REPORTABLE  IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 188 OF 2009  

Ranveer Yadav .....Appellant(s)

- Versus -

State of Bihar ....Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T

GANGULY, J.

1. This is a statutory appeal under Section 19(1)(b) of the  

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 read with Order XXI Rule  

15(1)(e) of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966 from the final  

judgment and sentence dated 3.9.2008 of the High Court  

of Patna in Original Cr. Misc.(DB) No. 8 of 2008.

2. The  said  Original  Misc.  (DB)  No.  8  of  2008  was  a  

reference through a communication dated 22.4.2008 by the  

1st Additional Sessions Judge, Khagaria about an incident  

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which  happened  in  his  Court  on  13.2.2008.   The  High  

Court treated the same a reference made under Section  

15(2) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter,  

“the Act”) made by the 1st Additional Sessions Judge,  

Khagaria (hereinafter, “the Judge”).  

3. The reference by the Judge was made for the reason that  

during  the  course  of  the  Sessions  Trial  No.46/93  on  

13.02.2008, five of the alleged contemnors were on one  

side  and  the  sixth  contemnor,  the  appellant  Ranveer  

Yadav, on the other side, and all of them disrupted the  

proceedings by aggressively exchanging heated words and  

creating  unpleasant  scenes  in  Court.  The  decorum  and  

dignity of the Court was so much threatened that the  

Judge was forced to rise.  

4. Out of the six contemnors, Bharat Yadav, Bimal Yadav,  

Ajay Yadav, Pandav Yadav and Madan Yadav are accused in  

the  Sessions  Trial  No.  46/93.  The  appellant  Ranveer  

Yadav, an witness in the case and was due to be cross-

examined on that day, i.e. 13.02.2008.

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5. The High Court on the basis of such reference issued  

notice  on  11.07.2008  to  show  cause  why  the  alleged  

contemnors  should  not  be  held  guilty  of  Criminal  

Contempt for their acts set out in the reference.  

6. In  the  joint  affidavits  filed  by  the  first  five  

contemnors, they tendered their apologies for creating  

the  disturbance  and  stated  that  the  main  person  

responsible  for  the  ruckus  was  the  appellant  Ranveer  

Yadav. They stated the scene was created by him to delay  

his cross-examination.  

7. The show cause submitted by Madan Yadav, who is 76 years  

old and is one of the accused in the Sessions Trial No.  

46/93, is a crucial one. Madan Yadav stated that the  

appellant is the prime accused in a case of murder of  

Madan’s son in 1998. In that case the appellant could be  

produced  before  the  Trial  Court  for  the  purpose  of  

framing charges only on the orders of the High Court.  

Madan further stated that he had been falsely implicated  

in the criminal case which was pending before the Court  

on  the  basis  of  a  police  complaint  containing  false  

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allegations made by the brother of the appellant. The  

main reason for Madan’s implication is to pressurize him  

to withdraw the earlier case relating to the murder of  

his son and which is pending against the appellant.  

8. The High Court after noting these facts observed that  

the appellant, on many occasions came to the Trial Court  

with followers who helped him in creating a nuisance in  

Court. It also observed that several Additional Public  

Prosecutors had withdrawn themselves from criminal cases  

against  the  appellant  in  view  of  threats  and  

intimidation they received from the appellant. On the  

date  of  incident,  even  the  defence  counsel  was  not  

spared as is apparent from the letter written by the  

defence counsel to the Presiding Officer.

9. The High Court found that appellant had also managed to  

postpone  and  delay  his  cross-examination  on  various  

occasions on the pretext of illness and non-appearance  

on the fixed dates.   

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10.  It was also brought to the notice of the High Court  

that a case under Section 302 IPC in which the appellant  

was an accused had to be transferred to another district  

in view of threats and intimidation given out by the  

appellant.  

11.  In the show cause submitted by the appellant Ranveer  

Yadav, he tried to justify his behaviour on 13.02.2008  

by  stating  that  on  12.12.2007,  the  Court  had  been  

informed that there would be a compromise. But he got  

miffed  when  the  Additional  Public  Prosecutor  made  an  

appearance  before  the  Court  and  he  thought  that  the  

latter  had  appeared  without  the  orders  of  the  Public  

Prosecutor.   On  such  justification  of  the  appellant,  

High Court held that the appellant being a witness had  

nothing  to  do  with  the  appearance  of  the  public  

prosecutor  and  held  that  the  appellant’s  misbehaviour  

was not justified.  

12.  With regard to his failure to appear before the Court  

on  1.3.2008,  the  appellant  stated  that  he  was  not  

provided the police protection which he had asked for.

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13.  The High Court held that all the Contemnors were guilty  

of having committed criminal contempt and it relied on  

the letters of the two prosecution counsel as well as  

the defence counsel and came to the conclusion that the  

main  person  responsible  for  the  disruption  was  the  

appellant  who  acted  in  a  motivated  and  high  handed  

manner  to  interfere  in  the  due  conduct  of  the  

proceeding.  

