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CASE NO.: Appeal (crl.)  25 of 2004

PETITIONER: Reema Aggarwal                                                   

RESPONDENT: Anupam and Ors.                                                  

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 08/01/2004

BENCH: DORAISWAMY RAJU & ARIJIT PASAYAT.

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T

(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 3169 of 2003

ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.

         Leave granted.  

       Parties to a marriage tying nuptial knot are supposed  to bring about the union of souls.  It creates a new  relationship of love, affection, care and concern between  the husband and wife.  According to Hindu Vedic philosophy  it is sanskar \026 a sacrament; one of the sixteen important  sacraments essential to be taken during one’s lifetime.   There may be physical union as a result of marriage for  procreation to perpetuate the lineal progeny for ensuring  spiritual salvation and performance of religious rites, but   what is essentially contemplated is union of two souls.  Marriage is considered to be a junction of three important  duties i.e. social, religious and spiritual. A question of  intricate complexity arises in this appeal where factual  scenario has very little role to play.                  Filtering out unnecessary details, the factual position  is as follows:

       On 13.7.1998 information was received from Tagore  Hospital, Jalandhar that Reema Aggarwal the appellant had  been admitted on having consumed poisonous substance.  On  reaching hospital, ASI Charanjit Singh obtained opinion of  the doctor regarding her fitness to make a statement.   Appellant stated before Investigating Officer that she was  married to Anupam the respondent no.1 on 25.1.1998 and after  the marriage, she was harassed by her husband-respondent  no.1, mother-in-law, father-in-law and brother-in-law  (respondents 2, 3 and 4) respectively for not bringing  sufficient and more dowry. It was also disclosed that it was  the second marriage of both the appellant and respondent  no.1.  On the date of incident at about 5.00 p.m. all the  four accused persons forced her to take something to put an  end her life and forcibly put some acidic substance in her  mouth.  She started vomiting and was taken to the hospital  in an unconscious state.  The first information report was  registered accordingly and on completion of investigation  the charge sheet was placed and charges were framed for  offences punishable under Sections 307 and 498-A of the  Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short the ’IPC’). Accused  persons pleaded innocence.  Seven witnesses were examined to

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further the prosecution version.

       Before the trial Court the accused persons put the plea  that charge under Section 498-A was thoroughly misconceived  as both Sections 304-B and 498-A IPC pre-suppose valid  marriage of the alleged victim-woman with the offender- husband.  It was required to be shown that the victim-woman  was the legally married wife of the accused.  Since it was  admitted that the appellant had married during the lifetime  of the wife of respondent no.1, what happened to his first  marriage remained a mystery. Prosecution has failed to  establish that it stood dissolved legally. Prosecution  having failed to bring any material record in that regard,  Section 498-A had no application. Reliance was placed on a  decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Ramnarayan &  Ors. v. State of M.P. (1998 (3) Crimes 147 M.P.)  The Trial  Court held that the accusations, so far as Section 307 is  concerned, were not established and in view of the legal  position highlighted by the accused persons vis-‘-vis  Section 498-A the charge in that regard was also not  established. Accordingly the accused persons were acquitted.

       The State of Punjab filed an application for grant of  leave to appeal which was disposed of by the Division Bench  of the Punjab and Haryana High Court with the following  order:

       "We have heard the learned counsel for  the appellant and with his assistance, have  gone through the finding recorded by the  learned trial Court.  In our considered  opinion, the finding recorded by the learned  trial Court cannot be held to be erroneous  or that there was no perverse appreciation  of evidence.  Leave to appeal declined.   Appeal is also dismissed."

       In view of the dismissal of the State’s application  for grant of leave, criminal revision application which was  filed by the appellant before the High Court  was dismissed  with the following orders:-

"Vide our separate order of even date  in Crl. Misc. No. 580 MA of 2002, we have  not granted permission to the State to file  the appeal.  In these circumstances, there  is no merit in this criminal revision which  is hereby dismissed."

