 2008 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No.5781 of 2007)

S. Ramakrishna …Appellant

Versus

The State rep. by the Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P. Hyderabad …Respondent

JUDGMENT

Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of the learned Single Judge of

the Andhra Pradesh High Court upholding the conviction of the appellant for

the offences punishable under Sections 376 and 342 of the Indian Penal Code,

1860 (for short ‘IPC’), while acquitting the appellant of the charges in terms of

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Section  506  IPC.  The accused  was  sentenced  to  10  years  imprisonment  by

learned Sessions Judge, Chittoor, which was reduced to 7 years by the High

Court.  The appellant  faced trial  for offences punishable under Sections 376,

323, 342 and 506 IPC. The Trial Court directed acquittal  of the appellant in

respect of offence punishable under Section 323 IPC but convicted in respect

of other offences as noted above.

3. Background facts as projected by the prosecution are as follows:

On 1.10.2001  at  about  5.30  pm while  U.  Vijayalakshmi  -  PW.1  was

returning  from the fields  to  the  village  and  when she reached  the  fields  of

Viswanatha Reddy along with her cattle,  the accused who was hiding in the

bushes,  gagged her mouth with his towel and tied her hands with his lungi,

pushed her to the ground, lifted her petty coat and forcibly committed rape on

her. When PW.1 struggled to  escape,  the accused pinched on her  face with

nails and caused scratches. Then, the accused untied the hands of the victim-

PW.1, threatened to kill her and her family members if she informs the incident

to her parents. When PW.1 told the accused that she would inform the incident

to  her  uncle,  the accused threatened her  with dire consequences  to  kill  her.

After accused left the place, PW.1 returned to village informed the incident to

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her parents, and on the next day she went to Police Station, Baireddipalli and

presented  a  report  to  the  Sub-Inspector  of  Police  who  in  turn  sent  her  for

medical  examination.  The  doctor  gave  report  to  the  effect  that  sexual

intercourse  was  committed  on  her.  The  investigation  revealed  that  accused

committed the offence of rape on PW.1 and also threatened to kill her and thus

the accused committed the offence punishable under Sections 342, 376 and 506

IPC.

On the said allegations, the learned Magistrate took the case on file and

after appearance of the accused furnished copies of the documents. The learned

magistrate after observing all the formalities, duly committed the case to the

Court of Session, Sessions Division, and the Sessions Judge took the case on

file  as  Sessions  Case  and  made  over  the  same to  the  Additional  Assistant

Sessions Judge, Chittoor for trial.

The  learned  Additional  Assistant  Sessions  Judge  after  hearing  the

defence counsel and the prosecutor, framed charges under sections 376, 323,

342 and 506 Indian Penal Code against the accused, read over and explained to

him for which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.  

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4. To establish the accusations, the prosecution examined 12 witnesses and

got marked 13 exhibits besides marking of MOS. After closing of prosecution

evidence  accused  was  examined  in  terms  of  Section  313  of  the  Code  of

Criminal  Procedure,  1973  (in  short  ‘Code’).   The  accused  again  pleaded

innocence but marked Ex.D1. The Trial Court placed reliance on the evidence

of the prosecution PW1 and the evidence of the doctor PW9 and held that the

accusations  were  established.  Accordingly,  the  appellant  was  convicted  and

sentenced.

5. In appeal, the stand was that PW9 has stated that the age of the victim

was around 18 years and, therefore, no offence was made out under Section

376 IPC.  The reference was also made to the evidence of the doctor to show

that in the note, rape was not established.  The High Court did not find any

substance in the plea and noted that the case of the accused was not of consent.

The age of the victim was really of no consequence.  So far as the stand that no

rape  was  established  by  medical  evidence,  the  High  Court  analysed  the

evidence of the PW9 to hold that stand was without any substance.                   

6. In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that

the  High Court  has  erroneously dismissed  the  stand  of  the  appellant.   It  is

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submitted that the evidence of doctor clearly establish that no rape, in fact, was

committed.  

7. Learned counsel  for  the respondent,  on  the other  hand,  supported  the

judgment of the Trial Court as confirmed by the High Court.  Before we deal

with the factual and legal position it has to be noted that in the judgment of the

Trial Court and the High Court the name of the victim has been mentioned.        

