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PETITIONER: RAYALA CORPORATION (P) LTD. & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: DIRECTOR OF ENFORCEMENT, NEW DELHI

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 23/07/1969

BENCH: BHARGAVA, VISHISHTHA BENCH: BHARGAVA, VISHISHTHA SHELAT, J.M. VAIDYIALINGAM, C.A. HEGDE, K.S. GROVER, A.N.

CITATION:  1970 AIR  494            1970 SCR  (1) 639  1969 SCC  (2) 412  CITATOR INFO :  R          1970 SC 549  (3,6,20,24,28)  RF         1971 SC1511  (6)  R          1979 SC1588  (14)

ACT:     Foreign  Exchange  Regulation  Act (7   of   1947),  and Foreign  Exchange Regulation (Amendment) Act (39  of  1957), ss.’4(1),  23(1)  and 23D(1) --Section  23(1)(b),  if  ultra vires Art.  14-- Scope  of proviso  to  s. 23(D)(1)--Defence of  India Rules, 1962 R. 132A--Omission  by  Notification-If prosecution permissible for offence committed when Rule  was in existence.

HEADNOTE:     The premises of the first appellant were raided  by  the Enforcement  Directorate  and certain records  were  seized. The  second  appellant was the  first  appellant’s  managing director.   Thereafter,  on  25th August  1967,  notice  was issued  by  the  respondent to the two  appellants  to  show cause  within  fourteen days  why  adjudication  proceedings should not be instituted against them under s. 23D(1) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, for violation of  ss. 4  and  9 of the Act, on the   allegation  that  2,44,713.70 Swedish Kronars had been deposited by them in a bank account in Sweden instead of surrendering the foreign exchange to an authorised   dealer   as  required  by   the   Act.    After investigation,  on  4th November 1967,  another  notice  was issued to the second appellant stating that out of the total sum mentioned, he had acquired, during 1963 to 1965, Sw. Kr. 88,913.09,  that  he  held the amount in a  bank  in  Sweden instead  of  offering it to the Reserve Bank  of  India  and thereby  contravened ss. 4(1) and 9 of the Act,  and  asking him  to show if he had any special exemption  for  acquiring the  foreign  exchange.   A similar show  cause  notice  was issued to the first appellant in. respect of the same amount on 20th January 1968. On 16th March 1968, in supersession of the  show  cause notice dated 25th August  1967,  a  further notice  was addressed to both the appellants to  show  cause

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within 14 days why adjudication proceedings under s. 23D  of the  Act should not be held against them in respect  of  the balance  of Sw. Kr. 1,55,801.41 and added that it had  since been  decided to launch a prosecution in respect of the  Sw. Kr.  88,913.09  and on the 17th March 1968 a  complaint  was filed  against both the ’appellants in the Chief  Presidency Magistrate’s  Court for contravention of ss.  4(1),  5(1)(e) and 9 of the Act, punishable under s.. 23(1)(b) of Act,  and for  violation rule 132A(2) of the Defence of  India  Rules, 1962,   punishable  under  rule  132A(4).   Thereupon,   the appellants  fried ’applications in the High Court  under  s. 561A, Criminal Procedure Code, for quashing the  proceedings in  the  Magistrate’s  court,  but  the  applications   were dismissed.     In  appeal to this Court, it was contended that: (1) The punishment under s. 23(1)(b) is severer and heavier than the penalty  to  which a person is made liable  if  adjudication proceedings  are  taken under s. 23(1)(a), but  the  section lays  down  no principles at all for  determining  when  the person  concerned  should  be  proceeded  against,under   s. 23(1)(a)  and when under s. 23(1)(b) and has left it to  the arbitrary  discretion of the respondent ’and hence  violates Aft.  14  of Constitution;  (2) Even if s. 23(1)(b)  is  not void the respondent did not act in ’accordance with the 640 requirements of the proviso to s. 23D(1)which lays down that a  con plaint may be made at any stage of the  enquiry,  but only  if, having regarto the circumstances of the case,  the Director  of Enforcement finds the the penalty which ’he  is empowered to impose under s. 23(1)(a) would not be adequate; and  (3)  Since the Notification issued by the  Ministry  of Home  Affairs  dated 30th March 1965 provided that  R.  132A shall be omitted except ’as respects things done or  omitted to  be done under that Rule, a prosecution in respect of  an offence  punishable under that Rule could not be  instituted on  17th March 1968 when that Rule had ceased to exist  even though  it  might  be in respect  of  an  offence  committed earlier during the period that the rule was in force.      HELD:  (1) The choice whether the proceeding  be  taken under  s.  23(1)(a) or 23(1)(b) against the  person  who  is liable  for action for contravention under s. 23(1), is  not left   entirely  to  the  discretion  of  the  Director   of Enforcement  but  the  criterion for making  the  choice  is indicated in the proviso to s. 23D(1). [648 A-B]      The Foreign Exchange Regulation (Amendment) Act,  1957, amended  s. 23(1) and at the same also, introduced  s.  23D. The  intention  of the Legislature  from  such  simultaneous amendment was that the two sections are to be read together. While   providing  for  alternative  proceedings  under   s. 23(1)(a)  and s. 23(1)(b), the Legislature ensured that  the procedure  laid down in s. 23D(1) was to be followed in  all cases in which proceedings are intended to be taken under s. 23  (1 ).  Thus, whenever there is any contravention of  any section  or  rule  mentioned in s. 23 (1)  the  Director  of Enforcement must first proceed under the principal clause of s.  23D(1)  and  initiate proceedings  for  adjudication  of penalty.  He cannot at that stage, in his discretion, choose to file a complaint in a court for prosecution of the person concerned  for  the offence under s.  23(1)(b).  Though  the Legislature  has  not  used in either  of  the  sub-sections specific  words excluding the filing of a  complaint  before proceedings  for adjudication are taken under s. 23D(1),  it must be presumed that Parliament knew that if provision  was made  for two alternative punishments for the same act,  one differing from the other, and without any limitations,  such

