REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL  APPEAL NO.     825         OF 2009 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 732 of 2008)

Ratan Singh ….Appellant

Versus

State of M.P. & Anr. ….Respondents

J U D G M E N T

Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.

1. Leave granted.

1. Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by a learned Single  

Judge  of  the  Madhya Pradesh  High  Court  allowing  the  petition  filed  by  

respondent  no.2.  The  High  Court  by  the  impugned  order  accepted  the  

petition filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in  

short  the  ‘Code’).   Respondent  no.2  had  filed  the  petition  questioning  

framing  of  charges  against  him  along  with  co-accused  for  offence  

punishable under Sections 307, 148, 323 read with Section 149, 307 read  

with Section 149, 341 and 294 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the  

‘IPC’).  The petition was filed primarily on two grounds. One was that the  

present  respondent  no.2  had  suffered  injuries  in  the  incident  which  

admittedly had happened at two different places at a distance of 7 kms. from  

each other and, therefore, the case was falsely foisted.  The other was that  

injuries were simple in nature and no injury was found on the vital part of  

the  body and,  therefore,  Section  307  read  with  Section  149  IPC has  no  

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application.  The High Court accepted the latter submissions and held that  

framing of charge for  offence punishable  under  Section 302 or 307 read  

with Section 149 IPC is an abuse of process of court.                  

3. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the scope and ambit  

of  Section 307 has not  been kept  in view.  The stand was supported by  

learned counsel for the State.  Learned counsel for the respondent no.2, on  

the other hand, supported the judgment.  

4. It is to be noted that the alleged offences are of very serious nature.  

Section 307 relates to attempt to murder.  It reads as follows:  

“Whoever  does  any  act  with  such  intention  or  knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he by  that  act  caused  death,  he  would  be  guilty  of  murder,  shall  be  punished  with  imprisonment  of  either  description for a term which may extend to ten years,  and shall also be liable to fine; and, if hurt is caused to  any  person  by  such  act,  the  offender  shall  be  liable  either to (imprisonment for life), or to such punishment  as is hereinbefore mentioned.”  

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5. To  justify  a  conviction  under  this  Section,  it  is  not  essential  that  

bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted. Although  

the nature of injury actually caused may often give considerable assistance  

in coming to a finding as to the intention of the accused, such intention may  

also be deduced from other circumstances, and may even, in some cases, be  

ascertained  without  any  reference  at  all  to  actual  wounds.  The  Section  

makes a distinction between an act of the accused and its result, if any. Such  

an act may not be attended by any result so far as the person assaulted is  

concerned, but still there may be cases in which the culprit would be liable  

under this Section. It is not necessary that the injury actually caused to the  

victim of the assault  should be sufficient under ordinary circumstances to  

cause  the  death  of  the  person  assaulted.  What  the  Court  has  to  see  is  

whether the act,  irrespective of its  result,  was done with the intention or  

knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in the Section. An attempt  

in order to be criminal need not be the penultimate act. It is sufficient in  

law, if there is present an intent coupled with some overt act in execution  

thereof.  

6. It  is  sufficient  to justify a conviction under Section 307 if  there is  

present an intent coupled with some overt act in execution thereof.  It is not  

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essential  that  bodily  injury  capable  of  causing  death  should  have  been  

inflicted. The Section makes a distinction between the act of the accused  

and its result, if any.  The Court has to see whether the act, irrespective of  

its  result,  was  done  with  the  intention  or  knowledge  and  under  

circumstances  mentioned  in  the  Section.   Therefore,  an  accused  charged  

under  Section  307  IPC  cannot  be  acquitted  merely  because  the  injuries  

inflicted on the victim were in the nature of a simple hurt.        

7. This  position  was  highlighted  in  State  of  Maharashtra v.  Balram  

Bama Patil  and Ors. (1983 (2) SCC 28),  Girija Shanker v.  State of Uttar  

Pradesh (2004 (3) SCC 793), R. Parkash v. State of Karnataka (JT 2004 (2)  

SC 348) and State of M.P. v. Saleem @ Chamaru and Anr. (2005 (5) SCC  

554) and, State of Madhya Pradesh v. Imrat and Anr. 2008 (11) SCC 523.

8. In Sarju Prasad v. State of Bihar (AIR 1965 SC 843) it was observed  

in para 6 that the mere fact that the injury actually inflicted by the accused  

did not cut any vital organ of the victim, is not by itself sufficient to take the  

act out of the purview of Section 307.

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9. Whether there was intention to kill or knowledge that death will be  

caused is a question of fact and would depend on the facts of a given case.  

The circumstances that  the injury inflicted by the accused was simple or  

minor  will  not  by  itself  rule  out  application  of  Section  307  IPC.   The  

determinative question is intention or knowledge, as the case may be, and  

not nature of the injury. The basic differences between Sections 333 and  

325 IPC are that Section 325 gets attracted where grievous hurt is caused  

whereas Section 333 gets attracted if such hurt is caused to a public servant.  

10. Section  307  deals  with  two  situations  so  far  as  the  sentence  is  

concerned.  Firstly, whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge,  

and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would  

be  guilty  of  murder,  shall  be  punished  with  imprisonment  of  either  

description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable  

to fine; and secondly if hurt is caused to any person by such act the offender  

shall  be  liable  either  to  imprisonment  for  life  or  to  such  punishment  as  

indicated in the first part i.e. 10 years.  The maximum punishment provided  

for Section 333 is imprisonment of either description for a term which may  

extend to 10 years with a liability to pay fine.  

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11. In view of what  has been stated above,  the impugned order  of the  

High  Court  is  clearly  unsustainable.   The  scope  of  interference  under  

Section 482 of the Code at the present juncture as was done by the High  

Court  is  clearly unsustainable.   The appeal  is  accordingly allowed.  It  is  

made clear that we have not expressed any opinion on merits of the case and  

this  appeal  is  being  decided  keeping  in  view  the  parameters  relating  to  

exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code.    

……………………..…….……J. (Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT)

……..…………………..………J. (ASOK KUMAR GANGULY)

New Delhi, April 24, 2009

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