8. We do not propose to mention name of the victim. Section 228-A IPC

makes disclosure of identity of victim of certain offences punishable. Printing

or publishing name of any matter which may make known the identity of any

person against whom an offence under Sections 376, 376-A, 376-B, 376-C or

376-D is alleged or found to have been committed can be punished. True it is,

the restriction does not relate to printing or publication of judgment by High

Court or Supreme Court. But keeping in view the social object of preventing

social victimisation or ostracism of the victim of a sexual offence for which

Section 228-A has been enacted, it would be appropriate that in the judgments,

be it of this Court. High Court or lower Court, the name of the victim should

not be indicated, we have chosen to describe her as 'victim' in the judgment.

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The above position was highlighted in State of Karnataka v. Puttaraja (2004 (1)

SCC 475).

9. The evidence of the prosecutrix (PW-1) shows that she has described the

manner in which the rape was committed on her.  Apart from that PW1 has

stated that on the way she had met PWs 3 and 4 to whom she had mentioned

about the incident.  That was in addition to the information given to her mother

PW2.   Stand  of  the  appellant  in  the  instant  case  was  that  there  was  no

corroboration with the evidence of the prosecutrix.   

10.    A  prosecutrix  of  a  sex  offence  cannot  be  put  on  a  par  with  an

accomplice. She is in fact a victim of the crime. The Indian Evidence Act, 1872

(in  short  “the  Evidence  Act”)  nowhere  says  that  her  evidence  cannot  be

accepted unless it is corroborated in material particulars. She is undoubtedly a

competent witness under Section 118 and her evidence must receive the same

weight  as  is  attached to  an injured in cases of  physical  violence.  The same

degree of care and caution must attach in the evaluation of her evidence as in

the case of an injured complainant or witness and no more. What is necessary is

that the court must be alive to and conscious of the fact that it is dealing with

the evidence of a person who is interested in the outcome of the charge levelled

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by her. If the court keeps this in mind and feels satisfied that it can act on the

evidence of the prosecutrix, there is no rule of law or practice incorporated in

the Evidence Act similar to Illustration (b) to Section 114 which requires it to

look for corroboration. If for some reason the court is hesitant to place implicit

reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix it  may look for evidence which

may lend assurance to her testimony, short of corroboration required in the case

of  an accomplice.  The nature  of  evidence required to  lend assurance to  the

testimony  of  the  prosecutrix  must  necessarily  depend  on  the  facts  and

circumstances  of  each  case.  But  if  a  prosecutrix  is  an  adult  and  of  full

understanding, the court is entitled to base a conviction on her evidence unless

the  same  is  shown  to  be  infirm and  not  trustworthy.  If  the  totality  of  the

circumstances appearing on the record of the case discloses that the prosecutrix

does not have a strong motive to falsely involve the person charged, the court

should ordinarily have no hesitation in accepting her evidence.

11. The  aforesaid  position  was  highlighted  in  State  of  Maharashtra v.

Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain (1990 (1) SCC 550), Karnel Singh  v. State

of M.P. (1995 (5) SCC 518) and  Sri Narayan Saha v. State of Tripura (2004) 7

SCC 775).

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12. Coming to the medical evidence though at first it appears that the doctor

had opined that  rape was not  committed,  it   was,  in  fact,  not  so.  On closer

reading of the evidence of PW9, the position is crystal clear that the doctor has,

in fact, stated that sexual intercourse had occurred on PW1. Apart  from that

presence of human semen and protozoa clearly establishes allegation of rape.

Therefore,  the  prosecution  has  clearly  established  the  allegation  of  rape.

Though the question is not really of any importance as the stand of the accused

was  not  one  of  consent,  the  documentary  evidence  adduced  i.e.  school

certificate clearly shows that she was about 14 years of age.            

13. That  being  so,  the  Trial  Court  and  the  High  Court  rightly  found  the

accused-appellant guilty.  The appeal is without merit and is dismissed.  

……………………………………J. (Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT)

……………………………………J. (Dr. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA)

New Delhi:  October 20, 2008

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