REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.2406 OF 2009 (arising out of SLP(Crl.)No.2663 of 2009)

RAVINDRA SAXENA ….APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

STATE OF RAJASTHAN     ……RESPONDENT(S)

O R D E R

SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. The  application  filed  by  the  appellant  seeking  

anticipatory bail has been rejected for the third time by the  

High Court of Rajasthan, Jaipur Bench. On the basis of the  

complaint made by one Karan/Karani Singh an FIR has been  

registered against  the  appellant  i.e.  FIR No.107/2007 dated  

3.5.2007 Jaipur City, Police Station Vidhyadhar Nagar under  

Section  420,  467,  468,  120-B  IPC.  It  is  alleged  that  the

complainant agreed to purchase the flats being Flat Nos.101  

and  101A  from the  appellant  and  his  father  the  necessary  

consideration was received by the accused Nos. 1 and 2. The  

same  flats  were  subsequently  sold  to  somebody  else.  It  is,  

therefore,  alleged that the appellant has committed offences  

under Section 420, 467, 468, 120-B IPC.  Amar Nath Saxena  

(father of the Appellant); the Appellant i.e., Ravindra Saxena;  

Shrimati Sharada Devi and Pradeep Maheshwari and accused  

numbers  1  to  4  in  the  FIR.  According  to  the  appellant  the  

investigation in the FIR was taken over by Samunder Singh,  

ASI, who happened to be a close relative of the complainant.  

Therefore, the criminal process is being abused at the instance  

of the investigating officer.   

3. At  the  time  of  the  hearing  of  the  matter  the  learned  

counsel  for the appellant  pointed out that the father of the  

complainant is a retired police officer. The complainant is a  

property  dealer.  The  parties  are  well  known to  each  other.  

They have commercial transactions with each other.  In fact,  

the criminal complaint has been filed in order to pressurise  

the  appellant  for  not  to  pursue  the  civil  litigation  pending  

2

between the parties. The complainant has already filed a suit  

for specific performance on 07.5.2007 on the same cause of  

action.  Since,  the  appellant  was  being  pressurized  to  

compromise in the civil  litigation he filed an application for  

anticipatory  bail.   He  also  filed  the  complaint  in  the  Bar  

Council of Rajasthan against some Advocates who had been  

compelling  the  appellant.  Even then Session Judge  rejected  

his application for anticipatory bail on 13.07.2007.  

4. Thereafter,  on  the  basis  of  a  complaint  made  by  

Amarnath Saxena,  FIR being No.207/2007 dated 2.08.2007  

has  been registered  against  the  Karni  Singh  and  others  at  

Police  Station  Sadar,  Jaipur,  under  Section  448,  456,  457,  

420, 467, 468, 471, 380, 120-B IPC.  

5. Being  unsuccessful  before  the  Sessions  Judge,  the  

appellant moved an application for anticipatory bail before the  

High Court in the earlier case,  which was dismissed by the  

High Court, as well on 13.08.2007. The appellant also sought  

quashing  of  the  FIR  in  a  petition  filed  under  Section  482  

Cr.P.C.  before  the  High Court  of  Rajasthan.   This  was also  

rejected  by  the  High  Court.  The  appellant  again  moved  

3

application  for  anticipatory  bail  which  was  rejected  by  the  

High  Court  on  24.03.2008.  Therefore,  the  appellant  

approached this Court by way of petition for special leave to  

appeal, which was disposed of on 12.2.2009 with the following  

order:

“This special leave petition is filed against an  order of the High Court dismissing the second bail  application  of  the  petitioner  under  Section  438.  Cr.P.C.

On  the  prayer  of  Mr.  S.K.  Jain,  learned  counsel  appearing  for  the  petitioner,  the  special  leave petition is dismissed as withdrawn with liberty  to the petitioner to apply for third bail application  before the High Court. If such an application for bail  is moved the concerned Court shall decide it on the  same day.”

6. In  view  of  the  above,  the  appellant  moved  the  third  

application  for  anticipatory  bail.  This  has  again  been  

dismissed by the High Court with the following observations:

“In the facts and circumstances, therefore, the  case of the petitioner cannot said to have improved  with  the  filing  of  the  challan  against  him  when  prima  facie  case  has  been  found  against  the  accused petitioner.”

7. We  are  of  the  considered  opinion  that  the  approach  

adopted  by  the  High  Court  is  wholly  erroneous.  The  

4

application  for  anticipatory  bail  has  been  rejected  without  

considering the case of the appellant solely on the ground that  

the challan has now been presented.

