RUPA RANI RAKSHIT Vs JHARKHAND GRAMIN BANK .
Case number: C.A. No.-001786-001786 / 2002
Diary number: 12523 / 2001
Advocates: Vs
BINA GUPTA
Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1786 OF 2002
Rupa Rani Rakshit & Ors. … Appellants
Vs.
Jharkhand Gramin Bank & Ors. … Respondents
WITH
CA Nos.1787-1788 & 1789 of 2002
J U D G M E N T
R.V.RAVEENDRAN, J.
The appellants in these appeals are the employees of
the first respondent-Bank – Ranchi Kshetriya Gramin Bank
– now known as Jharkhand Gramin Bank. The appellants were
working as clerks-cum-cashiers or equivalent posts in
different branches of the first respondent-Bank. The
Regional Rural Banks (Appointment and Promotion of
Officers and other Employees) Rules, 1988 (for short ‘the
Rules’) made by the Central Government in exercise of
powers conferred under the Provincial Rural Banks Act,
1976 governed the appointment and promotion of employees
of the Bank. Rule 5 provided that all vacancies shall be
filled in accordance with the provisions of the Second
Schedule to the Rules. Entry (5) of Second Schedule to
the Rules related to filling of posts of Field
Supervisors (subsequently merged with the post of
officers). Clause (a) thereof provided that 50% of the
posts shall be filled by promotion from amongst the
confirmed senior and junior clerks-cum-cashiers or
clerks-cum-typists or stenographers or steno-typists on
the basis of seniority-cum-merit (the remaining 50% to be
filled by direct recruitment which is not relevant for
these appeals). Clause (b) of Entry (5) prescribed the
educational qualifications and the eligibility (minimum
number of years of service in the feeder post) for
promotion. Clause (e) of Entry (5) prescribed the mode of
selection for promotion as “interviews and assessment of
performance reports for preceding three years period”.
2. The first respondent Bank drew up a common seniority
list of all the eligible candidates (candidates
possessing the prescribed educational qualifications who
have put in the prescribed period of service) from the
feeder grades. Then the eligible candidates were
subjected to a comparative assessment based on marks
secured with reference to four parameters adopted by the
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Board of Directors of the first respondent-Bank at its
58th Meeting, on the basis of the norms prescribed by the
National Bank for Agricultural and Rural Development (for
short ‘NABARD’). The four parameters and maximum marks
allocated to each of them were as under:
Sl.N o.
Particulars Maximum Marks
(i) Seniority (one mark for each completed quarter of service)
40
(ii) Educational Qualifications : [for possessing graduate degree : 3 marks; post-graduate degree : 2 marks and Doctorate : 1 mark]
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(iii )
Performance-appraisal : [for Very Good (A) - 8 marks; for Good (B) - 6 marks; for Average (C) - 5 marks; and for Poor (D) - 0 marks]
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(iv) Interview : [Minimum qualifying marks for interview : 10 marks]
30
TOTAL 100
A list of the candidates who secured the minimum
qualifying marks in the interview was prepared in the
order of merit with reference to the marks secured by
them on such assessment. Therefore, 31 candidates were
promoted from among the said list of clerical cadre to
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the post of Field Supervisors in the order of merit, vide
notification dated 20.11.1990.
3. Feeling aggrieved, the third respondent herein filed
a writ petition before the High Court, contending that in
making the promotions, the Bank had ignored the principle
of seniority-cum-merit prescribed under the Rules and had
followed the principle of merit-cum-seniority. It was
also contended that contrary to the provisions of the
Rules which required that the mode of selection would be
only by interviews and assessment of performance reports
for preceding three years, the Bank had adopted the
method of assessment with reference to four parameters,
that is, years of service (seniority), educational
qualifications, in addition to performance appraisal and
interview.
4. By the time the said writ petition came up for
consideration, a Full Bench of the Patna High Court had
rendered its judgment in Ranchi Kshetriya Gramin Bank vs.
