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PETITIONER: S. M. GOPALAKRISHNA CHETTY

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: GANESHAN & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT11/08/1975

BENCH: GOSWAMI, P.K. BENCH: GOSWAMI, P.K. ALAGIRISWAMI, A. UNTWALIA, N.L.

CITATION:  1975 AIR 1750            1976 SCR  (1) 273  1975 SCC  (2) 408  CITATOR INFO :  D          1979 SC1559  (5,10)  RF         1989 SC1101  (16)

ACT:      Madras Buildings  (Lease  &  Rent  Control)  Act  1960- Section 2(6)-  Section 14-Whether a single eviction petition with regard  to two  tenancies in  the    same  premises  is maintainable.

HEADNOTE:      The appellant  landlord is a holder of life interest in the property  in question He filed a suit against the tenant for eviction  on the grounds of bona fide requirement by him for demolition  and reconstruction. The Rent Controller held the requirement  of  the  landlord  bona  fide  and  ordered eviction of the tenant. The appellant filed one petition for evicting the  tenants in respect of two different tenancies, one  for   residential  purpose   and  the  other  for  non- residential  purpose.  The  appellate  Authority  under  the Madras  Buildings   (Lease  and   Rent  Control)  Act,  1960 dismissed the  appellant’s application  for eviction  on the ground that  a landlord  having a  life interest cannot seek eviction  for  bona  fide  requirement  for  demolition  and reconstruction. The  High Court in Revision refused to inter fere with  the order  of the  Appellate Authority  under the Act.      On appeal  by special  leave, it  was contended  by the appellant that  the land  lord having  a  life  interest  is entitled to  evict the  tenant for bona fide requirement for demolition and  reconstruction under  section 14 of the Act. The respondent contended that granting of the application of the landlord  might prejudice  the interest of the remainder man. ^      HELD: Allowing the appeal,      (1) Definition  of landlord under- section 2(6) is wide enough to include the appellant who holds a life interest in the premises.  The  right  between  the  appellant  and  the remainder man  with regard  to the  deed of settlement would have to  be worked  out in appropriate proceedings. ’The Act in question  is a  self-contained  and,  complete  Code  for

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regulation of  the rights between the land lord and tenants. Even  a  possible  dispute  between  the  landlord  and  the remainder man cannot affect adjudication of the claim of the landlord against  his tenants  under the  provisions of  the Act. [275F-276D]      (2) A  single petition  with regard to two tenancies in the same  premises is  maintainable when the tenancy is one. [276D-E]

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil  Appeals Nos. 493- 495 of 1 974      Appeals by  special leave  from the  judgment and order dated the 9th August, 1973 of the Madras High Court in Civil Revision Petition  Nos. 1470 to 1472 of 1973.      K. S. Ramamurthi, T. N. Vallinayagam, R. N. Nath and V. Maya Krishnan, for the appellant.      M. Natesan,  K. Jayaram  and R.  Chandrasekhar, for the respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      GOSWAMI,  J.-   These  appeals  by  special  leave  are directed against  the order  of the  High Court of Madras in three Civil  Revision Petitions  under  section  25  of  the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) 274 Act 1960 briefly the (Act) whereby the High Court refused to interfere A with the orders of the appellate authority under the Act  holding  that  the  appellant  (hereinafter  to  be described as  the  landlord)  has  no  right  to  evict  the respondents (hereinafter  to be  described as  the  tenants) from the  premises in  question on  the ground of demolition and reconstruction.      The tenancy  under the  landlord  is  admitted  by  the tenants there   is  also no question with regard to validity of the notice of eviction. The only questions in controversy in these  appeals are whether the landlord in this case, who is the  holder of life interest in the property, is entitled to evict  the tenants  under section 14(1) (b) of the Act on the ground  that the  building is  bona fide required by the landlord for  demolition and  for reconstruction. The second question raised‘  in one  of the appeals is whether a single petition is  maintainable to  evict  the  tenants  from  two different tenancies  one for  residential  purpose  and  the other for non-residential purpose. The latter point has been held by  the High  Court in  favour of  the landlord but the tenants are  raising it  in seeking  to support  the earlier order of the appellate authority.      The premises are situated at Anna Pinai Street, Madras. Originally  the   premises  belonged   to  late  S.  Manicka Chettyar,  father  of  S.  M.  Gopalakrislina,  the  present landlord. By  virtue of  a Deed of Settlement executed by S. Manicka Chettyar  on May 9, 1934, possession of the premises was delivered  to his wife, Manoranjithammal, as trustee and guardian an of his three minor children, S. M. Gopalakrishna then aged  13‘ years,  and his  two minor daughters, Indrani Ammal and  Palani Ammal.  We  are  not  concerned  with  the various directions  in the Deed of Settlement except to note the admitted  position that  Manoranjithammal was allowed to enjoy the  rents and  profits of  the property  for her life time subject to certain charges mentioned in the Deed. After the life  time  of  the  settlor’s  wife,  his  son,  S.  M. Gopalakrishna (appellant)  shall enjoy the rents and profits of the  said property....  for his  life  time"  subject  lo

