http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 5  

CASE NO.: Appeal (crl.)  426 of 2008

PETITIONER: Renu Kumari

RESPONDENT: Sanjay Kumar & Ors

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 03/03/2008

BENCH: Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT & C.K. THAKKER & LOKESHWAR SINGH PANTA

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO 426 OF 2008 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.2314 of 2006)

Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.  

1.      Leave granted.

2.      Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a learned  Single Judge of the Patna High Court quashing the  proceedings initiated against the respondents 1 to 7, in  purported exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code of  Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the ’Cr.P.C.’).  A prayer was  made before learned Sessions Judge, Patna to quash the  proceedings in Criminal Revision No. 817 of 2001.  Learned  S.D.J.M., Patna in Pirbahore PHB Case No. 120 of 2000 had  rejected the prayer of discharge made by the aforesaid  respondents.  The prayer was made in terms of Section 239  Cr.P.C.

3.      Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

       Appellant was married to respondent No. 3 Rajesh Kumar  on 1.7.1998.  Alleging that she was being harassed and  tortured both mentally and physically for having not met the  dowry demands, complaint was made alleging commission of  offences punishable under Section 498 A of the Indian Penal  Code, 1860 (in short the ’IPC’) and Sections 3 & 4 of the Dowry  Prohibition Act, 1961(in short the ’Act’).   Police registered FIR  No. 120 of 2000 in Pirbahore Police Station.  Appellant’s  father-in-law filed a complaint alleging assault and criminal  trespass by the appellant.  Another complaint was filed  alleging an attempt to kidnap. A suit for divorce was filed by  the husband.  Appellant entered appearance in the  matrimonial suit which was filed on 15.3.2000. Learned  Principal Judge, Family Court directed grant of maintenance  at the rate of Rs.2000/-p.m. and the cost of litigation to be  paid to the appellant.  Respondent’s father in law filed Misc.  Case No. 12 of 2001 questioning correctness of the  maintenance order on the ground that the respondent’s  husband has no share in the ancestral property and  maintenance cannot be paid out of it.  Charge sheet was filed  on 12.8.2000.  An application for discharge in terms of Section  239 Cr.P.C. was filed on 28.8.2001.  The prayer was rejected  on 7.9.2001 by learned SDJM.  As noted above Learned  Sessions Judge, Patna dismissed the Revision Application

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 5  

being Criminal Revision No. 817 of 2001.  Respondents filed a  Criminal Misc. Petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C.  By the  impugned order the prayer has been accepted.  To complete  the narration it needs to be noted that the matrimonial case  No. 49 of 2000 filed by the respondent-husband was  dismissed on 12.10.2004.   

Learned Single Judge after referring to a judgment of this  Court in State of Haryana & Ors. v. Ch. Bhajan Lal & Ors. (AIR  1992 SC 604) held that the present case is a clear example of  malafide where the proceedings have been maliciously  instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on  the accused and with a view to spite them due to private and  personal grudge.  Reference has been made to the matrimonial  case stating that the same was filed earlier to the lodging of  the FIR.

4.      In support of the appeal learned counsel for the appellant  submitted that the parameters for exercise of jurisdiction  under Section 482 Cr.P.C. have not been kept in view by  learned Single Judge, further he lost sight of the fact that the  Matrimonial Case No. 49 of 2000 was dismissed long before  the disposal of the case before the High Court.  The  matrimonial suit was dismissed on 12.10.2004 whereas the  impugned judgment has been passed on 19.12.2005.

5.      There is no appearance on behalf of the respondents in  spite of service of notice.

6.      Exercise of power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in a case of  this nature is the exception and not the rule. The section does  not confer any new powers on the High Court. It only saves the  inherent power which the Court possessed before the  enactment of Cr.P.C. It envisages three circumstances under  which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to  give effect to an order under Cr.P.C., (ii) to prevent abuse of  the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of  justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any  inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent  jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure  can provide for all cases that may possibly arise. The courts,  therefore, have inherent powers apart from express provisions  of law which are necessary for proper discharge of functions  and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine  which finds expression in the section which merely recognises  and preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All courts,  whether civil or criminal possess, in the absence of any  express provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such  powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong  in the course of administration of justice on the principle of  "quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur id sine  quo res ipsa esse non potest" (when the law gives a person  anything, it gives him that without which it cannot exist).  While exercising the powers under the section, the court does  not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent  jurisdiction under the section, though wide, has to be  exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when  such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in  the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do  real and substantial justice for the administration of which  alone the courts exist. Authority of the court exists for  advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse  that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has the  power to prevent abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the  court to allow any action which would result in injustice and

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 5  

prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers the  court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds  that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the  process of court or quashing of these proceedings would  otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is  disclosed by the report, the court may examine the question of  fact. When a report is sought to be quashed, it is permissible  to look into the materials to assess what the report has alleged  and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are  accepted in toto.