In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the  appellant submitted that the High Court was not justified  to dispose of the application for grant of leave as well as  the revision filed by the appellant by such cryptic orders.   Important questions of law are involved.  In fact, various   High Courts have taken view different from the one taken by  the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Vungarala Yedukondalu v.  State of Andhra Pradesh (1988 Crl.L.J. 1538 (DB)) and State  of Karnataka v. Shivaraj (2000 Crl.L.J 2741). The Andhra  Pradesh High Court and the Karnataka High Court have taken  different view. According to him the expressions "husband"  and "woman" appearing in Section 498-A IPC are to be read

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in a manner so as to give full effect to the purpose for  which Section 498-A was brought into the statute.  The  restricted meaning as given by the Madhya Pradesh High  Court in Ramnarayan case (supra) does not reflect the  correct position of law. On the other hand, contrary view  expressed by the Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh High Courts  reflect the correct view.

In response, learned counsel for the respondents  submitted that to constitute a marriage in the eye of law  it has first to be established that the same was a valid  marriage. Strong reliance was placed on Bhaurao Shankar  Lokhande and Anr. v. The State of Maharashtra and Anr.   (AIR 1965 SC 1564) in that context. Reference was also made  to Sections 5(i), 11 and 16 of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955  (for short the ’Marriage Act’) to contend that the  stipulations of conditions of valid marriage, the  circumstances in which the marriage becomes void and the  protection given to children of void and voidable marriage  respectively makes the position clear that wherever the  legislature wanted to provide for contingencies flowing  from void or voidable marriages, it has specifically done  so. It is latently evident from Section 16 of the Marriage  Act.  There is no such indication in Section 498-A IPC.   The language used is "husband or relative of the husband".   Marriage is a legal union of one man and woman as husband  and wife and cannot extend to a woman whose marriage is  void and not a valid marriage in the eye of law.     

The marriages contracted between Hindus are now  statutorily made monogamous. A sanctity has been attributed  to the first marriage as being that which was contracted  from a sense of duty and not merely for personal  gratification. When the fact of celebration of marriage is  established it will be presumed in the absence of evidence  to the contrary that all the rites and ceremonies to  constitute a valid marriage have been gone through. As was  said as long as 1869 "when once you get to this, namely,  that there was a marriage in fact, there would be a  presumption in favour of there being a marriage in law".   (See Inderun Valungypooly v. Ramaswamy (1869 (13) MIA 141.)  So also where a man and woman have been proved to have lived  together as husband and wife, the law will presume, until  contrary be clearly proved, that they were living together  in consequence of a valid marriage and not in a state of  concubinage. (See Sastry Velaider v. Sembicutty (1881 (6) AC  364) following De Thoren v. Attorney General (1876 (1) AC  686) and Piers v. Piers (L.R.(2) H.L.C. 331). Where a  marriage is accepted as valid by relations, friends and  others for a long time it cannot be declared as invalid. In    Lokhande’s case (supra), it was observed by this Court "The  bare fact that man and woman live as husband and wife it  does not at any rate normally give them the status of  husband and wife even though they may hold themselves before  the society as husband and wife and the society treats them  as husband and wife". These observations were cited with  approval in Surjit Kaur v. Garja Singh and Ors. (AIR 1994 SC  135). At first blush, it would seem that these observations  run counter to the long catena of decisions noted above. But  on closer examination of the facts of those cases it is  clear that this Court did not differ from the views  expressed in the earlier cases. In Lokhande’s case (supra),  this Court was dealing with a case of prosecution for  bigamy. The prosecution had contended that second marriage  was gandharva form of marriage and no ceremonies were