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a  provision  would be void under Art. 14.  In view  of  the principle that an interpretation which would save a  section should be preferred ss. 23(1) and 23D(1) must be interpreted to mean that the Director of Enforcement must first initiate proceedings  under  the principal clause of  s.  23D(1)  for adjudication  of penalty and that he is empowered to file  a complaint  in court for the offence under s.  23(1)(b)  only when at any stage of the adjudication enquiry,, he comes  to the opinion that, having regard to the circumstances of  the case, the penalty which he is empowered to impose would  not be: adequate. [647 D, F--H; 648 E--H; 649 A--C]     Shanti  Prasad  Jain v. The  Director  of  Enforcement,. [1963] 2 S.C.R. 297;. followed.     (2) When such a safeguard is provided by the Legislature it is necessary that the authority, which takes the steps of instituting  against  that person proceedings, in  which,  a severer  punishment can be awarded, complies  strictly  with all  the conditions laid down by law, that is, the  Director could  file  a complaint for prosecution in court  only  if, having  regard  to the circumstances of the case,  he  finds that  the.  penalty that he is empowered to  impose  in  the adjudication  proceedings  would not be  adequate.  [650  G- H]                           .     In the present case, the enquiry had been instituted  by the  issue of the show cause notice dated 25th August  1967. But it does not appear on 641 the  record  that even after the issue of that  notice,  any such  material  came .before the respondent which  could  be relevant  for forming an opinion that the penalty which  he. was empowered to impose for the contravention in respect Sw. Krs.  88,913.09  would  not  be  adequate.   No  doubt  some investigation  was made, but the investigation would not  be part of the enquiry which had to be held in accordance  with the  Act and the Adjudication Proceedings and Appeal  Rules, 1957.   Neither  of  the  appellants  had  shown  cause   in pursuance  of the notice and there was no consideration,  of such cause to decide whether adjudication proceedings should be  held or not.  Nor were any statements taken or  recorded during an enquiry under s. 23D(1).  Whatever statements were recorded were in the course. of investigation and not in the course  of  an  enquiry  under  s.  23D(1).  Therefore,  the complaint must be held to have been filed without satisfying the requirements and conditions of the proviso to s.  23D(1) of   the  Act,  and  in  .so  far  as  it  related  to   the contravention  of the provisions of ss. 4(1), 5(1)(e) and  9 of  the Act, punishable under s. 23(1)(b), it must  be  held invalid. [651 D-E; 652 C-D, F-G; 653 B-D]     (3) The language used in the Notification of 30th  March 1965  only affords protection to action already taken  while the  rule was in force, but cannot justify initiation  of  a new proceeding which will not be a thing done or omitted  to be  done  under  the rule but, a new act  of  initiating,  a proceeding  after the rule had ceased to exist. The  offence alleged against the appellants is in respect of acts done by them  which  cannot  be held to be  acts  under  that  rule. Unlike  case  of Wicks v. Director of  Public  Prosecutions, [1947]  A.C. 362, where an express provision was made.  that the operation of the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 1939 (a temporary  Act)  was  not to be affected by  its  expiry  as respects things, previously done or omitted to, be done, in. the present case, the operation of r. 132A of the Defence of India  Rules  has  not been continued  after  its  omission. Section  6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, also could  not be  invoked,.  because,  the  section  does  not  apply   to

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temporary statutes, or rules and omissions.  It only applies to  repeals to. Central Acts. Further, the  Notification  of the Ministry of Home Affairs omitting R. 132A, did not  make any such provision similar to that contained in s. 6 of  the General  Clauses  Act.   Moreover, though  s.  4(1)  of  the Foreign  Exchange Regulation Act was amended  simultaneously with  the omission of the r. 132A, the Legislature  did  not make  any provision that an offence  previously   committed, under  r.  132A would continue to remain  punishable  as  an offence  of contravention of s. 4(1) of the Act nor was  any provision  made  permitting operation of r. 132A  itself  to permit  institution  of  prosecutions  in  respect  of  such offences.   Consequently, after the omission of r. 132A  the complaint  is,  incompetent even in respect of  the  offence under Rule 132A(4). [654 A--D; 655 F  H; 656 B--C, E--F; 657 A  F] S.  Krishnan  & Ors. v. The State of Madras,  [1951]  S.C.R. 621, applied.     State of M.P.v. Hiralal Sutwala, A.I.R. 1959 M.P. 93, 1. K. Gas: Plant Manufacturing Co. Ramput v. The King  Emperor, [1947] F.C.R. 141, distinguished.     Seth  Jugmendar  Das  v.  State,  A.I.R.  1951  All.  703, referred to.

JUDGMENT:     CRIMINAL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeals  Nos. 18 and 19 of 1969.     Appeal  from  the judgment and order dated  October  16, 1968’  of the Madras High Court in Criminal  Misc.  Petition No. 980 of 1968. 642       A.K.  Sen,  N.C.  Raghavachari, W.S.  Sitaram  and  R. Gopalakrishnan, for the appellants.       S.T.  Desai,  B.D. Sharma and S. P.  Nayar.,  for  the respondent.       P.R. Gokulakrishnan, Advocate-General, Tamil Nadu  and V. Rangam, for the intervener.       Bhargava,   J.   These   appeals,    by   certificate, challenge  a  .common  Order of the  High  Court  of  Madras dismissing  applications under section 561A of the  Code  of Criminal   Procedure presented by the appellants in the  two appeals  for quashing proceedings  being taken against  them in the Court of the Chief Presidency Magistrate, Madras,  on the  basis of a complaint filed on 17th March; 1968  by  the respondent,  the  Director of Enforcement, New  Delhi.   The Rayala  Corporation  Private  Ltd.,  appellant  in  Criminal Appeal  No. 18 of 1969, was accused No. 1 in the  complaint, while one M.R. Pratap, Managing Director of .accused No.  1, appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 19/1969 was accused No.  2. The circumstances under which the complaint was filed may be briefly stated.      The  premises  of  accused No. 1  were  raided  by  the Enforcement Directorate on the 20th and 21st December,  1966 and  certain  records were seized from the  control  of  the Manager.   Some  enquiries  were  made   subsequently   and, thereafter, on the 25th August, 1967, a notice was issued by the  respondent  to  the  two  accused  to  show  cause  why adjudication  proceedings should  not be instituted  against them  for  violation  of sections 4 and  9  of  the  Foreign Exchange Regulation Act VII of 1947 (hereinafter referred to as  "the  Act")  on  the allegation  that  a  total  sum  of 2,44,713.70   Swedish Kronars had been deposited in  a  Bank account  in  Sweden  in the name of accused  No.  2  at  the

