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REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL  NO. 1320 OF 2005

Rishab  Chand  Bhandari  (D)  by  Lrs. & Anr.

.... Appellants

Versus

National  Engineering  Industry  Ltd.

.... Respondent

O R D E R

1. Heard learned counsel for the parties.

2. This appeal has been filed against the judgment and  

order dated 17.01.2005 of the Division Bench of the High  

Court of Judicature at Rajasthan Bench at Jaipur whereby the  

learned  Division  Bench  has  set  aside  the  order  of  the  

learned Single Judge dated 23.08.2001 and restored that of  

the  Trial  Court,  i.e.,  the  Addl.  District  Judge  No.  5,  

Jaipur City, Jaipur dated 31.07.1993.

3. The respondent-plaintiff filed a suit for eviction  

against the appellants-defendants and for deposit of arrears  

of rent.  The said suit was decreed by the Trial Court.  In  

appeal the said decree was set aside by the learned Single  

Judge of the High Court, which order has been set aside by  

the learned Division Bench by the impugned order.  Hence,

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this appeal by special leave.

4. The  facts  in  brief  are  that  the  suit  premises  

admittedly  belonged  to  Sitaram  Bhandar  Trust  (hereinafter  

for short 'the Trust') and the Trust is the owner of the  

suit  premises.   The  respondent,  claiming  that  it  was  

authorized by the Trust to do so, alleged that it had let  

out the premises in dispute to appellant No.2 (defendant No.  

1 in the suit) and was collecting rent from it.  However,  

thereafter, the defendant No. 1 started paying rent to one  

Ram Das Modani who claimed to be an employee of the Trust.  

The respondent then filed a suit for eviction and arrears of  

rent against the appellants alleging that the appellants had  

committed default in payment of rent.

5. Under  the  Rajasthan  Premises  (Control  of  Rent  &  

Eviction)  Act,  1950,  under  Section  3(iii)  the  word  

'landlord' has been defined as under:-

 “landlord” means any person who for the time  

being is receiving or is entitled to receive the  

rent of any premises, whether on his own account  

or as an agent, trustee, guardian or receiver or  

any other person or who would so receive or be  

entitled to receive the rent if the premises were  

let to a tenant; it includes a tenant in relation

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to a sub-tenant”.

6. Learned  counsel  for  the  appellant  submitted  that  

there were no arrears of rent as rent was being paid to Ram  

Das Modani, who was collecting rent on behalf of the Trust.  

Hence, he submitted that there was no default in payment of  

rent.   

7. On the other hand learned counsel for the respondent  

submitted that the respondent company was the landlord and  

hence rent should have been paid to it and thus there was  

default in payment of rent.  He further submitted that it  

was  the  respondent  who  had  let  out  the  premises  and  

accordingly in terms of the Act it was entitled to receive  

rent.   

8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. We  

are required to interpret the word 'landlord' as provided  

under the Act.

9. In  our  opinion  a  purposive,  and  not  literal  

interpretation  has  to  be  given  to  the  definition  of  

'landlord' in the Act.   

10.  The natural landlord of a premises is ordinarily  

the owner.  However, an expanded definition has been given  

in various rent statutes of many States for the  reason that  

sometimes the owner may not himself be in a position to

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collect the rent and may hence appoint an agent or authorize  

any person to collect rent on his behalf because he may be  

abroad or is unable to do so for any other reason.  This  

does  not  mean  that  the  natural  meaning  of  the  word  

'landlord',  who  is  the  owner  of  the  premises,  would  

disappear  and  that  the  owner  goes  out  of  the  picture  

altogether.  This is the view taken by the Delhi High Court  

in the case of Shri Madan Lal Vs. Shri Hazara Singh 1977 (2)  

RLR,  641.   We  approve  of  the  view  taken  in  the  said  

decision.  If we interpret the definition of 'landlord' in  

the Act literally it will result in strange consequences.  

It will mean that even if the owner, who is the natural  

landlord, does not want to evict a tenant, his agent may do  

so.  Surely this is an absurd situation.  It is well settled  

that  if  a  literal  interpretation  leads  to  absurd  

consequences,  it  should  be  avoided,  and  a  purposive  

interpretation be given.   

11. In the present case the respondent has not been able  

to show that it was authorized in writing to act on behalf  

of the Trust either by a power of attorney or any other  

written document.  Unless there is some documentary proof  

that the Trust had authorized its agent to file a suit for  

eviction  on  its  behalf,  it  cannot  be  said  that  the

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respondent had any right to file such a suit, even though it  

had  actually  let  out  the  premises  to  the  appellant  and  

collected rent.  The respondent is admittedly not the owner  

of the premises, and only claims to be the agent of the  

Trust.

12. On the facts and circumstances of the case, we are  

of the opinion that this aspect of the matter needs to be  

gone into by the Trial Court. Accordingly, we allow this  

appeal and set aside the impugned judgment and order of the  

Division  Bench  and  that  of  the  learned  Single  Judge  and  

remand the matter to the Trial Court.  Before the Trial  

Court,  the  respondent  will  have   liberty  to  produce  any  

documentary evidence to show that the Trust had authorized  

it in writing to receive rent and file suit for eviction on  

behalf of the Trust.  The respondent-plaintiff shall also  

implead  the  Trust  as  proforma-defendant  before  the  Trial  

Court.   

13. The Trial Court shall decide the suit uninfluenced  

by  any  observations  made  by  us  in  our  order  or  the  

observations made by the Division Bench and learned Single  

Judge of the High Court or the earlier decree of the Trial  

Court.  All contentions are left open to the parties to be  

urged before the Trial Court.

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14. Appeal allowed.  No order as to the costs.

.....................J.       (MARKANDEY KATJU)

.....................J.                (ASOK KUMAR GANGULY)

NEW DELHI; SEPTMBER 17, 2009