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necessary and, therefore, did not allege or prove that any  customary ceremonies were performed. In that background, it  was held that even in the case of gandharva marriages,   ceremonies were required to be performed. To constitute  bigamy under Section 494 IPC, the second marriage had to be  a valid marriage duly solemnized and as it was not so  solemnized it was not a marriage at all in the eye of law  and was therefore invalid. The essential ingredient  constituting the offence of Bigamy is the "marrying" again  during the lifetime of husband or wife in contrast to the  ingredients of Section 498A which, among other things,  envisage subjecting the woman concerned to cruelty.  The  thrust is mainly "marrying" in Section 494 IPC as against  subjecting of the woman to cruelty in Section 498A.   Likewise, the thrust of the offence under Section 304B is  also the "Dowry Death".  Consequently, the evil sought to  be curbed are distinct and separate from the persons  committing the offending acts and there could be no  impediment in law to liberally construe the words or  expressions relating to the persons committing the offence  so as to rope in not only those validly married but also any  one who has undergone some or other form of marriage and  thereby assumed for himself the position of husband to live,  cohabitate and exercise authority as such husband over  another woman. As the prosecution had set up a plea of  gandharva marriage and had failed to prove the performance  of ceremonies, it was not open to fall back upon the  presumption of a valid marriage. It was further held that  there was no such presumption if the man was already  married. In Surjit Singh’s case (supra) the stand was that  the marriage was in Karewa form. This Court held that under  the custom of Karewa marriage, the widow could marry the  brother or a relation of the husband.  But in that case the  man was a stranger. Further even under that form of marriage  certain ceremonies were required to be performed which were  not proved. Dealing with the contention relating to  presumption, reference was made to Lokhande’s case (supra).  As the parties had set up a particular form of marriage  which turned out to be invalid due to absence of proof of  having undergone the necessary ceremonies related to such  form of marriage, the presumption of long cohabitation could  not be invoked.           The presumption may not be available in a case, for  example, where the man was already married or there was any  insurmountable obstacle to the marriage, but presumption  arises if there is strong evidence by documents and conduct.  Above position has been highlighted in Mayne’s Hindu Law and  Usage.  

The question as to who would be covered by the  expression ’husband’ for attracting Section 498A does  present problems. Etymologically, in terms of the definition  of "husband" and "marriage" as given in the various Law  Lexicons and dictionaries \026 the existence of a valid  marriage may appear to be a sine qua non for applying a  penal provision. In Smt. Yamunabai Anantrao Adhav v.  Anantrao Shivram Adhav and Anr. (AIR 1988 SC 644) a woman   claimed maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of  Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the ’Cr.P.C.’). This  Court applied the provision of the Marriage Act and pointed  out that same was a law which held the field after 1955,  when it was enacted and Section 5 lays down that for a  lawful marriage the necessary condition that neither party  should have a spouse living at the time of the marriage is

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essential and marriage in contravention of this condition  therefore is null and void. The concept of marriage to  constitute the relationship of ’husband’ and ’wife’ may  require strict interpretation where claims for civil rights,  right to property etc. may follow or flow and a liberal  approach and different perception cannot be an anatheme when  the question of curbing a social evil is concerned.     

The question of origin of dowry or dos has been the  subject of study by theoreticians. Mayne says that it was a  contribution by the wife’s family, or by the wife herself,  intended to assist the husband in bearing the expenses of  the conjugal household (Mayne on "Early History of  Institution" page 319). While dos or dowry previously  belonged to husband, his right over it being unrestricted,  all the property of the wife not included in the dowry was  called her "paraphra" and was her absolute property over  which her husband had no control. (See Banerjee on ’Marriage  and Stridhan’ 345) In Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar and Anr.  (AIR 1985 SC 628) after tracing out the history of stridhan  it was held that wife is the absolute owner of such property  under Section 27 of the Marriage Act. Property presented to  the husband and wife at or about the time of marriage  belongs to them jointly.  

       The Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (in short the ’Dowry  Act’) was introduced to combat the ever-increasing menace of  dowry. The avowed object is prohibition on giving and taking  of dowry. Section 2 defines "dowry". Section 4 provides  the penalty for demanding "dowry", while Section 5 is a  significant provision making agreement for giving or taking  dowry to be void. Section 6 is another provision which  reflects statutory concern for prevention of dowry, be it  taking or giving. It is provided therein that pending  transfer of the dowry, the person who received the dowry  holds it in trust for benefit of the woman. Amendment to  Section 2 by Amendment Act 43 of 1986 has made the provision  clear and demand made after the marriage is a part of dowry,  in view of addition of words "at or before or after the  marriage". (See State of H.P. v. Nikku Ram (AIR 1996 SC  67).  

The definition of the term ’dowry’ under Section 2 of  the Dowry Act shows that any property or valuable security  given or "agreed to be given" either directly or  indirectly by one party to the marriage to the other party  to the marriage "at or before or after the marriage" as a  "consideration for the marriage of the said parties" would  become ’dowry’ punishable under the Dowry Act. Property or  valuable security so as to constitute ’dowry’ within the  meaning of the Dowry Act must, therefore, be given or  demanded "as consideration for the marriage."

