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PETITIONER: REGIONAL TRANSPORT OFFICER CHITTOOR ETC.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: ASSOCIATED TRANSPORT, MADRAS (P) LTD. & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT05/09/1980

BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. KOSHAL, A.D.

CITATION:  1980 AIR 1872            1981 SCR  (1) 627  1980 SCC  (4) 597  CITATOR INFO :  R          1987 SC1399  (18)

ACT:      Andhra Pradesh  Motor Vehicles  (Taxation of Passengers and Goods) Act, 1954, Section 4(1)-Power to make rules under Section 4(1)-A  delegate cannot  exercise the  same power of the delegator unless there is special conferment thereof .      Retrospectivity in the rule-making power-Mere fact that the rules  framed by  the State Government (delegate) had to be  placed   on  the  table  of  the  Legislature  does  not automatically  empower  the  former  to  make  retrospective rules.

HEADNOTE:      Dismissing the special leave petition, the Court ^      HELD: (1) The legislature has no doubt plenary power in the matter  of enactment  of statutes  and can  itself  make retrospective laws subject, of course, to the constitutional limitations. But  it is  trite law  that a  delegate  cannot exercise the  same power  unless there is special conferment thereof to  be spelled  out from  the express  words of  the delegation or by compelling implication. In the present case the power  under  Section  4(2)  does  not  indicate  either alternative. Therefore the authority of the State Government under  the   delegation  does   not  empower   it  to   make retrospective rules. [629 A-B; 630 B]      (2) The  mere fact  that the  rules framed  had  to  be placed on  the table  of the  legislature was not enough, in the absence  of a  wider power in the Section, to enable the State Government  to make  retrospective  rules.  The  whole purpose of  laying on the table of the legislature the rules framed by the State Government is different. [629E]      Hukum Chand  v. Union  of India,  [1973] 1  S.C.R.  896 (902), followed.      Observation: The State Government should have been more careful in  giving effect  to the  resolution passed  by the legislature and  should not  have relied  upon its delegated powers which  did not  carry with  it  the  powers  to  make retrospective rules. [629C]

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JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 301-303 of 1970.      From the  Judgment and  Order dated  17-11-1967 of  the Andhra Pradesh  High Court  in Writ  Petition  Nos.  138/63, 1256/63 and 1460/63.      A.V.V. Nair for the Appellant.      K. Rajendra Chowdhary for the Respondent. 628      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      KRISHNA IYER,  J.-We are in complete agreement with the reasoning and  conclusions of  the High  Court and  a  brief statement of the short point that arises for decision and of the grounds for dismissing the appeal is all that is needed. The Motor  Vehicles (Taxation  of Passengers  and Goods) Act passed by  the Madras  legislature in  the composite  Madras State was  made applicable to Andhra Pradesh when that State was carved  out. There  were  certain  difficulties  in  the matter of levy of taxation on vehicles plying on inter-state routes and  the State  of Andhra  Pradesh thought  it fit to enact its  own legislation,  which it did in the form of the Andhra Pradesh  Motor Vehicles  (Taxation of  Passengers and Goods) Act,  1952, Section  4(2) whereof empowered the State Government  to   make  necessary  rules  to  effectuate  the enactment.  Pursuant  to  this  power,  certain  rules  were framed, of which rule 1 consisted of three sub-rules. On 19- 6-1957 sub-rules  (4) and  (5) were  added to  that rule and sub-rule (5) ran thus:           "The proviso  to sub-rule  1 of Rule 1 shall cease      to be  operative on  and from 1st October, 1955 and the      composition fee calculated with reference to clause (a)      or clause  (b) of  sub-rule (1)  in respect  of vehicle      plying on  inter State  routes lying  partly in  Madras      State and partly in the Andhra State shall, with effect      from that  date be paid in the State where the vehicles      are registered and normally kept."      This sub-rule  enabled operators  of Motor  Vehicles on inter-state routes  lying partly  in the  Madras  State  and partly in the State of Andhra Pradesh to pay the tax duly to either of  these two  States. It was, however, deleted along with sub-rules  (3) and  (4) on 29th March, 1963 with effect from 1st  April, 1962  and it  is the retrospectivity of the deletion that  is challenged  before us  because the  Andhra Pradesh  State   sought  to   collect  tax  for  the  period commencing 1st April, 1962 from the respondent under the Act above referred  to, although he had already paid the same to the State  of Madras. The ground of invalidity was stated to be that S. 4(1) did not confer on the State Government power to make rules with retrospective effect.      Thus, the  only question which engages our attention is as to  whether S.  4(2) does confer on the delegate, namely, the State Government, the power to make retrospective rules. The  High  Court,  after  an  elaborate  discussion  on  the jurisprudence  of   subordinate  legislation,  came  to  the conclusion that  no such  power was  conferred on  the State Government and that consequently the deletion which resulted in retrospective  operation of  the liability  to payment of tax was bad in law. 629      The legislature  has no  doubt a  plenary power  in the matter  of   enactment  of  statutes  and  can  itself  make retrospective laws subject, of course, to the Constitutional limitations. But  it is  trite law  that a  delegate  cannot exercise the  same power  unless there is special conferment