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certain charges on account of his two sisters. It is further mentioned  in   the  Deed   that  after  the  life  time  of Gopalakrishna, his son and son’s heir of any predeceased son living at  that time  shall enjoy  the property  subject  to identical charges  as absolute  owners, with  right of sale, gift, etc.  There are  further directions  in case  of other contingencies with  which we  are  not  concerned.  We  may, however, note that S. M. Gopalakrishna is issueless.      From the  above terms of the Settlement it is contended by the tenants that the landlord has only a life interest in the premises  in question  and that it is inherent in such a life interest that it is not permissible for the landlord to invoke section  14(1) (b)  as grounds  for eviction  of the: tenants by  demolition of  the property  for the  purpose of reconstruction. It  is emphasised that since the interest of the remainder-man  may be  prejudiced? the  landlord with  a life interest  in the  premises cannot  evict the tenants on these grounds.       The  Rent, Controller held that the requirement of the landlords bona fide and ordered for eviction of the tenants. The Court of Small Causes, 275 which is the appellate authority, allowed the appeals lodged by the  tenants against the orders of eviction and set aside the orders  of eviction.  As noticed  earlier the High Court refused to interfere in revision.      The High  Court agreed  with the! view of the appellate authority that the landlord had no right to ask for eviction of  the   respondents  on   the  ground  of  demolition  and reconstruction, he admittedly having only a life interest or right to  enjoy the property for his life. The appellant sub mits that this view is not legally tenable.      Before we proceed to consider the point in controversy, we may read section 14(1)(b):      14. "Recovery  of possession by landlord for repairs or      for reconstruction.-           (1)  Notwithstandig  anything  contained  in  this                Act, but subject to the provisions of section                12 and  13,  on  an  application  made  by  a                landlord  the  Controller  shall,  if  he  is                satisfied-                (b)  that the  building is bona fide required                     by  the   landlord  for   the  immediate                     purpose  of   demolishing  it  and  such                     demolition is to be made for the purpose                     of erecting  a new  building on the site                     of the building sought to be demolished,                     pass an  order directing  the tenant  to                     deliver   possession of  the building to                     the landlord before a specified date". The expression  landlord is  defined under  section 2(6)  as follows:-           " ’Landlord’  includes the person who is receiving      or is  entitled to  receive the  rent  of  a  building,      whether on  his own ac count or on behalf of another or      on behalf  of  himself  and  others  or  as  an  agent,      trustee, executor,  administrator, receiver or guardian      or who  would so  receive the  rent or  be entitled  to      receive the  rent,  if  the  building  were  let  to  a      tenant".           x         x         x         x      This inclusive definition o landlord would clearly take in its  sweep the present landlord who holds a life interest in the premises and who admittedly has been on his own right under the Deed of Settlement as a trustee receiving rents of

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the premises  from the  tenants. We  are not  even concerned with the  question as  has been  sought to be established in the case  by proving  that there  is no  possibility or  any objection from  the daughters  of the  settlor or  from  any other remainder-man.  It is  sufficient to  observe that the rights between  S. M.  Gopalakrishna and  the  remainder-man with regard  to the terms of the Deed of Settlement win have to be  worked out  in appropriate  proceedings, if necessary and the  general law  win govern  the matter if any occasion arises.      On the  other hand, the Act with which we are concerned is a  self contained and complete code for regulation of the rights between  landlord and  tenants as  defined in the Act (See M/s Raval and Co. v. K. G. 276 Ramachandra and  others (1).  Thus a  controversy  that  may arise between a landlord and others, who are not his tenants under the  Act, is  outside the  ken of  this  Act.  Even  a possible dispute,  imaginary or  real, between  the landlord and the  remainder-man cannot  affect  adjudication  of  the claim  of   the  landlord  against  his  tenants  under  the provisions of  the Act.  It win also not affect the efficacy of the  nature of  the plea  of bona fide on the part of the landlord, if  otherwise so.  Such questions as are raised in this appeal  by the  tenants are, therefore, irrelevant in a litigation between  the landlord and tenants when a suit for eviction is  instituted by  the former on any of the grounds available to  him under  the Act.  It is clear that when the objection on  the score  of the  landlord being  a holder of life interest and hence incapable of invoking section 14 (1) (b) fails the suit must be decreed.      lt was  strenuously submitted  by Mr.  Natesan  that  a tenant with  a life  interest cannot  be allowed to demolish the property  in order  to reconstruct  it  as  that  action would, per  se be  not bona fide. We are unable to accede to this submission.  A landlord has every right to demolish his property in  order to build a new structure on the site with view to improve his business or to get better returns on his investment. Such  a step  per se, cannot be characterised as mala fide  on the  part of the landlord. There is therefore. no merit in this contention.      Mr. Natesan  faintly submitted  that a  single petition with regard to two different tenancies, although in the same premises, one for residential purpose and the other for non- residential purpose, is not maintainable. We do not find any substance in such a contention when the tenancy is one.      In the  result the appeals are allowed and the order of the High  Court as  well as  that of the appellate authority are set aside. The order of the Controller allowing eviction of the  tenants stands restored. We win, however, allow time to the  tenants upto  31st  January,  1976,  to  vacate  the premises on  the distinct  condition that  they shall submit affidavits in  this Court undertaking to vacate the premises by the  aforesaid date  within two  weeks from  to-day.  The appellant win be entitled to his costs in these appeals. One set of costs P.H.P.                                       Appeal allowed. 277