D.P. Singh [2000 (1) PLJR 251], holding that promotion of
persons with reference to merit, that is, promoting those
who secured highest marks in the list of eligible
candidates was contrary to the principle of seniority-
cum-merit. A learned Single Judge of the High Court,
therefore, allowed the writ petition field by third
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respondent, by order dated 10.1.2001 and set aside the
promotions. He held that the promotions effected as per
the order dated 20.11.1990 without following the
principle of seniority-cum-merit, but on a comparative
assessment of merit which was based on marks for academic
qualifications, interview etc. were illegal.
Consequently, he directed as follows :
“While considering the cases all the eligible candidates, it shall be open to the respondent to fix marks for assessment of performance of proceeding three years prior to the date such promotion as were considered originally. This clearly means the three proceeding years from the date of original consideration which was the subject matter of the writ application. It shall be open to the Bank to allocate marks at the minimum level for the interview/viva voce test in addition to assessment of performance, to determine the standard of candidate in the interest of administration. Once it is done, seniority shall have precedence over everything else.
x x x x x
Till order of promotion is issued based on the aforesaid directions the respondents No.3 to 7 and the intervener(s) will continue to hold the post(s) as presently held by them and not to be disturbed till the final order(s) are passed in the matter of promotion. If, however, any contesting respondent(s) or intervener(s) or one or other fail to get promotion they shall be deemed to be reverted to the post as originally held by them before issuance of the impugned order of promotion, which has been set aside.
It is also made clear that contesting respondents no.3 to 7 or the interveners if allowed promotion on such consideration, they will not get benefit in pursuance of earlier
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notification dated 19th Nov. 1990, which has been set aside by this Court.”
The appeals filed by the appellants (candidates promoted
on 20.11.1990) against the said judgment were dismissed
by the Division Bench, holding by a short order that the
judgment of the learned Single Judge did not call for
interference. The said judgment is challenged in these
appeals by special leave.
5. The first contention urged by the appellants is that
the promotions made on dated 20.11.1990 were lawful and
valid. It was submitted that the Bank had effected
promotions by giving primacy to seniority as it allotted
maximum marks of 40 out of 100, for the period of service
(at the rate of one mark for every quarter of service).
It was pointed out that marks allotted to other
parameters were less - 30 marks for interview, 24 marks
for performance-appraisal in regard to three years
service and 6 marks for educational qualifications. It
was contended that when primacy was accorded to seniority
(period of service) in the assessment process, the
promotion should be treated as on the principle of
seniority-cum-merit.
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6. The principle of seniority-cum-merit is well-
settled. In Rajendra Kumar Srivastava & Ors. v. Samyut
Kshetriya Gramin Bank & Ors. [C.A. No.6691 of 2001
decided on 17.11.2009], this Court observed as follows :
“8. It is also well settled that the principle of seniority-cum-merit, for promotion, is different from the principle of ‘seniority’ and principle of ‘merit-cum-seniority’. Where promotion is on the basis of seniority alone, merit will not play any part at all. But where promotion is on the principle of seniority- cum-merit, promotion is not automatic with reference to seniority alone. Merit will also play a significant role. The standard method of seniority-cum-merit is to subject all the eligible candidates in the feeder grade (possessing the prescribed educational qualification and period of service) to a process of assessment of a specified minimum necessary merit and then promote the candidates who are found to possess the minimum necessary merit strictly in the order of seniority. The minimum merit necessary for the post may be assessed either by subjecting the candidates to a written examination or an interview or by assessment of their work performance during the previous years, or by a combination of either two or all the three of the aforesaid methods. There is no hard and fast rule as to how the minimum merit is to be ascertained. So long as the ultimate promotions are based on seniority, any process for ascertaining the minimum necessary merit, as a basic requirement, will not militate against the principle of seniority-cum-merit.
x x x x x
10. Thus it is clear that a process whereby eligible candidates possessing the minimum necessary merit in the feeder posts is first ascertained and thereafter, promotions are made strictly in accordance with seniority, from among those who possess the minimum necessary merit is recognised and accepted as complying with the principle of ‘seniority-
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cum-merit’. What would offend the rule of seniority-cum-merit is a process where after assessing the minimum necessary merit, promotions are made on the basis of merit (instead of seniority) from among the candidates possessing the minimum necessary merit. If the criteria adopted for assessment of minimum necessary merit is bona fide and not unreasonable, it is not open to challenge, as being opposed to the principle of seniority-cum-merit. We accordingly hold that prescribing minimum qualifying marks to ascertain the minimum merit necessary for discharging the functions of the higher post, is not violative of the concept of promotion by seniority-cum-merit.”