Section 4 of the Dowry Act aims at discouraging the  very "demand" of "dowry" as a ’consideration for the  marriage’ between the parties thereto and lays down that if  any person after the commencement of the Act, "demands",  directly or indirectly, from the parents or guardians of a  ’bride’ or ’bridegroom’, as the case may be, any ’dowry’ he  shall be punishable with imprisonment or with fine or within  both. Thus, it would be seen that Section 4 makes punishable  the very demand of property or valuable security as a  consideration for marriage, which demand, if satisfied,  would constitute the graver offence under Section 3 of the  Act punishable with higher imprisonment and with fine which

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shall not be less than fifteen thousand rupees or the amount  of the value of such dowry whichever is more.

The definition of the expression ’dowry’ contained in  Section 2 of the Dowry Act cannot be confined merely to be  ’demand’ of money, property or valuable security’ made at or  after the performance of marriage. The legislature has in  its wisdom while providing for the definition of ’dowry’  emphasized that any money, property or valuable security  given, as a consideration for marriage, ’before, at or  after’ the marriage would be covered by the expression  ’dowry’ and this definition as contained in Section 2 has to  be read wherever the expression ’dowry’ occurs in the Act.   Meaning of the expression ’dowry’ as commonly used and  understood is different than the peculiar definition thereof  under the Act.  Under Section 4, mere demand of ’dowry’ is  sufficient to bring home the offence to an accused.  Thus,  any ’demand’ of money, property or valuable security made  from the bride or her parents or other relatives by the  bridegroom or his parents or other relatives or vice-versa  would fall within the mischief of ’dowry’ under the Act  where such demand is not properly referable to any legally  recognized claim and is relatable only to the consideration  of marriage. Marriage in this context would include a  proposed marriage also more particularly where the non- fulfilment of the "demand of dowry" leads to the ugly  consequence of the marriage not taking place at all.  The  expression "dowry" under the Dowry Act has to be  interpreted in the sense which the statute wishes to  attribute to it. The definition given in the statute is the  determinative factor.  The Dowry Act is a piece of social  legislation which aims to check the growing menace of the  social evil of dowry and it makes punishable not only the  actual receiving of dowry but also the very demand of dowry  made before or at the time or after the marriage where such  demand is referable to the consideration of marriage.  Dowry  as a quid pro quo for marriage is prohibited and not the  giving of traditional presents to the bride or the  bridegroom by friends and relatives. Thus, voluntary  presents given at or before or after the marriage to the  bride or the bridegroom, as the case may be, of a  traditional nature, which are given not as a consideration  for marriage but out of love, affection or regard, would not  fall within the mischief of the expression ’dowry’ made  punishable under the Dowry Act.

       Aryan Hindus recognised 8 forms of marriage, out of  which four were approved, namely, Brahma, Daiva, Arsha and  Prajapatya. The dis-approved forms of marriages were  Gandharva, Asura, Rakshasa and Paisacha. In the Brahma form  of marriage, some amounts had to be spent by  father/guardian, as the case may be, to go ultimately to the  spouses. The origin of dowry may be traced to this amount  either in cash or kind.  

The concept of "dowry" is intermittently linked with  a marriage and the provisions of the Dowry Act apply in  relation to marriages. If the legality of the marriage  itself is an issue further legalistic problems do arise. If  the validity of the marriage itself is under legal scrutiny,  the demand of dowry in respect of an invalid marriage would  be legally not recognizable. Even then the purpose for which  Sections 498A and 304B-IPC and Section 113B of the Indian  Evidence Act, 1872 (for short the ’Evidence Act’) were