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instance  of  accused No. 1 which had acquired  the  foreign exchange  and  had failed to surrender it to. an  authorised dealer  as required  under the provisions of the Act.   They were called upon to show cause in writing within 14 days  of the  receipt of the notice. Thereafter, some  correspondence went  on  between the respondent  and the two  accused  and, later,  on 4th November, 1967, another notice was issued  by the respondent addressed to accused No. 2 alone stating that accused  No.  2  had acquired a sum of  Sw.  Krs.  88,913.09 during   the.  period  1963  to  1965  in   Stockholm,   was holding  that  sum in a bank account, and did not  offer  or cause  it   to be offered to the Reserve Bank  of  India  on behalf of the Central Government, so that he had contravened the  provisions   of  s.  4(1) and s.  9  of  the  Act,  and affording  to him. an opportunity under s. 23(3) of the  Act of showing, within 15 days from  the receipt of the  notice, that he had permission or special exemp- 643 tion  from  the  Reserve Bank of India  in  his  favour  for acquiring  this  amount  of foreign exchange  ,and  for  not surrendering  the amount in accordance with law.  A  similar show cause notice was issued to accused No. 1 in respect  of the  same  amount  on 20th  January,  1968,  mentioning  the deposit  in favour of accused No. 2 and failure  of  accused No. 1 to surrender the amount, and giving an opportunity  to accused No. 1 to produce the permission or special exemption from  the Reserve Bank of India.  On the 16th  March,  1968, another  notice was issued addressed to both the accused  to show cause in writing. within 14 days of the receipt of  the notice  why adjudication proceedings as contemplated  in  s. 23-D  of the Act should not be held against them in  respect of  a sum of Sw. Krs. 1,55,801.41 which were held in a  bank account  in  Stockholm in the name of accused No. 2  and  in respect  of  which  both the  accused  had  contravened  the provisions of ss. 4( 3 ), 4( 1 ), 5(1)(e) and 9 of the  Act. The   notice   mentioned  that  it  was  being   issued   in supersession  of  the  first show cause  notice  dated  25th August,  1967, ,and added that it had since been decided  to launch  a prosecution in respect of Sw. Krs. 88,913.09.  The latter  amount  was the amount in respect of which  the  two notices  of 4th November, 1967 and 20th January,  1968  were issued to the two accused, while this notice of 16th  March, 1968 for adjudication proceedings related to the balance  of the  amount  arrived  at  by deducting  this  sum  from  the original  total sum of Sw. Krs. 2,44,71-3.70. The next  day, on 17th March, 1968, a complaint was filed against both  the accused  in  the Court of the Chief  PresidenCy  Magistrate, Madras,  for contravention of the provisions of ss. 4( 1  ), 5( 1 ) (e) and 9 of the Act punishable under s. 23 (1 )  (b) of the Act. In addition, the complaint also charged both the accused  with violation of Rule 132-A(2) of the  Defence  of India.  Rules  (hereinafter referred to as "the  D.I.  Rs.") Which was punishable under Rule 132-A(4) of the said  Rules. Thereupon,  both  the  accused  moved  the  High  Court  for quashing the proceedings sought to be taken against them  on the  basis  of this complaint.  Those   applications  having been  dismissed,  the  appellants have come  up   in   these appeals  challenging the order of the High Court  dismissing their   applications  and  praying  for  quashing   of   the proceedings  being taken on the basis of that complaint.        In  these appeals. Mr. A.K. Sen, appearing on  behalf of  the appellants, has raised three points. In  respect  of the prosecution for violation of ss. 4(1), 5(1)(e) and 9. of the  Act  punishable under s. 23 (1 ) (b) of  the  Act,  the principal  ground raised is that s. 23(1)(b) of the  Act  is

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ultra  rites Article 14 of the Constitution inasmuch  as  it provides  for  a  punishment heavier and  severer  than  the punishment or  penalty provided  for the  same acts under s. 23(1)(a)  of the Act. In the alternative, the  second  point taken  is  that, even if s. 23 ( 1 ) (b) is  not  void,  the complaint in 644 respect  of the offences punishable under that  section  has not been filed properly in accordance with the proviso to s. 23-D  (1  )  of  the Act,  so  that  proceedings  cannot  be competently   taken   on  the basis of that  complaint.  The third  point raised relates  to  the charge of violation  of R. 132-A(2) of the D.I. Rs.  punishable under R. 132-A(4) of those  Rules and is to the effect that R. 132-A of the  D.I. Rs.  was omitted by a notification of the Ministry  of  Home Affairs  dated  30th  March,  1965   and,   consequently,  a prosecution  in respect of an offence punishable under  that Rule  could not be instituted on 17th March, 1968 when  that Rule had ceased to exist.  On these three grounds, the order quashing  the  proceedings being taken on the  complaint  in respect  of  all  the offences mentioned  in  it  has   been sought in these appeals.     To  appreciate the first point raised before us and  to. deal with it properly, we may reproduce below the provisions of s. 23 and s. 23-D(1) of the Act :--                   "23.  Penalty and procedure.--(1) If   any               person  contravenes the provisions of  section               4,  section 5,  section 9, section  10,   sub-               section.   (2)  of  section  12,  section  18,               section  18A  or section 18B or of  any  rule,               direction or order made thereunder, he shall-                    (a)   be  liable  to  such  penalty   not               exceeding  three  .times  the  value  of   the               foreign  exchange  in  respect  of  which  the               contravention   has  taken  place,   or   five               thousand rupees, whichever is  more,  as   may               be adjudged by the Director of Enforcement  in               the manner hereinafter provided, or                     (b)  upon  conviction by  a  Court,   be               punishable with imprisonment for a term  which               may extend to two years, or with fine, or with               both.                    (IA) If any person contravenes any of the               provisions  of  this  Act,  or  of  any  rule,               direction  or order made thereunder,  for  the               contravention of which no penalty is expressly               provided, he shall, upon conviction by a court               be  punishable  with imprisonment for  a  term               which  may extend to two years, or with  fine,               or  with both.                   (lB)  Any  Court  trying  a  contravention               under sub-section (1) or sub-section (IA)  and               the  authority   adjudging  any  contravention               under clause (a) of sub- section (1 ) may,  if               it   thinks  fit,  and  in  addition  to   any               sentence  or penalty which it may  impose  for               such contravention, direct that any  currency,               security,   gold  or  silver, or goods or  any               other money or property, In  respect of  which               the contravention has  taken place, 645               shall be confiscated to the Central Government               and  further direct that the foreign  exchange               holdings, if any, of the person committing the               contravention  or  any part thereof  shall  be