(emphasis supplied)
7. In this case, the bank did not subject the eligible
candidates to any process of assessment to ascertain any
specified minimum merit, for the purpose of promoting the
candidates who possessed the minimum merit, on the basis
seniority. On the other hand, the Bank proceeded to
assess their inter-se-merit with reference to four
criteria (period of service, educational qualification,
performance during three years, and interview) by
allocating respectively maximum marks of 40, 6, 24 and 30
(out of a total 100 marks) and then proceeded to promote
those who had secured the highest marks in the order of
merit. Thus there were two violations of the relevant
rules: (i) promoting candidates on merit-cum-seniority
and not on seniority-cum-merit; and (ii) assessing inter-
se merit, inter alia with reference to marks allocated to
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different educational qualifications. It cannot,
therefore, be said that the promotions made on 20.11.1990
were on the basis of seniority-cum-merit. Though the
period of service was also considered as one of the
factors for assessment of comparative merit, the
procedure adopted for promotion was merit-cum-seniority.
The High Court was, therefore, justified in interfering
with the promotions. The directions given by the High
Court for fresh process of promotion were in consonance
with the Rules and principles of seniority-cum-merit. The
appeals, therefore, have no merit.
8. The appellants submitted that they were promoted in
November 1990, that they had worked in the higher post of
Field Superiors for more than ten years and therefore,
even if there was some procedural irregularity, their
promotions ought not to have been interfered with, in the
year 2001. The submission is misleading. Though the
promotions of appellants were in November, 1990, it was
challenged before the High Court by the third respondent
by filing a writ petition, without any delay, that is, in
less than three months. The fact that the writ petition
was pending for a considerable time will not therefore
create any equities in favour of the appellants.
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9. The appellants in C.A. No.1789 of 2002 have an
additional grievance. The three appellants in that appeal
were originally promoted on 20.11.1990. When the High
Court set aside the said promotions and directed a fresh
process of promotions by adopting the principle of
seniority-cum-merit, the Bank accordingly made fresh
promotions by order dated 24.4.2001 and these three
appellants were again promoted with effect from 9.4.2001.
But their seniority in the post of Field Supervisor was
reckoned from the date of their fresh promotion i.e.
9.4.2001 and the previous period of service as Field
Supervisor from 1990 to 2001 was ignored. They contend
that their service as Field Supervisors between 1990 and
2001 should also be counted for the purpose of their
seniority in the post of Field Supervisors, further
promotions and other benefits.
10. It is now well-settled that if an appointment or
promotion is made without considering the claims of all
the available eligible candidates and/or without
following the relevant rules, the service rendered in
pursuance of such illegal appointment or promotion cannot
be equated to service rendered in pursuance of an
appointment or promotion validly and lawfully made.
Whenever a person is promoted to a post without following
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the rules prescribed for such promotion, he should be
treated as a person not regularly promoted to that post.
Consequently, where promotions are governed by Rules, in
computing the length of service, in the post to which an
employee is promoted, it is not permissible to include
the period of service rendered in pursuance of an illegal
promotion which is subsequently set aside. It,
therefore, follows that the period of service rendered by
the appellants from 1990 to 2001 cannot be counted for
the purpose of seniority in the cadre of Officers/Field
Superiors. Therefore, the appellants in C.A. No.1789/2002
are also not entitled to any relief.
11. Therefore, all the appeals and the applications for
impleadment are dismissed.
…………………………J. (R. V. Raveendran)
New Delhi; …………………………J. November 24, 2009. (K.S. Radhakrishnan)
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