14.  High Court further held that the main culprit for the  

disruption in Court was the appellant. While accepting  

the unqualified apology of the other five contemnors and  

letting them off with admonition and severe warning, the  

appellant was sentenced to a simple imprisonment for two  

months  with  a  fine  of  Rs.2,000/-  and  in  default  the  

appellant was to undergo a further imprisonment of one  

month.  

15.  This Court while issuing notice in this appeal passed  

an  order  dated  28.8.2009  asking  the  other  five  

contemnors to show cause why the order of the High Court  6

accepting their unconditional apology and directing them  

to  be  let  off  be  not  set  aside.  In  the  meantime,  a  

further stay on the arrest of the appellant was ordered  

extending  the  order  whereby  the  appellant  was  given  

exemption from surrendering.

16. The five contemnors who were let off by the High Court  

filed their joint counter affidavit on 28.01.2010. While  

tendering their unqualified apology, they have given the  

same explanation as given before the High Court that the  

main  person  responsible  for  the  disruptions  was  the  

appellant.  In  Paras  IV  as  well  as  V  of  the  counter  

affidavit, they have stated that the appellant behaved  

in an audacious manner and abused the counsel for the  

both sides and refused to be examined. They have also  

made  allegations  that  the  appellant  is  a  very  well  

connected  person  and  has  a  political  background  with  

criminal antecedents.

17. In this case learned counsel for the appellant sought to  

argue  that  in  a  contempt  proceeding,  the  High  Court  

cannot take a different stand by punishing the appellant  

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and  letting  the  other  appellants  go  unpunished  even  

after holding that they are guilty of contempt.

18.Learned  counsel  also  argued  that  in  the  show-cause  

notice which was given to the appellant, no different  

role has been attributed to him so he cannot be treated  

differently by the High Court in the matter of awarding  

punishment.

19. This Court is unable to appreciate the above contention  

of the learned counsel for the appellant. In the facts  

of the case and on the materials on record, it is clear  

that the case of the appellant stands on a different  

footing. In fact the appellant took the main role in  

causing disruption and there has no lack of opportunity  

on his part in answering the charges against him.  The  

charges  put  against  him  must  be  read  in  a  practical  

sense and cannot be read in a pedantic manner. All the  

constituents  of  the  charges  were  stated  in  the  show-

cause  notice  and  the  appellant  has  understood  the  

charges and has given the reply. Nowhere in the reply  

the appellant has raised any difficulty in understanding  

the charges. It does not appear that any contention was  

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raised by the appellant before the High Court about any  

vagueness in the charges or about furnishing inadequate  

particulars in the charges. This argument of the learned  

counsel  for  the  appellant  only  before  this  Court  and  

that  too  without  a  proper  factual  basis  cannot  be  

entertained.

20. Criminal contempt has been defined under Section 2(c) of  

the Act. The said definition is very wide. For a proper  

appreciation of the  questions involved in this case the  

said definition is set out below:-

“2(c). “criminal  contempt”  means  the  publication  (whether  by  words,  spoken  or  written,  or  by  signs,  or  by  visible  representation, or otherwise) of any matter or  the doing of any other act whatsoever which-

(i) scandalizes or tends to scandalize,  or  lowers  or  tends  to  lower  the  authority of, any court; or

(ii) prejudices, or interferes or tends  to interfere with, the due course  of any judicial proceeding; or  

(iii) interferes  or  tends  to  interfere  with,  or  obstructs  or  tends  to  obstruct,  the  administration  of  justice in any other manner;”

21. From the facts of the case it is clear that in this case  

the  offending  acts  of  the  appellant  are  specifically  9

coming  under  Section  2(c)(ii).  Due  conduct  of  any  

judicial  proceeding  is  a  matter  of  high  public  

importance as it is inextricably connected with rule of  

law  on  which  is  based  the  constitutional  mode  of  

governance in this country. That is why the framers of  

the Act preceded the expression interfere with the words  

“tends  to”  and  it  has  been  further  emphasized  by  

addition of word ‘due’ before “course of any judicial  

proceedings”.  

22. We must remember that legislature does not waste words.  

Therefore, every word used in Section 2(c)(ii) must be  

given its proper and natural meaning. Thus read, Section  

2(c)(ii) must be given a broad sweep so as to include  

within it even any attempt to interfere with the due  

course of a judicial proceeding. The word ‘due’ is very  

crucial  in  this  context  and  must  mean  a  natural  and  

proper course of judicial proceeding.  

23. This Court, therefore, holds that Section 2(c)(ii) has  

been  enacted  to  protect  apart  from  sanctity,  the  

regularity and purity of a judicial proceeding. This, we  

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repeat, is based on principles of high public policy.  