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             brought back into India or  shall  be retained               outside   India   in   accordance   with   the               directions made in this behalf.                   Explanation.   For  the purposes  of  this               sub-section,  property  in  respect  of  which                             contravention  has  taken place  shall   include               deposits in a bank, where the said property is               converted into such deposits.                   (2) Notwithstanding anything, contained in               section 32 of the Code of Criminal  Procedure,               1898  (Act 5 of 1898), it shall be lawful  for               any  magistrate of the first class,  specially               empowered   in  this  behalf  by  the    State               Government, and for. any presidency magistrate               to  pass  a  sentence of  fine  exceeding  two               thousand rupees on any person convicted of  an               offence punishable  under this section.                   (3) No Court shall take cognizance--                   (a) of any offence punishable  under  sub-               section  (1) except upon complaint in  writing               made by  the Director of Enforcement, or                   (aa) of any offence punishable under  sub-               section (2) of section 191,--                   (i)  where the offence is alleged to  have               been  committed by an officer  of  Enforcement               not  lower in rank than an Assistant  Director               of  Enforcement,  except  with  the   previous               sanction of the Central Government;                   (ii) Where the offence is alleged to  have               been  committed  by a Officer  of  Enforcement               lower  in rank than an Assistant  Director  of               Enforcement,   except   with    the   previous               sanction of the Director of Enforcement, or;                   (b) of any offence punishable under   sub-               section  (IA) of this section or section  23F,               except  upon complaint in writing made by  the               Director   of  Enforcement  or   any   officer               authorised  in  this  behalf  by  the  Central               Government or the Reserve Bank by  a   general               or special order;                   Provided  that where any such  offence  is               the contravention of any of the provisions  of               this Act or any rule, direction or order  made               thereunder which prohibits the doing of an act               without permission, no such complaint shall be               made unless the person accused of the  offence               has been given an opportunity of showing  that               he had such permission. 646               (4)  Nothing in the first proviso  to  section               188  of  the     Code of  Criminal  Procedure,               1898  (Act 5 of 1898), shall    apply  to  any               offence punishable under this section."               23D.   Power  to  adjudicate.--(1)   For   the               purpose   of  adjudging under’ clause  (a)  of               sub-section  (1)  of section  23  whether  any               person  has  committed ’a  contravention,  the               Director of Enforcement shall hold an  inquiry               in the prescribed manner  after  giving   that               person a reasonable opportunity of being heard               and if, on such inquiry, he is satisfied  that               the "person  has committed the  contravention,               he may  impose  such penalty as he thinks  fit               in accordance with the provisions of the  said

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             section 23:               Provided that if, at any stage of the inquiry,               the    Director of Enforcement is of  opinion.               that   having regard to the  circumstances  of               the case, the penalty  which he is.  empowered               to  impose  would not be adequate,  he  shall,               instead of imposing any penalty himself,  make               a complaint in writing to the Court." A  plain reading of s. 23 (1 ) of the Act shows  that  under this  sub-section provision is made for action  being  taken against  any per-son who contravenes the provisions. of  ss. 4, 5, 9, 10, 12(2), 18,18A or 18B or of any rule,  direction or order made thereunder;and cls. (a)  and (b) indicate  the two  different  proceedings  that  can  be  taken  for  such contravention.   Under  cl. (a), the person is liable  to  a penalty only, and that penalty cannot exceed three times the value  of  the  foreign exchange in  respect  of  which  the contravention has taken place, or Rs. 5,000/-, whichever  is more.This penalty can be imposed by an adjudication made  by the Director of Enforcement in the manner provided in s. 23D of the Act.  The alternative punishment that is provided  in cl. (b) is to be imposed upon conviction by a Court when the Court  can  sentence the person to imprisonment for  a  term which  may extend to two years, or with fine, or with  both. Clearly,  the  punishment provided under s..  23  (1)(b)  is severer and heavier than the penalty to which the person  is made  liable  if  proceedings are taken  under  s.  23(1)(a) instead  of prosecuting him in a Court under s.  23  (1)(b). The  argument of Mr. Sen is that this section lays  down  no principles   at  all,  for  determining  when  the   per-son concerned should be proceeded ’against under s. 23(1)(a) and when under s. 23(1)(b), and it would appear that it is left to  the arbitrary discretion of the Director of  Enforcement to decide which proceedings should be taken.  The  liability of a person for more or less severe punishment for the  same act  at  the  sole discretion and arbitrary  choice  of  the Director of Enforcement, 647 it  is  urged, denies equality before law  guaranteed  under Art. 14 of the Constitution.     The submission made would have carried great force  with us but for our view that the effect of s. 23D of the Act  is that  the  choice in respect of the proceeding to  be  taken under  s. 23(1)(a) or s,. 23(1)(b) has not been left to  the unguided  and  arbitrary  discretion  of  the  Director   of Enforcement, but is governed by principles indicated by that section,.  In this connection, it is pertinent to note  that s. 23 (1) of the Act ’as origin.ally enacted in 1947 did not provide   for   alternative   punishment   for   the    same contravention and contained only one single provision  under which  any person contravening any of the provisions of  the Act or of any rule, direction or order made thereunder   was punishable  with imprisonment for a term which could  extend to two, years or with fine or with bOth, with the additional clause  that any Court trying any such contravention  might, if  it thought fit and in addition to any sentence which  it might  impose  for  such  contravention,  direct  that   any currency,  security,  gold  or silver,  or  goods  or  other property  in  respect of which the contravention  has  taken place   shall   be   confiscated.   No   question   of   the applicability   of  Art.  14  of  the  Constitution   could, therefore,  ’arise  while  the provision stood as originally enacted.     Parliament,  by Foreign Exchange Regulation  (Amendment) Act  XXXIX of 1957, amended s. 23(1) and, at the same  time,