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thereof to  be spelled  out from  the express  words of  the delegation or by compelling implication. In the present case the  power   under  s.   4(2)  does   not  indicate   either alternative. The  position has  been considered  by the High Court at  length and  there is  no need for us to go through the exercise  over again.  Indeed, considerable reliance was placed  by   learned  counsel   for  the  appellant  on  two circumstances. He  argued that  the impugned rule was framed in pursuance of a dissolution passed by the legislature. The fact does  not  have  any  bearing  on  the  question  under consideration except for us to make the observation that the State Government  should have  been more  careful in  giving effect to the resolution and should not have relied upon its delegated power  which did  not carry  with it  the power to make retrospective  rules. The  second ground pressed before us by  learned counsel  for the  appellant is that the rules had to  be placed  on the  table  of  and  approved  by  the legislature.  This   was  sufficient   indication,  in   his submission, for  us to  infer that  retrospectively  in  the rule-making power  was implicit.  We cannot  agree. The mere fact that  the rules framed had to be placed on the table of the legislature  was not  enough, in  the absence of a wider power in the Section, to enable the State Government to make retrospective rules.  The whole  purpose of  laying  on  the table of  the legislature  the rules  framed  by  the  State Government is  different and  the effect  of any  one of the three alternative  modes of  so placing  the rules  has been explained by this Court in Hukam Chand v. Union of India,(1) Mr. Justice Khanna speaking for the Bench observed:           "The fact that the rules framed under the Act have      to be  laid before  each House  of Parliament would not      confer validity  on  a  rule  if  it  is  made  not  in      conformity with  Section 40 of the Act. It would appear      from the  observations on pages 304 to 306 of the Sixth      Edition of  Craies on Statutes Law that there are three      kinds of laying:           (i)  Laying without further procedure:           (ii) Laying subject to negative resolution:          (iii) Laying subject to affirmative resolution.           The laying  referred  to  in  sub-section  (3)  of      Section 40  is of the second category because the above      sub-section contemplates  that  the  rules  would  have      effect unless modified or annulled by 630      the  House  of  Parliament.  The  act  of  the  Central      Government in  laying the  rules before  each House  of      Parliament would  not, however, prevent the courts from      scrutinising the validity of the rules and holding them      to be  ultra vires  if on  such scrutiny  the rules are      found to be beyond the rule making power of the Central      Government."      It is, therefore, plain that the authority of the State Government under  the delegation does not empower it to make retrospective rules.  With this  position clarified there is no surviving  submission for appellant’s counsel. The appeal must be dismissed and we do so with costs (one set). S.R.                                        Appeal dismissed 631