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introduced cannot be lost sight of. Legislations enacted  with some policy to curb and alleviate some public evil  rampant in society and effectuate a definite public purpose  or benefit positively requires to be interpreted with  certain element of realism too and not merely pedantically  or hyper technically. The obvious objective was to prevent  harassment to a woman who enters into a marital relationship  with a person and later on, becomes a victim of the greed  for money. Can a person who enters into a marital  arrangement be allowed to take a shelter behind a   smokescreen to contend that since there was no valid  marriage the question of dowry does not arise? Such  legalistic niceties would destroy the purpose of the  provisions. Such hairsplitting legalistic approach would  encourage harassment to a woman over demand of money. The  nomenclature ’dowry’ does not have any magic charm written  over it. It is just a label given to demand of money in  relation to marital relationship. The legislative intent is  clear from the fact that it is not only the husband but also  his relations who are covered by Section 498A. Legislature  has taken care of children born from invalid marriages.  Section 16 of the Marriage Act deals with legitimacy of  children of void and voidable marriages. Can it be said that  legislature which was conscious of the social stigma  attached to children of void and voidable marriages closed   eyes  to plight of a woman who unknowingly or unconscious of  the legal consequences entered into the marital  relationship. If such restricted meaning is given, it would  not further the legislative intent. On the contrary, it  would be against the concern shown by the legislature for  avoiding harassment to a woman over demand of money in  relation to marriages. The first exception to Section 494  has also some relevance. According to it, the offence of  bigamy will not apply to "any person whose marriage with  such husband or wife has been declared void by a Court of  competent jurisdiction". It would be appropriate to  construe the expression ’husband’ to cover a person who  enters into marital relationship and under the colour of  such proclaimed or feigned status of husband subjects the  woman concerned to cruelty or coerce her in any manner or  for any of the purposes enumerated in the relevant  provisions \026 Sections 304B/498A, whatever be the legitimacy  of the marriage itself for the limited purpose of Sections  498A and 304B IPC. Such an interpretation, known and  recognized as purposive construction has to come into play  in a case of this nature. The absence of a definition of  ’husband’ to specifically include such persons who contract  marriages ostensibly and cohabitate with such woman, in the  purported exercise of his role and status as ’husband’ is no  ground to exclude them from the purview of Section 304B or  498A IPC, viewed in the context of the very object and aim  of the legislations introducing those provisions.    

       In Chief Justice of A.P. v. L.V.A. Dixitulu (1979 (2)  SCC 34), this Court observed:

"The primary principle of interpretation is  that a constitutional or statutory provision  should be construed "according to the  intent of they that made it" (Coke).  Normally, such intent is gathered from the  language of the provision. If the language  or the phraseology employed by the  legislation is precise and plain and thus by  itself proclaims the legislative intent in

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unequivocal terms, the same must be given  effect to, regardless of the consequences  that may follow. But if the words used in  the provision are imprecise, protean or  evocative or can reasonably bear meanings  more than one, the rule of strict  grammatical construction ceases to be a sure  guide to reach at the real legislative  intent. In such a case, in order to  ascertain the true meaning of the terms and  phrases employed, it is legitimate for the  Court to go beyond the arid literal confines  of the provision and to call in aid other  well-recognised rules of construction, such  as its legislative history, the basic   scheme and framework of the statute as a  whole, each portion throwing light, on the  rest, the purpose of the legislation, the  object sought to be achieved, and the  consequences that may flow from the adoption  of one in preference to the other possible  interpretation.  

       In Kehar Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.) (AIR 1988 SC  1883), this Court held:

"....But, if the words are ambiguous,  uncertain or any doubt arises as to the  terms employed, we deem it as out paramount  duty to put upon the language of the  legislature rational meaning. We then  examine every word, every section and every  provision. We examine the Act as a whole. We  examine the necessity which gave rise to the  Act. We look at the mischiefs which the  legislature intended to redress. We look at  the whole situation and not just one-to-one  relation. We will not consider any provision  out of the framework of the statute. We will  not view the provisions as abstract  principles separated from the motive force  behind. We will consider the provisions in  the circumstances to which they owe their  origin. We will consider the provisions to  ensure coherence and consistency within the  law as a whole and to avoid undesirable  consequences.  

       In District Mining Officer v. Tata Iron & Steel Co. (JT  2001 (6) SC 183), this Court stated:

"The legislation is primarily directed to  the problems before the legislature based on  information derived from past and present  experience. It may also be designed by use  of general words to cover similar problems  arising in future. But, from the very nature  of thing, it is impossible to anticipate  fully in the varied situations arising in  future in which the application of the  legislation in hand may be called for the  words chosen to communicate such indefinite  referents are bound to be in many cases,  lacking in charity and precision and thus  giving rise to controversial questions of

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construction. The process of construction  combines both literal and purposive  approaches. In other words, the legislative  intention i.e. the true or legal meaning of  an enactment is derived by considering the  meaning of the words used in the enactment  in the light of any discernible purpose or  object which comprehends the mischief and  its remedy to which the enactment is  directed".        