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also  introduced  s.  23D  in  the  Act.   It  was  by  this amendment  that  two alternative proceedings  for  the  same contravention  were  provided  in  s.  23  (1  ).   In  thus introducing two different proceedings, Parliament put in the forefront  proceedings  for  penalty  to  be  taken  by  the Director of Enforcement by taking up adjudication, while the punishment  to be awarded by the Court upon conviction,  was mentioned  as  the second type of proceeding that  could  be resorted  to.   Section 23D(1) is also  divisible  into  two parts.  The  first  part  lays down  what  the  Director  of Enforcement  has to do in order to adjudge penalty under  s. 23 ( 1 ) (a), and the second part, contained in the proviso, gives  the  power to the Director of Enforcement to  file  a complaint  instead of imposing  a penalty himself.   In  our opinion,  these  two  ss.  23(D  and  23D(1)  must  be  read together, so that the procedure laid down in s. 23D(1) is to be  followed in all cases in which proceedings are  intended to   be  taken  under  s.  23  (1).   The  effect  of   this interpretation is that, whenever there is any  contravention of any section or rule mentioned in s. 23( 1 ), the Director of  Enforcement  must  first proceed  trader  the  principal clause   of   s.  23D(1)  and   initiate   proceedings   for adjudication  of penalty.  He cannot, at that stage, at  his discretion,  choose  to  file a complaint  in  a  Court  for prosecution of the person concerned for the offence under s. 23(  1  )(b). The Director of Enforcement can  only  file  a complaint by acting Ll4Sup./69--12 648 in  accordance with the proviso to S. 23D(1), which  clearly lays  down that the complaint is only to be filed  in  those cases  where, at any stage of the inquiry, the  Director  of Enforcement comes to the opinion that, having regard to  the circumstances of the case, the penalty which he is empowered to impose would not be adequate.  Until this requirement  is satisfied,  he  cannot  make a complaint to  the  Court  for prosecution  of  the person concerned under s. 23  (1)  (b). The choice of the proceeding to be taken against the person, who is liable for action for contravention under S. 23  (1), is,  thus,  not  left  entirely to  the  discretion  of  the Director  of Enforcement, but the criterion for  making  the choice is laid down in the proviso to s. 23D(1).  It  cannot possibly be contended, and no attempt was made by Mr. Sen to contend,  that,  if we accept this interpretation  that  the right of the Director of Enforcement to make a complaint  to the  Court  for  the  offence under s. 23  (1)  (b)  can  be exercised  only in those cases where in accordance with  the proviso,  he comes to the opinion that the penalty which  he is  empowered to impose would not be adequate, the  validity of S. 23 (1) (b) of the Act can still be challenged. In this connection, it was urged before us that the language of the principal clause of s. 23D(1) taken together with the language  of the proviso does not justify an  interpretation that  a complaint for an offence under S. 23 (1) (b)  cannot be made by the Director of Enforcement except in  accordance with the proviso, particularly because the principal  clause of  S. 23D(1) merely lays down the procedure that has to  be adopted by the Director Of Enforcement when proceeding under S. 23 (1) (a), and contains no. words indicating that such a proceeding must invariably be resorted to by him whenever he gets  information of a contravention mentioned in s.  23(1). The  language does not contain any ,words creating a bar  to his  proceeding to file a complaint straightaway instead  of taking proceedings for adjudication under S. 23D(1).  It  is true that neither in S. 23(1) itself nor in S.    23D(1) has

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the Legislature used specific words excluding the filing  of a  complaint before proceedings for -adjudication are  taken under  S. 23D(1).  If any such words had been used, no  such controversy  could have been raised as has been put  forward before us in these appeals.  We have, however, to gather the intention of the Legislature from the enactment as a  whole. In this connection, significance -attaches to the fact  that S.  23D(1) was introduced simultaneously with the  provision made for alternative proceedings under S. 23 (1) in its  two cls.  (a)  and  (b).   It appears to  be  obvious  that  the Legislature  adopted  this course so as to ensure  that  all proceedings under S. 23(1) are taken in the manner laid down in  S.  23D(1).   Parliament  must  be  credited  with   the knowledge  that,  if provision is made for  two  alternative punishments  for the same act one differing from  the  other without  any  limitations, such a provision  would  be  void under Art. 14 of 649 the  Constitution;  and that is the  reason  why  Parliament simultaneously introduced the procedure to be adopted  under s. 23D(1) in the course of which the Director of Enforcement is’ to decide whether a complaint is to be made in Court and under what circumstances he can do so.  We have also to keep in  view the general principle of interpretation that, if  a particular  interpretation will enure to the validity  of  a law,  that  interpretation  must  be  preferred.   In  these circumstances,  we  have  no  hesitation  in  holding  that, whenever  there is a contravention by .any person  which  is made punishable under either cl. (a)or cl. (b) of  s. 23(1), the Director of Enforcement must first initiate  proceedings under  the  principal   clause  of s..23D( 1  )  and  he  is empowered  to file a complaint in Court only when  he  finds that he is required to do so in accordance with the proviso. It  is  by resorting to the proviso only that he  can  place that  person in greater jeopardy of being liable to  a  more severe punishment under s. 23(1)(b) of the Act.     The  view we have taken is in line with the decision  of this  Court  in  Shanti  Prasad  Jain  v.  The  Director  of Enforcement(1), where this Court considered the validity  of s.  23(1)(a) and s. 23D which were challenged on the  ground of two alternative procedures being applicable for  awarding punishment   for   the  same act.   The  Court  noticed  the position  in  the following words :--                     "It  will be seen that when there  is  a               contravention  of  s.  4  (1  ),  action  with               respect  to  it is to be taken  in  the  first               instance  by the Director of  Enforcement.  He               may  either  adjudge  the  matter  himself  in               accordance with s. 23(1)(a), or he may send it               on  to  a Court if he considers  that  a  more               severe  penalty than he can impose  is  called               for.  Now, the contention of the appellant  is                             that when the case is. transferred to a Court,               it  will  be  tried  in  accordance  with  the               procedure prescribed by the Criminal Procedure               Code, but that when the Director himself tries               it,  he will follow the  procedure  prescribed               therefor  under  the Rules framed  under   the               Act,  and that when the law provides  for  the               same offence being tried under two procedures,               which  are  substantially different, and it is               left to the discretion of an executive officer               whether the trial should take place under  the               one  or  the other of them,  there  is  clear’