8. We may notice here that the provision with regard to the  

grant  of  anticipatory  bail  was  introduced  on  the  

recommendations of the Law Commission of India in his 41st  

Report  dated  24.09.1969.   The  recommendations  were  

considered by this Court in a Constitution Bench decision in  

the case of Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia and others vs. State of  

Punjab,  (1980) 2 SCC 565. Upon consideration of the entire  

issue this Court  laid down certain salutary principles to be  

followed in exercise of the power under Section 438 Cr.P.C. by  

the Sessions Court and the High Court. It is clearly held that  

the anticipatory bail can be granted at any time so long as the  

applicant has not been arrested. When the application is made  

to the High Court or Court of Sessions it must apply its own  

mind on the question and decide when the case is made out  

for granting such relief.  In our opinion, the High Court ought  

not  to  have  left  the  matter  to  the  Magistrate  only  on  the  

ground that the challan has now been presented. There is also  

5

no  reason  to  deny  anticipatory  bail  merely  because  the  

allegation  in  this  case  pertains  to  cheating  or  forgery  of  a  

valuable security. The merits of these issues shall have to be  

assessed at the time of the trial of the accused persons and  

denial of anticipatory bail only on the ground that the challan  

has  been  presented  would  not  satisfy  the  requirements  of  

Sections 437 and 438 Cr.P.C.

9. In our opinion, the High Court committed a serious error  

of law in not applying its mind to the facts and circumstances  

of  this  case.  The  High  Court  is  required  to  exercise  its  

discretion upon examination of the facts and circumstances  

and to grant anticipatory bail “if it thinks fit”. The aforesaid  

expression  has  been  explained  by  this  Court  in  Gurbaksh  

Singh’s case (supra) as follows:

“The expression “if  it  thinks  fit”,  which occurs  in  Section 438(1) in relation to the power of the High  Court  or  the  Court  of  Session,  is  conspicuously  absent in Section 437(1). We see no valid reason for  rewriting Section 438 with a view, not to expanding  the scope and ambit of the discretion conferred on  the High Court and the Court of Session but, for the  purpose of limiting it. Accordingly, we are unable to  endorse the view of the High Court that anticipatory  bail  cannot  be  granted in  respect  of  offences  like  criminal breach of trust for the mere reason that the  

6

punishment provided therefor  is  imprisonment for  life. Circumstances may broadly justify the grant of  bail in such cases too, though of course, the court is  free to refuse anticipatory bail in any case if there is  material before it justifying such refusal.”

10. The salutary provision contained in Section 438 Cr.P.C.  

was introduced to enable the Court to prevent the deprivation  

of personal liberty. It cannot be permitted to be jettisoned on  

technicalities  such  as  “the  challan  having  been  presented  

anticipatory bail cannot be granted”. We may notice here some  

more observations made by this Court in the case of Gurbaksh  

Singh (supra) :

“We  find  a  great  deal  of  substance  in  Mr  Tarkunde’s  submission  that  since  denial  of  bail  amounts to deprivation of personal liberty, the court  should lean against the imposition of unnecessary  restrictions on the scope of Section 438, especially  when no  such restrictions  have  been imposed  by  the legislature in the terms of that section. Section  438 is  a procedural  provision which is  concerned  with the personal liberty of the individual,  who is  entitled  to  the  benefit  of  the  presumption  of  innocence  since  he  is  not,  on  the  date  of  his  application  for  anticipatory  bail,  convicted  of  the  offence in respect of which he seeks bail. An over- generous  infusion  of  constraints  and  conditions  which are not to be found in Section 438 can make  its provisions constitutionally vulnerable since the  right to personal freedom cannot be made to depend  on compliance with unreasonable restrictions. The  

7

beneficent provision contained in Section 438 must  be saved, not jettisoned. No doubt can linger after  the  decision  in  Maneka  Gandhi,  that  in  order  to  meet the challenge of Article 21 of the Constitution,  the  procedure  established  by  law  for  depriving  a  person  of  his  liberty  must  be  fair,  just  and  reasonable. Section 438, in the form in which it is  conceived by the legislature, is open to no exception  on the ground that it prescribes a procedure which  is unjust or unfair. We ought, at all costs, to avoid  throwing  it  open to  a  Constitutional  challenge  by  reading  words  in  it  which  are  not  to  be  found  therein.”

11. In our opinion, the High Court erred in not considering  

the application for anticipatory bail  in accordance with law.  

The defence put forward by the appellant cannot be obliterated  

at  this  stage  itself.   We  are  also  of  the  opinion,  that  the  

submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that the  

dispute herein is purely of a civil nature cannot be brushed  

aside at this stage. We, therefore, grant anticipatory bail to the  

appellant in the case pending on the basis of FIR No.107/2007  

registered  at  Police  Station  Vidhyadhar  Nagar,  Jaipur  City  

under  Section 420,  467,  468,  120-B IPC now pending only  

under Section 420 and 120-B IPC. It is directed that in the  

event of arrest the appellant shall be released on bail to the  

8

satisfaction of the Investigating Officer. It is also directed that  

the appellant shall join investigation as and when required.   

12. The  impugned  order  is  set  aside  and  the  appeal  is  

allowed.

..……….……………………….J (TARUN CHATTERJEE)

         ..…………………………… ……J (SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR)

NEW DELHI DECEMBER  15 , 2009

9