RAVINDRA SHALIK NAIK Vs STATE OF MAHARASHTRA
Bench: ARIJIT PASAYAT,ASOK KUMAR GANGULY, , ,
Case number: Crl.A. No.-000245-000246 / 2009
Diary number: 36954 / 2007
Advocates: C. N. SREE KUMAR Vs
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. OF 2009 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) Nos. 1669-1670 of 2008)
Ravindra Shalik Naik and Ors. ..Appellants
Versus
State of Maharashtra ..Respondent
J U D G M E N T
Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J
1. Leave granted.
2. Challenge in these appeals is to the common judgment of a Division
Bench of the Bombay High Court, Nagpur Bench, dismissing the appeals
filed by the present appellants. The appellants were found guilty of offence
punishable under Sections 302 read with 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
(in short the ‘IPC’). The appellant Ravindra was also convicted for offence
punishable under Section 324 IPC. Appellants Ravindra, Naresh and
Shalikrao are hereinafter referred to as A-1, A-2 and A-3. The learned
Adhoc Additional Sessions Judge, Yuvatmal had found the appellants
guilty as aforenoted.
3. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:
Appellant Shalik is father of appellants Ravindra and Naresh. On
13.11.1999, at about 7 p.m. appellant Naresh was going to his house and
was carrying bundle of cotton/grass. The road to his house was adjacent to
the house of complainant Vandana (PW1). On the way, the cotton bundle hit
the roof of the complainant’s house and, therefore, husband of the
complainant, Dewanand (PW 3) accosted appellant Naresh and told him that
he should have been more careful while carrying the bundle of cotton and
ought to have seen that no damage was done to the roof of the house of
complainant. Quarrel ensued between appellant Naresh and Dewanand
(PW-3) and there was exchange of words between them. Appellants Shalik
and Ravindra also came to the spot of incident and started quarrelling with
the husband of the complainant- Dewanand (PW3). The father-in-law of the
complainant, Kisan Gedam (hereinafter referred to as ‘deceased’) intervened
to pacify the quarrel between appellants and his son Dewanand. Appellants
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Shalik, Ravindra and Naresh went inside their house, which was close to the
spot of incident and all of them returned to the spot armed with axe, knife
and gupti. All the three appellants inflicted injuries on the head and
abdomen of deceased Kisan by means of those weapons. Appellants
Ravindra and Naresh inflicted injuries on the hand of husband of
complainant-Dewanand (PW3) with those weapons with intention to cause
his death. Deceased Kisan was taken to the Hospital at Ner where he was
declared dead.
After completion of investigation charge sheet was filed and since the
accused persons pleaded innocence trial was held.
Placing reliance on the evidence of complainant Vandana (PW-1) and
Dewanand (PW-3) the trial Court held the accused persons guilty as
aforenoted.
In appeal, the primary stand was that PWs 1 and 3 should not have
been relied upon and in any event the provisions of Section 302 IPC are not
attracted to the facts of the case. The High Court did not find any substance
in the plea and upheld the conviction and sentence as afore noted.
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The stands taken before the High Court were re-iterated in the present
appeals.
So far as the reliability of the evidence of PWs 1 and 3 are concerned
their evidence is clear and cogent and though they were subjected to
incisive cross examination, nothing material could be elicited to discard
their evidence.
4. The main plank of the appellants’ arguments relates to applicability of
section 302 IPC. It has been contended that there is no pre-meditation
involved and in course of sudden quarrel the incident took place.
5. For bringing in operation of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC it has to
be established that the act was committed without premeditation, in a
sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel without the
offender having taken undue advantage and not having acted in a cruel or
unusual manner.
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6. The Fourth Exception of Section 300, IPC covers acts done in a
sudden fight. The said exception deals with a case of prosecution not
covered by the first exception, after which its place would have been more
appropriate. The exception is founded upon the same principle, for in both
there is absence of premeditation. But, while in the case of Exception 1
there is total deprivation of self-control, in case of Exception 4, there is only
that heat of passion which clouds men’s sober reasons and urges them to
deeds which they would not otherwise do. There is provocation in
Exception 4 as in Exception 1; but the injury done is not the direct
consequence of that provocation. In fact Exception 4 deals with cases in
which notwithstanding that a blow may have been struck, or some
provocation given in the origin of the dispute or in whatever way the quarrel
may have originated, yet the subsequent conduct of both parties puts them
in respect of guilt upon equal footing. A ‘sudden fight’ implies mutual
provocation and blows on each side. The homicide committed is then
clearly not traceable to unilateral provocation, nor in such cases could the
whole blame be placed on one side. For if it were so, the Exception more
appropriately applicable would be Exception 1. There is no previous
deliberation or determination to fight. A fight suddenly takes place, for
which both parties are more or less to be blamed. It may be that one of them
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starts it, but if the other had not aggravated it by his own conduct it would
not have taken the serious turn it did. There is then mutual provocation and
aggravation, and it is difficult to apportion the share of blame which
attaches to each fighter. The help of Exception 4 can be invoked if death is
caused (a) without premeditation, (b) in a sudden fight; (c) without the
offender’s having taken undue advantage or acting in a cruel or unusual
manner; and (d) the fight must have been with the person killed. To bring a
case within Exception 4 all the ingredients mentioned in it must be found. It
is to be noted that the ‘fight’ occurring in Exception 4 to Section 300, IPC is
not defined in the IPC. It takes two to make a fight. Heat of passion
requires that there must be no time for the passions to cool down and in this
case, the parties have worked themselves into a fury on account of the
verbal altercation in the beginning. A fight is a combat between two and
more persons whether with or without weapons. It is not possible to
enunciate any general rule as to what shall be deemed to be a sudden
quarrel. It is a question of fact and whether a quarrel is sudden or not must
necessarily depend upon the proved facts of each case. For the application
of Exception 4, it is not sufficient to show that there was a sudden quarrel
and there was no premeditation. It must further be shown that the offender
has not taken undue advantage or acted in cruel or unusual manner. The
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expression ‘undue advantage’ as used in the provision means ‘unfair
advantage’. These aspects have been highlighted in Dhirajbhai Gorakhbhai
Nayak v. State of Gujrat (2003 (5) Supreme 223], Parkash Chand v. State
of H.P. (2004 (11) SCC 381), Byvarapu Raju v. State of A.P. and Anr.
(2007 (11) SCC 218) and Buddu Khan v. State of Uttarakhand (SLP (Crl.)
No. 6109/08 disposed of on 12.1.2009)
7. Considering the background facts in our considered opinion the
appropriate conviction would be under Section 304 Part I IPC. The
custodial sentence of 10 years would meet the ends of justice.
8. The appeals are allowed to the aforesaid extent.
………………………………….J. (Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT)
………………………………….J. (ASOK KUMAR GANGULY)
New Delhi, February 09, 2009
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