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             discrimination,  and Art. 14  is  contravened.               Therefore, s. 23(1)(a) must, it is argued,  be               struck   down  as  unconstitutional  and   the               imposition of fine on the appellant under that               section set aside as illegal." (1)" [1963] 2 S.C.R. 297. 650 The Court then distinguished the provisions of the Act  with the  law considered in the case of State of West  Bengal  v. Anwar A1i(1) and held -.- "Section  23D confers authority on the very officer who  has power  to try and dispose of a case to send it on for  trial to -a Court, and that too only when he considers that a more severe  punishment  than  what he is  authorised  to  impose should be awarded." On this view about the effect of S. 23D, the Court gave  the decision  that  the  power  conferred  on  the  Director  of Enforcement under S. 23D to transfer cases to a Court is not unguided  and arbitrary, and does not offend Art. 14 of  the Constitution;  and  s.  23 (1) (a)  cannot  be  assailed  as unconstitutional.   In that case, the argument was  that  s. 23(1)(a)  should  be  struck  down,  because  the  procedure prescribed  by it permitted proceedings to be taken  by  the Director  of  Enforcement himself which  procedure  did  not confer  the  same  rights on the defence  as  the  procedure prescribed for trial if the Director of Enforcement filed  a complaint for the offence under s. 23 (1) (b).  In the  case before  us, it is s. 23(1)(b) which is challenged and  on  a slightly  different  ground that it provides  for  a  higher punishment than that provided by S. 23 (1) (a).  The  answer to  both the questions is found in the view taken by  us  in the  present  case as well as by this Court in the  case  of Shanti  Prasad  Jain(2) that the  Director  of  Enforcement, though he has power to try the case under S. 23 (1) (a), can only  send  the  case to the Court if he  considers  that  a severer  punishment  than what he is  authorised  to  impose should  be  awarded.   The  Court in  that  case  also  thus accepted  the  principle  that S. 23D  limits  entirely  the procedure  the Director of Enforcement has to  observe  when deciding  whether the punishment should be under s.  23  (1) (a) or under S. 23 (1) (b). However,   we  consider  that,  in  this  case,   there   is considerable  force in the second point urged by Mr. Sen  on behalf of the appellants that the respondent, in filing  the complaint  on  17th March, 1968, did not act  in  accordance with the requirements of the proviso to s. 23D(1).  We  have held above that the proviso to S. 23D(1) lays down the  only manner  in  which  the Director of Enforcement  can  make  a complaint  and  this  provision  has been  laid  down  as  a safeguard  to ensure that a person, who is  being  proceeded against  for a contravention under S. 23(1), is not  put  in danger  of higher and severer punishment at the  choice  and sweet-will  of  the Director of Enforcement.   When  such  a safeguard  is provided by legislature, it is necessary  that the  authority, which takes the step of instituting  against that person proceedings in which a severer punishment can be awarded, complies strictly (1) [1952] S.C.R. 284. (2) [19631 2 S.C.R. 297. 651 with all the conditions laid down by law to be satisfied  by him  before  instituting that proceeding.   in  the  present case, therefore, we have to see whether the requirements  of the  proviso to s. 23D(1) were satisfied at the  stage  when the  respondent filed the impugned complaint on 17th  March,

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1968.     The  proviso ’to s. 23D(1) lays down that the  complaint may be made at any stage of the enquiry but only if,  having regard  to the circumstances, of the case, the  Director  of Enforcement finds that the penalty which he is empowered  to impose would not be adequate.  It was urged by Mr. Sen that, in this case, the complaint was not filed as a result of the enquiry under the principal clause of s. 23D(1) at all  and, in any case, there was no material before the respondent  on which  he  could have formed the opinion  that  the  penalty which  he was empowered to impose would not be  adequate  in respect  of  the stun of Sw. Krs. 88,913.09  which,  it  was alleged,  had  been  acquired  by  the  two  accused  during the  period  1963 to 1965 and kept in deposit  against  law. Arguments  at  some length were advanced before  us  on  the question  as to what should be the stage of the  enquiry  at which  the Director of Enforcement should form  his  opinion and  will  be entitled to file the complaint in  Court.   It appears  to us that it is not necessary in this case  to  go into  that  question.  It is true that the enquiry  in  this case  under s. 23D( 1 ) had been instituted by the issue  of the  show cause notice dated 25th August, 1967,  that  being the  notice  mentioned in Rule 3 (1 )  of  the  Adjudication Proceedings and Appeal Rules, 1957.  On the record, however, does  not appear that, even after the issue of that  notice, any such material came before the respondent which could  be relevant  for forming an opinion that the penalty  which  he was empowered to impose for the contravention in respect  of the  sum of Sw. Krs. 88,913.09 would not be  adequate.   The respondent,  in the case of accused No. 2, appears  to  have formed  ’a prima. facie opinion that a complaint  should  be made  against him in Court when he issued the notice on  4th November, 1967 under the proviso to s. 23(3) of the Act, and a similar opinion in respect of accused No. 1 when he issued the  notice  on 20th January, 1968 under the  same  proviso. There is, however, no information on the record to  indicate that, by the time these notices were  issued,  any  material had  appeared before the respondent in the  course   of  the enquiry  initiated by him through  the  notice  dated   25th August, 1967 which could lead to the opinion being formed by the  respondent   that  he will not  be in  a  position   to impose  adequate  penalty by  continuing  the  ,adjudication proceedings.  Even  subsequently, when one  of  the  accused replied  to the notice, there does not appear to  have  been brought before the respondent any such relevant material. Mr.  S.T.  Desai  on  behalf  of  the  respondent  drew  our attention to para. 3(E) of the petition presented by accused No. 1 for 652 certificate  under  Art. 132(1) and Art.  134(1)(c)  of  the Constitution  in  this  case which  contains  the  following pleading :               "In this case, having issued show cause notice               dated 25-8-67 in respect of the subject matter               of  the pending prosecution and  having  taken               various   acts,  taking   statements,   taking               recorded   statements,   investigations,   the               respondent  did  not hold an enquiry  for  the               purpose  of his forming an  opinion  that  the               accused is  guilty of violations and that  the               penalty  is  not  adequate and  as  such,  the               prosecution filed in C.C. 8756 of 68 is liable               to be quashed on this ground." Relying on this pleading, Mr. Desai urged that it amounts to a  admission by accused No. 1 that, during enquiry,  various