7.      In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab (1960 (3) SCR 388) this  Court summarised some categories of cases where inherent  power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings: (i) Where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar  against the institution or continuance e.g. want of sanction; (ii) where the allegations in the first information report or  complaint taken at their face value and accepted in their  entirety do not constitute the offence alleged; (iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there  is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced  clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. (SCR  p.393) 8.      In dealing with the last category, it is important to bear  in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal  evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly  inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case where  there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or may not  support the accusations. When exercising jurisdiction under  Section 482 CrPC, the High Court would not ordinarily  embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is  reliable or not or whether on a reasonable appreciation of it,  accusation would not be sustained. That is the function of the  trial Judge. Judicial process should not be an instrument of  oppression, or, needless harassment. The court should be  circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should  take all relevant facts and circumstances into consideration  before issuing process, lest it would be an instrument in the  hands of a private complainant to unleash vendetta to harass  any person needlessly. At the same time the section is not an  instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a  prosecution and bring about its sudden death. The scope of  exercise of power under Section 482 CrPC and the categories  of cases where the High Court may exercise its power under it  relating to cognizable offences to prevent abuse of process of  any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice were set  out in some detail by this Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan  Lal (1992 Supp (1) SCC 335). A note of caution was, however,  added that the power should be exercised sparingly and that  too in the rarest of rare cases. The illustrative categories  indicated by this Court are as follows: (SCC pp.378-79, para  102)

"102. (1) Where the allegations made in the  first information report or the complaint, even  if they are taken at their face value and  accepted in their entirety do not prima facie  constitute any offence or make out a case  against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first  information report and other materials, if any,  accompanying the FIR do not disclose a  cognizable offence, justifying an investigation  by police officers under Section 156(1) of the  Code except under an order of a Magistrate

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 5  

within the purview of Section 155(2) of the  Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations  made in the FIR or complaint and the  evidence collected in support of the same do  not disclose the commission of any offence  and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not  constitute a cognizable offence but constitute  only a non-cognizable offence, no  investigation is permitted by a police officer  without an order of a Magistrate as  contemplated under Section 155(2) of the  Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or  complaint are so absurd and inherently  improbable on the basis of which no prudent  person can ever reach a just conclusion that  there is sufficient ground for proceeding  against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar  engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code  or the Act concerned (under which a criminal  proceeding is instituted) to the institution and  continuance of the proceedings and/or where  there is a specific provision in the Code or the  Act concerned, providing efficacious redress  for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly  attended with mala fide and/or where the  proceeding is maliciously instituted with an  ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the  accused and with a view to spite him due to  private and personal grudge." 9.      As noted above, the powers possessed by the High Court  under Section 482 Cr.P.C. are very wide and the very  plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise.  The court must be careful to see that its decision, in exercise  of this power, is based on sound principles. The inherent  power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate  prosecution. The High Court being the highest court of a State  should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a  case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so  when the evidence has not been collected and produced before  the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are  of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective  without sufficient material. Of course, no hard-and-fast rule  can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court  will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the  proceeding at any stage. It would not be proper for the High  Court to analyse the case of the complainant in the light of all  probabilities in order to determine whether a conviction would  be sustainable and on such premises arrive at a conclusion  that the proceedings are to be quashed. It would be erroneous  to assess the material before it and conclude that the  complaint cannot be proceeded with. When an information is  lodged at the police station and an offence is registered, then  the mala fides of the informant would be of secondary  importance. It is the material collected during the investigation  and evidence led in the court which decides the fate of the  accused person. The allegations of mala fides against the  informant are of no consequence and cannot by themselves be  the basis for quashing the proceedings. [See Dhanalakshmi v.  R. Prasanna Kumar (1990 Supp SCC 686), State of Bihar v. P.P.  Sharma (1992 Supp (1) SCC 222), Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 5  

Pal Singh Gill (1995(6) SCC 194) , State of Kerala v. O.C. Kuttan  (1999(2) SCC 651), State of U.P. v. O.P. Sharma (1996 (7) SCC  705), Rashmi Kumar v. Mahesh Kumar Bhada (1997 (2) SCC  397), Satvinder Kaur v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) (1999 (8)  SCC 728) and Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi (1999 (3) SCC  259)] 10.     The above position was again reiterated in State of  Karnataka v. M.Devendrappa (2002(3) SCC 89), State of M.P. v.  Awadh Kishore Gupta (2004(2) SCC 691) and State of Orissa v.  Saroj Kr. Sahoo (2005(13) SCC 540).

11.     In view of the position of law highlighted above the  impugned order is indefensible and is set aside.                                                                                                        12.     The appeal is allowed but without any order as to costs.