That is why contempt power is said to be an inherent  

attribute of a Superior Court of Record. This power has  

not been given to the subordinate judiciary, but in an  

appropriate  case,  subordinate  judiciary  can  make  a  

reference to the High Court under Section 15 (2) of the  

Act, as has been done in this case. Thus when High Court  

exercises its power on a reference under Section 15(2)  

of the Act, it is virtually exercising the same as a  

guardian  of  the  subordinate  judiciary  to  protect  its  

proceedings  against  an  outrage  and  affront.   In  

exercising such power, the High Court being a ‘Court of  

Record’ and the highest judicial authority in the State  

is discharging its jurisdiction ‘in loco parentis’ over  

subordinate judiciary in that State.  Therefore, there  

is something in the nature of High Court’s power under  

Section 15(2) of the Act which couples it with a duty.  

The duty is obviously to uphold the rule of law.  Here  

we  may  remember  the  views  of  Lord  Chancellor  Earl  

Cairns, who gave the concept of power coupled with duty,  

the most graceful articulation and which I quote:

“...But there may be something in the nature of  the thing empowered to be done, something in  the  object  for  which  it  is  to  be  done,  something in the conditions under which it is  

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to  be  done,  something  in  the  title  of  the  person or persons for whose benefit the power  is to be exercised, which may couple the power  with a duty, and make it the duty of the person  in whom the power is reposed to exercise that  power when called upon to do so...”

[Julius v.  Lord Bishop of Oxford and another,  5 A.C. 214 (H.L.) at 222-223]

24. These  words  resonate  with  a  strange  poignancy  even  

today.  But there is a rider. Contempt power has to be  

exercised with utmost caution and in an appropriate case  

and that is why High Court has been entrusted with it.   

25. The offending acts of the appellant constitute contempt  

in the face of Court. When contempt takes place in the  

face of the Court, peoples’ faith in the administration  

of justice receives a severe jolt and precious judicial  

time  is  wasted.  Therefore,  the  offending  acts  of  the  

appellant  certainly  come  within  the  ambit  of  

interference with the due course of judicial proceeding  

and are a clear case of criminal contempt in the face of  

the Court.

26. The High Court, in the impugned judgment, therefore was  

correct  in  holding  the  appellant  guilty  and  also  in  12

punishing  him  with  the  sentence  it  has  imposed.  It  

appears in the show cause notice, which was given by the  

appellant,  initially  he  did  not  offer  any  apology.  

Rather the appellant tried to justify.  The apology was  

offered in a subsequent show cause reply. Therefore, it  

is a belated apology.

27. It may be noted that under Explanation to Section 12(1)  

of the Act, the Court may reject an apology if the Court  

finds that it was not made bonafide.  Under Section 12  

it has been made very clear that the apology must be to  

the  satisfaction  of  the  Court.  Therefore,  it  is  not  

incumbent upon the Court to accept the apology as soon  

as it is offered. Before an apology can be accepted, the  

Court  must  find  that  it  is  bonafide  and  is  to  the  

satisfaction of the Court. However, Court cannot reject  

an apology just because it is qualified and conditional  

provided the Court finds it is bonafide.   

28.An apology in a contempt proceeding must be offered at  

the  earliest  possible  opportunity.  A  belated  apology  

hardly shows the ‘contrition which is the essence of the  

purging of a contempt’.  

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29. This  Court  in  the  case  of  Debabrata  Bandopadhyay  and  others vs. The State of West Bengal and another reported  in AIR 1969 SC 189, observed “an apology must be offered  

and that too clearly and at the earliest opportunity. A  

person who offers a belated apology runs the risk that  

it may not be accepted for such an apology hardly shows  

the contrition which is the essence of the purging of a  

contempt” (See para 7 page 193 of the report).

30. Apart from belated apology in many cases such apology is  

not accepted unless it is bonafide.

31. Even in a case of civil contempt this Court held in the  

case of Principal, Rajni Parekh Arts, K.B. Commerce and  B.C.J.  Science  College,  Khambhat  and  another vs.  Mahendra Ambalal Shah reported in 1986 (2) SCC 560 that  an apology offered at a late stage would encourage the  

litigants to flout the orders of Courts with impunity  

and accordingly the Court refused to accept the apology  

(See para 7 page 566 of the report).

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32. Equally  in  the  case  of  Secretary,  Hailakandi  Bar  Association vs.  State of Assam and another reported in  (1996)  9  SCC  74,  this  Court  in  a  case  of  criminal  

contempt refused to accept an apology which was belated.  

The  Court  held  that  such  belated  apology  cannot  be  

accepted because it has not been given in good faith  

(See para 24 page 82).

33. Even if it is not belated where apology is without real  

contrition  and  remorse  and  was  merely  tendered  as  a  

weapon of defence, the Court may refuse to accept it.  

(See   

Chandra Shashi vs. Anil Kumar Verma, (1995) 1 SCC 421).

34. For  the  reasons  aforesaid,  the  appeal  fails,  the  

judgment of the High Court is affirmed.  The appellant  

is to serve the sentence in terms of the High Court  

order.   Notices  issued  on  other  respondents,  namely,  

Bharat Yadav, Bimal Yadav, Ajay Yadav, Pandav Yadav and  

Madan Yadav are discharged.    

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.......................J. (G.S. SINGHVI)

.......................J. New Delhi (ASOK KUMAR GANGULY) May 12, 2010

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