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statements were taken and recorded and investigations  made, so that we should not hold that there was no material on the basis of which the respondent could’ have formed the opinion that it was a fit case for making a complaint.  The pleading does  not  show that any statements were taken  or  recorded during  the course to the enquiry held under s. 23D( 1 )  of the  Act  in  the  manner  laid  down  by  the  Adjudication Proceedings and Appeal Rules, 1953 Under those Rules,  after a notice is issued, the Director of Enforcement is  required to  consider the cause shown by such person in  response  to the  notice and, if he is of the opinion  that  adjudication proceedings  should  be held, he has to fix a date  for  the appearance  of that person either personally or through  his lawyer or other authorised representative.  Subsequently, he has  to  explain that the person proceeded  against  or  his lawyer  or authorised representative the offence alleged  to have been committed by such person indicating the provisions of  the  Act  or of the rules,  directions  or  orders  made thereunder  in respect of which contravention is alleged  to have taken place, and then he has to give an opportunity  to such  person to produce such documents or evidence a he  may consider  relevant to the inquiry.  It is on the  conclusion of  such an inquiry that the Director can impose  a  penalty under  s.  23(1)(a).   In  the present  case,  there  is  no material at all show that any proceedings were taken in  the manner indicate by the Rules referred to above.  There  does not appear to has been any cause shown by either of the  two accused, or consideration of such cause by the respondent to decide whether adjudication proceedings should be held.   It is true that there is some material to indicate that,  after the  issue  of notice dated 25-8-1967,  some  investigations were   carried   on   by   the   respondent;    but    these investigations would not be part of the inquiry which had to be  held  in accordance with  Adjudication  Proceedings  and Appeal  Rules, 1957.  It appears that, at one stage,  before the  complaint  was filed, a writ petition was  moved  under Art.  226  of the Constitution in the High Court  of  Madras praying for the quashing of 653 the notice dated 25th August, 1967.  The order made’ by  the High Court on one of the interim applications in  connection with  that notice shows that, while that writ  petition  was pending,  some investigations were permitted by  the  Court, but  further penal proceedings in pursuance of  that  notice were  restrained.   This  clearly  indicates  that  whatever statements  were recorded by the respondent as mentioned  in the  petition of accused No. 1 referred to above  must  have been in the course of investigation and not in the course of the  inquiry  under  s. 23D ( 1 ) of the  Act.   The  record before us, therefore, does not show that any material at all was available to the respondent in the course of the enquiry under s. 23D( 1 ) on the basis of which he could have formed an opinion that it was a fit case for making a complaint  on the  ground  that he would not be able  to  impose  adequate penalty.   The complaint has, therefore, to be held to  have been   filed   without  satisfying  the   requirements   and conditions of the proviso to. s. 23D(1) of the Act and is in violation  of the safeguard provided by the Legislature  for such contingencies. The complaint, insofar as it related  to the contravention by the accused of provisions of ss. 4 (  1 ),  5  (  1 ) ( e ) and 9 of the  Act  punishable  under  s. 23(1)(13)  is  concerned, is invalid and  proceedings  being taken in pursuance of it must be quashed.     There  remains  for consideration the  question  whether proceedings  could be validly continued on the complaint  in

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respect  of  the  charge under R.  132A(4)  of  the  D.I.Rs. against  the two accused.  The two relevant clauses of  Rule 132A are as follows:                     "132A.  (2)  No  person  other  than  an               authorised  dealer  shall  buy  or   otherwise               acquire  or borrow from, of sell or  otherwise               transfer  or  lend to, or exchange  with,  any               person  not being an authorised  dealer,  ’any               foreign exchange.                  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .                      (4)  If any person contravenes  any  of               the   provisions  this  rule,  he   shall   be               punishable with imprisonment for a term  which               may extend to two years, or with fine, or with               both; and any court trying such  contravention               may  direct  that  the  foreign  exchange   in               respect  of which the court is satisfied  that               this  rule  has  been  contravened,  shall  be               forfeited to the Central Government." The charge in the complaint against the two accused was that they had acquired foreign exchange to the extent of Sw. Krs. 88,913.09  in violation of the prohibition contained  in  R. I32A(2)  during the period when this Rule was in  force,  so that they became liable to punishment under R.132A(4).  Rule 132-A  as a whole ceased to be in existence as a  result  of the notification issued by the Ministry 654     of  Home  Affairs  on 30th March,  1955,  by  which  the Defence  of India (Amendment) Rules, 1965 were  promulgated. Clause 2 of these Amendment Rules reads as under :--                  "In the Defence of India Rules, 1962,  rule               132A  (relating to prohibition of dealings  in               foreign  exchange) shall be omitted except  as               respects  things  done or omitted to  be  done               under that rule." The  argument  of  Mr. Sen was that, even  if  there  was  a contravention  of R. 132A(2) by the accused when  that  Rule was in force, the act of contravention cannot be held to  be a  "thing  done or omitted to be done under that  rule,"  so that,  after that rule has been omitted, no  prosecution  in respect  of  that  contravention  can  be  instituted.    He conceded  the  .possibility  that,  if  a  prosecution   had ,already  been  started  while R. 132A was  in  force,  that prosecution might have been competently continued.  Once the Rule  was  omitted altogether, no new proceeding by  way  of prosecution  could be initiated even though it might  be  in respect  of an offence committed earlier during  the  period that  the rule was in force.  We are inclined to agree  with the  submission of Mr. Sen that the language  contained  in’ el.  2 of the Defence of India (Amendment) Rules,  1965  can only  afford  protection to action already taken  while  the rule  was in force, but cannot justify initiation of  a  new proceeding  which will not be a thing done or omitted to  be done under the rule but a new act of initiating a proceeding after the rule had ceased to exist.  On this interpretation, the  complaint made for the offence under R. 132A(4) of  the D.I.  Rs., after 1st April, 1965 when the rule was  omitted, has to be held invalid.     This view of ours is in line with the general  principle enunciated  by.  this Court in the case of S.  Krishnan  and Others’  v. The State of Madras(1), relating  to  .temporary enactments, in, the following words :--                  "The general rule in regard to a  temporary               statute  is  that, in the absence  of  special               provision  to the contrary, proceedings  which

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             are being taken against a person under it will               ipso  facto terminate as soon as  the  statute               expires." Mention  may also be made to a decision of a learned  single Judge of the Allahabad High Court in Seth Jugmendar Das  and Others  v.  State(2), where a similar view  was  taken  when considering the effect of the repeal of the Defence of India Act, 1939, and the (1) [1951] S.C.R. 621.      (2) A.I.R. 1951 All. 703. 655 Ordinance No. XII of 1946 which had amended s. 1 (4) of that Act.     On the other hand, Mr. Desai on behalf of the respondent relied  on  a  decision of the Privy  Council  in  Wicks  v. Director  of  Public  Prosecutions(1).  In  that  case,  the appellant, whose case came up before the Privy Council,  was convicted for contravention of Regulation 2A of the  Defence (General)  Regulations  framed under  the  Emergency  Powers (Defence) Act, 1939 as applied to British subjects abroad by s. 3 (1 )(b) of  the said Act. It was held that, at the date when  the acts, which were the subjectmatter of the  charge, were committed, the regulation in question was in force,  so that,  if  the  appellant had  been  prosecuted  immediately afterwards, the validity of his conviction could not be open to  any  challenge  at  all.  But the  Act  of  1939  was  a temporary  Act, and after various extensions it  expired  on February 24, 1945. The trial of the accused took place  only in  May  1946, and he was Convicted and  sentenced  to  four years’  penal servitude on May 28. In  these  circumstances, the question raised in the appeal was: "Is a man entitled to be  acquitted  when he is proved to have  broken  a  Defence Regulation at a time when that regulation was in  operation, because  his  trial  and conviction  take  place  after  the regulation  expired ?" The Privy Council took notice of sub- s. (3) of section 11 of the Emergency Powers (Defence)  Act, 1939 which laid down that "the expiry of this Act shall  not affect  the operation thereof as respects things  previously done or omitted to be done".  It was argued before the Privy Council  that the phrase "things previously done"  does  not cover  offences  previously committed.   This  argument  was rejected  by Viscount Simon on behalf of the  Privy  Council and  it  was held that the appellant in that cane  could  be convicted  in respect of the offence which he had  committed when  the  regulation was in force.  That  case,  however,is distinguishable from the case before us inasmuch as, in that case,  the saving provision laid down that the operation  of that  Act  itself was not to be affected by  the  expiry  as respects things previously done or omitted to be done.   The Act could, therefore, be held to be in operation in  respect of  acts already committed, so that the conviction could  be validly made even after the expiry of the Act in respect  of an offence committed before the expiry.  In the case  before us,  the operation of R. 132A of the D.I. Rs. has  not  been continued  after  its omission.  The language  used  in  the notification only affords protection to things already  done under the rule, so that it cannot permit further application of that rule by instituting a new prosecution in respect  of something  already  done.  The offence alleged  against  the accused  in the present case is in respect of acts  done  by them  which cannot be held to be acts under that rule.   The difference in the language thus makes (1) [1947] A.C. 362. 656 it clear that the principle enunciated by the Privy  Council in  the  case cited above cannot apply to  the  notification