       The suppression of mischief rule made immortal in  Heydon’s case (3 Co Rep 7a 76 ER 637) can be pressed into  service. With a view to suppress the mischief which would  have surfaced had the literal rule been allowed to cover the  field, the Heydon’s Rule has been applied by this Court in a  number of cases, e.g. Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd., v. State of  Bihar and Ors. (AIR 1955 SC 661), Goodyear India Ltd. v.  State of Haryana and Anr. (AIR 1990 SC 781), P.E.K. Kalliani  Amma and Ors. v. K. Devi and Ors. (AIR 1996 SC 1963) and  Ameer Trading Corporation Ltd., v. Shapporji Data Processing  Ltd. (2003 (8) Supreme 634).   

       The judgments of High Courts taking a view contrary to  the one expressed above, cannot be considered to lay down  the correct position of law.

In Reserve Bank of India etc. etc. v. Peerless General  Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. and others etc. etc. (1987  (1) SCC 424) while dealing with the question of  interpretation of a statute, this Court observed:

"Interpretation must depend on the  text and the context. They are the bases of  interpretation.  One may well say if the  text is the texture, context is what gives  the colour.  Neither can be ignored. Both  are important.  That interpretation is best  which makes the textual interpretation match  the contextual.  A statue is best  interpreted when we know why it was enacted.   With this knowledge, the statute must be  read, first as a whole and then section by  section, clause by clause, phrase by phrase  and word by word. If a statute is looked at  in the context of its enactment, with the  glasses of the statute-maker, provided by  such context, its scheme, the sections,  clauses, phrases and words may take colour  and appear different than when the statute  is looked at without the glasses provided by  the context.  With these glasses we must  look at the Act as a whole and discover what  each section, each clause, each phrase and  each word is meant and designed to say as to  fit into the scheme of the entire Act.  No  part of a statute and no word of a statute  can be construed in isolation.  Statutes  have to be construed so that every word has  a place and everything is in its place."

In Seaford Court Estates Ltd. v. Asher (1949) 2 All ER

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155 (CA), Lord Denning, advised a purposive approach to the  interpretation of a word used in a statute and observed:

"The English language is not an  instrument of mathematical precision.  Our  literature would be much the poorer if it  were. This is where the draftsmen of Acts of  Parliament have often been unfairly  criticised. A Judge, believing himself to be  fettered by the supposed rule that he must  look to the language and nothing else,  laments that the draftsmen have not provided  for this or that, or have been guilty of  some or other ambiguity.  It would certainly  save the Judges trouble if Acts of  Parliament were drafted with divine  prescience and perfect clarity.  In the  absence of it, when a defect appears, a  Judge cannot simply fold his hands and blame  the draftsman. He must set to work on the  constructive task of finding the intention  of Parliament, and he must do this not only  from the language of the statute, but also  from a consideration of the social  conditions which gave rise to it and of the  mischief which it was passed to remedy, and  then he must supplement the written word so  as to give ’force and life’ to the intention  of the legislature......A Judge should ask  himself the question how, if the makers of  the Act had themselves come across this ruck  in this texture of it, they would have  straightened it out?  He must then do so as  they would have doe.  A Judge must not alter  the material of which the Act is woven, but  he can and should iron out the creases."

                   (underlined for emphasis)   

       These aspects were highlighted by this Court in S.  Gopal Reddy v. State of A.P. (1996 (4) SCC 596).            

       Whether the offences are made out is a matter of trial.  The High Court was not justified in summarily rejecting the  application for grant of leave. It has a duty to indicate  reasons when it refuses to grant leave. Any casual or  summary disposal would not be proper. (See State of Punjab  v. Bhag Singh (2003 (8) Supreme 611). In the circumstances,  we set aside the impugned order of the High Court and remit  the matter back to the High Court for hearing the matter on  merits as according to us points involved require  adjudication by the High Court.  The appeal is allowed to  the extent indicated.