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with which we are concerned.     Reference  was  next made to a decision  of  the  Madhya Pradesh  High  Court in State of Madhya Pradesh  v.  Hiralal Sutwala(1),  but, there again, the accused was sought to  be prosecuted  for ’an offence punishable under an Act  on  the repeal  of  which section 6 of the General Clauses  Act  had been  made  applicable. In the case before us, s. 6  of  the General  Clauses Act cannot obviously apply on the  omission of  R. 132A of the D.I.Rs. for the two obvious reasons  that s.  6  only  applies to repeals and not  to  omissions,  and applies  when the repeal is of a Central Act  or  Regulation and  not of a Rule.  If s. 6 of the General Clauses Act  had been  applied  no  doubt this  complaint  ’against  the  two accused  for  the offence punishable under R.  132A  of  the D.I.Rs. could have been instituted even after the repeal  of that rule.     The   last  case  relied  upon  is  1.  K.   Gas   Plant Manufacturing  Co.,  (Rampur) Ltd. and Others  v.  The  King Emperor(2).   In  that case, the Federal Court had  to  deal with the effect of sub-s. (4) of section 1 of the Defence of India Act, 1939 and the Ordinance No. XII of 1946 which were also  considered by the Allahabad High Court in the case  of Seth  Jugmendar  Das & Ors.(2).  After quoting  the  amended sub-s.  (4) of s. 1 of the Defence of India Act,  the  Court held :-                   "The  express  insertion of  these  saving               clauses   was  no  doubt  due  to  a   belated               realisation that the provisions of s. 6 of the               General Clauses Act (X of 1897) apply only  to               repealed   statutes   and  not   to   expiring               statutes, and that the general rule in  regard               to  the expiration of a temporary  statute  is               that unless it contains some special provision               to  the  contrary, after a temporary  Act  has               expired,  no proceedings can be taken upon  it               and  it  ceases to have  any  further  effect.               Therefore,    offences    committed    against               temporary Acts must be prosecuted and punished               before the Act expires and as soon as the  Act               expires any proceedings which are being  taken               against a person will ipso facto terminate." The  Court cited. with approval the decision in the case  of Wicks v. Director of Public Prosecutions(4), and held  that, in   view  s. 1 (4) of the Defence of India  Act,  1939,  as amended by Ordinance No. XII of 1946, the prosecution for  a conviction  for  an offence committed when  the  Defence  of India Act was in force, was valid even after the Defence  of India Act had ceased to be in force.  That case is, however, distinguishable from the case (1) A.I.R. 1959 M.P. 93.    (2) [1947] F.C.R. 141. (3) A.I.R. 1951 All. 703.   (4) (1947) A.C. 362. 657 before us in two respects. In that case, the prosecution had been started before the Defence of India Act ceased to be in force and, secondly, the language introduced in the  amended sub-s.  (4)  of  s. 1 of the Act had the  effect  of  making applicable  the principles laid down in s. 6 of the  General Clauses Act, so that a legal proceeding could be  instituted even  after the repeal of the Act in respect of  an  offence committed during the time when the Act was in force.  As  we have indicated earlier, the notification of the Ministry  of Home  Affairs omitting R. 132A of the D.I.Rs. did  not  make any  such provision similar to, that contained ms. 6 of  the General Clauses Act.  Consequently, it is clear that,  after the omission of R. 132A of the D.I.Rs., no prosecution could

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be instituted even in respect of an act which was an offence when that Rule was in force.       ’     In  this connection, Mr. Desai pointed out to  us  that, simultaneously with the omission of R. 132A of the  D.I.Rs., s.  4(2)  of  the  Act  was  amended  so  as  to  bring  the prohibition  contained  in R. 132A(2) under s. 4(1)  of  the Act.  He urged that, from this simultaneous action taken, it should  be  presumed  that there was  no  intention  of  the Legislature that acts, which were offences punishable  under R.  132A  of  the D.I.Rs., should go  unpunished  after  the omission  of that rule.  It, however, appears that  when  s. 4(1)  of the Act was amended, the Legislature did  not  make any provision that an offence previously committed under  R. 132A  of the D.I.Rs. would continue to remain punishable  as an  offence of contravention of s. 4 ( 1 ) of the  Act,  nor was  any  provision made ’ permitting operation of  R.  132A itself  so  as  to permit  institution  of  prosecutions  in respect  of  such  offences.  The consequence  is  that  the present  complaint  is incompetent even in  respect  of  the offence  under R. 132A(4).  This is the reason why  we  hold that  this  was  an appropriate case where  the  High  Court should  have allowed the applications under s. 561A  of  the Code  of  Criminal  Procedure and should  have  quashed  the proceedings on this complaint.     Consequently,  as  already directed by our  short  order dated  2nd May, 1969, the appeals are allowed, the order  of the  High Court rejecting the applications under s. 561A  of the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure is  set  aside,  and  the proceedings  for  the  prosecution  of  the  appellants  are quashed. V.P.S.                                      Appeals allowed. 358